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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
In this thesis, I investigate how new forms of public leadership can contribute to 
solving complex problems in today’s welfare societies through innovation. 
Accordingly, leadership for collaborative innovation in the public sector is the focus 
of this thesis. I pursue this objective by making two contributions, a theoretical and 
an empirical. Theoretically the thesis provides an answer to the following research 
question: How to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative 
innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems? The answer to this 
question is a model that displays a social constructive process approach to 
leadership, in which leadership emerges through social processes of recognition in 
collaborative innovation processes; leadership is recognised by utilising uncertainty 
to influence collaborators’ sensemaking processes.   
Empirically the thesis provide an answer to the following research question: How is 
bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a 
collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems? 
The answer to this question is that leadership acquires recognition by adapting its 
leadership; this adaptation is conditioned by collaborators’ expectations, the 
profession-based leitmotifs of the innovation project as well as bottom-up 
leadership’s ability to make sense of resistance to the innovation project. On the 
basis of this sensemaking, bottom-up leadership must make strategic choices 
concerning how to position itself in relation to specific leadership dilemmas.  
Collaborative innovation in the public sector is an emerging research field 
concerned with how to understand and enhance collaborative innovation. Closed 
innovation methods do not provide adequate responses to today’s complex 
challenges like climate change, aging societies, and financial crises. These 
challenges demand another quantity and quality of the innovation solution. These 
challenges are often ill defined, sometimes even wicked. The character of the 
challenges requires the involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders. In relation to 
leadership, collaborative innovation focuses attention on the potential of innovation 
through relations of cooperation that penetrate the boundaries of the lead 
organisation. 
By means of literature reviews and an abductive, ‘engaged scholar’ research 
approach, I pursue a theory building strategy in order to detect and develop new 
forms of leadership for collaborative innovation. One of the conclusions inferred 
from this theory-building strategy is that network governance inspired leadership 
conceptions are dominant within the field of collaborative innovation leadership. In 
order to overcome this lack of differentiation concerning leadership conceptions, the 
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thesis juxtaposes existing leadership approaches and identifies four discussion 
points, which lead me to the following recommendations for theory building of 
collaborative innovation leadership conceptions:    
- Conceptualising leadership as a process phenomenon 
- Developing a new conception of influence and power  
- Paying attention to initial conditions of leadership positions in terms of 
identifying how novelty is intimately related to position of power 
- Conceptualising leadership approaches that can explicitly take into account 
the type of problem to be dealt with (lame/ill-defined/wicked)    
Consequently, the outcome of the theory-building strategy adopted in the thesis 
results in a creative re-interpretation of a bottom-up perspective of collaborative 
innovation leadership. I adapt this bottom-up leadership to an empirical condition of 
a bureaucratic bottom-up position conceptualised within the theory of innovation 
and wicked problem-uncertainty. Making and giving sense are central aspects of the 
type of influence that this type of leadership can exercise. The crucial issue for a 
leader in this context is being recognised as a leader by collaborators as well as 
decision-makers in the bottom-up leadership’s own organisation. Accordingly, 
leadership has to be made and exercised at the same time, having as its legitimate 
outset a profession-based, entrepreneurial platform. This recognition is dependent on 
the way in which the bottom-up leadership is able to introduce new organisational 
concepts and themes that direct the sense-making of collaborators. Accordingly, in 
order to enable an analysis in which it is possible to differentiate among emergent 
organisational phenomena that often occur simultaneously and iteratively, I develop 
a causal understanding of bottom-up leadership of collaborative innovation, which is 
defined as follows:  
1) An intentional process aimed at the generation and implementation of new ideas 
in a specific context 2) initiated at the bottom of a public-sector organisation 
requiring that the 3) lead unit responsible is able to gain influence through 
leadership recognition, which is conditioned by 4) utilisation of wicked–problem 
uncertainty as well as innovation uncertainty through skills of public 
entrepreneurship and making and giving sense. 
This causality is depicted in an analytical model. This analytical model as well as 
the above definition is the answer to the first, theoretical research question.  
 
The thesis empirically investigates how bottom-up leadership can be recognised by 
collaborators through processes of social construction.  In order to do so, the thesis 
investigates issues of bottom-up leadership through a single-case study. The 
 9 
 
empirical context for the case study is the City of Copenhagen. In one of the seven 
central administrations, the Technical and Environmental Administration (TEA), a 
newly established office sets in motion an organisational innovation process aimed 
at increased coordination across administrations. This happened in 2008. The office 
is called Neighbourhood Development, and is responsible for managing area-based 
programmes in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood Development is 
successful in influencing its collaborators: its own administration and mayor, the 
other administrations, as well as the powerful social housing sector. In 2012, when 
the case study finished, the endeavours of the office and its collaborators had 
resulted in developments of a larger scale than the office had expected in 2008: A 
powerful cross-administrative set-up was developed, involving all seven mayors, 
level-2 directors and professionals from each administration; a partnership forum 
has been established between municipality and the social housing sector; and finally, 
an ambitious area-based policy was approved unanimously among local politicians 
and mayors, the Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen. This case can be 
considered a case of collaborative innovation since administrations and social 
housing sector organisations are collaborating with the bottom-up leadership and 
TEA. The process can be considered an innovation in that the City of Copenhagen in 
this process develops a new way of dealing with wicked problems. The case is a 
case of bottom-up leadership since the innovation project is being driven by an 
office with an urban planning profession, located at the bottom of a municipal 
central administration.  
In the innovation ‘journey’ studied, contentious issues of organisational identities, 
scope of the innovation project and doubts of the collaborative value of the 
innovative solution dominates. This requires the bottom-up leadership to redefine 
leadership and the innovation project on a running basis. Adaptation, flexibility and 
making and giving sense in this chaos is what stabilises the collaborative innovation 
process. Accordingly, novelty is created in terms of a solution to a wicked problem - 
in spite of an inferior leadership position, in spite of a collaborative configuration 
and in spite a highly specialised, sector-defined outset. Arguably, such knowledge of 
novelty creation in spite of constraints is relevant for both research and (bottom-up) 
leaders in the public sector. So, bottom-up leadership is a highly flexible leadership 
approach. The analyses in this thesis demonstrate that for the people involved, this 
type of leadership requires a constant willingness to make sense of their identity, and 
constantly be able to adapt both leadership and project in order to keep up with the 
speed and turbulence related to collaborative innovation processes. 
With regard to research contributions the thesis theoretically contributes by 
introducing an analytical model for bottom-up leadership. This model may inspire 
other researchers of collaborative innovation leadership in that it draws on other 
theoretical legacies than those at present dominating the academic discourse 
concerning collaborative innovation leadership. Further, the analytical model can be 
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used by other researchers to investigate specific causalities related to how a 
professional unit is transformed into an informal leadership; how specific acts of 
entrepreneurship enable the emergence of this type of bottom-up leadership; how 
specific wicked-problem uncertainties  and innovation uncertainties develop a 
demand for a bottom-up leadership, related to the structural components of these 
wicked problems; how such a leadership exercises influence by making and giving 
sense to collaborators; and what happens when an informal bottom-up driven 
innovation project is being implemented and mainstreamed into the formal 
bureaucracies in political public organisations. By doing so, the thesis answers the 
first research question which is how to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for 
collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems? 
The thesis further contributes with empirical knowledge that explains the challenges 
for bottom-up leadership that want to address a wicked problem by means of 
innovation in a collaborative setting.  This knowledge about leadership challenges is 
relevant to other collaborative innovation initiatives in the public sector that seek to 
address wicked problems, not only the wicked problem of disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods.  
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DANSK RESUME 
I denne afhandling undersøger jeg hvordan nye former for offentlig ledelse kan 
bidrage til at løse komplekse problemer i nutidens velfærdssamfund gennem 
innovation. Lederskab for samarbejdsdreven innovation i den offentlige sektor er 
derfor fokus for afhandlingen.  
Dette gør jeg ved at svare på følgende to forskningsspørgsmål:  
Hvordan teoretisere en bottom-up type af lederskab for de samarbejdsdrevne 
innovationer i den offentlige sektor der har til formål at adressere ’wicked 
problems’?  Hvordan bliver bottom-up ledelse socialt konstrueret gennem 
anerkendelses-processer i en samarbejdsdreven innovationsproces i den offentlige 
sektor der retter sig mod et wicked problem?  
  
Det første bidrag er teoretisk i og med at jeg har et behov for at udvikle en teoretisk 
ramme. Svaret på dette spørgsmål er en social konstruktion af lederskab, en tilgang 
der er tilpasset en bottom-up bureaukratisk position, begrebsliggjort ved at trække på 
teori om innovationsusikkerhed og ’wicked problems’-usikkerhed. I dette 
forskningsmæssige perspektiv er usikkerheden til at skabe og give mening helt 
centrale forudsætninger for at et lederskab kan opstå. Den helt centrale udfordring 
for en leder i denne særlige kontekst er at blive anerkendt som leder undervejs i den 
samarbejdsdrevne innovation proces. Anerkendelse er betinget af måden, hvorpå 
denne vordende leder er i stand til at introducere nye begreber der kan dirigere 
samarbejdsparternes meningsdannelse. Afhandlingen giver os dermed viden om 
hvordan man bedre kan forstå bottom-up lederes særlige udfordringer, nogle 
udfordringer der er relateret til at have en ambition om at adressere en særlig 
kompleks og vedvarende samfundsproblematik (et ’wicked problem’) via 
innovation. Denne viden om lederskab er potentielt set relevant for andre 
samarbejdsdrevne innovationsinitiativer i den offentlige sektor der har til formål at 
adressere ’wicked problems’, dvs. ikke kun det ’wicked problem’ som udsatte by-og 
boligområder udgør.  
I afhandlingen er lederskab operationaliseret som en subjekt position der konstrueres 
gennem diskursiv handlen rettet mod at vinde de inter-organisatoriske mikro-kampe 
om mening. Lederskab tilegnes ved at opnå samarbejdsdreven anerkendelse via 
anvendelsen af professions-relateret entreprenørskab for at introducere nye 
diskursive begreber; og ved at forsøge at styre samarbejds-relaterede 
meningsdannelser som indflydelsesstrategi. Ved at gøre dette udnytter denne type af 
lederskab den organisatoriske usikkerhed, som generelt skabes i 
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innovationsprocesser, for dermed at skabe fælles retning på tværs af organisatoriske 
grænsedragninger. Denne usikkerhed forstærkes når man forsøger at innovere et 
’wicked problem’.  
Denne teoretiske ramme konceptualiseres kausalt i en analytisk model for bottom-up 
samarbejdsdreven innovationsledelse (’BUCIL’). Modellen er deskriptiv og 
forklarende, ikke handlingsanvisende, og tillader os at se hvilke betingelser der skal 
til for at lederskab kan opstå; lederskab her forstået som en forklaring på, hvordan 
professions-baserede ideer til at håndtere en præstations-brist i service-forsyningen 
til et bestemt politik-område genererer succes eller fiasko, betinget af evnen til at 
udøve indflydelse gennem uformelle kanaler.  At udøve indflydelse gennem disse 
uformelle kanaler kræver at den vordende leder bliver anerkendt som en leder, og at 
transformere sin professionelle identitet til en sådan lederskabsposition.  
 
Med henblik på at muliggøre en analyse, hvor det er muligt at skelne mellem 
emergente, organisatoriske fænomener, som ofte foregår samtidigt og iterativt, filtrer 
jeg disse komplekse årsagskæder ud ved at formulere en kausalforståelse af bottom-
up ledelse af samarbejdsdreven innovation, der er defineret som følger:  
1) En intentionel proces med henblik på skabelse og implementering af nye ideer i 
en specifik kontekst 2), påbegyndt i bunden af en offentlig organisation, hvilket 
kræver, at den 3) lederskabsenheden er i stand til at få indflydelse gennem 
lederskabsanerkendelse, som er betinget af 4) en udnyttelse af de usikkerheder, der 
akkompagnerer wicked-problem usikkerhed samt innovationsusikkerhed ved at 
benytte færdigheder der knytter sig til offentligt entreprenørskab samt sensemaking 
og sense giving.  
Denne kausalitet er i afhandlingen afbildet i en analytisk model. Hermed har jeg 
besvaret det første forskningsspørgsmål.  
 
Det andet bidrag er empirisk. Jeg anvender den analytiske ramme gennem et 
omfattende kvalitativt casestudie i Københavns Kommune. Jeg besvarer 
forskningsspørgsmålet: Hvordan bliver bottom-up ledelse socialt konstrueret 
gennem anerkendelses-processer i en samarbejdsdreven innovationsproces i den 
offentlige sektor der retter sig mod et wicked problem? 
I denne afhandling fokuserer jeg på bottom-up lederskab via et single-case studie. 
Den empiriske kontekst for casestudiet er Københavns Kommune. I en af de syv 
central-forvaltninger, Teknik- og Miljø Forvaltningen, påbegynder et nyligt dannet 
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kontor en organisatorisk innovationsproces, med det formål at øge koordineringen 
på tværs af administrationer. Dette sker i 2008. Kontoret bliver efterfølgende kaldt 
’Kvarterudvikling’, og har som ansvarsområde områdebaserede indsatser i udsatte 
boligområder. Kvarterudvikling har succes med at påvirke sine samarbejdsparter: sin 
egen forvaltning og den tilhørende borgmester, de andre forvaltninger, samt den 
magtfulde almene boligsektor. I 2012, hvor casestudiet slutter, har kontoret og dets 
samarbejdsparters bestræbelser resulteret i forandringer af en større skala end hvad 
der oprindeligt var forventningen i 2008: en magtfuld tværgående 
forvaltningsstruktur er blevet udviklet, involverende alle syv borgmestre, niveau 2-
direktører, samt embedsmænd fra samtlige forvaltninger; et partnerskabsforum er 
blevet etableret mellem kommune og den almene boligsektor; og endelig er en 
ambitiøs område-baseret politik blevet enstemmigt vedtaget i 
Borgerrepræsentationen og blandt borgmestre, ’Politik for Udsatte Byområder i 
København’.  
Jeg analyserer denne proces med henblik på at afdække, hvordan et sådant 
professionsbaseret byplanplægningskontor udvikler sit lederskab igennem denne 
proces, og hvad det er, der driver udviklingen af lederskab fremad. Jeg fokuserer på 
to faser i det kvalitative single-case studie: udviklingen af et tvær-administrativt 
evaluerings-værktøj samt den tvær-administrative politik-formuleringsproces. Jeg 
bruger dermed BUCIL-modellen to gange for at kunne analysere hvordan 
handlingstyperne entreprenørskab og meningsdannelse er relateret til bevægelser i 
den diskursive positionering af ledelse over tid; og for at kunne forklare, hvordan 
både lederskabs-handlinger og lederskabspositionering fører til subjektive 
fortolkninger af legitimitet, konflikt og modstand hos både samarbejdsparter og 
Kvarterudvikling. På denne basis opsummerer jeg udviklingen af 
lederskabspositionering vha. nogle fundamentale lederskabsdilemmaer. Disse 
lederskabsdilemmaer er af en generel karakter. Karakteren gør at de kan bruges til at 
blive sammenlignet med andre lignende, fremtidige cases af bottom-up 
samarbejdsdreven innovationsledelse. Af datakilder bruger jeg kvalitative interviews 
gennemført i 2010, 2011, og 2012, policy dokumenter, optagelser af politik-møder, 
mødereferater, observationer og felt-noter.  
 Ved at svare på de to ovenstående spørgsmål giver afhandlingen et 
samlet svar på det overordnede forskningsspørgsmål og bidrager til forskningsfeltet 
der omhandler ledelse af samarbejdsdreven innovation i den offentlige sektor. Dette 
gør afhandlingen ved at understrege at det hierarkiske udgangspunkt for ide-
generering har konsekvenser for evnen til at lede de samarbejdsdrevne 
innovationsprocesser der er rettet mod ’wicked problems’. Jeg understreger også i 
afhandlingen at lederskab bedst kan blive begrebsliggjort som socialt konstrueret, i 
og med at bottom-up lederskab er tvunget til at udvikle sig som leder. På denne vis 
bidrager afhandlingen teoretisk set med en differentiering af lederskabskoncepter. 
Hvad angår det empiriske så fremhæver afhandlingen nødvendigheden af at den 
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vordende leder adresserer lederskabsdilemmaer gennem den samarbejdsdrevne 
innovationsproces, og dermed konstant giver meningsfulde svar på sin egen 
lederskabsrolle og sit innovationsprojekt. Dette er særligt presserende i 
innovationsprocesser, i og med at innovationer ofte er præget af uforudsigelige 
kontekst-udviklinger samt revisioner af innovationsprojektet. Bottom-up 
lederskabets mulighedsbetingelse og strategiske fordel er, at når en 
samarbejdsdreven innovationsproces mobiliseres på baggrund af en professions-
relateret, specialiseret basis, så bliver usikkerhed angående omfanget af 
innovationsprocessen en kilde til lederskabs-dannelse, i og med at der bliver en 
efterspørgsel på svar. Denne lederskabs-dannelse er afhængig af offentlig, 
professionsbaseret entreprenørskab og evnen til meningsfuldt at svare på ’hvem er 
vi, og hvad er det egentlig vi laver?’ i den usikre situation for hermed at kunne 
dirigere samarbejdsparters meningsdannelse.  
Derfor bidrager afhandlingen med værdifuld viden for praksis i og med at den 
tilbundsgående analyserer hvordan ledelse rent faktisk udøves i en kommunes 
daglige liv. Afhandlingen påviser hvilke konflikter et sådant lederskab møder samt 
hvilke legitimitets-kilder som der kan trækkes på. Afhandlingen understreger især 
hvordan lederskabets fortolkninger af sin egen rolle, af konflikter, og af strategiske 
udviklingsmuligheder er helt fundamentalt for at kunne påvirke og manipulere den 
organisatoriske omverden. Hermed skabes der en helt ny organisatorisk virkelighed, 
hvor et wicked problem opstår som et problem, og dermed kalder på samarbejde på 
tværs af centrale interessenter.  
Afhandlingen opsummerer denne ledelses-anerkendelse ved at konstruere nogle 
fundamentale lederskabs-dilemmaer som kan bruges til sammenligning med andre 
forsøg på bottom-up, samarbejdsdrevne innovationsledelse. Dermed bidrager 
afhandlingen slutteligt i et større perspektiv til diskussionen om hvordan der kan 
udvikles offentlig sektor-lederskabsdesigns der bedre kan adressere 
samfundsmæssige ’wicked problems’ ved hjælp af samarbejdsdreven innovation.  
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CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter Title  Content 
1 Introduction Research questions are motivated and 
contextualised.  
Contributions and claim of thesis are stated 
2 Theory: Bottom-up 
leadership for 
collaborative 
innovation in the 
public sector 
The objective of the chapter is to answer the 
theoretical research question.  
Focus is on reviewing literature of collaborative 
innovation in order to identify conceptual 
challenges.  
Afterwards, leadership approaches are 
explained and discussed. As an implication, a 
list of theoretical design demands is produced 
that a new leadership conception for 
collaborative innovation should adhere to. 
On the basis of a critical assessment of 
Sandford Borins’ research, bottom-up 
leadership is theorised in a way that satisfies 
design demands.  
The following concepts are explained and 
discussed:  
-leadership emergence as recognition and 
relational leadership 
-public entrepreneurship 
-making sense and giving sense 
-wicked problem uncertainty 
-innovation journey uncertainty 
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-leadership distribution 
An analytical model (‘BUCIL’) is introduced 
and discussed. 
3 Analytical 
approachChapter 3.                      
Analytical approach 
The objective of the chapter is to explain and 
discuss the analytical approach deployed.  
Choice of analytical approach is motivated and 
a certain variant of discourse analysis is 
explained.  
The deployment of discourse analysis in terms 
of a synthesis with the BUCIL framework is 
discussed. 
The analytical concepts are operationalized. 
4 Methods The objective of the chapter is to explain the 
specific use of single-case study design.  
Single-case study design is explained.  
The selection of case is motivated.  
The process of data collection is explained, and 
method and data in relation to a qualitative 
case-study is described.  
It is described how data is analysed by means of 
Nvivo Software.  
5 Context of bottom-up 
leadership case: Area-
based programs and 
disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods in the 
City of Copenhagen 
The objective of the chapter is to explain the 
empirical context to the reader and to outline 
the profession underpinning bottom-up 
leadership.  
The mixed experience with area based 
programs in Denmark is briefly introduced. 
Program types are explained to the reader.  
Central concepts of neighbourhood governance 
scholars (Archon Fung, Carmen Sirianni) are 
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explained and deployed heuristically in order to 
frame the main empirical challenges in The 
City of Copenhagen.  
A phase figure is introduced, explaining what 
value-contribution the collaborative innovation 
seemingly have resulted in, in terms of a 
process of institutionalization in the City of 
Copenhagen.  
The organisational context is described in terms 
of municipal governance form.  
An organisational diagram of Neighbourhood 
Development, TEA, is introduced.   
 
6 Analysis A: The 
Evaluation Case 
The objective of the chapter is to provide first 
part of the answer to the empirical research 
question.  
 In this the first embedded case, the concepts of 
the operationalized BUCIL model are being 
used to analyse how leadership is being 
recognised.  
The chapter sums up the leadership dilemmas 
driving the positional development of 
Neighbourhood Development.  
7 Analysis B: The 
policy formulation 
case 
The objective of the chapter is to provide 
second part of the answer to the empirical 
research question.  
In this the second embedded case, all BUCIL 
model concepts are being used a second time in 
order to analyse how leadership is being 
recognised and challenged, and how this change 
relates to the previous embedded case.   
The chapter sums up the leadership dilemmas 
driving the positional development of 
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Neighbourhood Development across both cases.  
8 Discussion A discussion of empirical findings is made, 
focusing on limitations of the study, the 
generalizability of findings, the implications for 
practice and future research agendas.  
9 Conclusion The thesis is concluded, summarising the 
theoretical and empirical contributions.  
It is explained how the thesis has answered the 
research question.  
 
 
 25 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Research area  
This thesis focuses on collaborative innovation in the public sector with an emphasis 
on leadership. The outset of collaborative innovation is that it facilitates creative 
problem-solving which would otherwise not be possible for a single actor (Sørensen 
& Torfing, 2011). Due to the increasing complexity of societal problems, leadership 
becomes crucial, but also the more challenging, when collaborative innovation is 
being targeted at wicked problems. Wicked problems demand collaborative 
solution-making in a context of overlapping uncertainties. These uncertainties need 
to be managed by a network type of leadership with no capacity to enforce decision-
making (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Often this type of collaborations result in 
collaborative inertia, especially if leadership is not exercised (Huxham & Vangen, 
2005).  
Innovation only emphasises the importance of leadership. Innovation processes have 
their own dynamic of uncertainty, one that is tied up to an essentially unknown end-
point in a process of ‘becoming’ (Van de Ven, 1999). Consequently, people 
participating in innovation are forced to take risks (S. P. Osborne & Brown, 2011). 
In environments of uncertainty, people need something that can provide them with 
direction – leadership emergence is one of the ways in which this direction can come 
about (Griffin, 2002).  
Despite the societal importance of this agenda in current times of austerity, 
leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation in the public sector are 
undifferentiated. As Bommert (Bommert, 2010) notes, the main managerial 
approach to leadership in collaborative innovation is networked government. 
Sørensen & Torfing (2011) conceptualise this approach as a facilitative approach, 
providing the approach with the conceptual and empirical advantage of drawing on 
the vast and distinctive research traditions of network governance (Torfing, 2013).  
 
The theoretical and empirical problem 
Empirical studies of public sector innovation demonstrate that a large part of 
innovation processes are initiated at the bottom of public sector organisations by 
civil servants and middle managers, often on the basis of professional insight into 
complicated welfare issues (Borins, 2002). However, even though bottom-up 
leadership for public sector innovation often addresses problems in a holistic 
fashion, Sandford Borins’ empirical descriptions of bottom-up leadership are neither 
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explicitly adapted to a collaborative innovation context nor are wicked problems 
mentioned in these descriptions. Further, Borins’ notion of bottom-up leadership is 
not theoretically developed.  
So, if research is to contribute to the development of an innovative public sector, the 
suggestion pursued in this thesis is that (i) theoretical frameworks for leadership are 
needed that enables a differentiation of leadership conceptions, and (ii) that the 
concept of bottom-up leadership is a source of inspiration for such a theoretical 
development, insofar (iii) as the bottom-up approach is explicitly adapted to a 
context of collaborative innovation that seeks to address wicked problems.    
 
An important problem 
In this thesis, I argue that the theoretical problem related to leadership of 
collaborative innovation is important to address, because it implies a lack of detailed 
knowledge concerning how bottom-up leadership is made and exercised. I argue that 
this lack of a developed theoretical approach to how to analyse a bottom-up 
leadership makes it difficult to understand what the challenges of this type 
leadership are, in what circumstances bottom-up leadership is called for, and how 
such a leadership comes into being in the first place. A lack of theoretical 
development also makes this type of leadership unconnected to previous research on 
how to lead collaborations and innovation under uncertain conditions. As a result, it 
is difficult for researchers and professionals to forecast what possible conflicts a 
leadership might provoke, what resources that a leadership could mobilise, how a 
leadership exercises influence, what the long-term institutional implications are for 
such a bottom-up leadership, and how the relationship is between bottom-up 
leadership and other forms of leaderships.  
A further practical consequence of this problem is that this type of leadership is not 
noticed by students of strategic management, collaborative innovation and public 
sector leadership, as well as professionals and leaders enrolled in leadership training 
programmes. As a consequence, professionals engaged in bottom-up leadership of 
collaborative innovation will most likely run the risk of going through the same 
laborious and confusing learning process again and again. The professionals will be 
highly dependent on chance, such as whether someone among the staff might have 
experienced something similar previously. Providing a language and empirical 
knowledge will alter the perspective which bottom-up leadership has on the 
difficulties and conflicts that professionals and their collaborators will encounter, as 
well as avoiding challenges or making these challenges easier to accept.      
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How the thesis contributes to problem solving  
In this thesis, I answer the following overall research question in order to contribute 
to addressing an empirical problem: How new forms of public leadership can 
contribute to solving complex problems in today’s welfare societies through 
innovation. 
First I solve part of this problem by answering the following theoretical question: 
How to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation in a 
public sector addressing wicked problems? 
I do this by reviewing existing literature of collaborative innovation leadership. This 
serves the purpose of identifying theoretical design demands for collaborative 
innovation leadership. The review also helps identify discussion points that help 
clarify how bottom-up leadership should be theorised.  Subsequently, I use Sandford 
Borins’ (Borins, 2000; Borins, 2002) extensive empirical study related to innovation 
bottom-up leadership in the public sector as the main entry point for theory 
development. Motivated with Sandford Borins’ empirical descriptions, I argue that 
the concepts of profession-based, public entrepreneurship, leadership emergence, 
sense-making and sense-giving are essential for describing and understanding 
bottom-up leadership. This descriptive framework is conceptually contextualised 
within the uncertainties of wicked problems and innovation, further introducing the 
fundamental hypothesis that uncertainty is the core issue that creates confusion and 
loss of meaning that will create a demand for leadership.  
In accordance with this conceptualisation, I define bottom-up collaborative 
innovation leadership and develop an analytical model.  
Finally, I operationalise the theoretical framework by means of a micro-oriented as 
well as a locally oriented, organisational discourse framework. This 
operationalisation provides the analytical model of bottom-up leadership with a 
well-defined theory of science position, as well as providing the theoretical 
framework with more rigour and plausibility concerning the hypothesised causalities 
concerning the social construction of leadership. Finally, this analytical approach to 
discourse also provides researchers with a further possibility of positioning their 
research findings not only within collaborative innovation leadership, but also 
within discourse analytical approaches to leadership, like the Relational Leadership 
Theory (Uhl-Bien, 2006) and social constructivist approaches to leadership  
(Fairhurst & Grant, 2010).  
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 The second way in which this thesis contributes to problem-solving is that I apply 
the proposed theoretical framework, making an empirical contribution, answering 
the following question:  
How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition 
in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
In order to answer this question I conduct a single-case study of bottom-up 
leadership in the City of Copenhagen, Denmark, a city with a complex central-
administrative structure. This is a well-chosen case because of an on-going change 
process among central-administrations dealing with the wicked problem of 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods in a new way. The bottom-up leadership in this case 
utilised their professional experience related to area-based programmes in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods as a legitimate basis for initiating a change. The 
change was intended to bridge a performance gap in public service provision and 
public projects in these disadvantaged areas in Copenhagen. Public service provision 
and projects in these areas lacked coordination, which as a consequence led to 
fragmented welfare provision and a lack of strategic aim for these disadvantaged 
areas. Accordingly, a development project was launched with the aim of increasing 
the coordination in these disadvantaged areas by means of a central-administrative 
reform. When in 2009 I initiated the case study, efforts at operationalising and 
implementing the project elements had just begun. Because of this on-going process, 
the selection allowed direct participant-observation in a single case study of how 
leadership was constructed and applied.  
This analysis is the bulk of the thesis as regards scope, in that I apply the full range 
of concepts proposed in the analytical model that I developed by answering the first 
research question. I analyse how leadership is socially constructed. I focus on two 
phases in the qualitative single-case study: the development of a cross-
administrative evaluation tool and the cross-administrative policy formulation 
process. I thus use the bottom-up leadership model twice to analyse how actions of 
entrepreneurship, sense-making and sense-giving are related to a shift in leadership 
over time. 
On the basis of this analysis, I summarise the positional development of leadership 
by means of some fundamental leadership dilemmas that I construct on the basis of 
the empirical findings. As data sources, I use qualitative interviews completed in 
2010, 2011 and 2012, policy documents, policy-meeting recordings, minutes, 
observations and field notes.  
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Central claims of the thesis  
The central claim of the thesis is that bottom-up leadership first of all is a leadership 
that is socially constructed through processes of recognition as the innovation 
process unfolds, and that exercises influence by giving sense to collaborators. 
Leadership construction and application is made possible by a context of radical 
uncertainty. Accordingly, the proposed theoretical and analytical framework enables 
comparative studies of bottom-up leadership within and across wicked problem 
fields that hopefully can contribute with knowledge that will allow the public sector 
to create better conditions for collaborative innovation by developing organisational 
structures and resources that enable the utilisation of the important asset that 
specialised officials are.  
I further claim that bottom-up leadership is a highly flexible leadership approach. 
The analyses in this thesis demonstrate that for the people involved, this type of 
leadership requires a constant willingness to make sense of their identity, and 
constantly be able to adapt both leadership and project in order to keep up with the 
speed and turbulence related to collaborative innovation processes.  
This on-going dialectic between leadership and project is conditioned by the 
profession-related sense-making of substantial matters, thereby being forced to 
constantly keeping the project in alignment with aggregated profession-based 
experience of a public performance gap. For instance, in Analysis A of this thesis, 
the development of a central-administrative evaluation tool requires both to be 
aligned with the experience of working with area-based programmes, a profession 
which emphasises experiments and holistic solutions to neighbourhood problems; 
but the tool is also supposed to reflect the leadership identity through which the 
bottom-up leadership understands itself. Accordingly, when new substantial or 
leadership-related insights are achieved, leadership and innovation project are forced 
to adjust to each other.  
Because both the innovation project and the leadership are in fact emerging, 
adaptability becomes crucial. Making sense of what is going on is what provides this 
adaptability. For instance, in Analysis B, Neighbourhood Development and 
representatives put much effort into making a policy for area-based programmes in 
disadvantaged areas, but are experiencing frustration and inertia. Reflecting on this, 
an employee in Neighbourhood Development makes the interpretation that the 
inertia is not a result of the diffuse character of the area-based programmes as a tool, 
but that the inertia results from the unclear political, strategic and substantive 
municipal approach to the object of the policy – the disadvantaged areas. This 
initiates a new process of entrepreneurial activities in Neighbourhood Development, 
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in which the possibilities of redefining the policy commission is pursued both in 
terms of substance and strategic support by decision-makers. Accordingly, when the 
innovation project is altered so must the individuals in Neighbourhood Development 
redefine its leadership.       
In an organisational perspective, the thesis facilitates the perception of such bottom 
up leadership as an organisational function that enables constant sensitivity and 
adaptation to performance gaps. So, this type of leadership enables collaborative 
innovation to be imported into complex administrations. Here the constant 
construction and re-structuring of bottom-up leadership has the function of flexibility 
- providing the public sector with a highly flexible leadership that is able to absorb 
or avoid the blows of conflict, and consequently adapt the innovation project and 
leadership positioning to the conflictive structures in public political organisations. 
In this case, examples of these conflictive structures are role conflicts between 
administrations in terms of who has the right to define the major strategies of the 
municipality, but also to make it meaningful and strategically useful for municipal 
decision-makers to be part of a collaborative set-up.    
 
Contributions of the thesis 
This thesis contributes to the field of leadership of collaborative innovation in the 
public sector. The thesis theoretically contributes by introducing an analytical model 
for bottom-up leadership. This model may inspire other researchers of collaborative 
innovation leadership in that it draws on other theoretical legacies than what at 
present dominates the academic discussions of collaborative innovation leadership. 
Further, the analytical model can be used by other researchers to investigate specific 
causalities related to how a professional unit is transformed into an informal 
leadership; how specific acts of entrepreneurship enables the emergence of such a 
bottom-up leadership; how specific wicked–problem uncertainties as well as 
innovation uncertainties make a demand for a bottom-up leadership, related to the 
structural components of these wicked problems; how such a leadership exercises 
influence by making and giving sense to collaborators; and what happens when an 
informal bottom-up driven innovation project is being implemented and 
mainstreamed into the formal bureaucracies in political public organisations.  
The thesis further contributes with empirical knowledge that explains the challenges 
for bottom-up leadership that wants to address a wicked problem by means of 
innovation in a collaborative setting. This knowledge about leadership challenges is 
relevant to other collaborative innovation initiatives in the public sector that seek to 
address wicked problems, not only the wicked problem of disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. I analyse how actions of entrepreneurship and sense-making are 
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related to a shift in leadership over time. On the basis of this, I summarise how 
leadership is socially constructed by means of some fundamental leadership 
dilemmas. These leadership dilemmas may be of a general character that 
accordingly can be used to compare with other similar cases of bottom-up 
collaborative innovation leadership. Hopefully, the insight into these bottom-up 
leadership dilemmas can qualify for future bottom-up leadership for dealing with the 
uncertainties of collaborative innovation when addressing wicked problems.  
The thesis may also inspire practice in that it analyses in depth how a bottom-up 
leadership is actually enacted on a day-to-day basis of local government. It 
demonstrates what conflicts such leadership might encounter in a collaborative 
innovation process, and what sources of legitimacy can be drawn upon. For instance, 
how to create a new division of labour among collaborators in order to avoid 
defensive reactions? How to satisfy collaborative demands of clear leadership while 
at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and influence? Through 
interviews with both leadership and collaborators on the same events and conflicts, 
professionals are given insight into each other’s institutional rationality. For as the 
analyses demonstrate all reactions and conflicts are in fact perfectly rational. This 
makes conflicting viewpoints more understandable, which accordingly may help to 
reduce conflicts and meetings in which the same conflict points surface again and 
again.  
Moreover, the thesis highlights that bottom-up leadership have choices to make 
when it comes to understanding and redefining its own leadership. Each of these 
choices has structural repercussions concerning the recognition of leadership by its 
collaborators. As the analyses in this thesis exemplify, when an innovation project is 
launched that focuses on central administrative coordination with implications for 
local working professionals, the leadership will meet resistance by advocates of the 
local working professionals, resulting in a clash between centralistic and localistic 
discourses. The point is not that these conflicts can be avoided, but that each choice 
of leadership positioning will have consequences in terms of what conflict points 
will be generated.  
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CHAPTER 2. THEORY:                           
BOTTOM-UP LEADERSHIP FOR 
COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION IN 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I develop my theoretical framework and in so doing I answer the first 
of two research questions. The question is: How to theorise a bottom-up type of 
leadership for collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
The function of this chapter in the thesis is two-fold. First of all the chapter 
demonstrates how the theory building demonstrated is an independent, theoretical 
contribution. Second, the function of this chapter is also to demonstrate how the 
theoretical framework that I develop can be deployed in an empirical analysis. This 
accordingly produces a basis for an analytical strategy and an explanation of the 
methods that I deploy in this thesis, i.e. steps that allow me to make two empirical 
analyses. Hence, throughout the chapter these two meta-tracks (theoretical 
contribution and deployment of the theoretical contribution in an empirical analysis) 
are commented on by way of theoretical explanations and discussions. Accordingly, 
some discussions contribute to clarify elements in the theoretical contribution, and 
some discussions contribute to clarify how the developed theoretical model (the 
‘BUCIL’ model) can be deployed in subsequent analyses.  
In the following sections, the intention is to identify what theoretical design qualities 
leadership for collaborative innovation should adhere to. This requires an 
understanding of collaborative innovation literature in general as well as a critical 
review of leadership approaches to collaborative innovation. As a consequence of 
this theory building strategy I argue that bottom-up leadership for collaborative 
innovations has to be theorised and defined. 
This problem is important to address. First, studies of public sector innovation show 
that a large part of innovation processes are initiated at the bottom of public sector 
organisations by civil servants and middle managers, often on the basis of 
professional insight into complicated welfare issues (Borins, 2002). A significant 
number of these bottom-up innovation processes have a holistic focus, requiring 
collaboration across agencies and actors, potentially generating new collaborative 
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services. These observations are also highly relevant in a Danish context. Research 
demonstrates that when asking public sector leaders about what factors that initiates 
innovations, enthusiasts/employees are mentioned as the main factor with 85.2%. 
When asked about which groups are the source of innovation, employees likewise 
rank the highest with 73. 5% (FTF, 2010).  
If research is to contribute to the development of an innovative public sector capable 
of collaboratively utilise the expertise of civil servants, we need theoretical 
frameworks that provide us with knowledge on how to lead these processes. This 
might result in empowering politicians and decision-makers with profession-based 
political projects that address the wicked problems (Beinecke, 2009; Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Weber & Khademian, 2008) of today’s welfare 
societies.  
In this chapter, I cover different strands of theory, touching on a number of 
concepts. In order to avoid confusion I start by establishing some core definitions 
which are explained elsewhere in the thesis.   
I define innovation as an “intentional and proactive process that involves the 
generation and practical adoption and spread of new and creative ideas which aim to 
produce a qualitative change in a specific context” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011, p. 
849). 
I define collaboration as “organizations…that are working together” (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2000, p. 1159).  
I define a wicked problem as a phenomenon of uncertainty that “arises when parties 
are confronted with societal problems and do not know what the effects of their 
efforts to resolve them will be”. This uncertainty “in a network setting has three 
manifestations: substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainty” (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004, p. 6). 
This chapter is structured as follows: First, I introduce the research field of 
collaborative innovation. Subsequently, I review how existing scholars have 
conceptualised leadership of collaborative innovation. This is followed by a 
presentation of my argument for theorising a bottom-up type of leadership for 
collaborative innovation. I introduce an analytical model that supplements the 
existing leadership approaches to collaborative innovation in the public sector, and I 
discuss the applied concepts and the model in detail.   
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 INTRODUCING COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION 2.1
This section introduces the research field of collaborative innovation and points to 
issues that future research needs to address. Accordingly, the section functions as a 
backdrop for a discussion of leadership issues in Section 1.  
Collaborative innovation in the public sector is an emerging research field 
concerned with how to understand and enhance collaborative innovation (Hartley, 
2005; Moore & Hartley, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Scholars agree that 
bureaucratic, closed innovation methods do not provide adequate responses to the 
challenges of community and policies (Bland, Bruk, Kim, & Lee, 2010; Bommert, 
2010; Considine, Lewis, & Alexander, 2009). Today’s complex challenges such as 
climate change, aging societies, and financial crises (Harris & Aldbury, 2009) 
demand a different quantity and quality of innovation (Bommert, 2010). These 
challenges are often ill defined, sometimes even wickedly, which requires the 
involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders (Hartley, 2005; Moore & Hartley, 2008; 
Nambisan, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011).  
One of the claims of collaborative innovation is that it is a method of dealing with 
complex, ill-defined problems, such as education, health care, homeland security 
and environmental conservation (Nambisan, 2008). Accordingly, collaborative 
innovation in the public sector enables problem solving which is otherwise not 
possible for the individual actor; collaborative innovation focuses our attention on 
the potential of innovation through relations of cooperation that penetrate the 
boundaries of the lead organisation (ibid.). Sørensen & Torfing (2011) argue that 
there is a growing demand for this specific  type of public innovation, due to the fact 
that citizens and private firms have rising expectations concerning the quality of 
public services; that professionals and elected politicians have growing ambitions as 
regards the solving of social, economic and environmental problems; and that we 
witness a growing number of wicked problems that are ill-defined, require 
specialised knowledge, involve a large number of stakeholders and carry a high 
potential for conflict. (Torfing, 2013) argues that “the solution of the increasing 
numbers of ‘wicked problems’, which cannot be solved by standard solutions or by 
spending more money, calls for innovative solutions” (p. 301).  
Several other influential authors argue in much the same vein that collaborative 
strategies such as inter-organisational collaboration, network governance and new 
public government can be used to meet these demands in ways not possible for 
either hierarchy or market (Hartley, 2005; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004; S. P. Osborne, 2010).  A central aspect of this way of thinking is that 
the role of public managers is not to create the innovation by themselves. Hartley 
(2005) argues that we see a shift in management from New Public Management to 
network governance. (S. P. Osborne, 2010) argues that we are in fact witnessing the 
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rise of ‘New Public Governance’. (Torfing, 2013) explains the relation between New 
Public Governance and collaborative innovation by stating that New public 
governance is a new paradigm that “will help to unleash the innovative potential of 
collaborative interaction” (p. 303), because the paradigm focuses on the institutional 
conditions for collaboration and because it recognises the need to govern self-
regulating systems of interaction (ibid.). What unites the authors is essentially that a 
networked type of governance is necessary in order to create innovation in the 
public sector.  The challenge is to manage open and flexible, inter-organisational 
arenas (Sørensen and Torfing 2011) in which trust, relational capital and relational 
contracts are among the main governance mechanisms (S. Osborne, 2006), and 
where the networks are self-organising, functioning both with and without 
government (Rhodes 1997); where the public manager acts as a visionary ‘explorer’ 
that facilitates the creation of new networks (Hartley, 2005). Relating these 
considerations to traditional innovation research in the private sector, Moore & 
Hartley argue that what characterises much innovation in the public sector in general 
is ‘governance’ innovation, i.e. a radical change in the way in which a certain policy 
field or service is provided. Governance innovation thus “changes the location and 
financing of social production, and the level and distribution of things that could 
reasonably be called social or public goods and services” (Moore & Hartley, 2008). 
 Sørensen & Torfing (2011) describe the effect of collaborative innovation in terms 
of strengthening of innovation phases: idea generation is spurred when many 
stakeholders are involved; idea selection is improved in that ideas are tested 
critically among collaborators; implementation success is improved in that joint 
ownership is created; and dissemination is propelled by the collaborators involved 
(p. 852).    
Several authors point to the shortcomings of existing research in collaborative 
innovation in the public sector (Bommert, 2010; Hartley, 2005; Moore & Hartley, 
2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Hartley (Hartley, 2005) defines research agendas 
for public sector innovation in governance and public services. Hartley argues that 
more research is needed concerning the specific public sector contexts of public 
innovations.  Concerning the innovation process, Hartley, quoting Borins (2002), 
argues that innovation is increasingly a “bottom-up” and “sideways-in” process (p. 
32). Accordingly, Hartley asks what the ‘relative advantages and disadvantages’ of 
top-down, bottom-up and lateral innovation are for particular types of innovations, 
related to the ‘innovation journey’ through setbacks and barriers. Concerning 
governance innovation, there has been a tendency to focus on service innovations, 
not governance innovations, leading to questions such as in what ways is the shift an 
innovation, how does the innovation emerge and how is it sustained. 
Concerning diffusion of innovation, there is much to be learned about how diffusion 
takes place, and how and why innovations are adapted to different contexts and 
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cultures. How, for instance, can innovation be recognised and described to others as 
distinctive? (p. 33). Concerning innovative capacity in organisations, why do some 
organisations appear to be more receptive to innovation than others? Concerning the 
link between innovation and improvement, one should examine change over time 
considering early performance losses, learning curves, improvements or further 
decline (p. 33). Concerning leadership and innovation, there is a need to step beyond 
traditional hierarchical models of innovation leadership to understand how 
innovation climates are nurtured; how policy-makers and managers can work 
together in distinctive roles of innovation, and how far innovation leadership is 
distributed within and across organisations (p. 33). 
Bommert (Bommert, 2010) concludes that one of the conceptual shortcomings of 
collaborative innovation is that assumptions and conclusions about risks, issues and 
capacities are primarily based on theories of networked governance, whereas 
benefits are based on open innovation-literature (Bommert, 2010). As Bommert 
notes: “this provokes the question whether collaborative innovation is simply a 
composition of the two, an “advanced” function of networked governance or 
whether it needs to be conceptualised in other terms?” (ibid., p. 30). 
(Moore & Hartley, 2008) explore how innovations in governance differ from 
traditional product or process innovations. The authors argue that governance and 
innovation have not been combined sufficiently. The inspiration from the private 
sector innovation research has led to studies of innovations that improve 
organisational performance through product and process innovations, “rather than 
public sector innovations which seek to improve social performance through re-
organisations of cross-sector decision-making, financing and production systems” 
(p. 3). The authors also argue that the governance literature has focused on social 
coordination but has not drawn on innovation literature (p. 3). According to Moore 
& Hartley, these governance innovations involve networks of organisations, or the 
transformation of complex social production systems, being in general conceived 
and implemented above the organisational level (p. 4). These innovations focus both 
on concrete changes as well as the ways in which this productive activity is financed 
or resourced, as well as the processes used to decide what will be produced and the 
normative standards used to evaluate the performance of the social production 
system (p. 4). The authors points to a gap in the literature, because innovation 
literature does not work above the organisational level. Conversely, Governance 
literature focuses on analyses of broader social systems. Accordingly, this literature 
does not enable insight into how the precise ways “in which the outputs and 
production processes of the (social) production system have been altered by a 
change in governance arrangements” (p. 5). The governance literature lacks the 
detailed operational focus of the innovation literature (p. 5).  
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To sum up, I have in this section highlighted design demands for a theoretical 
conception of leadership for collaborative innovation, which are as follow:  
- To consider drawing on other theories than network governance 
- Investigate advantages/disadvantages of bottom-up, top-down and lateral 
innovations 
- Relate these advantages/disadvantages to particular types of innovations, 
related to a process perspective of the ‘innovation journey’ 
- How governance innovations are innovative 
- How an innovation emerges 
- How it is sustained 
- How it is diffused 
- Innovation leadership needs to step beyond hierarchical models, in order to 
explain how to nurture innovation climates, how policy makers and 
managers can work together, and how far leadership is distributed within 
and across organisations 
In the next section I explain and identify discussion points in order to produce 
further design recommendations for leadership theory building.  
 
 LEADERSHIP FOR COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION IN THE 2.2
PUBLIC SECTOR: A REVIEW 
Regarding leadership approaches to collaborative innovation, most scholars draw on 
some variant of network governance in order to conceptualise the aspect of 
collaboration. However, the conceptual depth, the leadership typologies and the 
understanding of how to exercise this networked type of collaborative leadership 
and other types of collaborative leaderships do vary within these collaborative 
innovation approaches. Below, I explain these approaches in more detail in order to 
identify discussion points relevant for theorising bottom-up leadership.  
A number of scholars argue that networked types of governance are assessed to be a 
fruitful public sector management approach to collaborative innovation (Bland et al., 
2010; Bommert, 2010; Eggers, Singh, Goldsmith, & Ash Institute for Democratic 
Governance and Innovation, 2009; Hartley, 2005; Nambisan, 2008; Sørensen & 
Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 2013) as they provide a focus on effective coordination 
across government organisations as well as the integration of actors across sectors.  
Some scholars are inspired by open innovation. This transforms the implementation 
focus of network governance into an explicitly innovation approach, even though it 
remains an open question whether this combination actually leads to a new research 
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field or just a variant of networked government (Bommert, 2010). Collaborative 
innovation involves a diverse set of actors (Bommert, 2010; Sørensen & Torfing, 
2011), thereby not only harnessing resources, but potentially enhancing all phases of 
the innovation cycle (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Power imbalances need to be 
levelled (Nambisan, 2008). 
In contrast to network governance, some scholars propose analytical frameworks 
that position collaborative innovation as an explicitly multilevel concept, both 
empirically (i.e. at public agency level) and analytically: (Moore & Hartley, 
2008)argue that ‘governance innovations’ need to integrate a more detailed view of 
the operations undertaken, a level of analysis that has so far been neglected in 
governance research but which holds a strong position in private sector innovation 
research. Sørensen and Torfing (2011) provide us with an analytical model, arguing 
that collaborative innovation occurs in institutional arenas of interaction which 
provide drivers and barriers that facilitate and hamper collaboration and innovation. 
An analysis of collaborative innovation should take into account the arenas of 
interaction embedded in an institutional framework, focusing on barriers and drivers 
at the levels of identity, as well as organisational, inter-organisational, institutional 
and cultural levels. Focus should also be on agency and individual level aspects of 
collaboration processes, such as empowered participation, mutual and 
transformative learning, and joint ownership.   
(Nambisan, 2008) argues that network-based collaborative innovation can be 
defined as an external approach to innovation and problem-solving that “relies on 
harnessing the resources and capabilities of external networks and communities to 
amplify or enhance innovation speed and innovation outcome” (p. 6). Such an 
approach has four principles: a shared set of goals and objectives; a shared 
worldview or awareness; knowledge creation that emphasises new knowledge 
through interactions among network members; the architecture of participation that 
provides the governance mechanisms for the contributions of the participants to be 
coordinated, integrated and synchronised (ibid.).  
Accordingly, Nambisan identifies four public leadership roles stratified according to 
two aspects of collaborative problem solving: the nature of the problem and the 
nature of the collaboration arrangement. Concerning the nature of the problem, this 
dimension relates to how well the problem is defined and how the innovative idea 
evolves. At one end of the continuum, the problem is defined by existing 
governance services or technologies; at the other end the problem space may be less 
well defined and more emergent in nature, which might require acquiring inputs 
from diverse stakeholders (p. 12). The second dimension relates to the organisation 
structure of the network, from centralised to de-centralised, i.e. whether the 
collaborative innovation is government-led or spread on various stakeholders. 
Accordingly, the four roles are innovation integrator, innovation seeker, innovation 
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champion and innovation catalyst. The innovation integrator works within a defined 
innovation space and is government led. The innovation seeker works within an 
undefined innovation space and is also government-led. With regard to the 
innovation champion, the government agency is perhaps not the primary innovation 
agent, but may take on a more facilitative and supportive role within an undefined 
innovation space. The innovation catalyst, by contrast, works within a defined and 
well-known problem space; the problem is defined but requires new collaborative 
solutions (Nambisan, 2008). 
(Hartley, 2005) develops another kind of leadership typology than (Nambisan, 
2008). This typology is related to innovation and improvement in the different 
regimes of governance and public management. These different roles are seen as 
related to a particular ideology and historical period, but may also co-exist and be in 
conflict. In ‘traditional’ public administration, the role of policy makers are 
commanders, and the role of public managers are as ‘clerks and martyrs’. Within a 
New Public Management regime, the role of policy-makers is that of 
announcers/commissionaires, and the role of public managers is that of efficiency 
and market maximising. In a networked governance regime, the role of policy-
makers is that of leaders and interpreters, whereas public managers take on the role 
of explorers (p. 29). According to Hartley, innovation under networked governance 
revitalises the leadership role of policy-makers: as enabler of innovation through 
large-scale legislation, but also by supporting innovation by providing resources for 
experiments and collaboration (p. 30). Public managers become explorers, 
commissioned by society to search for public value. Accordingly, managers are 
expected to use their initiative and imagination, but are also expected to be 
responsive to political guidance and feedback (p.30).  
Sandford Borins (Borins, 2002) develops yet another typology of collaborative 
innovation leadership, this one developed around who initiates collaborative 
innovations. Borins makes a distinction between ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ led 
innovations in the public sector. This distinction, investigated through a large 
statistical and qualitative material, leads to three ideal types of innovation 
leadership: bottom-up innovation, policy-directed innovation in response to crisis, 
and organisational turnarounds by agency heads. In the USA, 50% of the 
innovations originate from middle managers or front-line staff, 25% from agency 
heads, 21% from politicians, 13% from interest groups, and 10% from individuals 
outside government. Borins’ study further demonstrates that a huge part of these 
innovations are holistic (61% in the samples from 1990-1994 and 85% in the sample 
from 1995-1998). Holistic is here understood as providing multiple services to 
clients, coordinating organisations or taking a systems approach to problem (Borins, 
2000). 
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Borins argue that bottom-up innovations “require and create leadership” (p. 469), 
given the fact that innovations require advocates and often become subject of 
discussion within an organisation. Innovations may also lead to new structures 
within an organisation, often involving interorganisational collaboration. The 
initiators of the innovation in question are likely to play a role in several of these 
aspects of the innovative process (p. 470). Borins note that “because they are on the 
front lines or in middle management, they are creating an informal or alternative 
leadership structure” (p. 470). The influence of such bottom-up innovations depends 
on the stance that the public sector’s top take toward these initiatives, such as 
negative, neutral, or highly supportive. Furthermore, bottom-up innovations may 
support already defined goals set by politicians and senior public servants, but they 
can also be the ones that produce initiatives that politicians are willing “to embrace 
as their own” (p. 471).  
 Politically-directed innovation statistically tended to occur when it was a response 
to a crisis, in that citizens expect politicians to lead the response (Borins, 2002). 
Borins argues that in each case politicians defined the problem and took 
responsibility for choosing the solution, and instructed the bureaucracy to inform 
their choices (ibid., p. 473). The organisational turnarounds by agency heads were a 
type of innovation leadership adopted in response to a public sector organisation that 
does not meet normal expectations for service delivery. Typically this involves the 
appointment of a new agency head by politicians.  
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) argue that there is no “commonly accepted theoretical 
framework” for analysing collaborative innovation in the public sector (p. 858). 
Consequently, the authors introduce an analytical model, in which a specific 
governance role is defined. This managerial role is defined as “meta-governance” (p. 
857), having as a fundamental characteristic the “regulation of self-regulation” 
(ibid.), which involves a combination of hands-on/hands-off tools. The authors 
argue that the facilitative network approach located in the collaborative innovation 
literature is exactly what metagovernance is about, in that metagovernance “is a kind 
of facilitating network management that aims to provide a political, institutional, 
and discursive framework” (p. 857). Proactive forms of governance are essential as 
management by shaping the institutional arenas of interaction, consequently having 
impact on the specific processes of collaborative innovation, including issues of 
empowered participation, mutual and transformative learning, and joint ownership. 
Accordingly, metagovernance can help to stabilise the institutional arenas of 
interaction, strengthen drivers and remove barriers while respecting the self-
regulating character of collaborative innovation processes. Hands-off tools could be 
institutional design and network framing, and hands-on tools would involve process 
management and direct participation (p. 861).  
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(Torfing, 2013) argues that despite the great potential of collaborative interaction for 
enhancing innovation, attempts to facilitate and spur innovation might fail. 
Collaboration may be hampered by power asymmetries, mistrust, opportunistic 
behaviour, strategic and substantive uncertainty, conflicting frameworks and a lack 
of leadership and facilitation. Consequently, stakeholders need to exercise 
collaborative leadership and innovation management (p. 308). This can be acquired 
by trained facilitators or leaders connected with the involved stakeholders. 
Accordingly, this collaborative innovation management has to perform the different 
functions of steward, mediators and catalyst.  
The steward convenes actors, sets the agenda, and frames and represents the 
collaborative process as a whole. Collaborative innovation management also has to 
take on the role of mediator in order to facilitate and drive the process. The aim is to 
clarify interdependencies, manage the process, build trust and construct common 
frameworks. The management thirdly has to generate innovation by acting as a 
catalyst by exercising entrepreneurial leadership such as enabling a re-framing of 
problems and encourage transformative learning.  
Importantly, Torfing (Torfing, 2013) argues that the main analytical vantage point 
for studying collaborative innovation is provided by the theories of network 
governance. Torfing provides an overview of five different research approaches to 
network governance: rational choice institutionalism, normative institutionalism, 
interpretive governance theory, network management theory and governmentality 
theory (p. 310). This overview is important when dealing with the leadership of 
collaborative innovation, in that the different research traditions make possible 
different analyses of how leadership can be conceptualised. For instance, rational 
choice institutionalism produces an image of agents as calculating agents; normative 
institutionalism, conversely, allows analyses  focusing on the role of identity, 
institutional rules and cultural norms, but may be hampered by its weak conception 
of agency in changing institutional structures; interpretative governance theory 
focuses on “the social construction of practice through the ability of individuals to 
create and act on meaning”(p. 311), and the approach allows a bottom-up approach 
(p. 311-312). Focus is on the individual actors and the meanings that they are 
constructing. Interpretative governance theory does, according to Torfing (p. 312), 
fail to provide a proper explanation of institutional and organisational conditions for 
action. Network management theory defines governance networks as 
interorganisational arenas for interest mediation “between self-interested actors who 
interact because of the presence of a mutual resource dependency” (p. 312). 
However, this approach has few reflections on the role of power in shaping 
identities, interactions and the institutional frameworks. Finally, governmentality 
theory does not focus on collaborative innovation, but enables a perspective on 
innovation as a part of a particular governmentality, shaped by discursive power 
strategies. However, the approach remains at a general and abstract level of analysis, 
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in that it does not make possible analyses of how and why actors are interacting, and 
what the conditions are for these actors to produce policies and regulations both 
continuous and discontinuous with the past (p. 313).  
So, by assessing the leadership conceptions above I find that what inspires theory 
building in this research field is to strike a conceptual balance between stabilising 
the collaborative configuration, on the one hand, and de-stabilizing parts of the 
collaborative configuration, on the other hand, in order to utilise uncertainty. The 
solution for collaborative innovation has so far been to separate management and 
innovation: network governance is the approach taken as the management 
perspective, whereas open innovation is supposed to deliver the novelty (Bommert, 
2010). However, scholars do this differently. (Nambisan, 2008) argues in favour of 
differentiation of leadership roles related to problem type. (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2011) seems to assume that the concept of meta-governance is suitable as an overall 
leadership approach, having a non-hierarchical, facilitative management approach, 
involving deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage and direct more or less self-
regulating processes of collaborative interaction. The purpose of meta-governance is 
to stabilise the institutional arenas of interaction. Hands-off tools are institutional 
design and network framing; hands-on tools are process management and direct 
participation. 
What the explanation of leadership conceptions furthermore reveals is a heavy 
reliance on networked governance approaches to collaborative innovation 
leadership. This undifferentiation of the theoretical conception of leadership 
arguably limits how leadership of collaborative innovation can be understood and 
investigated.  
In the next section I identify discussion points that first of all demonstrate the 
undifferentiated conceptions of leadership. The discussion points also illustrate that 
another conceptual balance is possible between stabilisation and the utilisation of 
uncertainty, hence contributing to an increased differentiation of leadership 
conception.   
2.2.1. DISCUSSION  
In the previous section, I introduced conceptions of collaborative innovation 
leadership. The main theoretical challenge of collaborative innovation is to be able 
to conceptualise how to strike a balance between stabilising the collaborative 
configuration, on the one hand, and de-stabilising parts of the collaborative 
configuration, on the other hand. Accordingly, the leadership conceptions reveal a 
number of assumptions concerning agency, social structure, power and theory-of-
science position, all of which are related to the challenge of maintaining this balance 
between stabilisation and de-stabilisation. Accordingly, the previous introduction 
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and review contain a number of points relevant for discussing leadership approaches 
to collaborative innovation.  
What the discussion points below contribute with is first of all clarifications of 
assumptions related to leadership of collaborative innovation in general. Second, the 
clarification of these assumptions is interpreted in the light of a bottom-up 
leadership perspective. Accordingly, the purpose of this discussion section is to open 
new research terrain for collaborative innovation leadership by displaying some 
theoretical design demands that new leadership conceptions should adhere to. I do 
this by juxtaposing differences between leadership conceptions, using Borins’ notion 
of bottom-up leadership as an empirical source of inspiration, setting off from 
Bommert and Hartley’s suggestions for conceptual shortcomings and unexplored 
research agendas. 
 
Bommert suggests that researchers of collaborative innovation should reflect on 
conceptualisations of collaborative innovation, due to the fact that the research 
agenda is closely connected to research on network governance. Obviously, this 
comment is relevant for the leadership of collaborative innovation, especially for 
how to conceptualise bottom-up leadership, because Bommert’s argument 
encourages a conceptualisation of leadership that is not based on network 
governance literature. Hartley likewise calls for more research in relation to 
governance innovation and public sector innovation in general. Research should to 
investigate advantages and disadvantages with bottom-up, top-down and lateral 
innovation, related to the particular types of innovations, related to a process 
perspective of an ‘innovation journey’. Hartley also points to the fact that 
researchers need to demonstrate in what ways governance innovations are in fact 
innovative, how the innovation emerges, and how it is sustained. Hartley also points 
to research in innovation diffusion, in terms of innovative capacity, studying change 
over time taking into account initial conditions. Further, concerning leadership there 
is a need to step beyond hierarchical models, in order to explain how to nurture 
innovation climates, how policy-makers and managers can work together, and how 
far leadership is distributed within and across organisations. Moore & Hartley 
further argue that governance innovations, i.e. re-organisations of cross-sector 
decision-making, financing and production systems, have been neglected as a type 
of  public sector innovation, and that existing governance literature does not provide 
insight into the precise ways in which outputs have been changed due to a change in 
governance arrangements.   
When theoretically conceptualising leadership for collaborative innovation, the 
above remarks are important as they point to design standards of how to compose 
such theory. When reviewing leadership approaches for collaborative innovation, 
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the network governance approach is by far the theoretically most developed. The 
theoretical developments by (Nambisan, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 
2013) are important steps forward for the collaborative innovation research agenda, 
including leadership approaches. First of all, the analytical framework introduced by 
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) addresses a number of the weaknesses and 
shortcomings addressed by Bommert and Hartley. With regards to Bommert’s 
critique, the analytical framework is still heavily influenced by network governance 
in terms of management, but also uses and synthesises key concepts related to 
planning and innovation research. This conceptualisation consequently enables a 
more developed synthesis of network governance and innovation. Further, this 
analytical framework also makes possible an analysis related to Hartley’s remarks, 
in terms of a more detailed perspective on how outputs have been produced related 
to change in the governance system. Nambisan’s more practically oriented 
framework contributes by stratifying leadership roles for collaborative innovation, 
also allowing for defining cases in which a public sector agency may not be in 
charge. Further, Nambisan’s leadership concept is important in that it differentiates 
between ill-defined and well-defined societal problems, stressing the fact that the 
problem type to a high degree conditions leadership approaches. (Torfing, 2013)’s 
contribution is likewise important, because leadership roles of convener, mediator 
and catalyst are defined and conceptualised, by drawing on collaboration leadership 
literature. This is an important contribution since these roles are located closer to 
actual agency and action and less to managerial and governance functions. In this 
respect, Torfing’s conception opens up for an analysis in which governance and 
leadership is perceived of as distinct types of action, and furthermore points to new 
research territory in which the interplay between leadership and governance can be 
dealt with. Second, Torfing’s contribution is important by stressing the fact that 
analysis of collaborative innovation, governance and leadership to a high degree 
depends on what tradition of network governance research that a study deploys.  
Finally, Borins’ inductively generated distinctions of bottom-up/top down driven 
(holistic) innovations are important by providing categories that can be further 
theoretically conceptualised, and by providing categories that do not draw on 
assumptions on collaboration  or network governance literature, but instead takes 
outset in less abstract, and easily identifiable, group of leaders. 
Consequently, Borins’ research of especially bottom-up leadership is relevant for the 
on-going debate of collaborative innovation leadership, because the empirical 
categories and the descriptions of leadership motivate to theory building that do not 
necessarily draw on public administration literature, such as network governance, or 
on collaboration literature. In the next section, I juxtapose the differences of 
leadership approaches, emphasising elements of Borins’ bottom-up leadership. 
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2.2.1.1 Discussion point one: leadership as predefined vs. leadership 
as a process 
Key aspects of Borins’ descriptions of bottom-up leadership are that they are based 
on front-line staff and immediate managers perception of a public sector problem; 
that leadership has to be made, since bottom-up leadership is not present in the 
beginning of the innovation process; and that this bottom-up leadership creates an 
alternative leadership structure, using informal channels of influence.  
The first point that stimulates theory building in Borins’ conception is that 
leadership has to be made. This statement is actually quite radical. It has the 
potential of enabling a radically different perspective on leadership, because in the 
leadership explanations reviewed above, leadership is understood as something 
which is defined to begin with, either by researchers or by professionals: someone 
‘convenes’ or ‘facilitates’ the collaborative innovation to begin with, or someone 
acts as a ‘catalyst’, an ‘explorer’ etc. Despite the fact that these approaches suggests 
a flexible leadership approach, tailored to the different phases of collaborative 
innovations, the transformational aspect of leadership identity is not in itself taken 
into consideration as an independent research focus. Accordingly, an analytical 
perspective is generated in which the innovation process is the research object, i.e. 
the dependent variable, whereas leadership is kept fixed, i.e. the independent 
variable.  
I argue that this is actually an assumption worth reconsidering, given the fact that 
process literature in innovation explicitly characterise such processes in terms that 
suggest subjective experience of an all-encompassing chaos and confusion. Take for 
instance some of the most acknowledged researchers of innovation, Andrew Van de 
Ven et al. (Van de Ven, 1999), and their description of innovation:  
“The journey is an exploration into the unknown process by which novelty emerges. 
The process is characterized as inherently uncertain and dynamic, and it seemingly 
follows a random process (...) To say that the process is open and dynamic implies 
that the timing and magnitude of events make the system of actions entrepreneurs 
take, outcomes they experience, and external context events that occur 
unpredictable, truly novel, and genuinely a "process of becoming".."(p. 3, my bold) 
 
Being part of such chaotic processes will have the implication that participants’ 
identities and all of their organisational actions can actually be doubted upon: are we 
really on the right track here? Can we trust our own professional skills in terms of 
leadership, judgement and specialization? What will be the implications of the 
innovation for our jobs/position/department, given either success of failure?  
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Now, should we expect that this uncertainty, randomness, being part of something 
becoming and unknown that characterises single-organisational innovation would be 
reduced or amplified in a collaborative innovation context? The aggregated research 
of one of the most acknowledged researcher duo’s in collaboration suggests the 
opposite. In several publications Chris Huxham & Siv Vangen have investigated an 
idea similar to collaborative innovation but under the heading of what the authors 
call ‘collaborative advantage’. However, they have also developed the concept of 
‘collaborative inertia’, which is a great danger in collaborative enterprises. The 
authors argue that even though concepts like ‘strategic alliances’, ‘public service 
delivery partnerships’ and other collaborative forms are surrounded by a strong 
rhetoric of something positive and rewarding, stories of actual success are hard to 
find. Actually the authors go as far as stating the following:  
"The overwhelming conclusion from our research is that seeking collaborative 
advantage is a seriously resource-consuming activity so is only to be considered 
when the stakes are really worth pursuing. Our message to practitioners and policy 
makers alike is don't do it unless you have to” (Huxham & Vangen 2005, p.13).  
 
Accordingly, given the fact that collaborations are often heavily marked by aspects 
of collaborative inertia, I assume that leadership making and related identity issues 
in a collaborative innovation process perspective would be an important independent 
research agenda to pursue especially in collaborative innovation processes, and most 
definitely in relation to bottom-up leadership. This is a research approach to 
leadership that is closer to what Torfing (2013) regards as interpretive governance 
theory, and less close to the rationalistic and structural approaches of network 
governance, because emphasis is on actors’ interpretations, socially  constructed 
meanings and identity issues.  
What this discussion point suggests is that an independent research agenda of 
leadership making in collaborative innovation processes is called for. This is 
especially so for bottom-up leadership since such leadership not only have to 
exercise leadership in a collaborative innovation context that provokes a radical 
doubt of organisational identity and actions, but furthermore have to make its own 
leadership while simultaneously trying to exercise leadership. Accordingly, bottom-
up leadership faces a dual challenge of identity transformation.    
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2.2.1.2 Discussion point two: position of power  
Another aspect relevant to discuss in relation to leadership is the power position of a 
collaborative innovation leader. Nambisan differentiates leadership roles in 
accordance with whether the innovation is government led or not. In Borins’ 
conception, the bottom-up leader has an inferior position, whereas in the other 
leadership conceptions reviewed the notion of power with regards to leadership is 
less defined, actually non-existent. Arguably, the amount and type of power 
available for a collaborative innovation leader to a high degree determines how to 
initiate and exercise such leadership. As a thought experiment, one could reflect on 
whether it would be possible for bottom-up leadership in a public agency to take on 
the role of what Nambisan calls an innovation integrator? Or whether it would be 
possible for bottom-up leadership to act as a convener or a variant of meta-
governor? In Borins’ descriptions of bottom-up leadership, this seems unlikely – 
such leadership develops ‘alternative leadership structures’, and is highly dependent 
on a receptive stance of decision-makers. We could ask this critical question: Is it 
possible to facilitate a collaborative innovation if you as a leader have no 
organisational mandate to do so? Although this may be possible, establishing 
collaborative relations to other organisations is arguably made easier if hierarchical 
support from one’s own organisation is already achieved, thereby giving 
collaborators the impression that this project is worth the effort. Consequently, 
position of power is fundamental for the roles of leadership to exercise.  
Borins’ notion of bottom-up leadership explains how power and leadership role are 
closely interwoven. Reflecting on power and position of power also leads to a 
questioning of what the assumptions of governance network-related leadership 
conceptions are. Even though these leadership approaches are exactly adapted to a 
context of dispersed power and conflict, an assumption is that power is consolidated 
within the lead agency. On the basis of such a condition, it is possible for leadership 
to define what is supposed to be innovated, for instance a service, or what problem 
is supposed to be solved. On this basis, it is possible to facilitate spaces of more or 
less self-organised interaction.  
The discussion above allows further discussion about what organisational mandates 
the different collaborative innovation leaderships have. It seems plausible that 
network governance based collaborative innovation leaderships assumes that an 
organisational mandate is provided by formal power structures at the beginning of 
the innovation journey, and that such a mandate will continue to be provided by 
organisational decision-makers (politicians, CEO’s, mayor), until the collaborative 
innovation project is perceived of as a failure, as unfeasible, or has been 
implemented.  Accordingly, since this is not the outset for bottom-up leadership, 
such bottom-up leadership presumably have more brittle and unsteady mandates, 
being highly dependent on whether they can influence decision-makers to perceive 
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the innovation project as their own. As a consequence, the juxtaposition between 
bottom-up leadership and network governance leaderships of collaborative 
innovation highlights that the leadership tools related to convener, catalyst, 
integrator, seeker, meta-governor are not necessarily available for bottom-up 
leadership. As a result, bottom-up leadership and its way of influencing and gaining 
power needs to be reconceptualised in a way that take into account the process 
perspective of strengthening the mandate for the innovation project.  
This discussion of mandate, power position and related leadership tools also have 
consequences for how novelty is created within collaborative innovation.    
2.2.1.3  Discussion point three: what generates novelty? 
In the governance network based leadership conceptions, collaborators and their 
interaction are supposed to create a sort of open innovation. Based on the discussion 
above on formal power and mandate, this open innovation approach to novelty is 
consistent, in that it is possibly for a meta-governor, an integrator etc., to exercise an 
agenda-setting power: what is to be innovated, who the relevant stakeholders are, 
and to remove barriers of the collaboration, such as levelling out power 
asymmetries. Accordingly, a defined arena of interaction is established, increasing 
the possibility of enhancing the quality of innovation phases. As a result, the relation 
between leadership and novelty is deliberately separated.  
However, it is worth reflecting upon the strength and character of this separation 
between leadership and novelty. Nambisan’s work is in this respect useful. As 
Nambisan’s leadership roles describe, when the innovations are government led, the 
government defines what is supposed to be innovated – for instance, a service or a 
process. The government thereby also defines what the problem is that should be 
solved, ill-defined or not.  
Consequently, what this discussion draws our attention to is that in most of the 
network–leadership-based approaches to collaborative innovation, some necessary 
restraints are imposed on collaborators to begin with. And even though these 
boundaries can be negotiated and generate conflicts of legitimacy, a defining 
framework is imposed to begin with. Obviously, such a framework is highly 
enabling and restraining for novelty creation, in that the chance of success of 
collaborative innovation is increased, but at the cost of radicality, in that a path-
dependency is put on the collaborative innovation to begin with. So, with regard to 
novelty creation, it is definitely worth investigating what Hartley and Sørensen & 
Torfing calls the initial conditions: What the impact of the initial framing is, and 
whether this framing is based on political, administrative or professional insights, 
and what the consequences are for the long-term effects of the collaborative 
innovation.  
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For bottom-up leadership, the perspective is different. Interpreting Borins’ 
description along this line of discussion, leadership and novelty creation are 
intimately and explicitly related: It is the bottom-up leader that generates a new idea 
for solving a problem, often in a holistic way; it is also the bottom-up leader that 
leads the collaborative innovation process. I assume that such bottom-up leadership 
may also have rather firm ideas on the size of the innovation, and most definitely 
have defined what the problem to be innovated is, given their professional insight. 
However, since bottom-up leadership is highly dependent on whether decision-
makers embrace the innovation project as their own, and since they have a brittle, 
unsteady mandate at the outset of the innovation process, it is a plausible assumption 
that the administrative and political boundaries of the project are much more 
difficult to establish to begin with due to the brittle mandates of the innovation 
project. This also means that it is less clear ‘what’ is supposed to be innovated: is it a 
process, a product, a service, a policy or a systems innovation? For example, 
bottom-up leadership could have a project that calls for the need for a service-
innovation; however, as the innovation unfolds and an increasing number of 
stakeholders are involved, the innovation project generates discussions, conflicts and 
makes possible strategic advantages in relation to the service-innovation. 
Accordingly, the project develops in an unexpected way that also involves a process 
innovation; implementing the innovation project makes it obvious that it is unclear 
who should actually deliver the service and what cross-organisational infrastructure 
that is capable of delivering such a service.   
Consequently, what this discussion has made visible is that different conceptions of 
leadership impose different, but strong, enabling-constraining conditions on novelty 
creation, despite the fact that the network governance-related leadership conceptions 
seemingly separates the relation between novelty creation and leadership. 
Accordingly, this process link between the conception of the initial idea generation 
and its subsequently defined implementation is in itself a research agenda worth 
pursuing for collaborative innovation, and especially so for bottom-up leadership, 
because I suggest to perceive the path-dependency from initiation to ending of the 
innovation process as necessarily much more difficult to predict and sanction. These 
blurry and undefined boundaries, as well as the unpredictable status of the type of 
innovation that is being developed, are to a high degree what both enables and 
constraints bottom-up leadership. Bottom-up leadership has no power to sanction a 
path-dependency to begin with; instead, this path-dependency is created in the 
process, granting this type of leadership qualities of adaptability and flexibility, but 
at the cost of project stability.    
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2.2.1.4 What types of problems are leadership conceptions adapted 
to?  
This fourth and final discussion point deals with the link between problem type and 
leadership. Nambisan explicitly distinguishes between ill-defined, emergent 
problems and defined problems. In both cases, collaborative innovation can be 
applied, but requires different leadership roles. However, despite the ill-defined 
nature of the problem, it is still the lead agency that owns (Nambisan, 2008) the 
infrastructure for implementing the solution. This degree of governmental control 
over problem-definition and -solution clashes with research in wicked problems, for 
as Rittel and Webber (Rittel & Webber, 1973) argue, “one of the most intractable 
problems is that of defining problems (of knowing what distinguishes an observed 
condition from a desired condition) and of locating problems (finding where in the 
complex causal networks the trouble really lies)” (p. 159).  
As a consequence, based as it is on private sector insights, Nambisan’s notion of ill-
defined problems is definitely not on the same wickedness-level as wicked problems 
in Rittel & Webber’s understanding, given the fact that Nambisan seems to assume a 
consolidated government that despite the politicisation of problem issues is able to 
define goals and solutions. This assumption seems dubious. Sørensen & Torfing also 
recognise different types of innovations in their proposed analytical framework, 
from service to system innovation, but do not explicitly differentiate the leadership 
roles according to whether it is a defined problem or a wicked problem. In his 
conceptions of leadership, Borins does not differentiate between either tame or 
wicked problems, even though his notion of ‘holistic’ does qualify as examples of 
collaborative innovation.  
So, what this discussion has clarified is that despite the fact that collaboration is 
often perceived as a necessary solution to wicked problems, seemingly collaborative 
innovation can be used to deal with both wicked and tame problems. Accordingly, 
the leadership conceptions reviewed do not conceptually tailor the leadership 
approaches to either of these problem types. What is the consequence of this deficit, 
and how can this deficit be remedied?  
Considering the first question, the consequence is that the leadership conceptions of 
collaborative innovation risk operating with a vertical image of power structure and 
problem definition that is not useful when analysing wicked problems. Or put in 
another way, having Nambisan’s conception of an ill-defined problem in mind: the 
reviewed leadership conceptions are most suitable for deployment in that political or 
administrative phase in which powerful stakeholders have been able to detect that 
there is a wicked problem, and under what sector-based hierarchy the solution to 
such a problem should be placed. For instance, obesity is a public health problem 
that could be regarded differently from a sectorial perspective: As an educational 
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issue, or as a parental/family issue, as a consumer issue, or as a social class/lifestyle 
related issue, as a civil society issue, as a private issue, etc. Each of these sector-
based perceptions and solutions will impose a certain institutional and discursive 
approach to the problem. As a consequence, if this sectorial and institutional framing 
of wicked problems is not explicitly conceptualised as part of the innovation 
process, leadership for collaborative innovation risks adopting a vertical image of 
power with the consequence of making wicked problems a less contentious issue 
than it is. 
A possibility for remedying this conceptual weakness could be to import more 
insights of network governance and collaboration research that explicitly addresses 
wicked problems. (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) Koppenjan & Klijn’s network 
management conceptual framework for wicked problems is used here as an 
illustration (2004). As Torfing (2013) assesses, this framework does not have many 
reflections on the role of power in shaping identities, interactions and institutional 
frameworks. However, I find that Koppenjan & Klijn’s framework is highly useful 
in highlighting the power struggles between actors on the same power level, i.e. a 
horizontal collaborative configuration. The ‘Zink Case’ commented on throughout 
the book is very illustrative in highlighting this point: How knowledge claims are 
highly contentious when actors interact in a context in which no one has (yet) 
succeeded in establishing a legitimate framework of interaction. Conceptually, the 
authors describe the horizontal power struggles between collaborators as being 
conditioned by uncertainty: substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainty. These 
descriptive categories of uncertainties allow for theory building that draw on 
leadership concepts that is tailored to such a context of uncertainty and conflict, 
consequently allowing for less rationalistic, and more interpretive, approaches to 
how such leadership is exercised.   
Importing Koppenjan & Klijn’s concept of uncertainty would first of all contribute 
to leadership of collaborative innovation by allowing for an expansion of the phases 
of collaborative innovation processes. Not just leadership as something that 
enhances the innovation phases from idea generation to dissemination, but also as a 
specification of leadership enacted before the innovation phase takes place. When 
studying wicked problems, this initial phase is half of the innovation as this exercise 
of leadership is what allows an innovation process to be initiated to begin with, 
because in this phase, leadership will have located the wicked problem and defined a 
framework of how to solve it, a framework that will allow collaborators to interact 
in a way that is in alignment with claims of collaborative innovation.   
2.2.2.  SUMMING UP 
This section has discussed the emerging research field of leadership for 
collaborative innovation in the public sector. The purpose was to identify what 
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theoretical design qualities leadership for collaborative innovation should adhere to 
in order to differentiate leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation. 
Consequently, these discussion points qualify how I construct a theoretical model 
for a bottom-up approach to collaborative innovation leadership in the next section. 
First of all, conceptualisations of collaborative innovation are closely connected to 
research in network governance. I argue that this may hamper further theoretical 
development of leadership approaches, because: 
1) leadership is assumed to be predefined when an innovation is initiated  
2) the issue of power related to leadership position assumes a consolidated 
lead actor and a steady mandate throughout the innovation process 
3) the relationship between novelty and leadership does not take explicitly 
take into account the enabling-constraining path-dependency that different 
leadership impose on the innovation type  
4) Leadership conceptions are not explicitly tailored to specific problem 
types, consequently running the risk of rendering the innovation of wicked 
problems a less contentious issue than it is. 
 
Accordingly, researchers should consider the following elements if they want to 
differentiate the theoretical leadership approaches to collaborative innovation: 
- Conceptualising leadership as a process phenomenon, related to leadership 
making and related identity issues 
- Develop elaborated conceptions of the relationship between influence and 
power  
- Pay attention to initial conditions of leadership positions, due to the fact 
that leadership and the relationship to what it is that generates novelty is 
intimately related to position of power and the ability to exercise such 
power 
- Conceptualising leadership approaches that can explicitly take into account 
the type of problem to be dealt with (lame/wicked), since the existing 
approaches not explicitly are tailored to a wicked problem setting, hence 
producing an image of power which is vertical in terms of the power to 
locate and define what the problem to be solved is.  
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 THEORY DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A BOTTOM-UP 2.3
APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP OF COLLABORATIVE 
INNOVATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
In this section I interpret and theorise Sandford Borins’ conception of ‘bottom-up 
leadership’ in a way that live up to many of the above listed design demands and 
recommendations. Next, I outline concepts that address weaknesses that I have 
found in Borins’ conception. Thirdly, I theoretically outline a model for bottom-up 
leadership. Fourth, I explain and discuss concepts and model. Finally I conclude, 
summing up findings and my answer to my research question.  
2.3.1. INTERPRETATION OF SANDFORD BORINS’ ‘BOTTOM-
UP INNOVATION LEADERSHIP’ 
(Borins, 2002) notes the following characteristics of bottom-up innovation 
leadership:  
- The innovations require and create leadership 
- They create an informal or alternative leadership structure 
- Leadership are on the front lines or in middle management 
- These innovations may support already defined goals, but they can also be 
new initiatives that politicians are willing to embrace as their own 
 
Borins (Borins, 2002) further note that middle managers and front line staff (i.e. 
bottom-up innovation leadership) tended to “initiate innovations that responded 
proactively” to the internal problems of the organization or took advantage of 
opportunities created by new technology (p. 469). Further, bottom-up innovations 
are highly dependent on the supportive stance of politicians and senior managers, 
and are in general dependent on bureaucratic “high-level support” (p. 471).  
Despite the many stimulating empirical observations, there are some unclear points 
in Borins’ descriptions of bottom-up innovations. First of all, it is unclear how many 
of these descriptions are related to collaborative innovations, i.e. what Borins terms 
‘holistic innovation’. As a consequence, it is not evident that Borins’ empirical 
descriptions cover the whole breadth of challenges related to leading collaborative 
innovations from the bottom of a public agency. Second, even though bottom-up 
innovation leadership may create new organisational structures and/or create an 
informal leadership structure, it is unclear what such informal leadership structures 
consist of, and how it comes into being. What is especially lacking is an explanation 
of how it is possible to conceptualize leadership which is both made and exercised 
simultaneously. Thirdly, it is unclear how the inferior power position and the related 
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brittle mandate-issue are dealt with by bottom-up leaders. Fourthly, it is unclear how 
leadership is actually made, a very relevant piece of knowledge, given the fact that 
collaborative innovations are highly conflictual processes, riddled with uncertainties, 
constantly in the risk of being caught up in ‘collaborative inertia’ (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2005). In relation to this, the conflicts associated with disturbing the local 
power structures of always specific organisations by seeking support for an 
innovation project are not part of Borins’ concept either. This is due to the fact that 
Borins’ study is focused on producing empirical knowledge by means of 
quantitative methods as well as comparative case analyses. Accordingly, Borins’ 
findings are highly valuable for professionals as well as for highlighting the general 
differences between different types of leadership, but it is not a framework that 
allows for an analysis of the variety of ways of making and exercising bottom-up 
leadership.  
Accordingly, I introduce an analytical model that builds on Borins’ descriptions of 
bottom-up innovation leadership and that furthermore addresses the unclear points 
listed above. The analytical model likewise take into account the ideal design 
demands suggested by (Bommert, 2010; Hartley, 2005) listed above, including the 
recommendations that I have suggested as a consequence of the leadership 
discussion above.   
  
2.3.2. DESCRIPTION OF CONCEPTS FOR AN ANALYTICAL 
MODEL OF BOTTOM-UP LEADERSHIP 
In the section above, I have listed ideal design demands for bottom-up collaborative 
innovation leadership conception. In this section 2.3.2, I sketch out the concepts of 
an analytical model by describing how these concepts live up to many of the above 
listed design demands. In section 2.3.3 I present and describe the analytical model. 
In section 2.4 I go more into detail with the proposed concepts explaining and 
discussing them. In section 2.5 I critically discuss the interrelatedness between the 
concepts by discussing the analytical model.     
Six analytical key concepts are proposed that make up the profile of the analytical 
model for ‘Bottom-Up Collaborative Innovation Leadership’ (‘BUCIL’, for short): 
- Process- and end-point uncertainty (Van de Ven, 1999) and wicked 
problem uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) 
- The social construction of leadership, conceptualized as leadership 
emergence through the concept of ‘recognition’ (Griffin, 2002)  
- Public Entrepreneurship (Klein, 2010) 
- Sensemaking (Weick, 1995) 
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- Giving sense (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) 
- Leadership distribution  
 
In the remainder of this theory chapter, these concepts will be further explained, 
discussed and related to each other. For now, the rationale behind the concepts, and 
the way that each concept addresses some of the design demands described above, 
will be outlined below.  
Uncertainty is the most fundamental condition in my theory building strategy, for 
several reasons. First of all, theorising bottom-up leadership by means of a condition 
of uncertainties allows me to import core elements of both wicked-problem research 
and innovation research. Accordingly, my theory building is tailored to a wicked 
problem- and innovation context. Due to the fact that wicked problems by definition 
require collaboration, my theory building ensures that the collaborative aspect is 
maintained in the bottom-up leadership framework. Second of all, uncertainty 
satisfies the recommendations produced by my discussion above: that in order to 
differentiate leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation, conceptual 
relations between leadership, power position and novelty should be 
reconceptualised. Uncertainty as a theory building conception enables a theory 
building that take into account a process perspective on leadership (i.e. leadership 
recognition); that allows for an informal, yet strategic and intentional, process 
perspective on power of influence adapted to a context of wicked problem and 
uncertainty (i.e. giving sense); and that explains how the relation between novelty 
and leadership is reconceptualised, since uncertainty enables a theoretical 
explanation of novelty creation that emerges in a process through acts of 
construction and interpretation in radical change processes (i.e. sensemaking), as 
well as an increased power base (i.e. leadership distribution).  
Uncertainty is conceptualised by means of two different aspects: a wicked problem 
uncertainty aspect and an innovation uncertainty aspect. In combination, these 
uncertainties of collaborative innovations provide the necessary assumption 
allowing bottom-up leadership to emerge in order to address a wicked problem 
through innovation: If uncertainty is not present, it will not be possible for bottom-
up leadership to emerge by making and exercising their leadership, as described 
above.  
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004)’s categories of ‘network’ uncertainty is tailored to a 
public problem type being ‘wicked’. In this respect, adopting Koppenjan & Klijn’s 
concept of substantive, strategic and institutional uncertainties, the BUCIL model is 
tailored to a condition of a wicked problem. (Van de Ven, 1999)’s descriptions of 
the innovation journey do not in itself explicitly conceptualize the journey-
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uncertainty as a specific type of uncertainty. Van de Ven et al. do describe, however, 
uncertainties that resembles bottom-up leadership uncertainty, in stating that 
proprietary entrepreneurs are “exposed to high uncertainties and risks in not 
knowing what kinds of institutional regulations, technical standards, financing 
agreements, and specialized competences will emerge for the innovation” (p. 170). 
According to Van de Ven et al. innovation uncertainty decreases over time “as 
system functions that define technical and institutional parameters for the 
innovation emerge” (p. 172). In my interpretation the metaphor of ‘journey’, Van de 
Ven et al.’s descriptions of becoming, and the authors’ descriptions of setbacks and 
iterative process do allow for a general conception of innovation uncertainty. This 
uncertainty I interpret as a process- and endpoint uncertainty: where are we in the 
process and what is actually our endpoint?  
Adopting this condition of uncertainty ensures that a theoretical balance is 
maintained between collaboration and innovation in an analysis of bottom-up 
leadership. The concept also denotes that even though bottom-up leadership is 
successful in initiating an innovation project, the project will always be contested, 
and a basic uncertainty about the viability of the entire enterprise will always be 
present. This may be even more so in a public sector which do not have the same 
focus on technological innovation as Van de Ven et al.’s research (ibid. p. 170), 
hence presumably can be contested strategically or institutionally on a running basis. 
In this respect, even though it seems likely that bottom-up led innovations may be 
characterised by less uncertainty in the end of the innovation process, this is by no 
means given in a public sector, wicked problem context. Accordingly, this 
innovation uncertainty adopted into a framework of collaborative innovation 
uncertainty allows for an analysis that takes into account that innovation always 
entails a risk, the risk that the assumed value of the collaborative innovation will not 
be acquired. 
The social construction of leadership is conceptualized by means of Griffin’s 
concept of ‘leadership emergence’ (Griffin, 2002), a concept which I have chosen to 
position within a ‘relational leadership’ research field (Uhl-Bien, 2006). Leadership 
emerges in conditions of uncertainty through social processes of ‘recognition’. As a 
result, leadership emergence as a concept firstly is a suggestion for a post-structural, 
relational, theoretical explanation of how Borins’ ‘leadership making’ is being made 
and exercised at the same time. Furthermore, the concept is a process 
conceptualisation of leadership tailored to the uncertainty of radical change and 
related identity issues, thereby addressing this design demand described in the 
discussion above. Thirdly, positioning the concept of recognition within a relational 
approach enables me to define bottom-up leadership in a demarcated, yet relational, 
way: As the group of persons belonging to the professional unit that produces the 
innovation project in focus. This definition also allows for immediate superiors to be 
included in the bottom-up leadership unit. All of these persons will in a collaborative 
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setting be perceived of as leaders by collaborators, even though they do not 
bureaucratically have this position. Accordingly, leadership is something that is 
spread out, but only in the profession-based unit that develops the innovative 
solution. Accordingly, my concept of bottom-up leadership operates with an 
identifiable organisational unit that is to be understood as the main unit of agency.   
Profession based, public entrepreneurship is my conceptualisation of Borins’ (2002) 
notion of ‘bottom-up’. This concept is crucial in that it signifies both the point of 
departure of the innovation and the character of the innovation: Entrepreneurship is 
a type of action that bottom-up leadership will have to display in order to emerge as 
a leader. The emerging bottom-up leadership has the advantage of consisting of 
professionals and perhaps an immediate superior with specialised competences 
within a given service, program or policy field. These members of such a specialised 
unit know where there is a performance gap (Klein, 2010), and they have ideas 
about which creative organisational connections to make in order to span the 
boundaries (Williams, 2002) across sectors and professions.  
As a result, conceptualising the bottom-up dimension by means of public 
entrepreneurship captures how bottom-up leadership through its specialized, 
professional insights is able to form the basis of how to initiate innovations that, in 
Borins’ terms, ‘proactively’ addresses public problems. Public entrepreneurship 
furthermore maintains Jean Hartley’s (Hartley, 2005) recommendation of 
investigating advantages/disadvantages of bottom-up innovation, by emphasizing 
that such bottom-up based innovations have a distinctive character, and 
consequently, a distinctive way of remedying internal public sector problems. 
Entrepreneurship furthermore is a type of action explicitly located in a context of 
uncertainty, sometimes even producing this uncertainty, making it plausible that this 
type of action is what enables bottom-up leadership to make and re-make novelty in 
uncertain innovation processes.     
Sensemaking is a basic social condition in radical change processes (Weick, 1995) 
enabling the involved parties to address the uncertainties associated with a 
collaborative innovation project addressing a wicked problem. Accordingly, 
sensemaking is consistent with the design demand of investigating bottom-up 
innovation advantages/disadvantages through a process-/innovation journey-
perspective on innovation, as recommended by Hartley (Hartley, 2005).  
Furthermore, sensemaking is also a concept that draws on a theoretical approach not 
conceptualised in network governance approaches to collaborative innovation 
leadership. As a consequence, adopting a sensemaking perspective to bottom-up 
leadership provides the theoretical framework of this thesis with a perspective on 
collaborative innovation processes, in which both leadership and collaborators are 
caught up in emerging, unpredictable processes. As a result, this theoretical 
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construction is opening up for analyses of processes in which the relations between 
leadership, collaborators and innovation project are less clear-cut and defined than 
what network governance-inspired leadership approaches seem to suggest. 
Sensemaking consequently allows for analyses in which a collaborative innovation 
process may be highly strategic, but nevertheless a strategic process fundamentally 
conditioned by uncertainty and ambiguity, thus pointing to a conception of actors 
and their interests as being more fluent and malleable in nature.     
Giving sense (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991)  is a concept that captures the strategic and 
intentional elements of sensemaking described above, i.e. that bottom-up leadership 
initiates a change process with a specific, intended purpose in mind. As a 
consequence, giving sense as a concept first of all addresses an unclear aspect of 
Borins’ notion of ‘informal’ leadership structures. By adopting the concept of giving 
sense I make the assumption that when uncertainty engulfs all involved 
collaborators, forcing them to make sense of the innovation process, it will be 
possible for collaborators to influence each other’s sensemaking. Consequently, 
giving sense illustrates how it is possible for bottom-up leadership to exercise 
influence by giving sense in order to acquire high-level support. 
Further, the conceptual advantage of adopting a perspective of making sense/giving 
sense related to leadership and collaborative innovation is that the concepts allows 
for analyses in which influence is not defined by organisational boundaries. Making 
and giving sense is a sort of influence which is able to spread across organizations 
despite an inferior bureaucratic power position.  
Leadership distribution is the final concept of the proposed bottom-up leadership 
analytical model. Leadership distribution is a concept that I have generated out of a 
need of emphasising a defined output in the otherwise iterative processes of 
leadership making: that the sole purpose of bottom-up leadership is to make decision 
makers embrace the innovation as their own, or otherwise make it apparent that the 
innovation project supports already existing strategies. As Borins note, bottom-up 
leadership is highly dependent on top-level support. Leadership distribution is a 
concept that captures this vertical support. Leadership distribution can, however, 
also have several outputs: it can be consolidated within one organisation, 
presumably bottom-up leadership’s owns organization, or it can be distributed, 
because also collaborators embrace the innovation project as their own. Each of 
these leadership distribution outputs enables an analysis of why a specifically 
exercised bottom-up leadership resulted in a certain sustainability and diffusion.  
Accordingly, this concept addresses the design demands of diffusion of innovation 
as well as paying attention to the fact that initial leadership position conditions how 
novelty is developed and framed, a condition which most likely has impact on how 
stakeholders and collaborators assess and embrace the innovation project.   
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In conclusion, the concepts are iteratively interlinked. It is difficult to convince 
collaborators to recognise your leadership endeavours if you cannot display a 
properly prepared project. And vice versa: It is completely futile to introduce an 
innovative project without the proper support for implementing it, i.e. being 
recognised as a leader by collaborators. And it is highly unlikely that you will 
succeed in leading collaborators with the focus of supporting your innovation 
project, without constantly trying to make sense of what you and your collaborators 
are doing internally as well as externally, thus providing you and the entire 
collaborative configuration with outlined directions for further collaboration. 
In the next section, I causally combine the concepts outlined above by means of an 
analytical model and I describe the central idea of the model.  
 
2.3.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ‘BUCIL’ ANALYTICAL MODEL 
The proposed model is displayed below in Figure 1 below.  
 
FIGURE 1: ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR BOTTOM-UP COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION 
LEADERSHIP (BUCIL) 
  
The BUCIL model is a hybrid, in that the left side of the model denotes iterative 
processes in a context of uncertainty, whereas the right-hand side in terms of 
leadership distribution is an output-category.  
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So, the BUCIL model is a model which hypothesizes that bottom-up leadership 
builds leadership in an iterative way. Bottom-up leadership introduces novelty by 
means of entrepreneurship, which requires of the professional unit to make its 
leadership and exercise leadership. When introducing a new project to collaborators 
and to its own organisation uncertainty is created: What will be the result of 
innovation project, and will it yield value (process- and endpoint-uncertainty)? For 
whom will it yield this value (strategic uncertainty)? How are collaborators 
supposed to cooperate and handle the innovative solution to a wicked problem 
(institutional uncertainty)? Do collaborators agree on the substantive content of the 
innovation project (substantive uncertainty)? Despite these uncertainties, 
collaborators are forced to somehow respond to, and make sense of, the innovation 
project, because the innovation project claims legitimacy by both identifying a 
public performance gap and by also producing a solution to how to deal with this 
performance-gap.  
Accordingly, uncertainty is forced upon collaborators. This uncertainty is what 
enables bottom-up leadership to give sense to collaborators by drawing on its 
profession-based, entrepreneurially generated novel solution to how to deal with a 
wicked problem. Most likely, such attempts of giving sense will generate both 
resistance and accept, and will have to adapt to external events, such as new 
legislation, policies and strategies, or change in personnel, since external events in 
general are typical in lengthy innovation processes (Van de Ven, 1999). In both 
cases, bottom-up leadership has to make sense of what the implications are of 
resistance and accept, since in both cases, the organisational context of the 
innovation project will have changed: either an opportunity for the innovation 
project has disappeared due to resistance, or an accept of the solution provokes 
organisational change which will have intended and unintended implications. 
Making sense of these changes by bottom-up leadership will accordingly be a 
reservoir of meaning that will inform and push for new actions of entrepreneurship. 
As a result, these new actions of entrepreneurship will redefine, or redevelop, the 
innovation project (or elements of it).  
This redefinition of the innovation project will accordingly also require of the 
leadership to make sense of its own leadership. We have to remember Borins’ 
descriptions of such leadership: Bottom-up leadership only is leadership because of 
the innovation project. Accordingly, I assume that the innovation project is the only 
legitimate basis for bottom-up leadership for demanding change on a collaborative 
scale. In this respect, bottom-up leadership differs radically from many other types 
of leadership that acquire their leadership either through bureaucratic position or 
mandate.  
As will be explained in section 2.4, I make the assumption that leadership 
‘recognition’ explains how agency and structure are enacted simultaneously. Acts of 
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leadership (entrepreneurship, giving sense related to both the purpose of innovation 
project and leadership role) are at the same time trying to introduce a new social 
structure for collaborators to interact in relation to. So, the relationship between 
leadership and innovation project can be perceived of as post-structural at the micro-
level between organisations. Because of this post-structural, almost symbiotic, 
relationship between leadership and innovation project, when the innovation project 
changes, the leadership has to make sense of whether to redefine its own identity 
according to this change. Further, the post-structural relationship entails in the 
BUCIL model that a change of leadership may also require of the innovation project 
to be adjusted. For instance, if bottom-up leadership somewhere in the innovation 
process begins to perceive of itself as a strategic and cross-organisational leadership, 
but has formulated a project that does not has these strategic and cross-
organisational elements, the innovation project will have to be enhanced in 
accordance with these leadership ambitions.   
The reason why the BUCIL model also has an output-element is that I want to 
emphasize that bottom-up leadership is a distinct leadership. It is a time-limited 
leadership with a single purpose: Formulate an innovation project that bridges an 
identified public sector performance gap in relation to a wicked problem and make 
decision makers embrace this innovation project as their own. Leadership 
distribution as an output category denotes this embracing.  
As a result, a bottom-up led collaborative innovation process can have several 
outputs. The first logical output option is that the innovation unit ceases to be the 
main driver of change because leadership is distributed amongst collaborators. This 
is the most radical form of collaboration:  Organisations share resources, and, in this 
respect, also demand that leadership is imposed on each organisation, because 
sharing resources involves major changes in the central operations of the 
organisations (Keast & Mandell, 2011). In such a scenario, the innovation project is 
embraced both vertically (up through the innovation units’ own hierarchy) and 
horizontally (across organisational hierarchies). The second logical option is that 
leadership is consolidated within the organisation of the innovation unit; the project 
is embraced by powerful stakeholders higher up in the hierarchy, but not by 
collaborators. This scenario denote another option of inter-organisational structures, 
namely that of ‘coordination’ (Keast & Mandell, 2011). Here, the main organisation 
is now the driver of change, coordinating the collaborators’ activities. The 
collaborators only make changes at the margin of their respective organisations. 
Here it would be expected that the innovation unit would continue to play a vital 
role in the implementation of the project. Finally, the third logical option would be 
that the journey of influence could be terminated if neither collaborators nor 
powerful stakeholders embrace the innovation project as their own.  
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In we work ourselves backwards through the model this output is dependent on two 
conditions. First of all, does the innovation unit manage to deliver a collaborative 
leadership that collaborators will somehow accept, despite the fact that this 
leadership is leadership in the making? As hypothesised by the relational leadership 
approaches discussed in section 2.4 below, in order to fulfil the process of 
leadership-making, the leader must demonstrate a behaviour that allows the leader to 
be recognised as a leader - despite the fact that the leader’s ability to exercise this 
required leadership is limited, due to the low formal power position within the 
innovation unit’s organisation (Borins, 2000; Borins, 2002). This requires as a 
minimum the ability to act in conditions of uncertainty and provide direction for 
collaboration by means of giving sense. This influence channel could be criticised 
for being a very soft tool, but as O’Toole (1996) notes, the strategic complexity in 
networks generates an uncertainty that makes it impossible to play the game as 
hypothesised in rational choice literature. In my interpretation, this complexity 
creates an environment of uncertainty that bottom-up leadership can utilise, enable 
bottom-up leadership to act strategically while collaborators are engaged in making 
sense of the situation.   
So, a key challenge for bottom-up leadership is to influence collaborators’ processes 
of sensemaking in order to enable the collaboration partners to overcome the inertia 
inherent in the process of collaboration. This hypothesis is much in accordance with 
the research findings of (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), in which strategies of both 
collaborative ‘ideology’ and ‘thuggery’ are deployed by partnership coordinators in 
order to move the collaborative process forward. Thirdly, in cases of turf fights, 
which are typical of especially inter-agency collaborations, it is important to display 
a project that makes ‘collaborative turf’ visible (Bardach, 1996). I would argue that 
this sort of challenge is also relevant for bottom-up leadership, inter-agency or not.     
 
Finally, entrepreneurship in BUCIL is the point of departure of the innovation 
journey. Through professional insight in a complex problem, the innovation unit is 
able to display an innovation project that connects new and existing resources in 
new ways, thus delivering a collaborative solution to how a wicked problem can be 
addressed in a way that bridges the existing performance gap. This professional 
criticism of the status quo and related public performance gap is what provides the 
innovation unit with a legitimate claim to take action to begin with. Accordingly, 
entrepreneurship is the generator of novelty. It is the ‘back stage’ (Goffman, 1990) 
in which bottom-up leadership can digest and ponder the process, thus providing the 
‘front stage’ leaders or professionals with sufficient answers to continue their 
journey of influence by giving sense. This professional criticism of the status quo 
and its public performance gap is what provides the innovation unit with a legitimate 
claim to take action from the outset. This space for action has to be expanded, partly 
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by exercising and producing leadership, partly by constantly being able to make 
sense of the on-going innovation process through engagement with collaborators and 
important stakeholders. This will provide the innovation project with a space for re-
interpretation, flexibility and new guidelines for future collaborative and intra-
organisational action. 
However, entrepreneurship is also the weakness of bottom-up leadership, in that, to 
some extent, it is always based on a specific type of professional insight (urban 
planning, teaching, environmental affairs, immigration, employment, health etc.). 
Persuading collaborators with different sectorial insights to take part in the project 
could prove a challenge in the long run, thus perhaps pulling the output option 
towards a consolidated leadership position. Much depends on whether the 
innovation unit is able to convince collaborators of the collaborative turf of the 
innovation project. As (Crosby & Bryson, 2010) note, ‘champions’ of a 
collaborative solution need to be ‘multilingual translators’ in order to be seen as 
legitimate across camps (p. 219).  
 
The analytical model allows me to define bottom-up collaborative innovation 
leadership as follows:  
I define bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership as an 1) intentional process 
aimed at the generation and implementation of new ideas in a specific context 2) 
initiated at the bottom of a public sector organisation requiring that the 3) lead unit 
responsible is able to gain influence through leadership recognition, which is 
conditioned by 4) utilisation of uncertainty through skills of public entrepreneurship, 
sensemaking and giving sense. 
Part one of the definitions is the innovation definition, consistent with other 
innovation definitions (Hartley, 2005; Poole & Van de Ven, 2004; Sørensen & 
Torfing, 2011; Van de Ven, 1999), in that innovation is defined as context-
dependent and initiated with the intention of implementation. Part two describes the 
point of departure of a collaborative innovation process, part three outlines the 
influence strategy available, and part four the skills necessary for succeeding with 
the strategy.  
This construction of bottom-up leadership makes it appropriate to analyse cases in 
which wicked problem and innovation uncertainty dominate, as is the case, I argue, 
in bottom-up collaborative innovations that seek to deal with wicked problems. 
Further, uncertainty increases the level of conflict, thus further inhibiting the 
emergence of leadership figure and making it very difficult to prescribe leadership 
action. The theoretical construction underscores that leadership-making is a very 
 65 
 
context-dependent phenomenon, highly dependent on the construction of local 
meaning in the involved organisations, thus suitable for observing leadership 
construction.   
Figure 2 below summarises the leadership profile that the BUCIL model enables 
analyses of. 
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FIGURE 2: KEY ASPECTS OF BOTTOM-UP COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION 
LEADERSHIP 
Lead figure  Collaborative leadership in the making 
Power tools Leadership recognition  
Making sense of uncertainty 
Collaborative mandate Unsteady; negotiable scope; stop-and-go 
Novelty generating 
mechanisms 
Bottom-up, profession-based innovation: 
entrepreneurship  
sensemaking  
Cooperation characteristic ‘Hilly’: bottom-up leadership is highly involved in 
all interactions, being dependent on the support of 
collaborators and own hierarchy 
Conception of innovation Entrepreneurial and profession-based solution to a 
wicked problem 
The locus of power when 
initiating innovation 
Bottom of lead agency, mustering hierarchical 
support and  seeking collaborative influence 
through leadership recognition  
Theoretical foundations Collaborative innovation in the public sector 
Relational leadership theory 
Complex responsive processes theory  
Innovation process theory 
Making and giving sense 
Wicked problems                          
Dimension of analysis Horizontal  
Multilevel 
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2.3.4. SUMMING UP 
In section 2.2.2 I have summarised earlier findings of this theory building chapter. In 
section 2.6 I conclude on the entire theory chapter. Consequently, in this summary 
section I only recapitulate and outline the previous and future steps of my theory 
building strategy.  
First, based on a literature review of the emerging research field of collaborative 
innovation, I have identified what I perceive of as the main conceptual challenge. 
The literature review also contributed to identify avenues of future research. Both of 
these findings have provided me with recommendations for how to develop new 
leadership forms. Second, my theory building strategy has been to review and 
discuss conceptions of leadership for collaborative innovation. The overall 
conclusion of this review is that the present leadership conceptions are 
undifferentiated. Accordingly, I thirdly produce some discussion points with the 
purpose of stimulating such a differentiation. The result of these discussions resulted 
in additional recommendations for how to develop new leadership forms.  Fourthly, 
taking into account the above recommendations and guidelines for future research, I 
have argued that Sandford Borins’ empirical descriptions of bottom-up leadership 
has four intriguing aspects that stimulate theory building. Fifth, I have theoretically 
interpreted Sandford Borins’ descriptions and identified weaknesses in relation to 
the previous steps in my theory building strategy. Sixth, I have outlined six 
analytical concepts in accordance with the findings related to my theory building 
strategy which, accordingly, provide us with an elaborated theoretical account of 
how bottom-up leadership is made and exercised. Seventh, since this theoretical 
outline entails emergent phenomena that often occurs simultaneously and which can 
be causally related in different ways, I have introduced an analytical model that 
clarifies these causal relationships. 
The next step in my theory building strategy is to do the following:  
 further make plausible the interactions outlined in the BUCIL model 
 to enhance the analytical focus of the BUCIL model 
 To make the deployment of the BUCIL model more accessible to other 
researchers.   
I do this by explaining and discussing in more detail the content of each concept in 
relation to the model, and by discussing what the implications of this theory building 
are in terms of how to deploy the BUCIL model in an analysis.   
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 EXPLANATION AND DISCUSSION OF ANALYTICAL 2.4
CONCEPTS  
In the sections above I have outlined how bottom-up leadership for collaborative 
innovation can be conceptualized and causally modelled.   
In this section I explain the proposed concepts in more detail. This will provide the 
details necessary for discussing each concept, as well as the interactions of the 
concepts according to the BUCIL model. Accordingly, in this section I discuss on 
two different levels. On the first level I discuss each of the proposed analytical 
concepts. On the second level, I make an overall assessment of the model (section 
2.5), pointing to unclear issues across concepts.    
I argue that the following discussion points reflect steps in a research process for 
those that want to deploy the BUCIL model in an empirical analysis. The discussion 
points furthermore clarify issues relevant for the theory development of this thesis. 
Accordingly, these discussion points are generated first of all by reflecting upon my 
own experience with operationalising the BUCIL model, second by abstract, 
theoretical considerations concerning the concepts and their interaction, thirdly by 
reflecting on critical questions that I have received during the writing of this thesis.   
 
FIGURE 3: OVERVIEW OF DISCUSSION POINTS IN RELATION TO THEORY BUILDING 
 
Uncertainty  
How is uncertainty generated? 
What is the interplay between different types of 
uncertainty, leadership and sensemaking attempts? 
Leadership emergence Does leadership emergence as processes of recognition 
satisfies the design demands listed in the above 
sections? 
Comparing RLT and leadership recognition 
Leadership recognition and collaboration 
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Public entrepreneurship Why is entrepreneurship suggested as a bottom-up 
leadership platform for initiating an innovation project? 
What is the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
leadership? 
Making sense and giving 
sense 
What is the relationship between making sense and 
giving sense? 
Which actors should be focused on in an analysis when 
the concepts are applied? 
Leadership distribution  
 
 
 
 
 
Why is leadership distribution a relevant concept for 
theorising bottom-up leadership? 
Overall assessment of the 
BUCIL model 
 
 Is the proposed model a prescriptive or descriptive 
model 
Does the model neglect a vital distinction between 
managerial and political leadership? 
 Does the theory section neglect important strands of 
literature related to each of the concepts of the BUCIL 
model? 
 What are the demands for an analytical approach 
compatible with the BUCIL model? 
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2.4.1. UNCERTAINTY  
The way that I define the function of uncertainty in relation to the BUCIL model is 
that it creates a demand for leadership. The second way that I define the function of 
uncertainty is that it allows an analysis of wicked problem-solving related to bottom-
up leadership.  
As I have explained in previous sections uncertainty plays a fundamental role in the 
BUCIL model: it is the context condition for entrepreneurship, leadership 
emergence and making and giving sense. As a consequence of previous findings 
related to my theory building strategy, each of the suggested analytical concepts has 
been selected because they theoretically are linked to uncertainty in some way or 
another. This implicates that without uncertainty, the explanatory power of the 
BUCIL model is severely reduced. For bottom-up leadership, the utilisation of 
uncertainty is the central means of exercising influence. Furthermore, the explicit 
application of uncertainty into the BUCIL framework is what distinguishes this 
leadership framework from other forms of collaborative innovation leadership as 
uncertainty brackets and disturbs all that is structured and taken for granted: 
Professional, strategic and political identities, effects of strategies and policies, 
knowledge of organisational environment, perceptions of problem fields and 
efficient resource-combinations and -interactions. As a result, uncertainty 
underscores fundamental characteristics in processes that involve collaborative 
innovation and wicked problems.   
Despite this importance, uncertainty is conceptualised differently by the analytical 
concepts outlined above and discussed in the sections below. It is outside the 
objective of this thesis to make a thorough theoretical discussion of the various 
forms of uncertainties and the practical and epistemological foundations of these. 
This is an agenda for future research. I am, however, interested in outlining a 
pragmatic vocabulary for uncertainty in relation to the BUCIL elements in order to 
allow for an analysis in which different types, or combinations, of uncertainties can 
be linked to situations in which leadership is made, exercised or blocked. 
Koppenjan & Klijn’s work, “Managing uncertainties in networks” (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004), is relevant for this thesis in that it addresses uncertainty in relation to 
collaboration, management and wicked problems. Van de Ven et al.  (Van de Ven, 
1999) describe uncertainty in relation to innovation processes. Jointly these two 
types of uncertainty dimensions are plausible as dominating phenomena generated 
when bottom-up leadership initiates a collaborative innovation process with the aim 
of addressing a wicked problem.   
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2.4.1.1 The uncertainties of wicked problems 
Koppenjan & Klijn argue that government, business and civil society are 
increasingly faced with controversies over complex societal problems, and that these 
problems are characterized by a high degree of wickedness. Consequently, parties 
not only disagree about the solution, but also the nature of the problem. A second 
feature of these problems is that ”they cut across the traditional jurisdictions of 
organizations and cross the traditional boundaries between the private and public 
sector. Governments, businesses and civil society are unable to tackle these issues 
by themselves” (p. 1). According to Koppenjan & Klijn, the uncertainty of wicked 
problems has three manifestations: substantive, strategic and institutional (p.6). 
Substantive uncertainty is focused on the aspect of the ‘what’: what is the nature of 
the complex problem? (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) state that a major source of 
uncertainty has to do with determining the nature of the problem (p. 6). Often the 
necessary information is not available on time. Further, knowledge and information 
are frequently contested (p. 6). This problem arises both because of a lack of 
information, but also a lack of interpretation of information and the establishment of 
meaning (p. 19).  
The second aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the strategic uncertainty. Due to 
the unique character of perceptions held by some actors, other actors may not 
acknowledge or be aware of these; and therefore, a large variety of strategies may 
develop around a complex issue, making it difficult to predict what strategies actors 
will choose, and how the interaction of these divergent strategies will influence the 
problem situation and problem solving process (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
The third aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the institutional. In some 
instances wicked problems cut across organisational boundaries as well as 
administrative levels and networks. This will often result in uncertainty about 
process handling and the development of interactions with other actors, since actors 
work from different institutional backgrounds. Accordingly, each actor will have its 
behaviour guided “by the tasks, opinions, rules and language” of its own 
organization, as well as own administrative level and network. This leads to 
uncertainty about how the process will be handled and uncertainty about how the 
interaction with other actors will develop (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004 , p. 7).  
Koppenjan & Klijn argue that standard responses such as information collection and 
top-down measures are inadequate. According to the authors, given the three 
manifestations of uncertainty, solving a wicked problem is not only an intellectual 
design activity, but also a strategic and institutional challenge. This requires of the 
stakeholders to interact in order to coordinate their perceptions, activities and 
institutional arrangements (p. 9).  
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2.4.1.2 Innovation journey -uncertainty 
Van de Ven et al’s study of innovation processes demonstrate, that these processes 
can be characterised as a journey characterised by uncertainty, novelty, an unknown 
endpoint and an unpredictable process (Van de Ven, 1999).  
As a consequence, the authors develop key innovation journey-concepts. In their 
studies the authors discovered how innovative ideas proliferate into many ideas, 
with the result of invention and reinvention. Many people were involved, but only 
partially. Further, the authors note that networks of stakeholders involved was 
constantly revised; that multiple environments were enacted; that the innovation 
journey consisted of multiple tracks and spin-offs; that the final result was 
indeterminate and that assessments were multiple and in-process assessments; and 
that the identity of the innovation became blurred as the new innovation and old 
orders were integrated (p. 8-9). The authors also noted that the innovations did not 
develop through a simple linear sequence or predictable stages, but instead “a much 
messier and more complex progression of events” was observed (p. 23), involving 
numerous setbacks and criteria shift. What is particularly noteworthy is that many of 
these setbacks and errors went uncorrected because of four types of learning 
disabilities: It was difficult to separate substantive issues from noise; entrepreneurs 
escalated their commitments by ignoring “naysayers”; some innovation participants 
became hyper vigilant, calling prematurely for changes; process-criteria of 
innovation success shifted over time (p. 39). 
In relation to leadership, Van de Ven et al. investigates why top-managers did not 
intervene more than they did, given the fact that the innovation teams were 
experiencing uncertainty related to learning by discovery  and testing. The authors 
argue, drawing on Weick’s concept on equivocality, that the problem managers and 
investors faced was one of multiple, conflicting meanings of their investment 
decisions ((Van de Ven, 1999). Equivocality is more a result of diverse 
interpretations, a product of “the collective and pluralistic settings in which top 
managers participate” (ibid. p. 95-96). The authors essentially argue that “in 
uncertain and ambiguous situations, organizational learning and adaptability are 
enhanced when a balance is achieved between diverse, opposing, and conflicting, 
views among innovation leaders” (p. 97). However, maintaining a balance among 
pluralistic leadership roles is essential, requiring a negotiational style of decision-
making “by objection and constructive conflict resolution processes” (p. 97).  
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2.4.1.3 Discussing uncertainties  
In the section above I have explained the uncertainties that I assume will be present 
when innovating a wicked problem through collaborative innovation. As a 
consequence, these types of uncertainty in isolation are not unique for bottom-up 
leadership. However, what makes uncertainty essential for bottom-up leadership in 
accordance with the BUCIL model is that I make the hypothesis that uncertainty is 
what allows leadership to be made and exercised at all. All of the proposed concepts 
in the BUCIL model are chosen because they acknowledge and address the relation 
between uncertainty and novelty. This selection criterion is in accordance with the 
main theoretical ambition of collaborative innovation: to be able to make conceptual 
frameworks that allows for an analysis of how different perspectives of uncertainty 
have implications for leadership, novelty creation and the consequences of the 
collaborative innovation process. 
For instance, in the collaborative innovation leadership literature reviewed in the 
start of this theory section, the networked governance based concepts of leadership 
deals with uncertainty by making plausible boundaries around it. These concepts 
build on the assumption that in an empirical setting an identifiable, already defined 
leadership or management is present. This leadership/management defines a 
framework for collaborators, allowing for the self-management and self-organizing 
of uncertainty within this framework, using hands-off and hands-on tool to optimise 
the constructive use of uncertainty. The networked governance approach to the 
management of uncertainty optimises this framed uncertainty in several ways, for 
instance by levelling power differentials, empowering participants, etc. 
As a consequence of the BUCIL framework, a new type of collaborative innovation 
leadership is made identifiable. If we compare the BUCIL framework with the 
existing leadership frameworks in relation to uncertainty, we find that this leadership 
in not ‘there’ yet as a recognised, organisational social object or identity that 
collaborators and decision makers can relate to as a leader. Accordingly, uncertainty 
for bottom-up leadership is not an organisational phenomenon already there to begin 
with, located and delineated. On the contrary, it is something that emerges, 
collapses, is being expanded, perhaps enacted strategically in the process, and is 
being utilised by bottom-up leadership.  
Accordingly, given the inferior power position of bottom-up leadership, uncertainty 
cannot be dealt with by means of a steady mandate, since powerful stakeholders 
have not yet accepted the innovation project on a strategic level. The innovation 
project ‘only’ has status of a ‘project’. As a result, the way that bottom-up leadership 
deals with uncertainty is to stabilize and frame the collaborative configuration on a 
running basis. Not by mandate and strategic negotiations, but instead by a piecemeal 
form of sensemaking, utilising uncertainties in numerous interactions to influence 
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stakeholders, slowly building up momentum and increasing the scope of the project 
on a running basis.  
Given the important role of uncertainty for the BUCIL model, some analytical 
assumptions are worth discussing:  
 How is uncertainty generated?  
 What is the interplay between different types of uncertainty, leadership and 
sensemaking attempts? 
By discussing these issues I approach the limit of what can be theoretically explored 
within the boundaries of this thesis.  
 
How is uncertainty generated? 
Following the empirical descriptions of Borins, it seems most plausible that it is 
bottom-up leadership, perhaps in alliance with other stakeholders that initiates a 
process, in which uncertainty begins to surface. This conception of uncertainty is 
also made plausible by both Weick and Gioia (see section 2.4.5 below) who both 
argue that giving sense, or manipulating sense making, requires some sort of 
proactivity on behalf of the actor that wants to influence other stakeholders’ 
sensemaking processes.  
Applying the concept of entrepreneurship in the BUCIL model likewise puts 
proactivity in conditions of uncertainty at the centre of analysis when explaining 
innovation. Weick’s conception furthermore points to the fundamental constructive 
elements of sensemaking: Something is made sensible, and this making sensible 
requires acts of construction, in which a specific environment is produced. In this 
respect, the BUCIL model points to the fact that it is bottom-up leadership that 
produces and strives to enact a certain perspective on reality. In this certain 
perspective, a wicked problem is constructed as a problem and is being made 
possible to observe and identify for collaborators: as a problem that requires 
collaboration, as a problem that illuminates a public sector performance gap, as a 
problem that is highly complex, as a solution that likewise requires a complex 
solution – an innovation.   
However, even though it is bottom-up leadership that initiates an innovation process, 
and therefore generates uncertainty, this does not necessarily imply that it is 
extremely difficult to deal with this uncertainty, or that bottom-up leadership has to 
spend a lot of energy to mobilise support for an innovation agenda. In Borins’ 
descriptions bottom-up leadership acts proactively, before a public issue turns into a 
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crisis. In this respect, we get the image that a murmur is present in the ‘system’ (the 
public sector, group of stakeholder organisations), a dissatisfaction. Bottom-up 
leadership must be able to bring this dissatisfaction to the fore and synthesise it into 
a consistent critique of the status quo.  
Van de Ven et al.’s research supports this assumption. In Van de Ven et al.’s 
research on innovation, the ‘innovation journey’ is triggered by some sort of 
‘shock’, either internal or external to the organisation (Van de Ven, 1999). However, 
the authors note that innovations are not initiated “on the spur of the moment, by a 
single dramatic incident, or by a single entrepreneur”. In fact, before the “shock” 
phase, there was “an extended gestation period lasting several years in which 
seemingly coincidental events occurred that preceded and set the stage for the 
initiation of innovations” (p. 23). These descriptions resembles a Comples 
Responsive Processes perspective on novelty creation (see section 2.4.2 below), in 
which novelty cannot be created by designed leadership interventions through a top-
down mandate, but is something that emerges through micro-interactions on a daily 
basis, in which slowly, a new organisational theme is emerging as a consequence of 
numerous interactions within and across organisations.  Accordingly, it seems most 
likely that fragmented dissatisfaction of public agencies or stakeholders with contact 
to a wicked problem field will provide the seedbed for bottom-up leadership from 
which to launch a holistic critique of status quo.  
What is the interplay between different types of uncertainty, leadership and 
sensemaking attempts?  
The application of uncertainties to the framework of BUCIL opens up for theoretical 
and analytical questions with regard to the combinatory implications of uncertainty 
in relation to leadership emergence and sensemaking attempts. In this discussion 
section, I will briefly explore some plausible answers to this discussion point.  
First of all, one could critically ask whether BUCIL assumes that all four 
uncertainties should be present at the same time in order for leadership to emerge. 
Do all four types of uncertainties make a joint demand for leadership, or will 
specific combinations of uncertainty block or increase the demand for a bottom-up 
leadership?  
The answer to the first question would be that one or several of the uncertainties that 
Koppenjan & Klijn mention in relation to wicked problems must be present in order 
to enable an emergent leadership to be recognised by collaborators. This is because 
these uncertainties are what makes collaborative innovation distinct from single-
organizational innovation. If this collaborative dimension is removed, BUCIL might 
as well be applied to a single-organisational context. The wicked problem 
uncertainties are what underscore that the environment of bottom-up leadership is 
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highly strategic and politicised, even though bottom-up leadership may be succesfull 
in both constructing, enacting and utilising such uncertainty. Accordingly, this type 
of uncertainty is also what makes the BUCIL model relevant for a public sector 
context, in that these uncertainty categories are produced by Koppenjan & Klijn as a 
result of their research in how network management is possible for a public sector 
agency.   
Furthermore, I assume that the interplay between a journey-uncertainty and wicked-
problem uncertainty could result in either resistance to, or demand for, leadership. A 
journey-uncertainty underscores element of experiment, development, risk, the 
current change in objectives and assessments criteria, unknown boundaries of the 
innovation project and, hence, an endpoint uncertainty. This uncertainty could 
contribute to a demand for leadership in combination with a substantive uncertainty 
related to a wicked problem. Being a profession based, i.e. specialized, leadership I 
assume that bottom-up leadership will stand strong in coming up with a detailed, 
experience-based solution for how to deal with the substantive uncertainty of a 
wicked problem. I would also assume that a journey-uncertainty could block for the 
demand of leadership in combination with an institutional uncertainty, because 
people in other organisations would have difficulties relating to, for instance, the 
future institutional ramifications of the project, such as interorganisational 
management, political responsibility, resource provision, judicial aspects of joint 
public service delivery etc. Accordingly, it seems plausible that bottom-up 
leadership would have to take into account, and address, the substantive, 
institutional and strategic aspects of a collaborative innovation project.  
So obviously, this explorative discussion has stimulated to reveal some limitations 
of the BUCIL model that also stem from the research field of collaborative 
innovation:  that a more thorough discussion is required within the research field of 
collaborative innovation in the public sector concerning the different aspects of 
uncertainty. This explorative discussion also denotes that empirical research is 
needed in order to clarify combinatory implications of uncertainties.  
 
2.4.2. LEADERSHIP-MAKING IN A COLLABORATIVE 
INNOVATION CONTEXT 
In this section, I conceptualise leadership-making in a collaborative innovation 
context. I first explain two relational leadership approaches, each suitable for 
studying different aspects of leadership-making: Relational Leadership Theory 
(‘RLT’) and the theory of complex responsive processes (‘CRP’). Next I discuss 
these two approaches.  
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Relational Leadership Theory (RLT) was introduced by Uhl-Bien (Uhl-Bien, 2006). 
An operational definition for relational leadership is that “(1) some social order is 
constructed; and (2) structurally differentiated groups emerge which proceed to 
perceive each other’s ‘qualifications’ within constructed realities that become 
operative through the relationships inherent in or constitutive of social order” 
(Dachler & Hosking, 1995), qf. (Uhl-Bien, 2006). Also, participants are leaders 
when they: “(1) consistently make effective contributions to social order, and (2) are 
both expected and perceived to do so by fellow participants” (Hosking, 1988), cf. 
(Uhl-Bien, 2006).  
Uhl-Bien sums up the definition of relational leadership as “the social influence 
process through which emergent coordination (i.e. evolving social order) and 
change ((i.e., new values, attitudes, approaches, behaviours, ideologies, etc.) are 
constructed and produced” (Uhl-Bien, 2006) p. 668.) In this respect, leadership is 
an outcome.  
In order to reach these definitions, Uhl-Bien describes leadership as something that 
is constituted by the social construction of a certain type of reality in social relations.  
The opening quote in Uhl-Bien (p. 654) is revealing. It defines the radical range of 
RLT:  Leadership as being close to a social process in which the location of 
leadership in terms of agency becomes less relevant, since leadership is embedded in 
a dynamic system:  
“We consider the relational perspective and [the approaches within it]…to be at the 
forefront of emerging leadership thrusts…The relational focus is one that moves 
beyond unidirectional or even reciprocal leader/follower relationships to one that 
recognizes leadership wherever it occurs; it is not restricted to a single or even a 
small set of formal or informal leaders; and, in its strongest form, functions as a 
dynamic system embedding leadership, environmental, and organizational aspects” 
(Hunt & Dodge, 2000, p. 448 quoted from Uhl-Bien p. 654). 
Uhl-Bien argues that two approaches to leadership and relations exist. A traditional 
entity approach that focuses on relationships from the standpoint of individuals as 
individual agency vs. a relational approach that view leadership as social 
constructions, starting not with persons but processes (p. 655).  
In Uhl-Biens conception, entity approaches are focused on individuals and their 
perceptions, intentions, personalities and expectations. Entity approaches view 
leadership as an influence relationship. In these relationships individuals align to 
accomplish mutual and organizational goals. These approaches assume a realist 
ontology. Moreover, the approaches focus on manager-subordinate exchanges under 
the condition that structures are already organized (p. 661).   
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In contrast to entity-approaches, relational leadership see leadership as social-
relational processes of organizational design and change (p. 661).  A relational 
perspective changes the focus from the individual to the collective dynamic. In these 
social processes, leaders and with whom they interact are responsible for the 
relationships they construct together. Accordingly, relational perspectives view the 
multiple realities of self and other as constructed (p. 662).  
Relational constructionism is the most prominent approach to relational perspectives 
of leadership (p. 662). This approach suggests to focus on processes, understood as 
“the influential acts of organizing that contribute to the structuring of interactions 
and relationships” (p. 662). This ‘relational ontology’ raises questions such as how 
the processes of leadership and management in organizations emerge, and how 
“realities of leadership are interpreted within the network of relations”. Further 
questions are how decisions and actions are embedded in collective sense-making 
processes (p. 662). So, the focus of relational constructionism is on processes of 
interaction, conversation, narrating, dialoguing and multiloguing (p. 663). In this 
perspective, meaning is constantly negotiated and renegotiated, deriving its meaning 
“within the context of its particular sociocultural location”. (p. 663).  
Across relational perspectives leadership is viewed as the processes by which a 
social order is constructed and changed (p. 664). RLT is therefore a process theory 
of leadership (p. 666). RLT is focuses on the relational processes “by which 
leadership is produced and enabled” (p. 667). RLT does not preclude manager-
subordinate relationships, but is just recognized as one form of leadership. 
Accordingly, other types of leadership may be just as important. By using RLT as an 
approach to leadership it is possible to see other leadership relations than those built 
form hierarchy (p. 667). This focus is a break from the notion that position is 
necessarily a reflection of leadership (ibid.).  
An important question to address when perceiving of leadership as process is to 
define what distinguishes such leadership processes from other relational processes? 
The processes studied should demonstrate that a new social order is constructed and 
that groups emerge who perceive of each other’s qualifications within constructed 
realities as a result of the process. In such processes, leadership identifies a 
relationship in which some people are able to persuade others (p. 667). In this 
respect, leadership in itself seen as an outcome.  
Pursuing this research agenda, the focus is on investigating “how leadership 
relations are produced by social interactions” (p. 669). A specific research agenda 
identified by Uhl-Bien could adopt a constructionist perspective and examine 
relationship development focused on “skilful processes”. Here, leaders are those 
who make salient contributions and are recognized as such “because participants 
construe their influence as compatible with the means by which they seek to satisfy 
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their own values and interests” (p. 669). According to Uhl-Bien, this perspective 
views leadership as a political process, in which different participants seek to further 
different and sometimes conflicting values and interests. Much in accordance with 
the BUCIL model, such research could focus on sensemaking activities of 
participants. Uhl-Bien suggests to investigate acts which influence social 
constructions; those who are perceived to make the most significant and consistent 
contributions, and why they are perceived to do so (p. 669). Another research 
agenda would be to focus more on the emergence of a social order as a process of 
structuring (p. 670), in which leadership can result from everyday practices.       
 
Having now explained relational leadership theory, I turn to the concept of 
leadership emergence as ‘recognition’, and how this concept builds on what I have 
interpreted as a specific instance of a relational leadership approach, that of the 
theory of complex responsive processes.  
The theory of complex responsive processes (‘CRP’) (Fonseca, 2002; Griffin, 2002; 
Shaw & Stacey, 2006; Stacey, 2007) is chosen in this thesis as a certain type of 
relational leadership theory, and it is from CRP that the concept of ‘recognition’ is 
to be understood. CRP as a social theory understands the complexity of 
organisational life through the social theories of Herbert A. Mead and Norbert Elias. 
It delivers workable propositions regarding leadership-making in micro-interactive 
processes of uncertainty. The value of CRP in terms of leadership-making for 
collaborative innovation is the proposal of (i) a general management theory with a 
solution to the structure-agency dilemma of social theory  and (ii) a theory which is 
focused on novelty and identity creation in processes of uncertainty, conflict and 
power. The first point is valuable by allowing for an explanation of how bottom-up 
leadership can be exercised and made at the same time. The second point is valuable 
by locating these structure-agency aspects of leadership within a framework of 
uncertainty and conflict, an aspect highly relevant for processes related to innovation 
and wicked problems. Below, I will explain these two elements in more detail.  
The explanatory strength of CRP in relation to bottom-up leadership perspective is 
the process perspective on organisational development. This perspective is able to 
explain how novelty emerges in everyday life of organisations. CRP should be 
understood as a pure descriptive theory. Accordingly, Stacey concludes that CRP 
implies a new focus, a focus on the quality of participation, conversational life, 
anxiety and diversity, as well as on unpredictability and paradoxes (Stacey 2011, p. 
475). This process focus is relevant for bottom-up leadership, in that bottom-up 
leadership due to its lack of formal power is forced to participate and interact in a 
process characterised by uncertainties in order to influence collaborators.   
 80 
 
So, CRP’s strong focus on interaction and participation is important in that it argues 
for an actual necessity of leadership interaction. In contrast to a system theory 
perspective on organisational development, CRP does not conceptualize an 
organisation as a ‘whole’ which you can describe and influence from the outside (p. 
440). Managers need to interact in order to create development, and novelty happens 
as a consequence of numerous actions and interactions.  
 
This perspective of leadership as participants in a development process leads to an 
understanding of such leadership related processes which to a high degree provides a 
conceptual bridge between sensemaking and leadership. Stacey stresses that we need 
to pay more attention to the quality of conversations, because it is through the 
engagement in these self-organising organisational conversations that choices and 
responses emerge:  
“in moving from the position of manager as objective observer of a system to that of 
manager as participant in emergent enquiry, attention is focused on the unexpected 
an complex patterning of the responses of organisational members to managers 
intentions. Intention and design are understood as emergent and problematic 
processes and attention is focused on the interplay of intentions. The emphasis 
shifts from the manager focusing on how to make a choice to focusing on the quality 
of participation in self-organising conversations from which such choices and the 
responses to them emerge. It becomes a personal matter of reflecting together on the 
quality of participation” (2007: 444, my bold,) 
 
This perspective is relevant as it forces bottom-up leadership to constantly 
communicate and adapt its ideas of change in communication with other 
organisational participants, and further to reflect on why processes become 
problematic and on why the interplay of intentions results in other participants 
supporting, challenging or opposing the innovation project.  
Accordingly, Stacey & Griffin 2005 (Griffin & Stacey, 2005) note that the self-
organising and emergent draw attention to the fact that agents interact on the basis of 
their own locally organising principles, and that it is through this interaction that 
coherence emerges, without a predefined program or plan. These generalisations of 
coherence take on the forms of power in terms of social objects and cult values (p. 
8).  
This agenda is valuable for a theoretical explanation of leadership-making suitable 
for innovation in particular since uncertainty and explanations of novelty creation 
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are the focus. Griffin (Griffin, 2002) narrows down CRP to focus explicitly on ways 
in which leadership emerges in communicative, everyday interactions in 
organisations. Leadership has to be involved in everyday communicative 
interactions in order to influence the creation of organisational themes and the 
creation of ‘social objects’. The contradiction between individual and collective is 
preserved by arguing in favour of a self-contradictory approach, ‘participative self-
organisation’ (Griffin, 2002): Both the collective and the individual form and are 
formed by each other in local interactions. Power is to be understood as ideological 
and functional. Leadership as power has to be negotiated in conflictual, local 
processes of interaction, i.e. the functional power, in order to have an effect on 
organisational life.  
According to Griffin, that which leads to recognition as a leader is the improvement 
of a person’s ability to articulate emergent ‘themes’ of sensemaking in an 
environment of insecurity, as well as the person’s willingness to act in unfamiliar 
circumstances. ‘Themes’ is defined as relationally: “relationships between people in 
a group can then be defined as continuously iterated patterns of intersubjective 
themes that organise the experience of being together…themes interact in many, 
many local situations in which patterns of relating continuously emerge both locally 
and across populations. These patterns are changes in the themes organising local 
interaction as group members seek to negotiate with, and respond to, each other in 
some way as members of community” (Stacey 2011, p. 340). 
Further propositions regarding factors that generate recognition are that leaders tend 
to be idealised; leaders can assume the attitude of the ‘generalized other’; they 
display greater spontaneity, they take risks; and they interact creatively despite 
unknown circumstances (Griffin 2002). Griffin accentuates that the CRP conception 
of leadership as participation with others has some explicit normative consequences 
for effective leadership:  
”So, what is the practice of effective leadership from the perspective of complex 
responsive processes? The practice is that of participating skilfully in interaction 
with others in reflective and imaginative ways, aware of the potentially destructive 
processes one may be caught up in. It is in this practice that one is recognized as 
leader, as one who has the capacity to assist the group to continue ethically, 
creatively and courageously into the unknown. This is a very different way of 
understanding the role of leader to the mainstream perspective on which the leader 
stands outside the system, designing, manipulating variables and pulling levers in 
order to stay in control” (ibid., p. 13) 
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 Another central aspect is to act imaginatively, which requires reflexive capacities:  
”spontaneity then means the capacity to act in a wider range of ways, taking risks 
and often surprising oneself and others. Such a capacity must be particularly 
valuable when it comes to acting into the unknown” (Stacey & Griffin 2005, p. 11). 
 
Summing up, RLT and CRP provide us with a perspective on leadership that focuses 
not on individual traits, but on the ways in which collectives are moved in a certain 
direction through the social construction of leadership roles. These collectives are 
influenced by new organisational themes, i.e. patterns of micro-interaction, through 
conflict-ridden, even destructive, interactions between the people working in 
organisations. This enables a perspective of leadership in which leadership-making 
can be studied in social relations at all organisational levels and by all people 
involved. From CRP, we also have the proposition that it is possible to influence 
collaborators through the formulation of organisational themes, possibly resulting in 
‘strategizing’ (Stacey, 2007), as well as to be recognised as a collaborative leader by 
taking action in circumstances of uncertainty. This approach to leadership highlights 
the way in which leadership can influence processes of sensemaking across 
organisations.  
 
2.4.3. DISCUSSING LEADERSHIP EMERGENCE 
Below, I will discuss three points:  
 Whether leadership emergence as processes of recognition satisfies the 
design demands listed in the above sections 
 In what ways leadership recognition and RLT are similar and differs 
 what the theoretical challenges are with transferring organisational 
development and leadership theory to a collaborative context 
 
Does leadership emergence as processes of recognition satisfies the design demands 
listed in the above sections? 
Leadership emergence satisfies the demands that I have listed throughout the above 
sections in this chapter. In relation to leadership of collaborative innovation in 
general the concept lives up to my reflection concerning whether a collaborative 
innovation research agenda should consider working with a process perspective in 
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relation to leadership as well as on the collaborative innovation. Leadership 
emergence stresses the fact that leadership is something that is made through social 
interactions in organisations.  
The concept is also highly relevant for an innovation agenda in that it is based on 
theory that explains how novelty is created. CRP imports theoretical elements from 
many different research disciplines, but at the core of the theory is the ambition of 
producing an analytical framework that highlights complexity, engagement, paradox 
and unpredictability. In order to produce this framework, CRP imports element from 
Mead, Elias and complexity science. Mead and Elias in conjunction are of 
importance. Mead’s research is being used by CRP to argue that in every day 
interactions among people in organisations, there is always the possibility that 
novelty can arise.  
The concept is furthermore important for bottom-up leadership in that it is based on 
theory that can explain how new social orders emerge simultaneously with the 
emergence of leadership. CRP’s import of Elias is of relevance by providing a 
theory of how human agency is always located within relations of power that both 
enables and constraints (Stacey & Griffin p.6). Consequently, CRP produces a sort 
of theory building within organisations that positions it closely to other sociological 
attempts to overcome the structure-agency dilemma of social science, such as 
Anthony Giddens well-known structuration theory, as well as other post-structural 
theories such as Michel Foucault’s concepts of discourse, Niklas Luhmann's concept 
of social systems, and Pierre Bourdieu's framework of habitus and power struggles 
within fields. However, in contrast to many of these theories, the CRP focus 
narrowly takes outset in the actions and patterns of interactions of the micro-level in 
order to emphasise not to reify structures.  
Consequently, CRP as a theoretical base is valuable for a conception of bottom-up 
leadership in that it is applicable to a context of uncertainty, novelty, conflict and 
power, and because it can explain how leadership is made through a dialectic with a 
new social order created when the bottom-up unit begins to formulate and 
communicate its innovation project.   
Hence, this conception of leadership allows for a radical re-interpretation of the 
following question: What is leadership in relation to organizational development? 
According to Griffin, it is possible to conceptualise bottom-up leadership as the 
main leadership in change processes insofar as it lives up to the preconditions that I 
have highlighted above, in particular the ability to bear uncertainty, take risks, be 
reflective, spontaneous  and involved in numerous interactions.   
Griffin’s notion of leadership emergence as something that happens through social 
processes of recognition is furthermore important for the collaborative innovation  
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context as I have hypothesized in the BUCIL model in that it addresses the relation 
between uncertainty and leadership: When uncertainty is present in an organisation, 
people are searching for answers. If leaders demonstrate the ability to act in these 
conditions of uncertainty, as well as being able to introduce new themes, people may 
accept these themes. This general explanation of how leadership is dependent on the 
ability to bear uncertainty as well as coming up with a new organisational theme is 
consistent with Borins’ descriptions of how innovation and leadership are 
interlinked. And further, since bottom-up leadership does not have formal power, the 
informal leader is forced to interact in order to spread its novelty throughout the 
organization. Accordingly, a concept of recognition focuses attention to the fact that 
the construction of a leadership identity and a novel organisational theme can occur 
simultaneously. This is why bottom-up leadership and collaborative innovation 
processes are intertwined processes: They are agency and structure initiated 
simultaneously when bottom-up leadership begins communicating a critique of an 
existing performance gap and a perceived solution.  
 
Comparing RLT and leadership recognition 
Griffin’s concept of recognition can be perceived of as a specific instance of a 
Relational Leadership Theory approach, in that it satisfies the assumptions of RLT 
that Uhl-Bien lists (p.668):  
1. Leadership relationships are not restricted to hierarchical positions or roles, 
but occur throughout the organization 
2. Leadership relationships are identified by “interactive dynamics that 
contribute to emergence or direction of social order and action” (ibid.) 
3. Relational leadership at a collective level studies the whole process by 
which social systems change, including how the socially constructed roles 
and relationships can be labelled leadership 
4. All relationships occur in a context, and this context is important to the 
study of relational dynamics 
However, combining Griffin and Borins’ notion of bottom-up leadership in the 
BUCIL model makes the leadership conception a more operationalized version of an 
RLT instance. In my conception of bottom-up leadership, leadership is not restricted 
to hierarchical positions or to formal bureaucratic power. This is in accordance with 
RLT. But leadership in an analysis of bottom-up leadership using the BUCIL model 
is per definition located a priori:  The focus of analysis is a profession-based unit in 
a public sector agency that has developed an innovation project.  
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Second of all, in the BUCIL model, I have also defined the main legitimacy of such 
leadership, in that this legitimacy is acquired at the outset from the entrepreneurial 
ability to come up with a solution to a perceived performance gap as the central 
problem, in relation to a wicked problem. Accordingly, the solution has to be cross-
sectorial in some ways. Furthermore, the power of influence is likewise defined: 
influence to give sense in conditions of uncertainty, preconditioned on gaining 
recognition, by the ability to bear uncertainty, take risks, be reflective, and 
spontaneous.  
The implication is that even though my suggestion for leadership emergence allows 
for a process analysis of how leadership is socially constructed through relations of 
recognition with collaborators, it locates leadership a priori, accordingly emphasizes 
agency. By so doing I adopt another approach to some aspects of RLT which in its 
most radical form perceives leadership as embedded in a dynamic system.  
In my perspective, leadership is not seen as a dynamic system, in which leadership is 
embedded – leadership is something which is tied to a bottom-up position and the 
actions taken, taking into consideration enabling and constraining elements in the 
environment, enacted by bottom-up leadership. So, my argument is that it is bottom-
up leadership that interprets and constructs the ‘system’ in which collaborators 
should interact, not the other way around. Accordingly, my perspective of leadership 
is strongly related to Weick’s and Gioia’s conception of sense-making and giving 
sense as acts of construction in which a certain environment is made sensible, 
constructed and enacted.  
Accordingly I work with the assumption that bottom-up leadership is the driver and 
leader, implicating that other actors are not considered as being part of the 
leadership – they are placed on the other side of the leader/non-leader distinction, 
being here conceptualised as champions, sponsors and collaborators.    
Despite denoting a defined leadership the BUCIL model do have several elements of 
relational, social constructivist approaches to leadership. First of all, the entire 
BUCIL model assumes that leadership is something that is socially constructed; it 
explains how this construction comes about. But the content of this construction is 
left open for empirical investigations. Second, it is by no means fixed in the BUCIL 
model what the relation is between the proposed social order (i.e. the innovation 
project) and how bottom-up leadership defines its role in relation to this new 
proposed social order. It is furthermore not defined in the BUCIL model how 
emergent leadership and its critique of the status quo are interpreted and reacted to 
by collaborators and relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, it is not defined how 
bottom-up leadership mobilises support or how it reacts to the criticism and 
opposition of stakeholders. All of these issues are empirical and left open for an 
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analysis, allowing these social objects, relations and identities to be constructed in 
empirical investigations.   
 
Leadership recognition and collaboration 
One could critically ask whether leadership emergence is suitable for a collaboration 
agenda, being not specifically developed within such a context. This is indeed a 
relevant critique since the reviewed CRP and RLT literature concerning leadership 
does not operate with a collaborative dimension. Accordingly this literature could be 
assuming a single-organisational context or not deeming this distinction relevant.     
There are different ways to answer the above question. The first answer would be 
that the BUCIL model is actually based on the assumption that different types of 
collaborative leadership will be involved: bureaucratic and informal. This is clear in 
Borins’ description of bottom-up leadership and the way that the sometimes holistic 
innovation projects are developed: the purpose is to get decision makers to embrace 
the project as their own; bottom-up leadership operates both in the shadow of 
hierarchy, by making informal, or entire new, leadership structures in a strategic 
way but also being forced to activate hierarchy in order to increase the scope of the 
innovation project. Consequently, it is an empirical question when formal 
leadership, i.e. decision makers, engage with the bottom-up driven innovation, and 
how they do it. For instance, one could imagine a scenario in which bottom-up 
leadership uses its network to create a demand in its own organisation and in some 
of the other would-be collaborating organisations for a policy or strategy related to a 
wicked problem. This could have the consequence that bottom-up leadership 
forcefully can deliver an argument to politicians or CEOs in its own organisation 
that the problem is perceived of by other stakeholders, and that a strategy/policy has 
to be developed. So, in this scenario formal, bureaucratic power would be involved 
rather late in the process, with the purpose of mainly sanctioning a project that 
bottom-up leadership through numerous interactions can display of as viable and 
possible. This is actually the case in the empirical analyses in this thesis.  
However, numerous other scenarios are possible. For instance, one could also 
imagine a scenario in which bottom-up leadership first mobilises all available 
resources in order to influence its own managers and CEOs. This could have the 
consequence that these decision makers are involved early in the project, being 
involved in reflecting on how to proceed, what elements of the innovation project 
that should be removed or up-scaled, and how to establish contact with relevant 
stakeholders.  
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The second answer would be that whether such leadership can be recognised in a 
collaborative configuration is exactly part of bottom-up leadership’s challenge. 
However, being recognised in a collaborative configuration will, I argue, be more 
difficult than the CRP literature sometimes seems to suggest. For instance, Griffin 
assumes that if a unit, manager, group of persons etc. are able to bear uncertainty 
and to introduce new themes, increasing the quality of participation and interaction, 
this leadership will be recognised. However, in a collaborative context, this is by no 
means certain. Despite displaying all these qualities, collaborators may reject an 
innovation project out of strategic, institutional or substantive reasons. This is 
especially so for wicked problems. Because even though these problems may appear 
wicked to bottom-up leadership, it may not have been made sensible to collaborators 
that it is in fact wicked. An often mentioned feature of wicked problems is exactly 
that it is very difficult to define the problem to begin with (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
So, we may hypothesise that a major ground-breaking challenge for bottom-up 
leadership is to convince collaborators that a wicked problem actually exists to begin 
with, in Weick’s words: to make it sensible. If bottom-up leadership succeeds with 
this, uncertainty may begin to surface in the collaborators’ organisations, leading to 
a demand for answers, initiating iterative processes of leadership recognition. 
Accordingly, what is relevant for an empirical investigation of bottom-up leadership 
would be to pay attention to how bottom-up leadership is able to make a platform of 
interaction with collaborators.   
 
2.4.4. PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP:                         
BRIDGING THE PERFORMANCE GAP THROUGH 
PROFESSION-BASED ACTIVITIES 
In the BUCIL model I assume that public entrepreneurship is what provides 
leadership with both a legitimate claim for change as well as the ability to create 
novelty. I suggest that the concept of public entrepreneurship captures these aspects 
of bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership. Below I explain and discuss why.  
Klein et al. provide a valuable adaption of entrepreneurship  to a public sector 
context. The authors conceive public agents “as nominal stewards of resources that 
are commonly or jointly owned by members of a community” (p. 2). According to 
the authors public entrepreneurship encompasses a wide range of activities: 
changing the institutional environment, establishing new organizations, creating and 
managing public resources, and taking advantage of spillovers by private actors for 
the good of society (ibid.). The authors conceptualize entrepreneurship not as a 
specific individual or type of firm but as a function. Klein et al. argue that, despite 
their limitations, private and public entrepreneurships have a shared characteristic, 
namely that entrepreneurs are defined as “decision-makers in the allocation of 
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scarce resources under uncertainty”, focusing on bridging a perceived performance 
gap. Reviewing entrepreneurship conceptions held by Knight (1921), Kirzner (1973) 
and Schumpeter (1934), Klein et al. find that in the public sector, entrepreneurship is 
a function characterized by the following:  
 Alertness to opportunities (Kirzner, 1973)  
 Judgmental decision-making about investment under uncertainty (Knight, 
1921) 
 Product, process and market innovation (Schumpeter, 1934) 
Kirzner’s relevance for public entrepreneurship is, according to (Klein, 2010), that 
both private and public entrepreneurs “perceive gaps between actual and potential 
outcomes or performance, and look for resources to close the gap” (p. 3). Public 
entrepreneurship accordingly seek to marshal resources for fulfilling public or social 
interests, deploying them for better performance on public objectives (p. 3). So, the 
application to public entrepreneurship is sensing shifts in public preferences, 
anticipating common problems, identifying out-of-date practices, agencies and other 
institutions and avoiding undesirable outcomes in the public interest (p. 6).  
Knight’s relevance for public entrepreneurship is to focus on investments under 
uncertainty. Knight’s concept is in contrast to Kirzner’s, in that profit opportunities 
only exist in retrospective, i.e. after gains and losses are realized (Klein et al. p. 3). 
Klein et al. argue that Knight’s concept is important in that it stresses a focus on 
uncertainty-bearing: the greatest economic returns accrue to those who can bear 
market uncertainties. Accordingly, public entrepreneurship is required to make 
investments under uncertainty. Klein et al. argue that this may require establishment 
of public organizations, and may yield major returns, but entrepreneurship may also 
lead to failure (p. 3). So, the application to public entrepreneurship is investment of 
public resources to meet political objectives, evaluating the suitability of various 
policies for achieving particular outcomes, and identifying gamesmanship nominally 
in pursuit of public interests but truly in private interests (p. 6).  
Schumpeter’s concept of entrepreneurship is, according to Klein et al., a function 
that “disturbs existing patterns of resource allocation through bold, creative action” 
(p. 3). Accordingly, this function is what that enables the introduction of new 
political products and processes (p. 4). 
In my perspective, Hagedoorn (Hagedoorn, 1996) provide a valuable elaboration on 
Schumpeter’s concept of the entrepreneur in relation to innovation. Schumpeter 
defined innovation as ‘new combinations’ (p. 887). The entrepreneur can be 
described as the only agent of economic change. As a result, the entrepreneur is “the 
personification of innovation, i.e. the individual who carries out new combinations” 
(p.  889). According to Hagedoorn, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is in the first 
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place characterised by proactive behaviour and “not necessarily a strictly rational 
economically maximising subject” (p. 890), that is, a both rational and irrational 
agent who “seems to be never satisfied by results based on existing innovations, but 
who keeps searching for new opportunities” (p. 890). Schumpeter defined in his late 
writings the entrepreneur as follows:  
“The entrepreneurial function need not be embodied in a physical person and in 
particular in a single physical person. Every social environment has its own ways of 
filling the entrepreneurial function…Again the entrepreneurial function may be and 
often is filled cooperatively” (Schumpeter, 1949, p. 71-72, quoted from Hagedoorn 
1996, p. 891). “ 
According to Klein et al. (p. 6), the application of Schumpeter’s concept of 
entrepreneurship to public entrepreneurship contribute by emphasising the 
introduction of new policy proposals, political positions or paradigms, new 
procedures, changing administrative or electoral procedures, lobbying and other 
forms of rent seeking.  
Klein et al.’s valuable contribution related to bottom-up leadership and collaborative 
innovation is, in conclusion, to allow for an adaption of entrepreneurship concepts to 
a public sector context. Another valuable contribution is “breaking the boundary” 
(p. 11) between public and private action, that allows for collective or network based 
entrepreneurship.  
  In the description above, many parallels can be drawn between 
Borins’ notion of how bottom-up leadership acts proactively in order to come up 
with solutions of emergent public problems, and Klein et al. and Hagedoorn’s 
conceptions of entrepreneurship. What is especially relevant for bottom-up 
leadership in trying to solve a wicked problem is how entrepreneurship as an 
organizational function is adapted to an environment of uncertainty, enabling 
entrepreneurship to bear this uncertainty and perceive of performance gaps.  
2.4.4.1 Discussing public entrepreneurship 
In this section I discuss 
 why entrepreneurship is suggested as a bottom-up leadership platform for 
initiating an innovation project  
 what the relationship is between entrepreneurship and leadership 
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Why is entrepreneurship suggested as a bottom-up leadership platform for initiating 
an innovation project?  
The short literature review above suggests that uncertainty, entrepreneurship and 
innovation are closely related. What is also relevant is that entrepreneurship as an 
organizational function is primarily focused on creating novelty, even though 
entrepreneurship in Klein et al.’s conception also may have a management and 
decision making aspect. In this respect, entrepreneurship is first of all suitable for an 
innovation agenda, in that it is this organizational function that can generate new 
ideas for how to deal with an emergent problem or a perceived performance gap. 
Entrepreneurship also has the advantage in the BUCIL model that it is possible to 
separate novelty creation from leadership and strategy. Entrepreneurship is, 
according to Hagedoorn’s interpretation of Schumpeter, a person or function who is 
both rational and irrational, being constantly on the lookout for new opportunities. 
Consequently, adopting entrepreneurship as one element of bottom-up leadership 
also explains why a type of leadership needs to accompany entrepreneurship, simply 
because entrepreneurship in itself is not necessarily motivated to take on leadership.  
In fact, entrepreneurship is, in Schumpeter’s conception, partly irrational by 
constantly searching for new opportunities. So, what public entrepreneurship is 
essentially about is creating novelty in uncertain environments through proactive 
behaviour. This description fits Borin’s notion of bottom-up leadership, in that these 
innovations typically are initiated before a crisis emerges. Accordingly, such 
bottom-up innovations require proactivity.  
Furthermore, in the BUCIL model, I have explicitly assumed that different types of 
uncertainty are present when going through a bottom-up leadership innovation 
process targeting a wicked problem. As Klein et al.’s review of Kirzner, Knight and 
Schumpeter demonstrate, entrepreneurship is a skill, personal attribute or 
organizational function that is assumed to operate in, and perhaps even seeking out 
and enacting (Weick, 1995), an uncertain environment. These spaces of uncertainty 
make it possible for entrepreneurship to perceive of new combinations, to perceive 
of public performance gaps, and to take risks. Accordingly, adopting public 
entrepreneurship as a platform for bottom-up leadership allows for an explanation of 
why bottom-up leadership is able to create novelty. Adopting public 
entrepreneurship also allows for an explanation of how members of bottom-up 
leadership do this: they have an insight in a public performance gap, they are willing 
to address this performance gap by seeking out, even enacting, uncertain 
environments, and in this environment, they demonstrate proactive behaviour by 
formulating ideas of how to make better use of resources by making new 
combinations.  In this way, public entrepreneurship in the BUCIL model explains 
how bottom-up leadership expands its platform of influence by gradually improving 
and developing the innovation project.   
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What is the relationship between entrepreneurship and leadership? 
Despite the fact that entrepreneurship is a necessary platform for addressing a 
wicked problem through a bottom-up position it is by no means sufficient. As Borins 
mention, leadership has to be made, influence has to be exercised. Public 
entrepreneurship in Klein et al.’s conception does allow for wide-ranging 
implications on different organizational levels, but entrepreneurship does not in 
itself addresses the link between idea generation and how leadership is made in 
relation to this idea generation. Accordingly, in the BUCIL model, I separate 
entrepreneurship and leadership, even though both of these relational, constructed 
aspects of a specific organizational behaviour are located within the same bottom-up 
unit. The intention with this separation is that it allows for a more detailed analysis 
of the various forms of interplay between entrepreneurship and leadership: How a 
specific innovation project, conceptualised within a certain professional insight, 
calls for different, compatible leadership identities that consequently will have their 
own paths of leadership recognition, conditioned as they are by both innovation 
project and leadership choices taken.  
So, the relation between entrepreneurship and leadership is in no way clear cut. 
Accordingly, there are numerous ways that bottom-up leadership could interpret and 
create its own leadership, based on previous experience, staff and resources 
available, leadership training (if any), and the prevalence of different types of 
uncertainties.  
Another issue that highlights the explanatory advantage of separating 
entrepreneurship from leadership making is that the relation between 
entrepreneurship and leadership is an iterative process.  At a given point in time in a 
specific innovation process, bottom-up leadership and its collaborators will have a 
specific understanding of the innovation project and will accordingly have faced 
specific challenges in order to get the project and its bottom-up leadership 
recognised. However, what Van de Ven et al.’s research suggests, is that innovation 
is truly a process of ‘becoming’, presumably involving numerous setbacks, as well 
as change in objectives and assessments criteria during the process. Accordingly, 
even though entrepreneurship can deliver novelty, it does not guarantee that the 
novel idea is correct. As soon as the emergent leadership communicates the project, 
the innovation project will have to be modified to changes in the environment, to 
changing staff as well as to existing policies, legislation and strategies. So, even 
though entrepreneurship is a platform for bottom-up leadership, it is a platform that 
moves and is forced to move when new substantive, institutional or strategic 
uncertainties are faced, and when things in the innovation project do not work out as 
they were planned to. This moving platform makes both project and leadership 
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flexible, but it does not necessarily generate leadership recognition. When changes 
are made in the innovation project, or when unexpected challenges cannot be solved, 
leadership risks losing credibility and perhaps has to redefine the entire content of 
the project and also its leadership.  
So, on the basis of the above discussions, I define entrepreneurship as a function 
fulfilled by 1) bottom-up leadership who 2) acts proactively in environments of 
uncertainty 3) by combining new or already existing resources, 4) in order for them 
to be deployed for a perceived better performance on public objectives.  
 
2.4.5. MAKING SENSE AND GIVING SENSE 
In the sections above I have explained and discussed how to understand uncertainty, 
leadership and entrepreneurship. In this section I explain and discuss making and 
giving sense. These are important aspects of bottom-up leadership since these 
aspects are what enable bottom-up leadership to influence collaborators and decision 
makers.  
Sensemaking is related to entrepreneurship because it is through processes of 
making sense and giving sense that bottom-up leadership gather experience and 
reflections that leads to re-interpretation of organisational reality. Accordingly, 
making and giving sense is the fuel for the entrepreneurial motor, in that it allows 
for bottom-up leadership to make new resource-combinations or abandon old ones.  
In this thesis sensemaking is understood within the acknowledged framework of 
Karl E. Weick (Weick, 1995), whereas the strategic element of sensemaking, in 
terms of giving sense, is understood within the framework of (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991). Making and giving sense is in the BUCIL model what allows bottom-up 
leadership to influence collaborators and decision makers, in spite of inferior power 
position and constraints imposed by uncertainties. What research in sensemaking 
reveals is that sensemaking can be a possibility to exercise influence. In this respect, 
uncertainty in the BUCIL model changes character: From a restraining condition to 
an enabling condition of collaboration. Uncertainty is what makes collaborators and 
decision makers susceptible for new ideas and answers that can help them 
understand specific parts of their organisational environment in new ways.  
So, in this explanation of making and giving sense, I emphasize how new realities 
are created and enacted, as a consequence of bottom-up leadership’s strategic 
positioning of its own leadership in relation to collaborators and decision makers, 
and as consequence of the new organisational reality imitated by means 
entrepreneurship. 
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According to Weick, sensemaking literally means the making of sense, because 
“active agents construct sensible, sensable (…) events. They “structure the 
unknown” (…) How they construct what they construct, why, and with what effects 
are the central question for people interested in sensemaking” (p. 4).  Weick argues 
that sensemaking is distinct from interpretation studies (p. 6).  Interpretation is often 
used to focus on texts, whereas sensemaking address how the text is constructed as 
well as how it is read. Consequently, Weick argues that the element of construction 
and action is what distinguishes sensemaking from interpretation studies, since 
interpretation studies are unable to explain novelty and its transformation:  
“Porac et al.’s (1989) four assumptions about the nature of an interpretive study 
focus on attending to cues and interpreting, externalizing, and linking these cues. 
What is left unspecified are how the cues got there in the first place and how these 
particular cues were singled out from an ongoing flow of experience. Also 
unspecified are how the interpretations and meanings of these cues were then 
altered and made more explicit and sensible, as a result of “concrete activities”.” 
(ibid., p. 8)  
 
Drawing on Schön, Weick argues that problems do not present themselves to the 
practitioners as givens, but must be constructed from the materials of problematic 
situations which are “puzzling, troubling, and uncertain” (p. 9).   
Weick sums up sensemaking in contrast to interpretation in the following quote:  
“The key distinction is that sensemaking is about the ways people generate what 
they interpret (…) authoring and interpretation are interwoven. The concept of 
sensemaking highlights the action, activity, and creating that lays down the traces 
that are interpreted and then reinterpreted” (p. 13).  
Accordingly, sensemaking is focused on activity or process, and is more about 
invention than discovery (p. 13).   
In relation to the BUCIL model, sensemaking is valuable because it highlights “the 
invention that precedes interpretation”. (p. 14). Sensemaking is not a metaphor for 
interpretation, such as how individuals make sense of their situations. Sensemaking 
is about making something sensible.  
Weick’s understanding of sensemaking is furthermore useful because it relates to 
identity issues, making it plausible that collaborators attempts of making something 
sensible will have consequences for identity developments. Accordingly, 
sensemaking is also linked to the emergence of the identity of bottom-up leadership. 
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Drawing on Ring and Van de Ven’s (1989) studies of transactions as occasions for 
innovation, Weick argues that sensemaking is something that is triggered by a 
failure to confirm one’s self, and that sensemaking is central for maintaining a 
consistent, positive self-confirmation. Thirdly, Weick argues that “people learn 
about their identities by projecting them into an environment and observing the 
consequences” (p. 23). Fourthly, people simultaneously try to shape and react to the 
environments they face, in that they “take the cue for their identity from the conduct 
of others” (p. 23), but also make an active effort to influence this conduct to begin 
with (p. 23). Fifth, Weick argues that sensemaking is self-referential, in that people 
make sense of what happens around them by asking what the implications of these 
events will have for who they will be (p. 24). These considerations of identity are 
highly relevant for the iterative relationship that exists between sensemaking and 
leadership emergence – bottom-up leadership learns about identity by projecting it 
into an environment.  
 In relation to issues of retrospection, Weick argues that sensemaking is an activity 
in which many possible meanings may need to be synthesized. The problem for the 
sensemaker is not too little information, but too much (p. 27): 
“Investigators who favour the metaphor of information processing (…) often view 
sensemaking, as they do most other problems, as a setting where people need more 
information. That is not what people need when they are overwhelmed by 
equivocality. Instead, they need values, priorities, and clarity about preferences to 
help them be clear about which projects matter. Clarity on values clarifies what is 
important in elapsed experience, which finally gives some sense of what that elapsed 
experience means” (p. 28).  
 
These considerations that Weick has concerning retrospection are relevant for 
wicked problems since these types of public problems arguably generate an 
overwhelming equivocality.  
Concerning the aspect of action, Weick uses the concept of enactment, drawing a 
parallel between what managers and legislators do, in that they both construct reality 
through authoritative acts. In this respect, Weick emphasises that in organizational 
life people “often produce part of the environment they face” (p. 30).  
Weick further discuss what the occasions for sensemaking are. Sensemaking is 
typically triggered by ambiguity, puzzles or problems, and when people reach a 
threshold of dissatisfaction with their situation. This creates a type of shock that 
requires the initiation of action. However, not all cues or dissatisfaction are 
transformed into sensemaking.  As Weick notes, occasions for sensemaking are 
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themselves constructed, becoming a platform for further construction. Ambiguity 
and uncertainty are organizational occasions that often produce novelties (p. 83-86.). 
Further, interruptions and arousal are both occasions that will have an effect on 
sensemaking.  These two types of ‘shocks’ differ. Ambiguity leads to sensemaking 
because people are confused by too many interpretations; the events are experienced 
as complex, unclear or paradoxical (p. 92). Ambiguity creates confusion as a result 
of multiple meanings (p. 95), and therefore calls for social construction and 
invention. In contrast, uncertainty stimulates sensemaking because people are 
ignorant of any interpretation. Uncertainty is a shock that is occasioned by the 
inability “to extrapolate current action and to foresee their consequences” (p. 99).  
Accordingly, when relating these two occasions of sensemaking to the BUCIL 
model, I make the hypothesis that collaborators and bottom-up leadership are facing 
different challenges of sensemaking. It seems plausible that uncertainty as a shock is 
what generally engulfs collaborators, whereas the challenge for bottom-up 
leadership more is a challenge of ambiguity and of synthesising across situations of 
interaction.  
Weick further addresses the aspect of manipulation. Weick argues that political 
actors and organizational actors choose and create some of their own constraints (p. 
164). Environments can be manipulated. Weick notes that there is “a basic 
entrepreneurial quality to manipulation (…) the ways in which entrepreneurs create 
sensible niches for themselves and others is a good place to start in comprehending 
sensemaking by manipulation” (p. 166).   
 
To sum up, interpreting Weick’s conception of sensemaking within the BUCIL 
model clarifies and supports the following assumptions:  
- Sensemaking enables bottom-up leadership to construct a new perception 
of reality 
- Wicked problems have to be constructed as problems from the materials of 
problematic situations 
- Novelty creation and identity transformation are linked through iterative 
processes 
- Sensemaking is a synthesising ability  
- Sensemaking is what allows a leadership to create and enact an 
environment by means of entrepreneurship  
- Bottom-up leadership faces challenges of ambiguity and synthesising, 
whereas collaborators face challenges of uncertainty 
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In terms of the manipulation of sensemaking, or in other words, the strategic aspects 
of it, (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991)’s research is relevant for this thesis in that the 
authors explore the relation between sensemaking and sensegiving within a strategic 
change initiation at a university. In this respect, this piece of research is relevant, in 
that the concept of sensegiving provides a vocabulary for understanding how 
bottom-up leadership exercises leadership in terms of influence.  
The authors make a distinction between sensemaking and sensegiving. Sensemaking 
is related to meaning construction and reconstruction by the involved parties, as they 
tried to develop “a meaningful framework for understanding the nature of the 
intended strategic change”. (p. 442). In contrast, sensegiving is “concerned with the 
process of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of 
others toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (ibid.). In terms of 
sensemaking this process both involved the President of the university and his 
subordinates in the initial phases of a strategic change process. Especially lower 
level members were trying to figure out “the meaning of the proposed strategic 
change effort” (p. 442). Sensegiving had another character, in that the President of 
the university provided a viable interpretation of a new reality, in this way trying to 
influence stakeholders. This sensegiving attempt again prompted sensemaking 
responses of the targets of this sensegiving (p. 443). The authors likewise note that 
sensemaking is to high extent related to understanding, whereas sensegiving is 
dominated by influence. Furthermore, the authors note that when such strategic 
change was initiated, it had a distinctive character, by “being fraught with 
uncertainty, ambiguity and emotionality”, mainly on the part of the organization 
members, because the President’s initial communications indicated an obscure, but 
apparently significant, change was about to be implemented (p. 444). The authors in 
their discussion note that the change was not precipitated by crisis, and that 
arguably, managing strategic change without crisis is more difficult to accomplish 
because the lack of a rationale for change (p. 445). Instead, the process studied had a 
character of “ambiguity-by-design”, a tactic that may be effective for leading 
stakeholders to question the current situation (p. 446).  
 
2.4.5.1 Discussing making sense and giving sense 
In the BUCIL model, both making sense and giving sense are core because they 
enable bottom-up leadership to exercise influence without having a strong 
bureaucratic position. Giving sense and making sense may often be in play 
simultaneously, but in the BUCIL model I give them separate causal functions. The 
discussion points below are as follows:  
 What is the relationship between making sense and giving sense 
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 Which actors should be focused on in an analysis when the concepts are 
applied? 
 
 
What is the relationship between making sense and giving sense? 
Concerning the relation between giving sense and making sense, (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991) suggests a rather simple logic: sense has to be made in order for it 
to be given. Accordingly, the authors argue for a phase model in which first sense 
has to be acquired by the leader and uncertainty generated; next, sense has to be 
given, influencing the sensemaking of stakeholders.   
However, in the BUCIL model, even though I agree on the simple relation between 
making and giving sense, I would argue that making and giving sense could be in 
play simultaneously, as Weick suggests: that sensemaking is something that is 
triggered by a failure to confirm one’s self, and that sensemaking is central for 
maintaining a consistent, positive self-confirmation. Thirdly, Weick argues that 
“people learn about their identities by projecting them into an environment and 
observing the consequences” (p. 23). This simultaneousness as a producer of new 
patterns of interaction and the creation of novelty is something that is also 
emphasized by Complex Responsive Processes theory, by drawing on Mead’s 
notion, that in every interaction, there is a chance to deviate from presumed patterns 
of interaction. 
 An example of this could be when bottom-up leadership makes a presentation of an 
element of the project for a group of collaborators or decision makers, arguing why 
this project addresses an aspect of a wicked problem in a new and more efficient 
way (giving sense to collaborators, who are busy making sense of what the project is 
about, and what the consequences of it will be ) – but afterwards bottom-up 
leadership in a discussion becomes aware of resistance towards certain elements 
(forcing bottom-up leadership to make sense of the conflict, interpreting own role 
and innovation project in the light of this resistance). This simultaneousness is 
perhaps more dominant for bottom-up leadership than in Gioia & Chittipeddi’s 
study of an explicit top-down leadership, because bottom-up leadership has no 
authority to command in the first place, and definitely not to collaborators. This 
consequently does not provide bottom-up leadership with the luxury to first make 
sense, and then give sense, in an orderly, designed fashion. Influence has to be 
exercised on a constant basis. This simultaneousness is also what allows new sense 
to be made during conflicts.  
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Which actors should be focused on in an analysis when the concepts are applied? 
So, where to look when using these concepts in a BUCIL-related analysis? Drawing 
some implications on the discussion points above across sections, I argue that in the 
BUCIL model, giving sense is deployed by bottom-up leadership in order to create 
ownership to the project, influencing collaborators sensemaking processes. Making 
sense, accordingly, causally has three functions in the BUCIL model, related to 
different actors:  
1. Collaborators: Sensemaking as something that happens when 
collaborators are trying to make sense of what the innovation project is 
about. This can lead to counter- or co-attempts of alternative 
interpretations and constructions of reality, but may also lead to an 
openness for attempts of giving sense, due to resource constraints, 
disinterest in the project or lack of attention to the possible implications 
of the project 
2. Bottom-up leadership: Sensemaking as something that happens when 
bottom-up leadership meets resistance, unexpected approval and positive 
interpretations when giving sense. This creates ambiguity and the need to 
synthesise experience across situations further, which can lead to new 
actions of entrepreneurship, i.e. new combinations of resources, and, for 
that reason, a redefinition of project and bottom-up leadership 
3. Collaborators and Bottom-up Leadership: sensemaking as something that 
transgresses the two above strategic aspects of sensemaking by allowing 
for an experience of uncertainty and conflict that both collaborators and 
bottom-up leadership cannot interpret, hence is forced to make things 
sensible, i.e. to construct new realities.  
   
In the BUCIL model, I hypothesize a strong causal link between leadership 
emergence as recognition and the possibility of giving sense. Sensemaking in 
Weick’s conception has clear connections with the concept of leadership 
recognition. Constantly giving answers to uncertainty concerning collaborators 
identity and leadership identity in relation to the innovation project is, I argue, 
necessary in order to both keep believing in the collective enterprise and at the same 
time to remain responsive to inputs and learning during the uncertain innovation 
‘journey’(Van de Ven, 1999). Thus, as explained by CRP, sensemaking is essential 
for both creativity and the ability to act in conditions of uncertainty. Sensemaking is 
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crucially linked to processes in organisations, creating meaning as a result of the 
process (Hernes & Maitlis, 2010). Accordingly, I assume that the ability to give 
sense is highly dependent on whether bottom-up leadership is recognised, i.e. how it 
positions itself in relation to the innovation project and collaborators, and whether 
this positioning is perceived of as legitimate by collaborators. 
 I also assume that somehow bottom-up leadership has to generate uncertainty 
among collaborators in order for them to acknowledge that change is needed and in 
order for them to acknowledge bottom-up leadership. As (OToole, 1996) suggests, 
the complexity of interorganisational arrangements generates an uncertainty, that 
managers can exploit, when other stakeholders are busy figuring out what to do, 
because the complexity of problems and the interorganisational context make 
rational calculation of what games actors play very difficult:  
“I explore the idea of modelling interorganizational implementation via a rational 
choice approach. The first conclusion is that serious limitations constrain what may 
be possible through the formal rational choice representation and analysis of such 
settings. The second conclusion, however, is that these limitations for theorists do 
not mean that practical implementation success is itself problematic. In fact, an 
exploration of the limitations of formal approaches actually reveals the ways that 
practicing managers may be able to induce success under challenging network 
conditions: the modelling problems themselves point systematically to the practical 
management possibilities. (p.242)” 
 
 O’Toole further argues that:  
“For public actors managing programs through networks, looking for solutions 
means searching for options sufficiently cooperative to encourage or permit 
programs to work. This type of success is not necessarily reliant on predictive game 
theoretic solutions. Indeed, the multiple uncertainties that preclude game theoretic 
solutions are themselves potential objects of influence by network managers as they 
seek their own variety of “solution” (p. 250). 
  
Therefore I assume that bottom-up leadership has, due to its professional 
specialization and its entrepreneurship, a head start for influencing collaborator’s 
sensemaking, in that bottom-up leadership’s context has already been interpreted 
and made sensible and enacted by bottom-up leadership. This is in contrast to 
collaborators, in which the challenge of making sense of ‘the game’ may have just 
begun.  
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2.4.6. LEADERSHIP DISTRIBUTION 
My key argument for the importance of leadership distribution in relation to a 
research agenda for bottom-up leadership is that the aftermath of bottom-up 
leadership is crucial, and especially so when it comes to proposing new solutions to 
wicked problems, since arguably solutions to these wicked problems could be 
difficult to sustain. Further, leadership distribution is also a way of living up to some 
of the suggestions for research that I have found in previous sections (see section 1), 
which are as follows:  
- Investigate advantages/disadvantages of bottom-up, top-down and lateral 
innovations 
- Relate these advantages/disadvantages to particular types of innovations, 
related to a process perspective of the ‘innovation journey’ 
- How an innovation is sustained 
- How an innovation is diffused 
  
Accordingly, leadership distribution is a concept that I have generated out of a need 
to capture Sandford Borins’ observation concerning one of the main objectives for 
bottom-up leadership: That bottom-up leadership is forced to make decision makers 
embrace the innovation as their own, or otherwise make it apparent that the 
innovation project supports already existing strategies. The function in the BUCIL 
model of leadership distribution is first to enable an analysis of what the 
implications of a specific leadership recognition is, and second of all, to emphasize 
that bottom-up leadership is a distinct type of leadership which is identifiable 
exactly because it is forced to operate from an informal power position, and because 
the main purpose of bottom-up leadership is to establish alliances with ‘the top’ of 
its own organization, preferably also the collaborating organisations. In other words, 
leadership distribution draws our attention to the fact that bottom-up leadership is a 
type of leadership with a certain duration.  
 
2.4.6.1 Why is leadership distribution a relevant concept for 
theorising bottom-up leadership? 
I exemplify several scenarios below in order to explore why leadership distribution 
is relevant to address in an analysis using the BUCIL model, scenarios which are 
directly linked to how bottom-up leadership manages to conceptualise the 
innovation project and to exercise influence.  
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1. Bottom-up leadership’s innovation endeavours construct some sort of 
political or strategic consensus that ‘something has to be done’ about this 
wicked problem. This necessitates a re-invention process of the innovative 
solution that bottom-up leadership has already developed, resulting in a 
collaborative innovation process as conceptualised by (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2011), in which a formalised, facilitating leadership takes over.  
2. Bottom-up leadership’s own decision makers do not  approve of the 
specific solution when the innovation process is ended, implicating that the 
innovation project is taken over and modified by a collaborator 
3. Bottom-up leadership manages to make alliances with decision makers in 
its own organisation, that accordingly are so eager to make the project their 
own, that bottom-up leadership is terminated and put to other tasks 
4. Bottom-up leadership manages to make alliances with decision makers in 
its own organisation; decision makers accordingly embrace the initiative as 
their own. However, decision makers are unable to continue to drive the 
process onwards, due to the highly complex character of both wicked 
problem and the innovative solution. In this respect, bottom-up leadership 
would be required to continue driving the process, now with a steady 
mandate, having the difficult task of  maintaining the sense already made, 
and consolidate and sanction this sensemaking in new interorganisational 
structures, as Borins suggests.  
 
What these examples illustrate is that each of these innovation ‘sustaining’ and 
‘diffusion’  scenarios presumably will be a path-dependent consequence of how 
bottom-up leadership and innovation project are perceived by collaborators, and to 
which degree bottom-up leadership has managed to display the collaborative value 
of the innovation project, hence distribute leadership. As (Bardach, 1996) mentions, 
there are many barriers to inter-agency collaborations, but a central challenge is to 
make visible the ‘collaborative turf’ of the project. Collaborative turf here meaning 
that collaborators can see a strategic advantage or career opportunity in relation to 
the project. So, an important research agenda related to the interplay between 
leadership recognition, giving sense and leadership distribution is to investigate how 
bottom-up driven innovations are distributed among the top-levels of public 
agencies and collaborators, and what the aftermath of this distribution is, concerning 
the long-term value-contributing output of the innovation.   
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 DISCUSSION: AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE BUCIL 2.5
MODEL 
Above I have explained and discussed each of the applied concepts of the BUCIL 
model, highlighting issues of theory building and issues related to how to understand 
the causal interactions constructed in order to enable an empirical analysis. 
Before I conclude on the findings related to these discussions, I make a discussion in 
which I critically assess the BUCIL model in its entirety. This assessment further 
enhances the theory building concerning bottom-up leadership. This assessment also 
clarifies issues that are relevant for a deployment of the BUCIL model in an 
empirical analysis.   
In order to identify relevant discussion points, I reflect on the structure of my theory 
building strategy as well as one the discussions above. First of all, in my theory 
building I have used concepts that obviously have divergent theory of science 
positions. This theory building strategy leaves open issues of the 
prescriptive/descriptive character of the model, the status of the concepts, as well as 
theory of science position. Second of all, I have in my theory building drawn on 
literature that is not explicitly developed within a public sector context. Thirdly, I 
have drawn on literature that is located within different research fields, having the 
rather obvious implication that it has been outside the boundaries of this thesis to 
describe a state of the art of all these research fields.   
As a result of these theory building implications, I discuss four points:  
1. Is the proposed model a prescriptive or descriptive model? 
2. Does the model neglect a vital distinction between managerial and political 
leadership? 
3. Does the theory section neglect important strands of state of the art 
literature related to each of the concepts of the BUCIL model? 
4. What are the requirements for a theory of science position and a specific 
analytical approach, if these should be compatible with the interactions of 
the BUCIL model?  
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2.5.1. IS THE PROPOSED MODEL A PRESCRIPTIVE OR 
DESCRIPTIVE MODEL? 
The outset of the BUCIL model is that assumptions of leadership position when 
initiating collaborative innovation is somewhat neglected in the literature. As a 
consequence, related issues, such as power (the power to influence, the power to 
frame a problem), and uncertainty (process uncertainty, collaborative uncertainty), 
only play an implicit role in the collaborative innovation literature reviewed.  
This generates confusion about the epistemological status of the model that I 
propose, a confusion that I also detect when reading through frameworks produced 
by other scholars of collaborative innovation leadership (Hartley, 2005; Moore & 
Hartley, 2008; Nambisan, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 2013): are the 
models prescriptive, i.e. are the models ‘how-to-do-it’-leadership-models? Or is it 
descriptive perspectives describing what is really (supposed) to be happening in 
collaborative innovations, in order for those processes to be regarded as 
collaborative innovations? Are they both? This is not at all clear in the collaborative 
innovation literature. For instance, (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) call their article 
‘Enhancing collaborative innovation in the public sector’. Accordingly, the authors 
argue that an ideal scenario and agenda is indeed possible for collaborative 
innovation in the public sector. This is a seminal, and valuable, contribution in itself 
in order to highlight how collaboration in a certain form really can generate 
innovation and enhancing all phases of the innovation. However, the authors also 
state that the framework developed is an analytical model. Torfing (2013) implicitly 
seems to suggest that the role of power, and the epistemological status of the model, 
is left for empirical researchers to define; for as Torfing suggests, applying different 
sorts of traditions within network governance as the epistemological backcloth will 
provide different answers to the leadership status of the meta-governor, hence also 
to how to think of issues proposed in the model proposed by Sørensen & Torfing 
(2011), concerning the interplay between, for instance, discourse and empowerment, 
as suggested by the authors. 
So, this multitude of interpretive possibilities of existing leadership frameworks 
makes it somewhat confusing for empirical researchers whether to think of these 
models as (i) descriptive models of what actually happens in collaborative 
innovation (ii) prescriptive models of what should be happening in collaborative 
innovation in so far stakeholders want to enhance the value of all innovation phases, 
or (iii) defining models in so far as the concepts of the models define what empirical 
phenomena that should be regarded as collaborative innovations. As a result, the 
epistemological status of the concepts in these models is somewhat unclear.  
In order to counter this potential confusion of also the BUCIL model I first of all 
define bottom-up leadership in a descriptive way, and I suggest in Chapter 3 an 
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analytical approach that clarifies the epistemological status of the elements in the 
model.  
Accordingly, the BUCIL model is not in its outset intended as a ‘this is how to do 
it’-leadership model, but a model that only wants to explain how bottom-up 
leadership is constructed. I believe that this is fairly consistent with much of the 
theory underpinning the model, in that all theory adopted points to how leadership 
necessarily is constructed through struggles of meaning, conflict and power, and 
how the ideas, boundaries and framing of innovation project and leadership is a 
constant source of negotiation and strife. Accordingly  the BUCIL model in its basic 
state does not suggest what bottom-up leadership should do in order to get 
recognised, it only provides a framework for enabling explanations of how 
leadership is recognised. How such a recognition comes about is knowledge that is 
intentionally located in a black box-territory left to be discovered only by empirical 
analysis.     
However, this does not entail that the model cannot be used to produce knowledge 
of a prescriptive kind, because it is possible that empirical researchers may want to 
limit themselves to investigating only part of the model. This would require an 
explicit re-interpretation and accentuation of the prescriptive dimensions of the 
literature applied, for instance:  
 literature about how public entrepreneurship should be mobilised in order 
to be most efficient in terms of skills, team composition, etc. 
 what makes a manipulation of sense-making most efficient 
 how wicked problem uncertainty is best overcome through certain 
facilitated processes or tactics  
In this re-interpretation, researchers should keep in mind, however, the entire 
uncertainty-related, constructionist perspective of the model: That neither 
leadership, nor collaborators, are mastermind rational actors with full information. 
Rather, they are involved in an innovation process of truly becoming, in which 
social objects are made sensible in which leadership and collaborative identities are 
constructed in the process, within always specific and idiosyncratic organisations, 
accordingly defying any notion of master-mind manipulation. For it is exactly this 
process-ambivalence that enables, and forces, bottom-up leadership to walk the line 
between the extremes of uncertainty and stabilisation in a flexible manner.   
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2.5.2. DOES THE MODEL NEGLECT A VITAL DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN MANAGERIAL AND POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP? 
One could criticize the model for drawing too much on management theory, 
consequently not acknowledging political leadership.  
The first response to this critique would be that I have adapted the theoretical 
framework to a political, public sector dimension by drawing on empirical and 
theoretical conceptions from studies of public sector innovation and network 
management. Accordingly, within the ‘collaborative innovation in the public 
sector’- leadership literature, I have detected some theoretical lacunae for 
development, in which I have argued that the analytical model has a strength.  
Accordingly, the model guides our attention to other aspects of leadership than 
visible, already established leaderships, such as bureaucratic and political leadership. 
By doing so, the model of BUCIL can be used as a research tool for analysing how 
bottom-up leadership is influencing political leadership, and what the long term 
consequences are for innovation projects that has such a trajectory, including the 
interplay between these two kinds of leaderships. Obviously, such a research agenda 
is important due to the on-going debate, at least in Denmark, concerning the power 
balances and interactions between public sector administrations and political 
leadership. Hence, the BUCIL model can also be used critically in order to examine 
what happens when public sector officials are taking on the role as policy 
developers, how they try to influence politicians, and how politicians can critically 
engage with such attempts of bottom-up influence in terms of addressing a wicked 
problem.  
Second, the theoretical framework is a framework that is based on Borins’ empirical 
descriptions of public sector leadership. Theorising these descriptions by means of 
managerial theory does not make the causal dynamics of the model implausible in a 
public sector context. In fact, the opposite is the case: the model exactly describes 
how public sector officials come up with new solutions to wicked problems before 
they become a political contentious issue. In this respect, bottom-up leadership is 
part of the political leadership ‘food-chain’, in that employees in public sector 
administrations usually are highly engaged in qualifying and stimulating policy by 
pointing to problems in the public service delivery. In this respect, the BUCIL 
model describes what is going on in public agencies when it comes to policy 
processes in the phase just before the political level is involved.  
Thirdly, the model is not supposed to be an overarching research approach for public 
leadership of collaborative innovations in itself, such as (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011) 
– the BUCIL model definitely is adapted to, and consciously limited to, a specific 
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type of collaborative innovation, in which leadership has to be built in order to allow 
for a profession based innovation project to reach a scope of collaborative 
dimensions. After this, the project has to acquire a more regular status, by being 
championed by powerful stakeholders, albeit possibly with still a driving 
responsibility of bottom-up leadership. Hence, I assume that after this phase of 
initiating and driving such a collaborative innovation process, other types of 
leadership will take over, either supplementing, terminating or simply colonising the 
project.  
Consequently, an important future research agenda would be to investigate the 
interactions between different types of public leaderships: What happens when, for 
instance, bureaucratic leadership or network governance related leadership 
approaches or political leadership takes over, or when the project acquires a more 
regular character? How do these formal, more powerful, leaderships deal with 
bottom-up leadership and the bottom-up driven innovation project?  
Altogether, what this discussion has revealed is that it is an open question whether 
decision makers are able to take over and champion such a project, how they do it, 
and how bottom-up leadership constructed can co-exist or converge with more 
bureaucratic leadership structures, since it presumably will generate some 
adjustments having both a formal leadership and an informal leadership within the 
same organisation.  
In relation to this interplay between formal and informal leaderships and the relation 
to entrepreneurship, Borins notes in his article “Loose Cannons and Rule Breakers, 
or Enterprising Leaders? Some Evidence About Innovative Public 
Managers”(Borins, 2000), that sometimes public innovators are perceived of as 
being part of a New Public Management regime, accordingly by critical researchers 
perceived of as people “prone to rule breaking, self-promotion, and unwarranted 
risk taking” (p. 498). Arguably I assume that researchers’ criticism of public 
innovators points to potential empirical line of conflicts that are produced when 
someone gets success by using informal channels, as bottom-up leadership does. 
Presumably, these attempts of influence will meet resistance. So, it is of relevance to 
enable research into how such bottom-up projects are championed further on, and 
what the challenges are of such projects – whether the sector-based, narrow point of 
origin haunts bottom-up collaborative innovations continuously, or whether 
ownership can be distributed, and how politicians can respond and utilise such 
specialised projects.  
The final answer to this discussion point is that the BUCIL model, by drawing on 
Koppenjan & Klijn’s (2004) concepts of uncertainty, also allows for an analysis of 
strategic conflicts; of how bottom-up leadership navigates in such a strategic and 
political landscape. As such, a political environment is actually assumed in the 
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model, as bottom-up leadership has to adapt the innovation project to existing 
policies, and to adapt the project to the political and strategic reality of the 
innovation process.  
 
2.5.3. DOES THE THEORY SECTION NEGLECT IMPORTANT 
STRANDS OF LITERATURE RELATED TO EACH OF 
THE CONCEPTS OF THE BUCIL MODEL? 
The theory building strategy in this thesis has been to identify gaps in the literature 
of collaborative innovation leadership and address those weaknesses by producing 
an analytical framework for bottom-up leadership, a framework that may also 
stimulate alternative approaches for conceptualising collaborative innovation 
leadership.  Accordingly, the objective has been to make a theoretical model in 
which the causal linkages are clear and plausible, and which is able to answer as 
many of the identified design demands and theoretical lacunae as possible, hence 
making it possible for myself and other researchers to deploy the model in an 
empirical investigation. This has been achieved.  
Accordingly, it has not been the objective of this thesis to make a full literature 
review of all the theoretical fields mentioned here. The solution instead has been 
first of all to import highly acknowledged, seminal academic research as emblems 
for each theoretical concept. This theory building strategy does not make the 
causality of the BUCIL model fragile. Instead this seminal research will have 
elements that state-of-the-art literature will have to relate to and build on, 
accordingly providing the BUCIL model with a solid carcass that can be given more 
muscle and flesh in specific, empirical analyses. 
Further, each of these concepts have been re-interpreted within the causality of the 
BUCIL model, which has been made possible since much of the applied, seminal 
literature touches on a number of the issues and causalities also addressed in the 
BUCIL model - but this literature does so in a way that is not tailored to a 
collaborative, innovative, process, in which leadership is placed at the centre of the 
stage. So, the BUCIL model selects and enhances some of the causal linkages. For 
instance, Weick’s concept of sense making is an approach that has a keen eye for 
identity, the construction of social objects and ambiguity. However, the approach 
does not necessarily address an innovation context, or how leadership is made in 
uncertain environments, nor does it situate sensemaking within a collaborative 
context. Or another example: complex responsive processes theory does explain 
identity, leadership and uncertainty, but seems to presume a single-organisational 
environment, in which leadership accordingly is able facilitate organisational 
conversations of a higher quality, and, by implication, seems also to assume, that 
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leadership is located in a leader, accordingly not working on the level of how 
leadership in a collaborative configuration is always also an actor, that is, being 
perceived of, and positioned as, a part of an organisation that has to provide 
mandates for projects. Further, complex responsive processes theory does not work 
with a bottom-up leadership perspective. And a last example: Relational Leadership 
Theory approaches leadership in a social constructionist, emergent perspective, but 
does not situate and specify the approach within a collaborative context, and does 
not specify, what a context of radical change processes such as innovation has of 
implications for how a relational leadership emerges.  
Accordingly, as my presentation and discussion of each analytical concept has 
illustrated, each concept is imported exactly because they explain a causal link 
between two concepts.  
The causalities of the BUCIL model are furthermore made plausible by being based 
on a literature review that points to design demands (section 2.2). And further, 
BUCIL is based not only on logical deduction and discussions between different 
theories, but also on Borins’ well-acknowledged, quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of more than hundred American, public sector innovation projects, a large 
part of those ‘holistic’.   
Second, importing seminal research allows for more detailed literature reviews when 
deploying the model in specific analyses. For instance, in the discussion sections 
above, I have exemplified for each analytical concept how specific elements of the 
model can be explored by just focusing on the linkage between two concepts. If, for 
instance, a piece of research would investigate what conditions of uncertainty that 
facilitates the most entrepreneurial activity in relation to wicked problems, one 
would have to go deeper into literature of entrepreneurship and uncertainty. This 
would be a valuable contribution to the study of bottom-up leadership in for instance 
municipalities, in that such a study would highlight how to spur as much bottom-up 
leadership as possible, providing CEOs and politicians with knowledge about how to 
provide organisational structures that spur innovative projects. Or the linkage 
between leadership recognition and the specific tools which bottom-up leadership 
deploys for giving sense could be investigated, requiring literature reviews that in 
more detail describe what rhetorical devices, means of communication, and 
analytical tools etc. that public officials use in order to identify,  influence and 
interact with key stakeholders.    
Finally, I have in this thesis deployed an engaged scholarship approach, which is 
abductive in the sense that my field work has informed my choice of theory. By 
having two embedded cases in my research design in a single case study, one of 
those a pilot case, I have ensured that the challenges of practice have informed 
choices concerning theory building. I explain these issues in Chapter 4. Methods. 
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2.5.4. WHAT ARE THE DEMANDS FOR AN ANALYTICAL 
APPROACH COMPATIBLE WITH THE BUCIL MODEL?  
In the theoretical framework above I draw on literature that has different theory of 
science positions. A relevant critique to such an eclectic theory building approach is 
what theory of science position in which to locate the model, because this location 
influences how the research object should be conceptualised, hence what specific 
analytical approach to apply. For instance, is ‘leadership recognition’ an ‘identity’, 
as Weick would perceive it, or a position in a discourse, as Relational Leadership 
Theory perhaps would suggest? Or how to perceive of organisational and 
interorganisational, informal leadership structures – are they thematic ‘patterns of 
interaction’, as complex responsive processes suggests, or some sort of emerging, 
conflict-generating ‘institutional logic’ (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012)?  
And what exactly is profession based, public entrepreneurship – a kind of action? 
And on what level is that action to be located, and what is actually meant by such an 
action, i.e. is it to be regarded as communication, or interaction?  
Obviously, there is no single answer to this question, since this to some degree is left 
open for empirical researchers. I do, however, suggest in Chapter 3 to deploy a 
discourse analytical approach that allows for strategic action on the micro level, and 
that also allows analyses of how such a collaborative innovation process can develop 
into processes of discourse embeddedness and institutionalization. I argue that this 
type of discourse analysis is suitable for analysing the phenomenon of leadership 
emergence understood as a legitimate basis for initiating and sustaining intentional 
sensemaking processes, with the aim of ensuring that the lead agency’s 
entrepreneurial solution to a wicked problem is implemented and possibly 
institutionalized.   
That being said, for other researchers much depends on: 
 whether to use all the concepts of the BUCIL model in an analysis  
 whether a researcher wants to focus on only a specific part of the model 
 What part of the model to focus on 
No matter what approach taken, it is important to keep an eye on the following 
characteristics of the BUCIL model. BUCIL draws attention to how a leadership 
unit can increase the scope of a change process. In this change process, leadership is 
constructed in conflictual, power-ridden interactions. The selection premises for an 
analytical approach and a theory of science approach must have a theoretical 
approach to the structure-agency dilemma. Based on the previous sections in this 
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chapter, I argue that the following list of recommendations for analytical approaches 
should be kept in mind:  
 Agency: a lead actor is driving the change, expanding its power base, 
generating conflicts 
 Interaction: a lead actor is engaged in numerous conversations at the micro-
level and generates new meaning through conversations, texts, and 
alliances, thus introducing new ways of perceiving problems and solution 
 Epistemology: an approach which is constructivist regarding epistemology, 
i.e. explains social reality as a feature constructed in social interactions 
 Innovation diffusion: Allowing for an explanation of an altered institutional 
framework related to how a lead actor changes the framing conditions for 
working with a wicked problem. 
 Strategy: an approach that deals with, or at least takes into account, 
intentional, strategic action in a political and strategic environment  
 Increasing platform of influence: an approach which perceive influence 
processes to be originating from micro-interactions in a local setting  
 
Following the conclusion in the next section I go more in depth with the analytical 
approach adopted in this thesis, an approach which takes into account the above 
recommendations.  
 
 CONCLUSION  2.6
In this chapter I have contributed to the research field of leadership for collaborative 
innovation. I have done so by providing a theoretical answer to how new forms of 
public leadership can contribute to solving complex problems in today’s welfare 
societies through innovation. I have done so by pursuing a theory building strategy 
that has had the dual objective of producing an independent theoretical contribution 
and to make clear how such a theoretical contribution can be clarified as much as 
possible in order to allow for empirical analyses.  
The theory building strategy has enabled me to identify and answer the following 
theoretical question: How to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for 
collaborative innovation in a public sector addressing wicked problems? 
The theory building strategy has consisted of the following steps.  
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First, based on a literature review of the emerging research field of collaborative 
innovation, I argue that the main theoretical challenge that drives theory 
development in this field is: to be able to conceptualise how to strike a balance 
between stabilising the collaborative configuration, on the one hand, and de-
stabilising parts of the collaborative configuration, on the other hand, in order to 
allow for an utilisation of uncertainty. Accordingly, conceptions of leadership have 
to pay attention to this fundamental, conceptual challenge. This literature review of 
collaborative innovation furthermore identified recommendations for future 
research, recommendations that new conceptualisations should pay attention to in 
order to contribute to the field of collaborative innovation.  
Second, my theory building strategy has been to review and discuss conceptions of 
leadership for collaborative innovation. The overall conclusion of this review is that 
the present leadership conceptions are undifferentiated. In order to allow for 
leadership differentiation, I discuss four points that has allowed me to produce a set 
of recommendations guiding my theory building.  
Next, I interpret Sandford Borins’ notion of bottom-up innovation leadership, 
arguing that this notion has some intriguing aspects that stimulate a theory building 
that satisfies the theory building recommendations that I have found.  
As a result of identified weaknesses in Borins’ concept of leadership, I find that the 
following six analytical concepts can be used to analyse how bottom-up leadership 
is exercised in a collaborative configuration that seeks to deal with a wicked 
problem through innovation:  
- Process- and end-point uncertainty (Van de Ven, 1999) and wicked 
problem uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) 
- The social construction of leadership, conceptualized as leadership 
emergence through the concept of ‘recognition’ (Griffin, 2002)  
- Public Entrepreneurship (Klein, 2010) 
- Sensemaking (Weick, 1995) 
- Giving sense (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) 
- Leadership distribution  
The next step of theory building was to construct a rather simple analytical model 
that allows for the analysis of a very complex organisational phenomenon: bottom-
up leadership, constructed in collaborative innovation processes, with the aim of 
developing a new way of dealing with a wicked problem, involving phenomena of 
uncertainty, emergence, conflict and making and giving sense. Since many of these 
organisational phenomena occurs simultaneously, I have found it relevant to 
disentangle these phenomena causally in order to allow myself and others to make 
an analysis in which each phenomenon can be causally put in relation to bottom-up 
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leadership and the innovation of a wicked problem through collaborative innovation. 
Hence, this causally disentanglement also allows for future analyses of bottom-up 
leadership in which narrow analyses can be made by focusing only on a single 
causality in the analytical model, that I call ‘BUCIL’ (an abbreviation of ‘Bottom-
Up Collaborative Innovation Leadership).  
Based on the causality of the BUCIL model I define bottom-up collaborative 
innovation leadership as an 1) intentional process aimed at the generation and 
implementation of new ideas in a specific context 2) initiated at the bottom of a 
public sector organisation requiring that the 3) lead unit responsible is able to gain 
influence through leadership recognition, which is conditioned by 4) utilisation of 
uncertainty through skills of public entrepreneurship, sensemaking and giving sense  
The next step in theory building was to explain and discuss critically the proposed 
concepts as well as the model, thereby qualifying further aspects of theory building 
and the interaction of the concepts in relation to the BUCIL model. The previous 
steps in the theory building strategy enabled me to identify a number of discussion 
points useful for enhancing the theoretical framework. The discussion related to both 
concepts and the BUCIL model in its entirety produced several findings. Some of 
the most important are as follows.  
Concerning uncertainty, the discussion revealed that uncertainty for bottom-up 
leadership is not an organisational phenomenon already there to begin with, but it is 
something that emerges, collapses, are being expanded, perhaps enacted strategically 
in the process, and is being sought managed and utilised by bottom-up leadership. 
Bottom-up leadership deals with uncertainty by a piecemeal form of sensemaking, 
utilising uncertainties in numerous interactions to influence stakeholders, thereby 
slowly building up momentum and increasing the scope of the project on a running 
basis. Hence, it is bottom-up leadership that produces and strives to enact a certain 
perspective on reality that enables a wicked problem to emerge as a wicked 
problem.  It seems likely that fragmented dissatisfaction of public agencies or 
stakeholders with contact to a wicked problem field will provide the seedbed for 
bottom-up leadership from which to launch a holistic critique of status quo. 
Concerning the interplay of uncertainty, the discussion revealed that one or more of 
the uncertainties that Koppenjan & Klijn mention in relation to wicked problems 
must be present in order to enable an emergent leadership to be recognised by 
collaborators. Further, this explorative discussion has stimulated to reveal some 
limitations of the BUCIL model that also stem from the research field of 
collaborative innovation:  that a more thorough discussion is required within the 
research field of collaborative innovation in the public sector concerning the 
different aspects of uncertainty. Hence, the discussion identified an agenda for future 
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research in relation to bottom-up leadership but also to leadership of collaborative 
innovation in general.  
Concerning leadership emergence, the complex responsive process theory  
perspective on leadership emergence ((Griffin, 2002; Stacey, 2007) in combination 
with Relational Leadership Theory (Uhl-Bien, 2006) provide us with a perspective 
on leadership that focuses not on individual traits, but on the ways in which 
collectives are moved in a certain direction through the social construction of 
leadership roles in a context of radical uncertainty related to organisational change. 
The discussion furthermore highlighted the relevance of the suggested theory in 
order to overcome a structure-agency dilemma generated when explaining how 
leadership in the making can exercise influence. Hence, bottom-up leadership and 
collaborative innovation processes are intertwined processes: They are agency and 
structure initiated simultaneously when bottom-up leadership begins communicating 
a critique of an existing performance gap and a perceived solution.  
Furthermore, the BUCIL model emphasizes an identifiable agency in terms of a 
bottom-up unit, composed of professional, specialized individuals, that accordingly 
is forced all of them to transform their identity when emerging as a collaborative 
leadership. Accordingly, leadership is something which is tied to a bottom-up 
position and the actions taken: It is bottom-up leadership that interprets and 
constructs the ‘system’ in which collaborators should interact, not the other way 
around, as Relational Leadership Theory might seem to suggest.  
Further, this discussion emphasized that despite the fact that the BUCIL model 
provides a leadership conception that both defines and narrows down leadership, it 
is deliberately left open what the relation is between the proposed social order (i.e. 
the innovation project) and how bottom-up leadership defines its role in relation to 
this new proposed social order.  
Concerning public entrepreneurship, the discussion revealed several advantages by 
separating entrepreneurship and leadership, even though these aspects are located 
within the same bottom-up leadership. Adopting public entrepreneurship allows for 
an explanation of how bottom-up leadership do this: Leadership has insight in a 
public performance gap, is willing to address this performance gap by seeking out, 
even enacting, uncertain environments strategically, in order to generate the 
possibilities for strategic influence. BUCIL accordingly explains how bottom-up 
leadership expands its platform of influence by gradually improving and developing 
the innovation project. So, the relationship between entrepreneurship and leadership 
is necessary, but in no way clear cut. The intention with the separation of leadership 
and entrepreneurship is that it allows for a more detailed analysis of the various 
forms of interplay between entrepreneurship and leadership: How a specific 
innovation project, conceptualised within a certain professional insight, calls for 
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different, compatible leaderships, that consequently will have their own paths of 
leadership recognition, conditioned as they are by both innovation project and 
leadership choices taken.  
Accordingly, entrepreneurship is a platform for bottom-up leadership that moves and 
is forced to move when new substantive, institutional or strategic uncertainties are 
faced, and when things in the innovation project do not work out as they were 
planned to. This moving platform makes both project and leadership flexible, but at 
a cost. When changes are made in the innovation project, or when unexpected 
challenges cannot be solved, the leadership risks losing credibility. So, on the basis 
of the above discussions, I define public, profession based entrepreneurship as a 
function fulfilled by 1) bottom-up leadership who 2) acts proactively in 
environments of uncertainty 3) by combining new or already existing resources, 4) 
in order for them to be deployed for a perceived better performance on public 
objectives. 
Concerning the relationship between making and giving sense I find that that 
making and giving sense could be in play simultaneously. This simultaneousness is 
perhaps more dominant in bottom-up leadership than in Gioia & Chittipeddi’s study 
of an explicit top-down leadership, because bottom-up leadership has no authority to 
command in the first place, and definitely not to collaborators. This consequently 
does not provide bottom-up leadership with the luxury to first make sense, and then 
give sense, in an orderly, designed fashion. Influence has to be exercised on a 
constant basis. This simultaneousness is also what allows new sense to be made 
during conflicts. In relation to these discussion points I assume that bottom-up 
leadership has, due to its professional specialization and its entrepreneurship, a head 
start for influencing collaborator’s sensemaking, in that bottom-up leadership’s 
context has already been interpreted and made sensible and enacted by bottom-up 
leadership. This is in contrast to collaborators, in which the challenge of making 
sense of ‘the game’ may have just begun.   
Concerning leadership distribution I exemplify that the importance of leadership 
distribution in relation to a research agenda for bottom-up leadership is that the 
aftermath of bottom-up leadership is crucial, and especially so when it comes to 
proposing new solutions to wicked problems, since arguably solutions to these 
wicked problems could be difficult to sustain. The function in the BUCIL model of 
leadership distribution is to enable an analysis of what the implications of a specific 
leadership recognition is, and to emphasize that bottom-up leadership is a distinct 
type of leadership which is identifiable exactly because it is forced to operate from 
an informal power position, and because the main purpose of bottom-up leadership 
is to establish alliances with ‘the top’ of its own organizations, preferably also the 
collaborating organisations. Leadership distribution draws our attention to the fact 
that bottom-up leadership is a leadership type with a certain duration. Concerning 
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the output-category status of leadership distribution, I exemplify the importance of 
the concept by illustrating some output scenarios that illustrate that each of these 
innovation ‘sustaining’ and ‘diffusion’  scenarios will be a path-dependent 
consequence of how bottom-up leadership and innovation project are perceived by 
collaborators, and to which degree bottom-up leadership has managed to display the 
collaborative value of the innovation project, hence distribute leadership. 
As a consequence of my theory building strategy, I identify four discussion points, 
based on the fact that my theory building have used concepts which have divergent 
theory of science positions, leaving open issues of the prescriptive/descriptive 
character of the model as well as theory of science position. Second, I have in my 
theory building drawn on literature that is not explicitly developed within a public 
sector context and I have drawn on literature that are located within different 
research fields, having the implication that it has been outside the boundaries of this 
thesis to make a state-of-the-art literature review of all these research fields.   
My discussion of these points reveals that the BUCIL model is a descriptive model, 
thereby clarifying an unclear epistemological status which I find also surrounds 
existing concepts of leadership for collaborative innovation. This descriptive status 
is consistent with much of the theory underpinning the model. The BUCIL model in 
its basic state does not suggest what bottom-up leadership should do in order to get 
recognised, it only provides a framework for enabling explanations of how 
leadership is recognised. 
My overall discussion also reveals that the BUCIL model does not neglect a vital 
distinction between managerial and political leadership, since (i) the theoretical 
framework is actually adapted to a political, public sector dimension by drawing on 
empirical and theoretical conceptions from studies of public sector innovation and 
network management, (ii) the theoretical framework is a framework that is based on 
Borins’ empirical descriptions of public sector leadership, (iii) the model is 
explicitly limited to a specific type of collaborative innovation, in which leadership 
has to be built in order to allow for a profession based innovation project to reach a 
scope of collaborative dimensions. After this, the project has to acquire a more 
regular status, by being championed by powerful stakeholders, albeit possibly with 
still a driving responsibility of bottom-up leadership.  So, this discussion point 
furthermore points to the attention of a research agenda concerning how bottom-up 
leadership interacts with other public sector leaderships: What this discussion has 
revealed is that it is an open question whether decision makers are able to take over 
and champion such a project, how they do it, and how bottom-up leadership 
constructed can co-exist or converge with more bureaucratic leadership structures, 
since it presumably will generate some adjustments having both a formal leadership 
and an informal leadership within the same organisation. So, it is of relevance to 
enable research into how such bottom-up projects are championed further on, and 
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what the challenges are of such projects – whether the sector-based, narrow point of 
origin haunts bottom-up collaborative innovations continuously, or whether 
ownership can be distributed, and how politicians can respond and utilise such 
specialised projects.  
In conclusion, I contribute to the differentiation of leadership conceptions for 
collaborative innovation by first of all theorising a new type of leadership, and 
second, by highlighting the uncertainty-related aspects of collaborative innovation 
leadership not addressed in the literature so far, in terms of the social construction of 
leadership and the way that the conceptual balance between stabilisation and the 
utilisation of uncertainty is conceptualised in another way. For bottom-up 
leadership, stabilisation is ensured by making and giving sense to collaborators, 
thereby utilising uncertainty. Stabilisation is furthermore ensured by having a highly 
adaptive leadership that through iterative social constructions adapts to a 
collaborative, political, public sector context, in which uncertainty generates 
conflicts and demands for answers.
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CHAPTER 3.                      
ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
In this thesis, I investigate how new forms of public leadership can contribute to 
solving complex problems in today’s welfare societies through innovation. In the 
chapter above I have pursued this agenda by means of a research strategy that has 
enabled me to identify and answer the research question of how to theorise bottom-
up leadership addressing wicked problems by means of collaborative innovation. 
Accordingly, I have contributed theoretically to the research agenda of leadership 
for collaborative innovation by developing an analytical model that enables 
researchers to identify and investigate aspects of this new form of public leadership. 
I have furthermore in detail explained and discussed causal aspects of the leadership 
model that I have developed (the ‘BUCIL’ model) in order to enable an empirical 
research agenda for bottom-up leadership.  
In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I further pursue the empirical agenda 
concerning how new forms of public leadership can contribute to solving complex 
problems. I do so by answering the following question:  
How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition 
in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
This question is a direct implication of the research framework developed above. In 
the theory chapter above I have argued that researchers can apply the BUCIL model 
in two different ways. The first option is to focus on selected elements of the model. 
The second option is to focus on the model in its entireness. In this thesis I pursue 
the second option.  
First of all, as touched on in section 2.5.3, I have in this thesis explicitly an 
‘Engaged Scholarship’-approach (see section 4.6). This means that my analytical 
approach has been abductive in the sense that my theory building has been informed 
by my field work and vice versa. Consequently, the concepts of the BUCIL model 
have informed my data collection and my observations, which also means that I 
have data on most of the concepts. The only concept which I do not use as part of 
my analysis is leadership distribution. This is due to the fact that my case study for 
natural reasons had to come to an end after three years, with the consequence that I 
do not have sufficient data to make an analysis concerning the causality between 
bottom-up leadership and the long-term implications of leadership distribution.  
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The second reason is that since I argue for the necessity and relevance of a new 
analytical framework, testing the framework as much as possible seems to me 
appropriate in order to provide other researchers the possibilities to further criticize 
or develop the BUCIL model in light of the analyses of this thesis (Chapter 6 and 7).  
In this chapter I first explain how I deploy analytical tools that are in alignment with 
the methodological implications of the BUCIL model. I do so by outlining a 
discourse analytical approach. Next, I operationalize the BUCIL model.  
 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY:  DEPLOYMENT OF THE BUCIL 3.1
MODEL BY MEANS OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
In this section I explain the first step towards an operationalization of the BUCIL 
model. Arguably, the theory of science status of each concept in the BUCIL model 
will change according to which analytical approach to adopt.  
Accordingly, in this section I argue that a discourse approach both defines the theory 
of science position of the BUCIL model, as well as provides me with tools for 
operationalising the BUCIL model. I do so by briefly outlining central aspects of the 
deployed discourse approach. Next, I synthesise discourse approach and BUCIL 
model.  
3.1.1.  DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: ACTION, TEXTUAL 
PRODUCTION, INSTITUTIONALISATION 
The research of Cynthia Hardy and Nelson Phillips (Grant, 2004; Hardy, Lawrence, 
& Phillips, 1998; Hardy, 2001; Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Hardy & Thomas, 2012; 
Phillips & Hardy, 2002a; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004) is suited for 
conducting an organisational discourse analysis that allows for intentional, strategic 
action with the aim of exercising influence. In several publications, the authors 
discuss the relationship of the organisational ‘food chain’ between action, producing 
‘text’ (symbolic products such as conversations and written material), discourse 
production and the linkages to institutionalisation (Phillips et al., 2004). Altogether, 
the work of Cynthia Hardy and Nelson Phillips provide a framework for doing 
discourse analysis focused on the micro-levels of organisations and on the details in 
the local situational context, an approach endorsed and exemplified by Alvesson & 
Karreman (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000).  
First, a definition and delineation of the term discourse. I adopt the definition of 
discourse developed by Grant & Hardy, who define organisational discourse as “the 
struggles for meaning that occur in organisations” (Grant & Hardy, 2004: p. 5), 
understood as “an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, 
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dissemination and reception, that bring an object into being” (Phillips & Hardy, 
2002a).  
I also use the categories developed by (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) in order to 
delineate the scope of my discourse analysis. The authors distinguish between two 
different approaches to discourse. Either as social text (the study of talk and written 
text in its ‘social action context’) vs. the study of social reality as discursively 
constructed. The former conception views discourse as a local achievement with no 
general content, whereas the latter sees discourse as having a more general content 
in which discourse is “a general and prevalent system for the formation and 
articulation of ideas in a certain period” (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). Alvesson & 
Karreman distinguish between micro-, meso,-grand- and mega-discourses, stratified 
horizontally across a determination-autonomy-spectrum. In grand/mega-discourses, 
discourse is assumed to have powerful constitutive powers, thus demonstrating a 
very deterministic view of agency as reduced to subject positions made available by 
discourse.  
In this study, the focus is on the micro-level. Alvesson & Karreman’s arguments 
concerning the degree of agency determination ascribed to discourse are therefore 
relevant. The authors argue that it is important to make clear the degree to which 
discourse determines meaning: Whether they are overlapping, coupled or uncoupled. 
The discourse perspective of Cynthia Hardy and Nelson Phillips is placed 
somewhere in the middle, in that the formation of discourse is applied in a strategic 
organisational context (Phillips et al., 2004). Therefore, discourse formation will 
always be strategically contested and will consequently reduce the determinism of 
agency.  
In this respect, this study is in line with Alvesson & Karreman’s recommendations. 
As Alvesson & Karreman conclude, they have “expressed some sympathy for 
reducing the range in the study of discourses, thus being more attentive to the local 
social context of language use in organisations…We thus want to highlight 
problems with the tendency to work with a too grandiose and too muscular view on 
discourse ” (p. 1145). Consequently when I use the term discourse, the range of the 
discourse is local, limited to the organisations involved in the collaborative 
innovation project.  
Second, how can we deploy organisational discourse? (Phillips & Hardy, 2002a) 
have written a small handbook on the investigation of processes of social 
construction by means of discourse analysis. This handbook provides me with the 
main tools for conducting discourse analysis, supplemented with other publications 
that elaborate on this perspective (Hardy et al., 1998; Hardy, 2001; Hardy & 
Phillips, 2004; Hardy & Thomas, 2012; Phillips et al., 2004).   (Phillips & Hardy, 
2002a) define discourse as “an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their 
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production, dissemination and reception that brings an object into being” (p. 3). 
Discourses are embodied and enacted in a variety of texts, and may take a variety of 
forms: written texts, spoken words, pictures, symbols, artefacts etc. Discourse 
analysis is interested in ascertaining the constructive effects of discourse in the study 
of texts; discourses are shared and social, emanating from interactions between 
social groups and complex societal structures (p. 4). Discursive activity always 
arises in a specific context. Thus, according to Phillips & Hardy, when conducting 
discourse analysis, we need to study the interplay between text, discourse, and 
context.  
Discourse analysis is a methodology that explores how socially produced ideas and 
objects are created through the study of ways in which language constructs 
phenomena. According to Phillips & Hardy discourse analysis is constitutive of the 
social world. (p. 6). Discourse analysis thus commits itself to a strong social 
constructivist view. Discourse analysis is also a reflexive research practice, in that 
the processes of social construction also apply to the work of research. 
Consequently, discourse analysis is attuned to the co-construction of the theoretical 
categories applied in research.  
In the next section I further elaborate on discourse analysis by synthesising the 
approach with the BUCIL model.  
       
 SYNTHESISING DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND BUCIL  3.2
Discourse analysis is deployed in several ways in the analyses in chapter 5 and 6. In 
each analysis, Figure 4 is used to guide the operationalization. The synthesis of key 
concepts in the BUCIL model and a discourse analytical approach implicates that 
each key concept is interpreted within a discourse analytical paradigm, but also the 
other way around: discourse is interpreted by means of BUCIL. Consequently, both 
analyses draw upon the specific social constructive perspective that discourse 
analysis constitutes. I will explain what I mean by this statement below.  
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FIGURE 4: ANALYTICAL STRATEGY WHEN APPLYING THE BUCIL MODEL 
 
 
What the figure essentially describes is that entrepreneurship can be understood as a 
type of action that has the discursive function to make new combinations in order to 
produce discursive texts (presentations, talk, communication, minutes, strategy 
papers, etc.). This discursive text is what calls for, and allows, for a new subject 
position to be created, that of the collaborative innovation leader. This innovation 
leader has, in order to enable the introduced discourse to have organisational 
implications, to transform the discursive concepts and texts into social objects in the 
organisation (a new commission for a policy, a new strategy, new organisational 
structure, new service, new practice etc.). Leadership does so by making and giving 
sense in order to win the organisational struggles for meaning. If successful, these 
social objects result in a process in which the introduced discourse (the innovation 
project and its implementation results) is being embedded in the existing discourses 
in the organisations. In a long term perspective, this discursive embeddedness could 
result in a process of institutionalisation, as suggested by (Phillips et al., 2004).    
Remember that this analytical structure is an iterative, causal structure, not a linear 
structure: uncertainty, entrepreneurship, leadership construction and making and 
giving sense should be understood as organisational phenomena that are present 
simultaneously, go through iterative stages and presupposes each other. Obviously, 
such organisational phenomena are difficult to operationalize.  
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The strategy taken in this thesis is selecting two embedded cases that I analyse 
according to the following structure in the analyses: 
- Analysis of uncertainty on four dimensions:  
1. Substantive uncertainty 
2. Institutional uncertainty 
3. Strategic uncertainty 
4. Innovation uncertainty 
- Analysis of entrepreneurship 
- Analysis of leadership: 
1. Leadership conflicts 
2. Sources of leadership legitimacy 
3. Leadership identity  
- Analysis of making and giving sense 
 
Hence, each embedded case is fixed in time, and is being analysed from the 
perspectives of each category.  
Below, I display how the BUCIL model itself can be interpreted within the discourse 
analytical approach presented and how this interpretation can be regarded as a 
synthesis.  
 
BUCIL and discourse analysis 
As I have explained and discussed in Chapter 2, the BUCIL model is tailored to 
study emergent phenomena in organisations: emergent social orders (i.e. 
innovations) and emergent identities (i.e. leadership). BUCIL further is focused on 
how new things are made sensible, i.e. acts of social construction, and how these 
processes of sensemaking are being used strategically to influence collaborators, i.e. 
giving sense. BUCIL is furthermore focused on action, focusing on how structure 
and agency are being produced and enacted simultaneously.  
In section 3 above I have explained key elements in a specific type of organisational 
discourse analysis. This type of organisational discourse analysis emphasises several 
key issues that are central when applying this approach on empirical material. 
Concerning methodology, discourse analysis is focused on exploring how socially 
produced ideas and objects are created through the study of ways in which language 
constructs phenomena. This is in alignment with BUCIL. Further, the study of the 
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production of identity is central in discourse analysis (see below). This is also in 
alignment with BUCIL.  
In addition, these social constructions in discourse analysis needs to be examined in 
order to relate them to the individual strategies of actors, an element which is in 
alignment with BUCIL, in that it is bottom-up leadership that acts strategically and 
intentionally. Furthermore, (Phillips et al., 2004) combine the strategic agency with 
discourse, and explains how these micro-discursive actions can result in the 
embeddedness of a new discourse in the organisations, having institutional 
consequences. This aspect of ‘from the-small-to-the-grand’-process of influence is 
fully in accordance with the perspective produced by BUCIL, in which bottom-up 
leadership seeks to distribute leadership by making decision makers embrace the 
innovation project as their own.   
In conclusion, the discourse approach as explained above is compatible with the 
BUCIL model. But the discourse approach also enhances the explanatory power of 
BUCIL. First of all by demonstrating that the type of social order emergence as 
proposed by BUCIL is supported by organisational discourse approaches. Second of 
all by defining narrowly how to apply each of the BUCIL concepts on empirical 
material.  
So, in my interpretation of Figure 4 we can reduce it to two elements:  
1. a new social order, e.g. an organisational development process, strategy or 
project 
2. An actor that exercises influence by introducing this new social order, 
making leadership a necessity.   
I have suggested above that we understand this concept of leadership in terms of 
discourse: One or more actors introduce or coproduce a new discourse, by which a 
subject position as leader is expected and perceived.  
Thus, a workable definition of leadership recognition is: leadership recognition in 
the context of collaboration is acquired when the introduction of your discourse of 
change reaches such a momentum that your emergent leadership and discourse 
cannot be ignored, but are reckoned with, perhaps appreciated, in the strategic power 
games within and between organisations.    
Differences do, however, exist between the BUCIL model and the discourse 
analytical approach suggested. First of all, in (Phillips et al., 2004) , strategic action 
is emphasised on the expense of the emergent process perspective as proposed by 
BUCIL. The identity and subject position of the initiator of a micro-discourse is not 
in itself part of the analytical framework, neither do the model allow for more 
 124 
 
iterative approaches to how the emergence of a micro-discourse has an iterative and 
re-defining character in a context of bottom-up led collaborative innovation,  
As I have depicted in Figure 4, it is possible to understand entrepreneurship as a 
proactive kind of action that has as its discursive function to introduce new texts and 
concepts, being here informed by resistance to attempts of giving sense. The 
emergence of collaborative leadership is to be understood as an emerging subject 
position made possible by the new discourse introduced by entrepreneurship. 
Making and giving sense is to be understood as how bottom-up leadership seeks to 
transform concepts into social objects in the organisation, e.g. new organisational 
structures, strategy papers, policies, services, etc. Finally, the distribution of 
leadership is to be understood as the first step in the process towards how the social 
objects are elements in a process of institutionalization.  
Below, I will discuss this synthesis in more depth.  I do so by explaining each 
concept in the BUCIL model in relation to the function it takes in the synthesis with 
the proposed discourse approach.  
 
Discourse and uncertainty 
The synthesis of discourse analysis and uncertainty implies that uncertainty is 
interpreted as something that momentarily dissolves meaning. Consequently, the 
dominant struggles for meaning (i.e. the existing discourses) are being paused and 
re-interpreted, as people in organisations are forced to make sense of their 
environment. The implication is that it is possible for a new discourse to be 
introduced. A new discourse implies new power structures, new identities, new 
subject positions, and new social objects. The implication of this synthesis is that the 
operationalization of uncertainty focuses on demonstrating how uncertainty 
generates frustration and a search for answers for the people involved in the 
collaborative innovation processes.  
 
Discourse and entrepreneurship 
The synthesis of discourse analysis and entrepreneurship implies that public, 
profession based entrepreneurship is interpreted as a specific type of discursive 
action that could contribute to generating this new discourse in a condition of 
uncertainty. The work of (Phillips et al., 2004)  support this interpretation of 
discursive action related to sensemaking, stating that “sensemaking is a linguistic 
process (…) that produce texts that leave traces. For example, innovators who 
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depart from prior practice intervene proactively in the organization to promulgate 
new explanations of social reality” (p. 641). In my interpretation of entrepreneurship 
and discourse, the basis for being able to intervene proactively is having identified a 
performance gap, and providing a new solution to this performance gap by making 
new combinations between available organisational resources. By making new 
combinations, novel concepts are introduced. If these novel concepts produce a 
coherent text, one of the primary conditions for the production of a new discourse is 
fulfilled.  
The implication of this synthesis for analysis is that my operationalization of 
entrepreneurship guides the analysis of collaborative innovation leadership by 
showing:  
a. how new combinations are produced by means of entrepreneurship 
b. how these new combinations make up a coherent text 
c. how this coherent text implies how specific leadership subject positions 
are produced 
d. how the inspiration for new combinations, or the refinement of an 
existing text, is a result of an on-going and iterative sensemaking process 
forced upon the emergent leadership unit, sometimes provoked by 
resistance and conflict towards the discourse and the leadership subject 
positioning.  
 
I demonstrate this in the findings-tables in Figure 17 and Figure 22 by displaying 
what ‘key text’ that is introduced, what ‘social object’ that is constructed, and what 
‘resistance’ or ‘acceptance’ this new text and leadership generates. I further 
demonstrate this in each analysis in the entrepreneurship section by making a table 
(Figure 18, Figure 23) that displays the textual combinations made by means of 
entrepreneurship.  
In the analysis of entrepreneurship, I emphasize the element of discursive action by 
describing how bottom-up leadership acts proactively, carving out organisational 
niches of new sense, enacting a new organisational environment. The element of 
action is important to emphasize, since leadership emergence and the introduction of 
a new micro-discourse does not happen by chance or relies on structural, systemic 
necessities. Leadership and discourse is produced by the specific individuals who 
are part of the professional unit emerging as bottom-up leadership, and who has 
strategic intentions – they basically want their innovation project to be implemented 
in some version or the other. These individuals are acting and interacting on the 
basis of personal insights, qualifications, intentions and experience.  
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Proactivity is a further specific characteristic action element of entrepreneurship, 
allowing the leadership unit to navigate in a context of uncertainty, by utilising and 
creating windows of opportunities. As I demonstrate in especially analysis B, 
proactivity is used to reduce the resistance to the new collaborative innovation 
project (i.e. the discourse) by making alliances with powerful stakeholders and 
exploring the landscape of power, consequently adjusting the collaborative 
innovation project to the discursive context. As such, entrepreneurship interpreted 
by means of discourse analysis enables bottom-up leadership to produce a new 
discourse and contributes to embed the new micro-discourse in the existing fabric of 
organisational discourses.  
 
Discourse and leadership 
The synthesis of leadership emergence and discourse analysis implies first of all a 
focus on conflicts, since these reflect struggles of power. When studying identity by 
means of discourse analysis, in this case leadership identity, research demonstrates 
that new identities can be developed in order to reconcile conflicts between 
identities related to different discourses (Phillips & Hardy, 2002b). These conflicts 
therefore have to be interpreted and made sense of by bottom-up leadership and 
collaborators. One response for bottom-up leadership could be to revise leadership 
identity in alignment with a new strategic positioning. Another response could be to 
alter elements in the micro-discourse that bottom-up leadership is trying to 
disseminate across organisations. Sometimes these two types of responses are 
connected. For instance, describing the main goal of a collaborative innovation 
project as ‘increased coordination’ (demonstrated in this thesis) in contrast to 
‘facilitating cross-organisational service production’ (an example) would require 
another kind of leadership as well as another type of project. The first one would 
invoke a metaphor of someone trying to achieve a leadership position in which 
orchestrating the administrative actions of organisational partners is possible; 
whereas the second would invoke a metaphor of someone trying to achieve a 
leadership position in which nourishing and enhancing inter-organisational activity 
and interactions of de-central service-providers is possible. A third response could 
be to ignore conflicts, going around them by trying to influence more powerful 
stakeholders (also partially demonstrated in this thesis).  
 The synthesis of discourse and leadership also, however, implies an 
analytical attention towards legitimacy. As (Phillips et al., 2004) note, actions that 
lead actors to gain legitimacy, maintain or repair legitimacy are likely to produce 
texts that leave trace. Gaining legitimacy for bottom-up leadership is vital, 
especially because this leadership bases its claim for change on a perceived 
performance-gap, i.e. an ‘organisational crisis’ (ibid.). If bottom-up leadership does 
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not succeed in gaining legitimacy for this agenda by means of presenting a 
convincing text, most likely the support for the project will be negligible. Analytical 
focus on legitimacy therefore contributes to explain what existing discursive 
building blocks that support the innovation project. 
Another reason for why legitimacy is important for the analysis of bottom-up 
leadership and its struggle for recognition is to investigate whether or not the 
presence of uncertainty generates a demand for leadership. As the theory of complex 
responsive processes assumes (Griffin, 2002), when uncertainty is present, people are 
looking for something to provide a direction. Such a ‘something’ most likely will be 
leadership. This perspective on legitimacy, as something which organisational actors 
are actually willing to grant to someone who can produce a good-enough answer, 
supplements the discourse approach to legitimacy. It does by hypothesising that 
existing power structures will demand a new type of leadership in conditions of 
uncertainty, an uncertainty generated by both the innovation project and the wicked 
problem’s impact on cross-organisational understandings of substantive, institutional 
and strategic issues. Accordingly, applying legitimacy to the analysis creates a 
balanced approach to leadership recognition in which not only conflicts drives the 
innovation project and leadership construction forward.  
A final issue of the synthesis of discourse and leadership concerns identity. Related 
to my elaborations above concerning conflicts and sources of legitimacy, one could 
be given the impression that there exists a fairly obvious 1: 1 relationship between 
micro-discourse and leadership identity, and that, accordingly, it would be fairly 
obvious for bottom-up leadership to define its own position. That impression would 
be wrong. This thesis pursues a structure-agency relationship which is intimately 
related - but it is symbiotic in the sense that both social order (the innovation 
project) and subject position (bottom-up leadership) has its own dynamics and 
challenges. I have elaborated on this symbiotic relationship in section 2.4.4, arguing 
that the reason for separating entrepreneurship and leadership is to enable an 
analysis in which the profession-based, new combinations made by means of 
entrepreneurial action implicates challenges and possibilities for how bottom-up 
leadership interprets and makes sense of its leadership and consequently, how 
collaborators perceive of this leadership.  
So, in the analyses in this thesis, conflicts and sources of legitimacy denote possible 
routes of navigation and positioning within a micro-discourse landscape that bottom-
up leadership itself has generated. Because of this, different subject positions are 
available as options. The implication of this relationship is that a change in one of 
the discursive elements affects the other. For instance, if an unexpected event 
occurs, very plausible in innovations, the emergent leadership is forced to interpret 
this event, make sense of it, and perhaps revise its leadership position. I therefore 
hypothesize that a constant awareness concerning identity is paramount for bottom-
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up leadership. Another example would be that bottom-up leadership repeatedly 
experience conflict and resistance. This inertia could likewise result in a reflection of 
own leadership role, perhaps leading to a redefinition of identity, and perhaps even a 
redefinition of the innovation project.  
 A multiple positioning landscape is also proposed in this thesis 
because bottom-up leadership is not an actor perceived of as an all-knowing and 
rational kind of leadership. Bottom-up leadership has to constantly interpret its 
surroundings and make sense of them. As such, interpretations could be wrong, for 
instance, about how willingly alliance partners are to defend the innovation project 
or its leadership. Furthermore, not all conflicts may even be detected by bottom-up 
leadership, vital information concerning important contemporary or future events 
could risk not be paid attention to by bottom-up leadership. Consequently, bottom-
up leadership could risk aiming for a fatal leadership positioning or making fatal 
decisions concerning elements in the innovation project.  
Finally, and related to the multiple positioning landscape, leadership identity and 
positioning options are not something which is easily obtained or easily abandoned. 
First of all, bottom-up leadership starts out the innovation process with not being a 
full-blown, collaborative innovation leadership. What this means is that the 
leadership perhaps haven’t got sufficient resources (staff, training, equipment), a 
very likely problem given the fact that I hypothesize that the mandate for the 
innovation project is constantly up to negotiation (See theory chapter above). 
Consequently, bottom-up leadership may suddenly experience a huge organisational 
demand for answers and guidance, depleting its resources rapidly; or it may 
experience the opposite if the initial conditions generated by, or granted to, bottom-
up leadership, were highly supportive of the innovation project. Second, bottom-up 
leadership may not have the experience of thinking of itself as a leadership. 
Remember that bottom-up leadership emerges on a basis of specialization, and, 
therefore perhaps accustomed to a single-organisational environment and/or 
uncontroversial operations. Being suddenly positioned centre stage in cross-
organisational conflicts and communication may therefore be experienced as 
something of a shock and even a mystery, perhaps clouding the fact that what 
collaborators challenge are the leadership exercised and/or the way the innovation 
project is communicated.    
Discourse and making and giving sense 
The synthesis of discourse and sensemaking and sensegiving implies a focus on 
socially constructed objects. (Hardy & Phillips, 2004) define objects as follows:  
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“Objects are part of the practical realm: they are partially ideal but have a material 
aspect. When a concept is used to make some aspect of material reality meaningful, 
an object is constituted” (ibid., p. 302) 
The way I deploy discourse analysis in relation to sensemaking and sensegiving is 
by demonstrating that sensemaking, understood as the specific part of a struggle for 
meaning, in which individuals are ascribing meaning to what is going on around 
them, and to what other actors are doing and thinking. Sensegiving, on the other 
hand, has an intentional aspect, in that a certain actor deliberately tries to convince 
others of a certain interpretation of organizational reality (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991). Interpreted within discourse analysis, the aim is to construct objects in the 
organisation. Accordingly, in the analyses I track the introduced concepts, generated 
by means of entrepreneurship, to follow whether or not they have an impact in the 
organisation. This discursive impact I define as a socially constructed object. For 
each analysis, I list these ‘objects’ tracked in the right-hand side of the Findings-
tables (Figure 17 and 22).  
To recapitulate this section, BUCIL as understood in Hardy & Phillip’s concept of 
organisational discourse analysis is as follows, in my interpretation: 
Entrepreneurship is a type of action that produces ’texts’ (all types of 
communication) by introducing new concepts. However, entrepreneurship does not 
in itself has a leadership dimension, understood here as the ability to make decisions 
in conditions of uncertainty in such a way that collaborators will accept these 
decisions. Entrepreneurship is characterized by the ability to find a new solution to a 
performance gap. As a consequence, a new subject position has to be established, 
i.e. that of the ’collaborative innovation leader’. In order to be able to transform 
concepts into social objects, and thus to make ensure that the texts are embedded in 
the existing discourses of the organisation, the leader has to manipulate and guide 
the sensemaking of collaborators to win the struggles of meaning. The emergent 
leader is not outside of the innovation process, but is also conditioned by the 
uncertainties of the innovation journey; therefore the emerging collaborative 
innovation leadership is forced to make sense as well during the process, using this 
ability of sensemaking to further enhance capacities of entrepreneurship, thereby 
sharpening and adapting the introduced micro-discursive concepts further. The text-
producing unit must finally be recognised as a leader in order to disseminate the 
’texts’, and thus give sense. Leadership recognition is achieved when the 
’collaborative innovation leader’ is counted among strategic key actors across the 
collaborating organisations. In the next section I operationalise Figure 4.   
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 OPERATIONALIZATION 3.3
In the sections above, I have presented an analytical model; I have argued that the 
causal connections hypothesised between the key concepts in the BUCIL model are 
rendered plausible by applying a certain conception of discourse analysis. In this 
section, I operationalise the concepts by breaking them down into observable 
phenomena. After this section, I turn to the Methods chapter, in which I describe 
methods that allow me to observe these phenomena.  
Below, I operationalise the concepts by breaking them down into listed phenomena 
that could be interpreted as signs of bottom-up leadership. I provide examples of 
interview questions from the interview guides.  
 
Key concept: Leadership as social constructive processes of recognition. 
Definition: Leadership recognition in the context of collaborative innovation is 
acquired when the introduction of your discourse of change reaches such a 
momentum that your emergent leadership and discourse cannot be ignored, but are 
reckoned with, perhaps appreciated, in the strategic power games within and 
between organisations. 
Observable signs of the constructed key concepts: 
 Power struggles over leadership, i.e. who is the follower and who is to be 
led  
 A visible intention to take the lead in developing something new, to present 
a new way of doing things, despite uncertainty 
 People questioning, discussing, appreciating and assessing the leadership 
and the project 
 
Examples of interview questions and points of observation 
Interview questions: 
 Can you put some words on how to understand the managerial challenge of 
this development project? 
 In your opinion, has this project called for special efforts by officials and 
managers? 
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 Where has the need for leadership arisen, do you think? Can you think of 
any critical points? 
 Is it your impression that the administrations involved knew what they 
wanted in this project? 
Observations: 
 Where does conflict arise and around what issues?  
 Are leadership and innovation perceived of as legitimate?  
 Who has the power to define what the collaborators are actually doing? 
 
Key concept: Making sense and giving sense  
Definition: Sensemaking is a social condition in organisations which must be 
established in order to keep moving and navigating in an unpredictable process 
(Weick, 1995). Leaders have to provide direction by providing answers to who 
collaborators are and what they are doing (Griffin 2002). 
Observable signs of the constructed key concepts: 
 People are adopting the same world view by using the same concepts and 
rhetoric 
 People display uncertainty or considerations concerning the change and its 
implications. 
 An increasing range of actors is included in the interactions involved in the 
change project 
Examples of interview questions and points of observation 
Interview questions:  
 How much leverage have you professionals had in the project? 
 What are your and your management’s roles in the future? 
 How do you see leadership challenges in the future? 
o Who will lead? 
o How should such leadership be performed? 
o In the light of conflicts or surprises: what have they led to in terms 
of considerations on your part and that of your administration? 
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Observations:  
 What generates frustration and uncertainty in meetings and during 
interviews?  
 What are the key points of discussion?  
 What is conditioning conversational inertia and progress? 
 
Key concept: Leadership distribution 
Definition: The extent to which decision makers in their own organisations are 
influenced by giving sense 
Observable signs of the constructed key concepts: 
 People higher up in the hierarchy embrace the strategy  
 People in the other organisations: 
o Are able to see some relevance/strategic advantage of the project  
o Develop innovation spin-off strategies themselves, taking on the 
roles of maintaining and driving the process 
Examples of interview questions and points of observation 
Interview questions 
 Who demonstrates leadership in such a project? 
 What are you and your administration’s future roles? 
 What are the key leadership future challenges? 
Observation points:  
 Who breaks collaborative inertia and helps move the discussions forward? 
 Who takes charge when the situation is uncertain and decision making is 
crucial? 
 
Key concept: Public entrepreneurship 
Definition: Entrepreneurship as a function fulfilled by 1) bottom-up leadership who 
2) act proactively in environments of uncertainty 3) by combining new or already 
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existing resources, 4) in order to deploy them for a perceived better performance on 
public objectives.    
Observable signs of the constructed key concepts: 
 Professionally founded perspective 
 The entrepreneurs are able to improvise in conditions of uncertainty by 
being proactive 
 The entrepreneurs are able to combine resources in new ways in order to 
improve performance 
 
Examples of interview questions and points of observation: 
 How much leverage have you professionals had in the project? 
 What are the limitations?  
 What parts of the project were established in advance? 
 Do you perceive this project as an interdisciplinary, cross-sector product, or 
do you see the final product as sector-specific? 
Observations:  
 How are new concepts and conceptions developed?  
 By whom and why?  
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CHAPTER 4. METHODS 
In this section, I describe the methods used for collecting data consistent with the 
operationalization outlined in the section above.   
First, I motivate my selection of case. 
Subsequently, I define and describe the case study as a method. I focus on issues of 
generalizability and quality criteria. I argue that the qualitative, field work based, 
single-case study is an appropriate method framework when studying emergent 
phenomena such as innovation processes in which leadership is socially constructed. 
I finish the case study section by applying the case study method categories and 
criteria to my own case study. I conclude the section by describing how the different 
data sources (documents, transcribed recordings, field notes) live up to the standards 
of data triangulation characteristic of case studies (Yin 2009); and how the methods 
mutually reinforce each other, e.g. when observations made are used to inform and 
qualify a subsequent qualitative interview.    
Next, I present an overview of the data collection: the date of data collection, the 
amount of data, the type of qualitative data, and which parts of the innovation 
process I chose to focus on. I briefly describe the qualitative data methods used: 
qualitative interviews, direct observation, and participant observation (section 4.4). 
In section 4.5 I give examples of how data is analysed. In section 4.6 I describe and 
reflect on the theoretical and practical consequences of adopting an abductive, 
‘engaged scholarship’-approach.  
Finally, I sum up the chapter. 
 
 SELECTION OF CASES 4.1
First of all, this case is a case of what Sandford Borins (see Chapter 2) calls bottom-
up innovation leadership with a holistic aim. As I elaborate on in Chapter 5, the case 
is bottom-up in the sense that it is an office located within a central-administration in 
a professional unit with strong professional relations to the local level that is the 
initiator and driver of the process. Accordingly, the innovation project is not 
initiated in a strategy- or policy-office with natural, institutional relations to CEOs 
or the political level. Instead, the emergent bottom-up leadership is inspired by 
professional insights in performance gaps related to lack of coordination on a 
vertical dimension (local neighbourhood-central administrations) and horizontal 
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(administration-to-administration and municipality-social housing sector) when 
running the area based programs in disadvantaged areas.  
Another motivation for selecting this Copenhagen case was the ongoing character of 
the process. I had the opportunity to observe and participate in a collaborative 
development process that was under development. This ongoing, developing 
character is consistent with the theoretical and methodological foundations of the 
BUCIL model as this model is adapted to ongoing processes of social construction. 
As a result, having access to an on-going process was to be preferred instead of 
selecting a case in which the process had already ended.  
A third motivation was the collaborative dimension of the process. The development 
project was to begin with defined in a municipal strategy paper, having the objective 
of improving coordination across a number of organisationally separated 
stakeholders (See Chapter 5 for further case context details). Furthermore, the 
development project had the character of exactly a project, in that a strategy report 
had been written when the project was initiated. Accordingly, relevant data for an 
analysis for bottom-up leadership was bound to occur, no matter whether the project 
would be terminated or not. In this respect, the development project was indeed a 
development project that can be characterised as an innovation, in that the project 
denoted a radical break with former practice of running area-based programs in the 
City of Copenhagen. That being said, neither the emergent bottom-up leadership 
(Neighbourhood Development) nor collaborators coined the project as an 
‘innovation’ process. Likewise, no ‘innovation leadership tools’ were deployed 
formally. In this respect, the case is analytically consistent with the definition of 
innovation applied in this thesis (see the introduction in theory chapter). In this 
respect, the case is strong in describing a ‘natural’ bottom-up leadership process, in 
terms of what happens when a professional office sets in motion an innovation 
process with no prior knowledge of public sector innovation and no specific 
innovation-skills to do so, other than a modest level of standardised, regular 
leadership-training.  
Yet a further motivation fully consistent with the BUCIL model is that the case can 
be regarded as leadership’s endeavour to deal with aspects of a wicked problem: 
disadvantaged areas. What was clear to begin with was the process was highly 
contentious out of substantive, strategic and institutional reasons. As Analysis A 
demonstrate the parties involved had different perspectives on knowledge relevance 
related to evaluating the area based programs operating in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, and furthermore had difficulties with clarifying roles and agreeing 
on a shared agenda. In this respect the case is well-chosen, especially because 
bottom-up leadership, through its strong ties with their colleagues working in the 
disadvantaged areas in an area based approach, exemplify how front-line staff 
experience aggregated when working with a wicked problem with insufficient 
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means provides a push towards a coherent critique transformed into a development 
project.   
 SINGLE-CASE STUDY DESIGN: DEFINITION, 4.2
GENERALIZABILITY AND QUALITY CRITERIA 
In this section I explain my use of the qualitative case study as the main method for 
collecting and constructing data. In this thesis, these are approaches and definitions 
of case studies that are in accordance with (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Maaløe, 2002; Yin, 
2009). For this study, (Yin, 2009) is valuable in providing us with acknowledged 
standards for conducting and assessing case studies; (Flyvbjerg, 2006) is valuable in 
providing us with a narrow focus on analytical generalizability in single-case 
studies. And (Maaløe, 2002) is valuable in underscoring the strengths of field work 
based case studies. First, I define and describe the case study. Next, I focus on types 
of case study designs. Third, I use Yin (2009) to set up criteria for judging the 
quality of case study research designs. Finally, I apply the categories described in 
the first three sections to my research design, and use Yin’s ‘quality tests’ for my 
research design in order to summarise strengths and weaknesses of my design in 
relation to my analysis.  
 
Definition of a case study 
(Maaløe, 2002) argues that what characterizes a case study is the acceptance of 
ambiguity, and that, in contrast to other methods, such as an experiment, a case 
study is characterized by being an in-depth investigation of how people interact and 
act within their own environments. According to Maaløe, one of the main strengths 
of a case study is that it enables us to see what people are actually doing, instead of 
only relying on interview data describing what people say they have been doing. 
And further, the people you investigate to some extent provide the framework for 
your research (p. 31). Yin (Yin, 2009) defines a case study (p. 18) as “an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident”. Thus, case studies are suitable when the researcher has no 
control over external events, and when how- and why-questions are being posed (p. 
2).   
Yin further extends the above definition by adding technical characteristics: “The 
case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will 
be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
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propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (p. 18). This last definition I find 
important, in that it builds on explicit quality criteria for conducting case studies.  
A further characteristic of case studies is that they can be quantitative or qualitative. 
And they can rely on field work and ethnological approaches, but can also rely 
solely on desktop research (Yin, 2009).  
 
Case study designs and questions of generalization of findings  
Generally, (Yin, 2009) argues in favour of a multiple case study approach, and 
warns researchers against ‘single-case’ designs (p. 50). Choosing the single-case 
study approach may be well grounded, but the researcher will have to realise that 
this approach will have some consequences for the external validity, in that it will be 
difficult to argue that the findings in the single-case will be empirically 
generalizable.  
In contrast, (Flyvbjerg, 2006) argues that five misunderstandings about case studies 
exist, and that these misunderstandings draw on the misunderstanding that a case 
study is characterized by the making of inferences from a small population to a 
larger population (from a couple of cases to all members of the population). Instead, 
case studies are suitable for making analytical generalizations, i.e. contributing to 
theoretical developments by testing hypotheses. Yin also sees the use of case studies 
as a necessary tool for making analytical generalisations (p. 15), but recommends 
that a multiple case study approach is optimal, in that it also enhances the empirical 
generalizations (p. 24).;  whereas Flyvbjerg emphasizes that the major force of case 
studies is to develop theory through single-case studies, and therefore proposes 
single-case studies. Some disagreement does exist, however,  between these two 
scholars in that Flyvbjerg further argues that even single-case-studies “are multiple 
in most research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different 
ways” (p. 225).  
In this respect, Flyvbjerg advocates a position that is in alignment with Van de 
Ven’s ‘engaged scholarship’-position: you have to engage yourself in the complex 
life (of organisations) in order to develop theory (that is usable for both practice and 
academia) (See section 4.6 below).   
Another contribution by (Flyvbjerg, 2006) is a typology of cases. Flyvbjerg argues 
that the selection of samples and cases depends on the purpose of the study. The first 
choice to make is whether to choose random sample selection or a sample that is 
representative; or whether to choose informed-oriented selection, i.e. where a 
specific type of case is selected because you are interested in maximum utilisation of 
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information from small samples. Here, Flyvbjerg mentions five case types 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006) (p. 230):  
1. Extreme/deviant cases,  
2. Maximum variation cases 
3. Critical cases 
4. Paradigmatic cases 
(Yin, 2009) supplements Flyvbjerg by arguing that a fifth rationale for single-case 
designs is the longitudinal case, in which the same case is studied at two or more 
different points in time (p. 49).  
Other authors also argue that this type of process study is appropriate to study 
change, in that it helps locate the mechanisms that drive the process. A process study 
can account for path dependencies and the role of critical events in change and 
innovation. As Poole & Van de Ven (Poole & Van de Ven, 2004, p. 317) argue:  
 
“Poole et al. (2000) noted several advantages of process theory: (1) it gives a deep 
understanding of how change comes about by describing the generative mechanism 
that drives the process; (2) it can account for path dependence and the role of 
critical events in change and innovation; and (3) it can incorporate the role of 
human agency in change without reducing it to causal terms.”  
 
Yin further discusses two types of single-case designs: holistic versus embedded, 
which signifies that the same case study may have different units of analysis. 
Holistic designs are appropriate if no logical subunit exists, or if the theory 
underlying the case study is holistic. However, there is a risk that holistic designs 
may not permit the researcher to observe a phenomenon in operational detail (p 50), 
which will result in a highly abstract study. Another problem is that the nature of the 
case study shifts, and that the researcher is not aware of this. Thus, the research 
evidence begins to support another research question. Yin argues that a way of 
increasing your sensitivity is to have a set of subunits, thus having an embedded 
case study design.  
Embedded designs also have weaknesses, the most obvious being the risks that 
focus remains on the subunit level. This will cause interest to be focused on the 
original phenomenon as the context, not the target of the study.  
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In the section above, I have defined what a case study is, as well as how the 
sampling of cases/a case, determine the researcher’s scientific contribution. In the 
next section, I turn to the method requirements of a case study.  
Criteria for judging the quality of research designs 
(Maaløe, 2002; Yin, 2008) both argue that the use of different data sources is a 
requirement for conducting case studies; otherwise they do not qualify as cases. A 
case study must use the different data sources in order to acquire an overview of 
dialectics, and in order for the researcher to be able to apply as many analytical and 
inference methods as possible (Maaløe 2002, p. 32). Sources may be already 
existing documentation, archives, interviews, direct observations, and physical 
effects.   
Yin (Yin, 2009) argues in favour of five components of a research design (p. 27):  
1. The research questions of the study 
2. Its propositions, if any 
3. Its unit(s) of analysis 
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions; and 
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings.  
Yin argues that the ‘why’ and ‘how’ research questions are compatible with case 
study research. Second, Yin argues that even though the why and how questions 
guide you to conduct a case study, they do not guide you as regards what you should 
study. Only propositions will delineate your theoretical position. Next, the 
propositions will point towards areas to look for evidence of the proposition(s).  
Concerning unit of analysis, this concerns defining the case, which is a classic 
problem for case study researchers. The unit of analysis is related to your definition 
of your research question, and your research question should cause you to choose a 
unit of analysis which ranks higher than others. This unit may be revisited later in 
the research process (Yin 2009, p. 29-30). The case, which is also the unit of 
analysis, should be a real-time phenomenon, not an abstraction such as a topic, 
argument or a hypothesis. Finally, each case study and unit of analysis should either 
be similar to those previously studied by others, or should innovate this unit of 
analysis in a clear, defined way. If this is accomplished, Yin argues, previous 
literature can become a guide for defining the unit of analysis.  
Concerning point 4, this concerns the way in which to conduct a proper analysis: 
what types of data and analysis are needed in order to answer your research 
question.  
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Concerning point 5, Yin argues that it is important to identify and address rival 
explanations of your findings before conducting the actual case study, in order to 
establish criteria for interpreting the findings of a study.  
Yin proposes four types of tests, which are well known in empirical social research 
and useful in case studies as well (p. 123 ff):  
 Construct validity 
 Internal validity 
 External validity  
 Reliability 
In conclusion Yin provides valuable standards for researchers to assess their own 
case study findings (p. 160). External validity touches on how to generalize own 
findings, and is thus linked to Flyvbjerg's case typology above: whether or not the 
findings are applicable to other settings. Here, Yin and Flyvbjerg agree that case 
studies can lead to analytical generalizations that may be modified by other case-
studies. External validity is ensured first of all theory in single-case studies. And 
next, by the use of replication logic if multiple-case studies are concerned.   
Concerning reliability, this test is intended to ensure that in case another researcher 
was to conduct the same study, the researcher would arrive at the same findings and 
conclusion (p. 45). Yin proposes that case study protocols and a case study database 
are appropriate means for making the research procedure transparent to others. 
Having a case study protocol and developing a case study database are useful means 
to address problems of data collection. A case study database can consist of case 
study notes, case study documents, tabular materials and narratives.     
4.2.1. SUMMING UP RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDY 
TESTS 
My case study can be characterized as an embedded single-case study with two 
embedded cases: a pilot case and a main case. It is also a longitudinal case, in that 
the embedded cases are part of the same process.  It is qualitative and field work 
based. It uses a mix of qualitative methods: direct observation and participant 
observation, qualitative interviews and group meetings. I have also made drafts of 
analyses, either in presentations or in a report, in order for key stakeholders to give 
feedback on preliminary findings and analytical approaches. Data sources are 
recordings of meetings and interviews, main organisational documents, policy drafts 
and field notes. This case study design thus supports the engaged scholarship-
approach (see section 3.4), in that the embedded design has allowed for a adjusting 
of my propositions and research question in the research process, which has 
supported my goal of producing knowledge that is usable for both practice and 
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academia. My case study design also supports my view on discourse analysis, in that 
the design enables me to generate process sensitive data. In particular, this design 
provides me with detailed insight into the conflicts and sources of legitimacy that 
lead to shifts in leadership construction and leadership recognition.    
Considering the above case descriptions, which type of case is The Copenhagen 
Case? First of all, the choice seems to narrow down to an average case, an extreme 
case or a paradigmatic case. In addition, we need to situate the case within the 
population of cases selected by the analytical framework of BUCIL. Thus, the case 
is first of all a case of collaborative innovation leadership in a specific context. What 
distinguishes this case from other cases is first of all the profession that forms the 
basis of the leadership construction process through the formulation of a 
collaborative innovation project. This profession is experienced in working with 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Disadvantaged neighbourhoods are, as also 
demonstrated in the case analysis, a wicked problem. BUCIL is attuned to this type 
of context, and thus, the presence of a wicked problem does not make the case 
extreme, but rather average. In a Danish context, the case is extreme, though, in that 
the bureaucratic context, (demonstrated in this thesis’ analysis and described briefly 
in section 5.3), the bureaucratic context is so ambiguous. Some respondents denote 
this ambiguity by calling the City of Copenhagen ’the seven-headed beast’, i.e. an 
organisation that consists of seven more or less autonomous administrations, each 
with its own political committee and mayor, with different political parties being 
part of each administration, making joint problem solving difficult. As the analyses 
demonstrate, this bureaucratic structure implies that the number of stakeholders is 
high, which makes it difficult to maintain alliances and momentum, in that a large 
number of other programs and policies are also fighting for bureaucratic and 
political attention. The exact opposite might also be suggested: complexity and 
ambiguity may in fact enhance the momentum in that the institutional uncertainty is 
high, thus allowing the lead unit in the case, Neighbourhood Development, to 
progress, while collaborators remain passive due to the massive uncertainty; but it 
may also impede institutionalisation, as exemplified in Analysis B, in that leadership 
risks being consolidated. To a global audience, the City of Copenhagen will in this 
thesis be assessed as an average case; several of the interviewees reflect on problems 
of working across organisational borders, and state that even though the bureaucratic 
structure of the City of Copenhagen may be very well known for its complexity in a 
Danish context, it may not be very different from other capital city governments 
around the world. 
In conclusion, we might say that in a Danish context this is an extreme case with 
regard to the complex bureaucratic structure of the municipality. This means that the 
case is rich in information. For a global population of cases, this may still be an 
extreme case as compared to small municipalities, but average in regard to larger 
municipalities such as small- and medium-sized city governments.  
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In terms of types of tests, I have endeavoured in this study to comply with the 
general tests of case studies proposed by Yin (2009). Regarding construct validity, I 
have sought to operationalise my concepts to the largest extent possible in 
accordance with the applied theory. As I describe in this chapter, I have also used 
different methods and different data in order to follow the standard of data 
triangulation. The chain of evidence is also established in that it is possible to retrace 
findings. Further, key informants have been reviewing preliminary parts of the 
analysis, mainly through presentations and through feedback of the embedded case. 
With regard to internal validity, Yin proposes different analytical  tools. However, 
none of these have matched my abductive aim of developing and applying a 
theoretical model, and none of them support the single-case application of my 
theoretical model. Instead, I have applied discourse analysis (Hardy & Phillips, 
2004; Phillips et al., 2004), a case study approach more in align with (Flyvbjerg, 
2006)’s approach to theory development. Both the BUCIL model of analysis and the 
discourse analytical approach establish theoretically informed causal connections, 
whose relevance I will demonstrate later on in my analyses. 
Yin’s typology of ’rival explanations’ has been adhered to by using the BUCIL 
model, in that I have developed a synthesis of rival explanations. Despite the fact 
that this typology seems more relevant in terms of program evaluations, the 
typology is also useful for not overstating the discursive impact of the type of 
leadership studied in this thesis. With regard to external validity, I have used the 
theory to inform my case study; and I have characterized my case above in a way 
that delimits its empirical generalizability.  With regard to reliability, I have 
endeavoured to make systematic field notes. Further, I have made drafts of the 
content of the final report throughout the whole PhD process in order to ensure that 
the case study was in constant connection with theoretical propositions and research 
questions.  
 
 DATA COLLECTION 4.3
The case study conducted ran from September 2009 to mid-2012, although with 
differing intensity concerning field work. Sometimes the purpose of the case study 
was to keep myself up to date regarding the course of the innovation process: was 
the process about to terminate, being implemented or being expanded? During the 
low intensity periods, I was specifically searching for the emergence of delineated 
parts of the process in which cross-administrative collaboration took place, i.e. 
processes in which the administrations had to develop initiatives together.  During 
the entire period, field notes were made. The purpose of field notes is both to collect 
data, but also to record episodic events and conversations that would prompt my 
own memory as well as the memories of future interviewees. 
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Two delineated parts of the collaborative innovation process were selected. These 
processes can be characterized as ‘embedded cases’, i.e. sub-parts of a case on the 
basis of which it is possible to generalize ((Yin, 2008). These embedded cases are 
also located at different points in time. The purpose of the first embedded case was 
to conduct a pilot study which, in addition to the purpose of gathering data, was also 
meant to further develop and adjust my case study as well as adjust my theoretical 
conception.  
 
Embedded Case 1 
The first embedded case concerns an evaluation tool development process in a cross-
administrative setting. The evaluation tool should be applicable for evaluating area-
based programs in the City of Copenhagen. These area-based programs were owned 
by the social housing sector, supervised and co-financed by the City of Copenhagen. 
This process included civil servants from only three administrations, since the 
process was running at the beginning of the innovation process from the autumn of 
2009 to mid-2010. The process did not have a definitive ending, but faded out, with 
the result that the lead office ‘Neighbourhood Development’ decided to conduct its 
own evaluation as a yearly routine. This was due to the lack of participation in 
combination with conflicts and competing evaluation agendas. This embedded case 
also was intended as a pilot investigation: I conducted a preliminary analysis of the 
various potential themes that I had observed, and allowed the interviewees to give 
feedback on my observations. In this respect, the embedded case helped forming the 
focus of data collection later on, as well as sharpening my analytical approach. In 
the pilot phase I discovered the following points:  
1. Issues of management were indeed one of the main reasons for conflict.  
2. It was impossible to establish a non-adversarial, objective observation 
point of the process in my field work. I therefore came to realise that I 
could not register and mediate between all the competing interests in the 
City of Copenhagen. I therefore decided to adopt the management 
perspective of the lead office when conducting field work, knowing 
quite well that this would reduce my chances of conducting  field work 
in the other administrations. In order to compensate, I conducted 
retrospective, representative rounds of interviews.  
3. Leadership, rather than collaborative management or governance-
structures on a systemic or inter-organisational level, was the 
appropriate unit of the case, in that the process was mainly promoted by 
Neighbourhood Development. And because the conflicts in the pilot 
project were mainly linked to leader/follower-relations, i.e. 
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Neighbourhood Development pushing the agenda onwards, the rest of 
the administrations remained either supportive or critical. 
4. It was mainly the relations between administrations that were the main 
challenge, not the relations between municipality and the social housing 
sector.  
 
 
 
Embedded case 2 
The second embedded case was a cross-administrative policy development process. 
This process included civil servants and special consultants from all central 
administrations. The process was running for over a year, and the Policy for 
Disadvantaged Areas was finally approved of  on 1 December  2011. I recorded four 
of the most intense meetings at the beginning of the process, and interviewed the 
participants a year later. The reason for the timespan between recordings and 
interviews was the high-profiled nature of the process, in which I decided, after 
consulting ND staff, that interference in the on-going process would be unethical. 
During the field work, I also assisted ND with developing an interview guide in 
order to conduct a stakeholder analysis of relevant directors.  
The reason for choosing this embedded case was that:  
1. it included an observable collaborative aspect in that parties had to 
develop a policy together 
2. It included a critical aspect typical of collaborative innovation, in that 
several parties had to develop a common understanding of a wicked 
problem. 
3. It included a leadership dimension, in that the TEA held the final 
responsibility for producing the policy, but with the consent of the other 
administrations. 
4. It was characterized by being potentially conflict ridden. A tension 
could arise, in that Neighbourhood Development had been the driving 
force in the past, thus demonstrating an informal bottom-up leadership 
position. However, the policy was supposed to be a shared one, to which 
all administrations had to take ownership. On the basis of The 
Evaluation Case, I expected a potential conflict to develop between path 
dependency (‘has it already been decided what this policy should 
contain?’) and the clean slate (‘this is a shared policy, we have to 
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develop it together’). In this respect, my focus was to observe who 
would stand up and demonstrate leadership, and what conditions that 
would enable this leadership to ‘emerge’ ((Griffin, 2002)      
 
In the next section I describe the methods that I have applied and the data that I have 
gathered in relation to the two embedded cases. 
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 DESCRIPTION OF METHOD AND DATA 4.4
In Figure 5 below, type and quantity of data are displayed. All data types are 
qualitative.  
FIGURE 5: DISPLAY OF DATA 
Method Function in the 
research design 
Data type Data quantity Time 
Field work (2009-2012) 
Direct observation 
and participant 
observation, 
taking field notes 
in the ND office  
Registration of key 
events 
To detect evolving 
collaborative 
processes relevant to 
study 
Memory prompts 
usable for analysis 
and interviews 
Handwritten notes of 
conversations and 
observations, 
transferred afterwards 
into a word document 
45 field notes, 
ranging from 
½-2 pages a 
piece  
September 
2009-
September 
2012 
Embedded case 1: Evaluation tool development process (Sept 2009-Medio 2010) 
Field notes at 
meetings 
Registration of 
conflicts and co-
creational events 
   
Round 1: Semi-
structured, in 
depth, single 
interviews.  
   
Registration of 
participants’ 
experience with the 
collaboration, focusing 
on:  
Barriers of innovation 
concerning the 
substantive dimension 
of the innovation 
Recordings; 
afterwards transcribed 
Interviewees:  
-1-2 civil servants 
from the participating 
administrations 
- Middle manager of 
The Technical and 
7 interviews 
Length: 1-1.5 
hours per 
Interview 
2010 
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project Environmental 
Administration 
Round 2:  semi- 
structured 
interviews 
Feedback on 
preliminary analyses 
regarding innovation 
processes, in which 
interview data from 
round 1 was included 
Recordings; 
afterwards 
transcribed 
2 Interviews 
Length: 1-1.5 
hours per 
interview 
 
2009-2011 
Focus group 
interview  
Feedback on 
preliminary analyses 
regarding innovation 
processes, in which 
interview data from 
round 1 was included 
Recording; afterwards 
transcribed 
1 Interview:  
Length: 1 
hour per 
interview 
2011 
Embedded case 2: Policy formulation case (December 2010-February 
2012) 
  
Recordings of 
policy formulation 
meeting 
Registration of 
conflicts and co-
creational events 
Leadership positioning 
 
Recordings; 
afterwards transcribed 
Participants:  
1-2 special 
consultants from all 
seven administrations 
4 meetings.  
Length: 3-4 
hours per 
interview 
 
2010-2011 
‘Engaged’ 
interviews with 
directors or 
managers 
Access to decision 
makers in a tense 
climate during The 
Policy Formulation 
Recordings; 
afterwards transcribed 
Interviewees:  
-Level 2 director from 
SSA 
-Level 2 director from 
SUF 
Participating 
2 interviews.  
Length: 1 
hour per 
Interview 
2010 
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interviewers: 
2 Special consultants  
From The Technical 
and Environmental 
Administration 
Semi-structured, 
in depth, single 
interviews. 
Registration of 
participants’ 
experience with the 
collaboration 
- the soundness of the 
policy 
- the management of 
the policy process 
Recordings; 
afterwards 
transcribed.  
Interviewees:  
-Key special 
consultants from all 
seven administrations 
-If possible, directors 
from all seven 
administrations 
involved in the 
steering committee;  
- Managers with other 
knowledge of  
leadership during 
policy innovation and 
the preceding process  
15 interviews 
Length:  
½-1.5 hours  
2011 
Document 
analysis 
To clarify the line of 
events during analysis 
To clarify unclear 
issues of mandate and 
task descriptions 
related to 
collaborators’ 
involvement in the 
innovation process 
Policy documents:  
Drafts of Policy for 
Disadvantaged Areas, 
commission 
approvals, strategy 
reports, minutes 
 
8-10 main 
documents 
Used in the 
analysis 
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Field notes  
I made observations and field notes when I was during field work in the embedded 
cases, or when I was keeping myself up to date in the ND office, inspired by Yins 
recommendations (Yin, 2009).  In some instances, the field notes took on the 
character of working minutes of a conversation that I had conducted with ND staff. 
The purpose of this was mainly to document events and conversations, including  
issues dominating the process in this period of time. The purpose of my field notes 
was also to qualify the retrospective qualitative interviews, in that observations 
made could be used to dig deeper into experience of the informants. Finally, the 
purpose of the field notes was to observe the phenomena listed in the 
Operationalization section (2.5) above: what were the points of conflict, who took 
leadership in certain interactions, what triggered inertia and progress, etc. The 
structure of the notes was the following: First a detailed description of what was said 
during the observed conversations, next a record of my reflections concerning 
analytical points or issues relevant for theory building.  
 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
The second type of data analysed is qualitative, semi-structured interviews (Kvale, 
2007). Most interviews lasted around an hour, some 1.5; a couple of interviews 
lasted 45 minutes. The qualitative interviews focused (in the first embedded case) on 
innovation and management and how the respondents thought of the project. 
Concerning the second embedded case, the interviews focused on leadership and 
how the persons involved in the policy process ( i.e. team members formulating the 
policy as well as the directors from the steering committee) of the characteristics of 
The Policy Formulation process:  its subsequent approval, the cross-administrative, 
organisational set-up of the policy, as well as future challenges for ND/The 
Technical and Environmental Administration leadership and policy.  Thus, this type 
of data has a retrospective character, accommodating both further details concerning 
the policy process, but also an interpretative element in the data, such as when the 
interviewee presents a matter-of-fact, coherent story as a result of post-
rationalization. The interview guides can be found in the appendix, although not all 
versions:  The interview guides were tailored to the informant as part of the ND staff 
or not; it was also considered whether the interviewee was a formal leader or a civil 
servant, in that a formal position may be reflected in the interviewee’s engagement 
in the process. 
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Coding 
The qualitative material was coded by means of the qualitative software tool Nvivo 
9. For each code that proved relevant I described and condensed the content. I also 
worked with my operationalization, and combined these observations into three 
categories that I found relevant for understanding how the lead unit of ND is 
positioned as a collaborative innovation leader: Conflicts, Sources of legitimacy, and 
Leadership Dilemmas.  
 
Reflections concerning the translation of quotes 
Translating qualitative data from Danish to English has been a greater challenge 
than I had expected. Especially the interview quotes presented in the analyses 
display my inability to translate Danish metaphors and phrases into meaningful 
English statements. As an unfortunate consequence of this fact, the interviewees 
may sometimes make statements that seems clumsy and inexact. This is in contrast 
to the intelligence and motivation which were demonstrated by these interviewees 
during the interviews. I have tried to the best of my abilities to make up for this by 
describing what is being stated.        
 
 DATA ANALYSIS 4.5
As I have described in section 4.4 the data collected has different functions in 
relation to an analysis based on the BUCIL model. Accordingly, in the specific 
analyses, the data hierarchy is as follows:  
 Qualitative interviews and recordings of feedback and policy formulation 
meetings 
 Key policy and administrative documents  
 ‘Engaged’ interviews 
 Field notes 
 
So, the main data source is transcriptions of qualitative interviews and recordings, 
since these data sources first of all most explicitly allow the participants in the 
collaborative innovation project to describe with their own words how they perceive 
of leadership, the innovation project and related challenges. These data sources are 
also of the highest ethical value, in that the interviewees and researcher agree on the 
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conditions of how the interview data is to be used. This issue is especially pertinent 
in an occurring process in a highly politicized, hierarchical and collaborative 
environment, in which civil servants, managers and directors operate. Accordingly, 
field notes and ‘engaged’ interviews have also informed my analytical focus points, 
in that these process data have been vital in order to detect when shifts in innovation 
project, sense making and leadership occurred, consequently providing the analyses 
with more credibility. This was highly important, in that informants 6-12 months 
later would already have naturalised these shifts. 
The recorded qualitative material has mainly been used to address the analytical 
categories of uncertainty, entrepreneurship, leadership recognition and making and 
giving sense. The already written material available, such as policy drafts, minutes 
from inter-administrative meetings, and strategy reports, has mainly been used to 
first of all document how the endeavours of Neighbourhood Development and their 
collaborators have resulted in specific impacts, i.e. social objects, such as new 
organisational structures or a policy. This written material has also been used to 
document how entrepreneurship makes new conceptual combinations.  
For each analysis I have used the codes displayed in Figure 6 below. These codes, 
produced in the qualitative software program Nvivo, are in alignment with the 
operationalization of theory in section 3.3. Some of these codes were easy to define, 
for instance in terms of entrepreneurship. Here the concepts were very well-defined 
in the literature that I have applied, and were easily imported as codes. In the 
synthesis of the BUCIL concepts and my discourse analytical approach, the function 
in an analysis was furthermore defined, in that entrepreneurship is what provides the 
conceptual material for a micro-discourse, enabling the emergence of leadership.  
However, leadership recognition was more difficult to code. A challenge that 
surfaced when doing the analysis was to reconcile elements of Relational Leadership 
Theory, Complex Responsive Process Theory, sense making and discourse analysis. 
What makes it rather difficult to reconcile these theories in order to allow for a data 
analysis is that the approaches first of all allows for both the use of the terminology 
of subject position and identity. This also goes for the discourse analysis. To begin 
with in the analysis I approached the subject position as mainly a phenomenon 
which I had to construct by placing the statements of collaborators and emergent 
leadership on the same, interorganisational level. This would satisfy a discourse 
approach to a subject position, in which this position is only a position insofar as it 
is perceived of as legitimate by collaborators.  
However, I quickly discovered that ignoring the element of identity made it difficult 
to explain why leadership of Neighbourhood Development developed. Obviously, 
Neighbourhood Development makes sense of their own identity as well and makes 
interpretations of how people react to Neighbourhood Development’s projection of 
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identity upon collaborators, and accordingly has to make choices of how to position 
itself. So, in order not to re-introduce a structural explanation of how ND emerged 
as leadership (i.e. collaborators’ expectations and assessments), I imported elements 
of identity in the coding, which allows the analysis to explain how ND makes 
strategic choices of positioning, but within a discursive field, in which many 
different positionings are possible, and in which the discursive field is established in 
a collaborative fashion.  
What furthermore makes the issue of identity highly relevant in an organisational 
analysis is the collaborative dimension. Both ND and their collaborators are in each 
and every instance both acting as professionals and individuals, but are also bearers 
of an organisational identity and mandate. Accordingly, subject positions in 
collaborative, organisational configurations are not as flexible as one could presume 
when adopting the discourse term ‘positioning’. This term brings out post-modern 
connotations of flexibility and an easily-dispensable past in order to generate 
strategic or status-related value to the individual.   
The contrary relationship seems to be more relevant to assume when studying 
bottom-up leadership in collaborative configurations – that a running transformation 
of positioning in organisational sites of interaction is indeed possible and required, 
but may imply severe and painstaking transaction costs to individuals. This may be 
why the discourse scholars explained in Chapter 3 maintain the use of identity, 
despite the fact that identity as a concept entails connotations more related to 
modern theory building in terms of stability and essentialism, in contrast to 
postmodern and post structural theory building, that to a higher degree favour fluent, 
fragmented and adaptive perspectives on ‘selves’.   
In this thesis, as a result, maintaining both identity and subject position in the 
analyses thus capture both a steady and a flexible element of leadership making: 
Identity is the emergent leaders self-perception, which has to be in accordance with 
organisational mandates and qualifications, whereas the concept of subject position 
captures the flexible and dynamic elements related to the fact that it is the emergent 
leadership that introduces a new discourse (an innovation project) with several 
possible positionings available. Each new choice concerning positioning requires the 
recognition of this position from collaborators, and furthermore requires a change in 
the professional and organisational identity in order to actually being able to perform 
in accordance with this position.  
Accordingly, in the analyses, this is also why the positional development of ND is 
composed of two concepts, such as ‘value-based implementer’, in that these 
concepts display the tension between leadership identity and its aspirations, on the 
one hand, and a collaboratively negotiated subject position, on the other hand.  This 
tension is first resolved when the aspirations of the emergent leadership is fully in 
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alignment with the expectations of collaborators (or the other way around), as 
displayed in Chapter 7, when the position of ‘Strategic implementer’ is adopted as 
suitable for both leadership and collaborators.       
In the figure below, I have listed the codes used in the Nvivo Software, codes that 
are consistent with the operationalization of BUCIL concepts.  
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FIGURE 6: CODING TREE 
Name 
Entrepreneurship: 
 Ability to see system improvements 
 combining new or already existing resources 
 proactive_improvise_exploiting uncertainty 
 professionally founded perspective 
Leadership recognition: 
 Different roles and identities is created and negotiated 
 Leadership display success/failure to influence 
 Leaders deals with uncertainty 
 Acts perceived of as legitimate 
 people question/appreciate/judge  leadership and/or project 
 Power struggles over leadership_leader_follower 
 Attempts of taking the lead 
Making and giving sense: 
 adoption of worldview 
 More people are included in_affected by the change 
 people use the same rhetoric 
 Uncertainty_People try to explain difficulties/ conflicts/ insecurity 
 What are we doing?_people show uncertainty concerning implications 
 Who are we?_people demonstrate anxiety concerning their perceptions and 
roles 
 
Leadership recognition was furthermore more complex to analyse as I had to let the 
data help me to construct a new subject position, innovation leadership, which on 
top of this also developed over time, in accordance with a project leadership itself 
has launched. This is also one of (Phillips & Hardy, 2002a) approaches to discourse 
analysis: Despite the fact that a discourse approach is a highly theoretical approach, 
such an analysis has to allow for something new to be constructed out of the data. 
Accordingly, BUCIL is mainly focused on leadership, and so leadership was this 
‘something’ that should be produced when analysing data.  
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As can be seen in an excerpt of a mind-map below, in the analytical process I have 
taken the content from each of the codes. Subsequently, I have pointed to overall 
issues that these codes relate to, in terms of collaborators perspectives on the 
innovation project and the leadership. Accordingly, I subsumed these perspectives 
on leadership recognition in terms of conflicts and sources of legitimacy, since 
discourse analysis and CRP theory argue that new themes, or discourses, emerge 
through conflicts. However, Griffin also points to the fact that in uncertain 
environments, people may be receptive to being influenced as this helps them to 
make sense of what they are doing, and who they are. Accordingly, in the analyses I 
assume that there also are sources of legitimacy that ND as leadership can draw 
upon, in order to improve chances of influencing collaborators. In this respect, 
discourse analysis is represented by the synthesis with the BUCIL concepts, as I 
have described and discussed in section 3.2. 
Discourse analysis is also present when interpreting the overall findings, as 
displayed in the findings table of each analysis. Here, I display how the interactions 
hypothesized in the BUCIL model results in a positional development of NDs 
leadership.   
Given the large amount of qualitative material, for each empirical theme discovered 
I have selected one or two key quotes that exemplify the content of the theme the 
best. This may create an impression of uniformity within each code. However, the 
contentious and conflictive nature of the embedded cases is maintained by explicitly 
addressing the conflict points in each analysis.  
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FIGURE 7: MIND-MAP OF HOW TO CONNECT CONTENT OF ANALYTICAL CODES 
 
 
In the next section I explain how engaged scholarship as an approach provided me 
with some guidelines for developing theory usable for both academia and practice.  
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 ENGAGED SCHOLARSHIP: CONDUCTING RESEARCH 4.6
USABLE FOR BOTH ACADEMIA AND PRACTICE 
REQUIRES ABDUCTIVE APPROACHES TO THEORY 
BUILDING 
One of the aims of the thesis is that people in the practice field can recognise their 
professional challenges in the knowledge production part of the thesis. Thus, the 
thesis should reflect research that is usable for both academia and practice. This 
decision was inspired by four main conditions. First of all, this thesis is co-financed 
by two external parties: Neighbourhood Development, City of Copenhagen and The 
Danish Center for Urban Regeneration and Community Development (in Danish: 
Center for Boligsocial Udvikling). These parties have co-financed the project with 
the intention that knowledge which is relevant to them is produced.  
Second, I was throughout the PhD process associated to the ‘CLIPS’-research 
project. CLIPS is focused on contributing to the practice of doing collaborative 
innovation in the public sector by means of an interaction approachi. 
The third condition is theoretical: a preliminary literature study of public sector 
innovation as well as a literature study of collaborative approaches to innovation 
will point in the direction of a need for further theory building.  
The third condition was interlinked with the fourth condition: my field work. I 
experienced difficulties in reconciling insights from my early preliminary literature 
study with observations made in my field work, which forced me to engage in some 
theoretical development. 
I will elaborate on condition three and four below. Next, I will conclude this section 
by describing my solution to being engaged with the combined fields of practice and 
academia. This approach is Van de Ven’s ‘Engaged Scholarship’ approach (Van de 
Ven, 2007). His main inspiration for this book was the claim that when engaged in 
producing knowledge usable for both academia and practice, you have to accept that 
reality is complex, and that in order to address this complexity, you are forced to 
combine different strands of theory. This general perspective provided an answer to 
the question why I could not reconcile my field work observations with existing 
research, and provided me with a possible solution to my research problem, i.e. 
when building theory, drawing on strands of research from different disciplines is 
required.      
Public sector innovation is an emerging research field (Hartley, 2005). On the basis 
of a literature study of public sector innovation in relation to the research project 
PUBLIN, Röste argues that public sector innovation is an “amalgam of other 
theories”, and does not consist of independent theories (Røste, 2005). Röste's 
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solution to this 'amalgam'-quality of public sector innovation is that the 'amalgam' 
reflects the complexity of the public sector itself, not a lack of synthesis. I would 
argue that this is not only a problem in public sector innovation, but in innovation 
research in general. This argument is also supported by scholars of innovation, such 
as (Shavinina & ScienceDirect (Online service), 2003; Shavinina, 2003), who state 
that innovation consists of multidimensional and multidisciplinary research 
approaches.  
I find this polyphonic approach to the phenomenon of innovation unsurprising and 
uncontroversial. Definitions of innovation, such as that of (Albury, 2005; Eggers et 
al., 2009; Van de Ven, 1999), describe rather lengthy processes of innovation, from 
idea generation to implementation to dissemination. Obviously, for each of these 
phases, numerous disciplines can be applied: learning theory, implementation 
research, governance research, change management research, institutional research 
etc. Innovation has thus been exposed to multiple research approaches. 
To sum up, one out of many possible research agendas, following Röste and the 
PUBLIN-researchers and innovation researchers in general, is that when studying 
public sector innovation, there may be a need to combine different theories in order 
to be able to explain the complex phenomena. If this only applies to public sector 
innovation, I would argue that adding the dimension of ‘collaboration’ will amplify 
the need to combine previously separate research disciplines. This poses some 
challenges to innovation research: which combination of theories is appropriate for 
the integration and development of a specific theoretical position?  
This challenge can be narrowed down to two interlinked questions.  One question 
concerns theory building, the other concerns an abductive approach.   
1. Theory building: how can we conceptualize uncertainty within a 
collaborative, organisational setting suitable for public innovation sector 
research concerning leadership?   
2. Defining an abductive approach: what methodological approach should be 
taken to meet the challenge of complexity in a world of practice in order to 
ensure that this will contribute to the worlds of both practice and academia?  
 
I provide a theoretical answer to the first question by means of the BUCIL model 
(Chapter 2). And I answer it by using the methods suitable for an abductive 
approach: case studies, a feedback session on the pilot case, observations, field 
studies and semi-structured interviews (see Chapter 5 and previous sections in 
present chapter).  
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The second question can be answered by the 'engaged scholarship' approach (Van de 
Ven 2007). Below, I explain the elements I have found useful in Van de Ven’s 
approach to organisational and social research, engaged scholarship.  
Van de Ven argues that there is a theory-practice gap, and that this gap is partly 
caused by a knowledge production problem (p. 4). This knowledge production 
problem arises when the researcher recognises that the different perspectives and 
types of knowledge are ’partial, incomplete and involving [an] inherent bias with 
respect to any complex problem’ (ibid.). This problem can be solved by means of 
knowledge co-production among scholars and practitioners. Engaged scholarship 
thus proposes a position in which the engaged scholar perceives of herself as a 
participant, thus learning and understanding a subject by engaging in conversations 
with stakeholders (p. 14). This is a pluralistic approach to knowledge, which 
requires a pluralistic methodology (p. 15). An engaged scholarship approach thus 
proposes that it is necessary to operate with different theoretical perspectives in 
order to understand a complex phenomenon (p. 15). A pluralistic methodology 
proposes to compare different explanations to the same problem (p. 21).  
One of the main strengths of Van de Ven’s engaged scholarship is that in academia 
it legitimizes theory building that first of all draws on different strands of 
explanations to a problem. This theory building requires “intimate familiarity” with 
the problem domain (p. 100). Thus, one of the ways in which to build theory through 
an engaged scholarship approach is to discuss different explanations with 
stakeholders; and to look for the development of a theory by looking for anomalies, 
i.e. defining the phenomena that a certain theory cannot explain. Thus, the search for 
anomalies can be used to test hypotheses. Overall, this is what Van de Ven means by 
abduction: engaging with stakeholders, using and testing different hypothesis in 
order to define issues that cannot be explained, thus bringing in new types of 
explanations in order to build a theory that will explain the phenomenon under 
study.  
In the short description above, I have stated the main points that I have found 
inspiring to guide my interaction with practice.  
First of all, I would argue that leadership of collaborative innovation in the public 
sector is a complex phenomenon. Literature concerning innovation, public 
innovation and leading and managing collaborations supports this claim.  
I have had the aim to make knowledge coproduced during my PhD process. I have 
mainly accomplished this by being present in the ND offices and the embedded 
cases, acting as a discussion partner and participant, carrying out minor analytical 
tasks, as well as taking notes in order not to forget my observations and thus 
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recording the complexity in terms of the changes that both the practitioners and I 
were subject to. I also gave three presentations on my preliminary findings.  
Another precondition according to van de Ven is familiarity with the problem 
domain. I have fulfilled this condition, in that I was familiar with the professional 
field connected to area-based programs through short employment in 
Neighbourhood Development during the period preceding my PhD fellowship.  I 
had also become familiar with the issue by specializing, through my BA-assignment 
and Master thesis in urban development and the social problems of disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, as well as area-based programs. During this process, I had 
participated in a course in order to develop an area-based project together with four 
other students. And finally, by having been part of the process of formulating a 
strategy report “The “Horisontal Pillar”. A Strategic Development Perspective for 
the Coordination of Area-Based Interventions in the City of Copenhagen” (Engberg, 
2008) which is a central component of the innovation project driven forward by 
Neighbourhood Development. My role in this process was as student help for the 
associate professor who wrote the report.  
Another element of engaged scholarship is the dialogue between research and 
practice. I established this in my pilot-study and the subsequent feedback sessions, 
in which I described different theoretical approaches and preliminary analyses 
possible, and urged the interviewees to give their opinion about my preliminary 
analyses and also to state the areas of research they were most interested in. This 
interaction was one of the main reasons for my choice to focus on leadership.  
Another example concerned collaborative innovation and novelty. I was engaged in 
this in my field work, for instance, in that one hypothesis of collaborative innovation 
is that novelty is created in collaborative arenas. However, I discovered that this was 
not so – novelty was created between TEA and EIA, written down in The Horisontal 
Pillar, and developed and adapted through the almost three-year long case study 
process.   
And finally, I have been searching for anomalies; spending time on defining the 
shortcomings and strengths of innovation, collaboration and leadership research, 
combining these insights by means of the BUCIL model. This is a plural 
methodology in which I regularly compare and adapt different explanations to the 
same phenomenon.  
The examples above demonstrate how I have defined my engagement with practice 
as an abductive methodology. My overall evaluation of this approach is that to some 
extent it requires experienced researchers to conduct intensive exchange of 
knowledge between practice and academia. Despite having the ambition of being 
engaged, I became less engaged than I had expected in interaction with practice that 
contributed both to my practice and research processes. Thus, by means of Van de 
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Ven’s typology, I have adopted the engaged scholar-position as ’informed basic 
research’. Van de Ven describes this position as one in which the research question 
is focused on describing and explaining, but the researcher takes advice from 
stakeholders and inside informants on research activities concerning theory building, 
problem formulation, problem solution etc. This is a position in which the researcher 
directs and controls all research activities, including the final report (p. 271). Thus, 
this position is more detached than the positions of collaborative research, 
design/evaluation research or action/intervention research (p. 271-2).  
 
 SUMMING UP  4.7
In this chapter I have motivated my choice of case, emphasising the qualities of the 
case in terms of its on-going character, the strong bottom-up leadership element of 
the development project, the collaborative dimensions and the wicked problem that 
the development project aims to address and the uncertainties that the case 
unleashes. These are all aspects that make the case a strong case for an analysis of 
bottom-up leadership consistent with the BUCIL model. I have furthermore 
explained how I understand and apply a qualitative single-case study design with 
two embedded cases, and I demonstrate how the research design meets the standards 
of such a case study. The data collection has been described in terms of elaborated 
descriptions of the two embedded cases, and method and data has been described in 
relation to the function of these in the research design, as well as time of data 
collection and amount of data. Further, the analysis of data has been described, 
especially how Nvivo Software has been deployed. Finally, Van de Ven’s (Van de 
Ven, 2007) concept of engaged scholarship has been explained and the application 
of it elaborated on, based on explorative literature reviews of public innovation that 
justifies a pluralistic methodology.     
In the next chapter, I describe the empirical context of the bottom-up leadership 
case.   
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CHAPTER 5.                           
CONTEXT OF BOTTOM-UP 
LEADERSHIP CASE: AREA-BASED 
PROGRAMS AND DISADVANTAGED 
NEIGHBOURHOODS IN THE CITY OF 
COPENHAGEN 
The research focus in this thesis investigates issues of leadership through a single-
case study approach. The empirical context for the case study is The City of 
Copenhagen. In one of the seven central administrations, The Technical and 
Environmental Administration (’TEA’), a newly established office sets in motion an 
organisational innovation process aimed at increased coordination across 
administrations. This happens in 2008. The office is called ‘Neighbourhood 
Development’, and is responsible for managing area-based programs in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood Development is successful in 
influencing its collaborators: its own administration and mayor, the other 
administrations, as well as the powerful social housing sector. 
 In 2012, when my case study ends, the endeavours of the office and its 
collaborators have resulted in developments of a larger scale than the office had 
expected in 2008: A powerful cross-administrative set-up has been developed, 
involving all seven mayors, directors and professionals from each administration; a 
Partnership Forum has been established between municipality and the social housing 
sector; and finally, an ambitious area-based policy has been approved unanimously 
among local politicians and mayors, the ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in 
Copenhagen’. In this chapter, I describe this development process and the context of 
this in more detail.  
Now, before going more in depth with the specific elements developed as a 
consequence of the innovation process, I provide in section 5.1 the reader with 
guidance for understanding what kind of institutional development that has been 
going on since 1998-2012 in The City of Copenhagen. I do this by means of 
explaining the prescriptive theories of two well-acknowledged scholars within 
governance literature that addresses the institutional and strategic design challenges 
related to disadvantaged areas.  
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In section 5.2 I provide a brief overview of the Danish experience with using area-
based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods from 1998 to 2008; this overview 
is important, in that it provides the reader with an understanding of the function of 
the programs in dealing with the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, 
and how this function entails the citizen-related ‘bottom-up’ design principles 
explained in section 5.  This understanding will allow the reader to understand, how 
the involved administrations (TEA, EIA) interpreted this experience critically in 
order to establish a legitimate claim for change.  
In section 5.3 I provide a brief description of the complex and silo-divided way in 
which The City of Copenhagen is organized. This organisational overview will 
allow the reader to understand why working across administrative boundaries is a 
leadership challenge. In section 5.4 I also provide an organisational diagram 
describing the organisational position of Neighbourhood Development.    
In section 5.5 I describe the innovation process year by year. Despite its length, this 
process description is important, in that it will allow the reader to understand how 
the leadership exercised by Neighbourhood Development resulted in specific 
outcomes. These specific outcomes will also be described.  
In section 5.6 I combine the descriptions from the previous sections in order to 
assess the institutional change that the innovation project in the City of Copenhagen 
has generated. I do so by deploying neighbourhood governance concepts explained 
in section 5 to the context description of the case, producing a phase model that 
explains how the innovation process in the City of Copenhagen has created value in 
terms of enhancing the institutional design related to deal with disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods.  
Finally, I sum up, relating the findings of this context-chapter to research question. 
 
 THE POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CITY OF 5.1
COPENHAGEN: PROMOTING AREA BASED GOVERNANCE 
BY FACILITATING LOCAL-CENTRAL COLLABORATION   
In this section, I outline key literature that deals with area based governance in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Sirianni, 2009)(Fung, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003). 
The purpose of the literature is to allow the reader to understand, what the overall 
purpose of the innovation project in the City of Copenhagen is, and what 
contribution bottom-up leadership makes to promote more efficient neighbourhood 
governance. Consequently, I only use the literature in order to create a heuristic 
 165 
 
framework that demonstrates what the contributions and challenges related to this 
innovation are.   
Interpreting the context of this thesis within the governance frameworks explained 
below, the innovation that I study can be regarded as an emergent development of a 
new institutional framework in local government. The challenge is to make efficient 
linkages between central administrations, between administrations and social 
housing organisations, and between central administrations and local stakeholders at 
the neighbourhood level, mainly street level bureaucrats and front-line staff. 
Coordination is crucial here, so is central-administrative reform strategies. The 
thesis exemplifies this institutional development by focusing on how area based 
programs both have informed this development and, in the end, is transformed by it. 
Accordingly, the Copenhagen case of collaborative innovation leadership can be 
understood as a process demonstrating in detail the emerging of specific institutional 
design principles. 
As will be explained further down below, Fung and Sirianni both argues that if 
citizen involvement in disadvantaged neighbourhoods is to be exploited to the 
fullest, a certain institutional set-up is required. This institutional set-up requires that 
different principles are applied. One of these institutional design principles required 
is that a strategic, coordinating central administration is established that is flexible 
enough to deal with the complex, differentiated and interrelated set of problems 
these neighbourhoods are dealing with. The Copenhagen case is such a case: an 
inter-organizational development project initiated at the central level has been 
evolving since 2007, aiming at coordination across administrations and through a 
partnership with the social housing sector. A cross-administrative policy and 
organization for socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods have been developed and 
approved of.  Large-scale development plans for disadvantaged city areas have been 
approved of.  
The thesis therefore demonstrates a trajectory concerning the development of a 
certain municipal program: how working with area based programs in socially 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods for more than a decade has been a vital discursive 
underpinning of a central-administrative reform in The City of Copenhagen. Since 
the late 90s, municipalities in Denmark have been using the ‘area based program’-
approach as one of the main tools to address some of the extraordinary needs of 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The programs are organized as projects, working 
with the neighbourhood characteristics and local stakeholders, co-financed by 
central and local government, involving the different administrations and local 
stakeholders in an ad hoc fashion, in accordance with each program’s objectives. 
However, the innovation process in the City of Copenhagen raises the question of 
whether this program level approach has been sufficient. The case points to an 
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alternative development path for the area based approach to disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, a path in which the programs are being assigned a more fixed 
institutional function, and in which the area based approach to disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods is moved from program-level to policy-level.   
The thesis thereby demonstrates a local governmental innovation that can be 
explained in the following way: Welfare provision at the neighbourhood level in 
socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods can be more efficient and innovative insofar 
a central-administrative reform is implemented that coordinates the sector-divided 
municipal activities through a city district planning level; the central-administrative 
reform is to be stabilized by means of a cross-administrative and political 
partnership-structure that allows for a continuous management of political, 
administrative and strategic conflicts between the involved stakeholders.  
In the section below, I outline key literature that is specific enough to contextualise 
the institutional features of the Copenhagen innovation.  
 
5.1.1. ARCHON FUNG & ERIC OLIN WRIGHT: OVERCOMING 
THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN CENTRALISATION AND 
LOCALISATION 
(Fung & Wright, 2003) argue that empowered participatory governance can be 
summarized along three principles:  
 Practical orientation  
 Bottom-up participation  
 Deliberative solution  
In practice, this ideal is advanced in practice by three design properties:  
 Devolution  
 Centralized supervision and coordination  
 State-centered, not voluntaristic, reforms, i.e. the purpose is to remake 
official institutions along the principles listed above 
 
The application of principles and design properties will result in ‘accountable 
autonomy’. Fung (Fung, 2004) points out that it is very much a form of "bottom-up 
innovation” which is the driver of accountable autonomy: 
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”While new public management strategies claim to invite citizen 
participation…(…)they depend predominantly on the resourceful action of 
professionals at the street, school, and headquarter levels (…)Much more than new 
managerial strategies…accountable autonomy encourages the incorporation of 
local values and knowledge into public decisions” (ibid. p. 13).  
 
The role of central government is thus to facilitate local action by making focused 
assessments, develop new institutional cultures, ensure cross-functional 
coordination, and ensure trust-building between participants. In a democracy 
perspective, this will enable an empowered participation.  
Fung’s normative foundation rests on a dual argument: that 'Empowered 
participation' is better than existing forms of citizen participation in public 
governance, so far that citizen participation 1) is more responsive, and 2) provide a 
better distribution of resources. At the same time this citizen participation must 
result in 3) innovation, and 4) efficiency. As such, citizen participation is not an end 
in itself. This is evidenced by the following quote:  
”Even if some version of participatory democracy is feasible, it might not be very 
desirable as a path of reform. The core argument of this book is that troubled public 
agencies such as urban police departments and school systems can become more 
responsive, fair, innovative and effective by incorporating empowered participation 
and deliberation into their governance structures” (Fung 2004: 3) 
Fung argues that in some cases it makes more quality for public action if the 
programs are decentralised, in that decentralization permits public action to tailor 
measures to suit local stakeholders’ needs or preferences (p. 4). 'Devolution' also 
allow local stakeholders (residents, teachers, police, etc.) to create new ideas and 
implement them as innovations (p. 5). Third, local knowledge is used to improve the 
effectiveness of public actions already under way in the area, such as better 
patrolling and knowledge of the crime. Fourth, committed citizens are provided 
resources and expertise in order to take action. 
However, local solutions are sometimes borne by the local parties themselves. This 
can lead to bias and favouritism as a result of local power struggle and an exclusion 
of certain groups (p. 6). 
Accountable autonomy denotes an apparent contradiction, in that the term describes 
a circumscribed local autonomy since this autonomy is being monitored, supported 
and evaluated centrally. Autonomy locally lies in the understanding of independence 
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from the central power in order to build up capacity of local actors in order for them 
to pursue their own objectives (p. 6). 
Fung states through two case studies that apparently it requires certain prerequisites 
before the actions of empowered participation can be successful: 
1. External support, in the form of ad hoc assistance from various government 
agencies or external funding 
2. That there must be an incentive for local stakeholders to work together in a 
common cause. A blocking factor may include infighting among the 
resident (p. 7) 
In relation to the second prerequisite centralized authority in the form of external 
assessments can help to reduce local power struggles. 
The role of central authorities in order to support the local developments is: 
1. providing various forms of support to local groups 
2. Hold these groups accountable that their autonomy is being used to 
generate   efficiency and democracy (p. 8). 
Of particular interest is the fact that Fung refers to the ‘central-local dichotomy’, 
stating that this dichotomy is dominant in our understanding of political structure 
and organizational design (p. 69). Each model has its advantages and disadvantages, 
and Fung argues therefore that it is necessary to have a hybrid model where the 
central level supports and monitors the locals, and where the locals engage civil 
society and innovate:  
“the dichotomy between centralization and decentralization dominates our notions 
of political structure and organizational design. This chapter nevertheless argues 
that a hybrid design, in which local autonomy requires centralized support and 
accountability and in which accomplishing broader aims requires street-level 
innovation and civic engagement, is more promising than either simple 
centralization or decentralization” (ibid., p. 70).  
 
Fung gives an example in which the central city government was especially 
confused about who should take initiatives and leadership in relationships with 
schools, and points out that although there is still a central power, it has been 
reconfigured to support, rather than control. Central support is needed in order to 
create local autonomy (p. 70): 
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”Surveying the range of these mechanisms underscores the importance of robust, 
albeit reconfigured, centralized power for the sake of local deliberative autonomy 
and illuminates the variety of design challenges whose answers require rejecting the 
dichotomy between centralization and devolution. The political conflicts between 
proponents of local control and central authority highlight the practical difficulties 
of overcoming this dichotomy and establishing a stable hybrid form” (p. 70)  
Fung summarizes the dilemmas of participatory decentralization and argue that a 
hybrid design is to cope with the following challenges (p. 70-71): 
• Difficulties in mobilizing citizens and disseminate information on the participants' 
opportunities and benefits 
• To ensure that participants have the properties and the knowledge necessary to 
conduct a consultation ('deliberation') and solve public problems effectively 
• To ensure that participants have commitment and decision-making power to 
implement their choice 
• Domination and exclusion of certain groups as a result of power inequalities 
between the groups, or between groups and professional 
• The high variability of quality across urban areas which occur as a result of 
decentralization 
• Provincialism and consequent inefficiency in problem solving 
• Local actors' dependence on resources and organizations outside their own control 
range 
 
So, Fung’s framework is relevant for this thesis in that it highlights that problems at 
the neighbourhood level can only be solved by building institutional frameworks 
that combine the advantages of central-administrative governance with the 
advantages of involving citizens and stakeholder knowledge at the local level.  
5.1.2. CARMEN SIRIANNI: POLICY DESIGN FOR INCREASED 
CITIZEN SELF-GOVERNMENT  
In this section I outline Sirianni’s approach to disadvantaged neighbourhoods. I do 
so by explaining the eight design principles for collaborative governance that she 
proposes, and by describing the institutional challenges that her study of Seattle’s 
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neighbourhood empowerment and planning practice demonstrates. By doing so, I 
illustrate the difficulties that may also be a context factor in the Copenhagen case.   
Carmen Sirianni (Sirianni, 2009)  approaches local problems by using concepts of 
complexity as well as a multi-level approach to ‘collaborative governance’. 
Sirianni’s outset is that the complexity of public problems is a core challenge of 
governance.  
Sirianni’s contribution is to couple the increasing complexity of public problems 
with the fact that democracy is waning. Sirianni notes that the ‘self-governance’ of 
ordinary citizens is becoming more and more expensive due to complexity: “various 
general factors drive the cost side of civic problem solving and collaborative 
governance. Among the most important are the increasing complexity of public 
problems, the growing diversity of publics, and the rising expectations of citizens for 
voice and inclusion.” (p. 13). Put in another way: government is inclined to become 
more and more expensive if citizens are not involved in governance in new ways.  
Of empirical relevance to this dissertation is Sirianni’s analysis of neighbourhood 
empowerment and planning in Seattle, the State of Washington. Sirianni’s analysis 
describes in detail how Seattle during two decades developed its neighbourhood 
system. The city developed a Neighbourhood Matching Fund Program, and 
consolidated its neighbourhood service centers in a Department of Neighbourhoods, 
giving the directors of this department training, a training which allowed the 
Department to train neighbourhood groups (p. 68). This setup, enforced by thirteen 
district councils, and supported by staff through the coordinators of the 
neighbourhood service centers, is to a high degree a decentralized way of involving 
citizens and local stakeholder, which the neighbourhood service centers facilitate 
interaction at the local level and see it as their role to develop local leadership (p. 
79). Sirianni’s analysis also describes how neighbourhood plans were developed by 
citizens, and was supported in their implementation by the fact that the mayor in 
1998 decentralized various city departments into six sectors, so that local 
departmental units could collaborative with the neighbourhood plans (p. 100). And 
the mayor urged departments to align their budget with the priorities of 
neighbourhood plans. In all, this lead to a cultural change in planning, in which 
planners felt obliged to take into account the work done by the citizens (p. 102).  
Sirianni concludes that the design principles of policy developed piecemeal faces 
important challenges if to remain robust in a dynamic economic, demographic and 
political environment. First of all, budget cuts accelerated during a mayor with a 
centralist leadership style has eroded much of the civic infrastructure, reducing the 
muscles of Department of Neighbourhoods by removing key staff, the so-called 
neighbourhood development managers. As such, there is a tendency to revert to 
bureaucratic silos (p. 109); the trust between neighbourhood leaders and 
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departments erodes quickly when new staff did not receive the proper training and 
disenchantment arose among experienced neighbourhood leaders.  
What the study in my opinion thus demonstrates in terms of the enhancement of 
collaborative innovation and governance, is how much of the stability of the 
institutional design that is dependent on central support, especially the support of 
decision makers – and how quickly the pendulum can move once again towards 
centralization and bureaucratic silos. The study also demonstrates, according to 
Sirianni, that despite major challenges with the design of both neighbourhood 
empowerment and the leadership style of central decision makers, a collaborative 
governance culture seem to have emerged in Seattle and its surrounding region, both 
in terms of stakeholder mind-set as well as in the city’s new strategies (p. 116). 
Sirianni argues that the fiscal and democratic challenges can be dealt with insofar as 
collaborative governance and policy to some degree apply eight design principles. 
The first five principles are directed towards the local level, whereas the remaining 
three are directed towards the collaborative level (p. 42):  
 Coproduce public goods: public goods are increasingly complex, and thus 
require that citizens are coproducers.  
 Mobilize community assets: The line of reasoning here being that even the 
poorest communities have resources that can be mobilized  
 Share professional expertise: All professionals engaged with policy should 
use their expertise to empower citizens. Conversely, citizens have local 
knowledge about the environment, crime, pollution etc. that can inform 
professional practice. This principle thus advocates that a mix of 
knowledge types gives the most efficient solutions.  
 Enable public deliberation: policy should promote public deliberation 
among citizens. The value here being that deliberation can produce insights 
otherwise unavailable to elected representatives or public administrators; 
deliberation also make citizens appreciate varied perspectives and thus 
gives higher legitimacy to decisions.  
 Promote sustainable partnerships: policy should encourage collaboration 
amongst relevant stakeholders.  
 Build fields and governance networks strategically: this principle of a 
network form of governance ensures that complex public problems are 
dealt with in a sustainable manner, thus combining all relevant governance 
components together in the best possible way.  
 Transform institutional cultures: this principle requires that government 
institutions support the principles above.  
 Ensure reciprocal accountability: when engaging in collaboration, and thus 
sharing power, influence, expertise, resources and knowledge, 
accountability becomes complicated and crucial.  
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So, for Sirianni, innovation is on a governance level, i.e. when a public sector 
authority (agency, state, local government) alters its way of governing in a way that 
applies as many as the above design principles in so far as the problem at hand 
requires it. Like Fung, this broad framework has numerous outputs, the overarching 
aim for Sirianni being an increased capability of citizens to self-govern.  
 
5.1.3. DISCUSSING AND SUMMING UP FUNG AND SIRIANNI 
The authors both agree that in order to deal with the complex problems in welfare 
societies, stakeholders and especially citizens have to be involved in coproducing 
solutions. It is the adaption to this principle that is supposed to create more efficient 
governance, i.e. a governance whose solutions are cheaper, that are more sustainable 
because they are adapted to local circumstances, and innovative, i.e. that generates 
as much value as possible in that solutions are coproduced by a set of diverse 
stakeholders. 
 
FIGURE 8: OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF CARMEN 
SIRIANNI AND ARCHON FUNG & ERIC OLIN WRIGHTS 
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As can be seen in Figure 8 above, there are many similarities between design 
principles, whether the principles are for institutional design or policy design. 
Fung’s principles I-III is very similar to Sirianni’s principles I-V. Sirianni operates 
with a horizontal governance design principle (VI), whereas Fung conceptualizes his 
conception of governance more narrowly in terms of supervision and coordination. 
Fung’s principle VI is also quite similar to Sirianni’s no. VII. and Sirianni’s no. VIII 
is similar to Fung’s principle VI.  
A guiding metaphor for my understanding of the above frameworks consists of the 
concepts vertical, horizontal and integrative. Fung provides the clue for this 
metaphor when he states that we have to overcome the dichotomy of ‘local-central’. 
This metaphor thus invokes a top, i.e. the central-administrative, strategic power 
level that has the ability to take strategic decisions on devolution and coordination; 
and a bottom, i.e. citizens, street level bureaucrats, local professional service 
providers. These two entities have to be integrated in order to create synergy. 
Sirianni invokes the same metaphor in her design principles, and adds a horizontal 
dimension, that of partnership building and networked governance. Also here we 
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find a horizontal integration in that actors have to be linked to each other in a non-
hierarchical manner.   
The authors differ in their insistence on how to apply the design principles. Sirianni 
(Sirianni, 2009) seems to argue for a flexible list of principles, arguing that not all 
principles will be relevant in every instance, even though her case studies apply 
most, if not all, of these principles. In this respect, it is the exact combination of 
applied principles that ultimately is the mechanism for producing knowledge 
analytical framework. (Fung, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003) distinguishes between 
deduced principles and empirical applications of these principles as a design. Thus, 
in contrast to Sirianni, Fung & Wright’s principles are the a priori assumptions 
drawn from democratic theory, whereas the design principles are to be applied in 
practice. 
The frameworks of the authors, though much alike, do have some differences. 
Fung/Fung & Wright have a keen eye for principles relevant for the vertical 
dimension, i.e. the specific training and involvement of citizens. The consequence is 
here that even though design principles do address the central governance 
dimension, we do not receive many pieces of advice concerning how to strategically 
involve stakeholders in a horizontal exercise. The cases described by Fung/Fung & 
Wright remain in its understanding in vertical silos (school, policing), in which the 
strategic involvement is only addressed at the local level, and centralized power 
struggles are conceptualized more pragmatic as coordination. Accordingly, the 
wicked problem dimension in terms of cross-sectorial solutions seems not to be fully 
approached by the developed principles. 
Sirianni’s framework makes up for these weaknesses, since the principles of 
partnership and the strategic building of fields and governance networks address the 
central power dimensions; in Sirianni’s case-study in Seattle, we are being given 
more insight into power struggles at the central level. This is also demonstrated in 
the somewhat gloomy conclusion of Sirianni’s case-study, as with a new mayor, the 
whole decentralized organisational design concerning neighbourhood involvement 
in development work, built up during two decades, seems to quickly erode when a 
centralist new mayor is appointed.   
As a result of the above exploration of governance frameworks addressing 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods, in this thesis I deploy in section 5.6 Fung and 
Sirianni’s design principles in order to make a simple presentation of how the 
development process in the City of Copenhagen has developed the institutional 
framework for working with disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In order to do so, some 
background information concerning area-based programs in Denmark has to be 
conveyed.   
 175 
 
 
 AREA-BASED PROGRAMS IN DENMARK: NATIONAL 5.2
EXPERIENCE 
First, I provide a brief overview of the Danish experience with using area-based 
programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods from 1998 to 2008; this overview is 
important, in that it provides the reader with an understanding of the function of the 
programs in dealing with the public problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This 
allows the reader to understand, how the two involved administrations (TEA, EIA) 
interpreted the somewhat mixed national experience with area based programs 
critically in order to establish a legitimate claim for change of this type of program 
in 2008 when the innovation project began. Further, this elaboration explains how 
area based programs arguably can be perceived as having design qualities that to a 
high extent capture Fung and Sirianni’s bottom-up principles.  
‘Area-based programs’ is a term that covers many other program names in which the 
content of the program is more or less identical. Another name for area-based 
programs in research literature is ‘comprehensive community initiatives’. In this 
thesis, area-based programs are defined broadly as programs that seek to 
“…promote positive change in individual, family, and community circumstances in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods by applying the principles of comprehensiveness and 
community building to improve physical, social, and economic conditions.” 
((Fulbright-Anderson & Auspos, 2004). 10). As discussed by several scholars in 
(Connell, 1995), area-based programs as program types are especially difficult to 
evaluate due to complexity of the problems that the programs intend to solve.  
The role that this type of program has in a Danish context is to be perceived as an 
extraordinary welfare initiative in disadvantaged areas that is supposed to counter 
the negative development of these areas. However, as the brief description below 
will reveal, the experience at present with these types of programs are somewhat 
mixed. The mixed experience is somewhat in contradiction to the initial optimism 
that surrounded the high-profiled and strong state support of these programs in the 
end-90s. In a historical perspective, the programs demonstrated a radical break with 
the existing planning practice towards disadvantaged areas. The existing planning 
practices prior to the launching of area based programs in a Danish context were 
mainly physical and top-down. The area based programs were perceived of as a 
radical break, in that in 1996, Neighbourhood Lift was perceived of as distinctive by 
being defined by the National City Commission as (Skifter Andersen, Kielgast, & 
Norvig Larsen, 2003): 
- Addressing a selected geographically defined district, 
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- Being holistic, i.e. integrating resources from several public sector areas 
- Involving local stakeholders in the district 
 
The holistic, cross-sectorial, geographically bounded aspect, combined with huge 
efforts in facilitating the interaction of local residents and stakeholders symbolised a 
new way of conceptualising the problems of the areas. However, the large-scale, 
area-strategic aim of Neighbourhood Lift was not pursued by subsequent 
governments, with the impact that the funding of the programs was considerably 
reduced.  
I will describe in short the Danish types of programs in more detail below, in order 
to provide the reader with knowledge of what types of programs that are involved in 
the innovation project in the City of Copenhagen, and how these programs operate.   
First of all, in the history of municipally operated area based programs, 
Kvarterløft/’Neighbourhood Lift’ and its contemporary successor, 
Områdefornyelsen/’Area Renewal’ are the most important. Second, there are at 
present social and physical types of area-based programs operated by the social 
housing sector, supervised and sometimes co-financed by the relevant municipality, 
in Danish called a ‘Helhedsplan’, meaning an ‘entirety plan’, which I translate into 
‘Comprehensive Plan’ – a physical Comprehensive Plan and a social 
Comprehensive Plans. The physical Comprehensive Plans are uncontroversial in the 
context of this collaborative innovation process, and will not be described further.  
In 1998, new urban renewal legislation was passed, the so called ‘Holistic Area 
Renewal’, which paved the way for the area-based programs called ‘Neighbourhood 
Lifts’ (Andersen et al., 2009). These programs were, compared to the succeeding 
area based programs, far the most ambitious ones. These programs came in two 
waves: the first seven Neighbourhood Lifts were launched in 1997-2002, with a total 
budget of DKK 1. 3bn (approx. 174.4m Euro) (Jensen & Munk, 2007); and the 
second wave, composed of five Neighbourhood Lifts, was launched in 2002-2008, 
with a total budget of DKK (approx. 120m  Euro). 
The main part of the funding was spent on improving housing conditions, between 
80-90% (Jensen & Munk, 2007)51; (Andersen et al., 2009). The programs were 
funded nationally by the state, to which the City Council applies for funding. As the 
Danish evaluation reports show, the programs were relatively successful ((Jensen & 
Munk, 2007)54), despite the fact that effects sometimes are impossible to document 
(Skifter Andersen et al., 2003). On the basis of aggregated experience with 
evaluating the effects of area based programs, (Andersen, 2002) argues that both 
 177 
 
purpose and effects of the area-based programs in Denmark and in Europe in general 
are unclear, due to the inadequate understanding of the nature of these deprived 
urban areas in which the programs operate.  
In terms of organisation, the largest cities, such as Copenhagen, have had local 
secretariats in all area lifts, operated by a handful of municipal employees (Jensen & 
Munk, 2007)31), whereas in smaller municipalities, the secretariat is located closer 
to the Town Hall. Some advantages of local secretariats are easy access to local 
community ties, creation of local social capital and resident empowerment, 
enhancement of the holistic perspective due to increased local knowledge, sustaining 
of project momentum, and providing a voice to the local area. However, 
disadvantages of the local organisation of secretariats might be local isolation, lack 
of municipal ties, later on hampering the anchoring of the program; the risk of 
developing projects that counteract general municipal policy; the risk of enforcing 
the perception of the area as stigmatized, because it needs special area-based 
program-attention; and finally there may be conflicting issues of loyalty (municipal 
vs. the local area) for local working professionals in the secretariat. A main 
conclusion is that the area-based programs and their projects must be located closer 
to the municipality in order to ensure ownership of the projects (ibid., p. 31).  
Further, research demonstrates that Neighbourhood Lift often has the disadvantage 
that the programs are being targeted towards goals defined by the funding ministry, 
which may not be in alignment with residential experience of the problems 
(Mazanti, 2002).  
Problems are also often mentioned in relation to the area-based approach in 
Denmark concerning the issue of shared ownership of the area-based programs 
across administrative units. In evaluations of area renewals, only the administration 
with technical planning expertise is typically involved in the programs, the other 
administrations contributing somewhat reluctantly (Engberg, Hansen, & Norvig 
Larsen, 2008); the programs face the barrier that despite their holistic perspective, 
the programs are perceived of as being within the resort of the technical and 
planning administrations. Some municipalities suggest that this can be overcome by 
distributing the funding centrally in the municipality, instead of only to the technical 
administration (ibid.).   
So, despite the relative success of Kvarterløft/Neighbourhood Lift, these large-scale 
programs were not continued. The area-based programs still operating in Denmark 
are called ‘Områdefornyelse’ (Area Renewal), and are nationally funded. This 
funding frame is considerably smaller than that of Neighbourhood Lift: around DKK 
60 m a yearii, plus an annual frame of DKK 40 m for additional building renovations 
in the areas where Area Renewal is operating.  The municipality is expected to co-
finance the double amount.  
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The City of Copenhagen describes ‘Area Lift/Area Renewal’ in much the same way 
as Neighbourhood Lift, in that it (TEA 2012: 7iii):  
- Aims to initiate positive development of the chosen areas 
- Has a well-defined geographical boundary 
- Is comprehensive and all-embracing 
- Takes its starting point in the policies and strategies of the City of 
Copenhagen 
- Is based on citizen participation and local involvement 
- Is limited to a six-year period 
- Is generally financed by public funds but is co-financed by foundations, 
residents and businesses 
- Consists of three phases: a district plan phase, an implementation phase and 
an anchoring phase 
 
Now we turn to the social area-based program operated by the social housing sector. 
As part of the governmental Housing Agreement in 2005 and 2006, the National 
Building Fund generated by the social housing sector was commissioned to launch 
both social and massive physically Comprehensive Plans: From 2007-10, DKK 
2.4bn /Year for physical renovations, and 400 Mio. DKK 400m /Year (approx. 295, 
2m Euro) (Boligaftalen 2006), and from 2011-2016, DKK 18bn for physical 
renovations, and DKK 440m/year, a total of DKK 2.64bn , for social 
Comprehensive Plans (Boligaftalen 2010).  
Differences and similarities exist between area renewal and social Comprehensive 
Plans. Area Renewal operates on a city district level. The Comprehensive Plans also 
have an area-based focus, but this is limited to the social housing block of flats and 
its tenants as the working unit. The largest Comprehensive Plans also have a local 
secretariat operated by employees from the social housing sector. As these social 
housing areas are the main problem areas in Denmark, two different types of area-
based programs could in practice be operating in the same neighbourhoods, but with 
different project owners (local governments vis á vis social housing organisations), 
and on the basis of different neighbourhood plans.   
So, to sum up the national experience with area based programs when the 
collaborative innovation in The City Copenhagen in 2007-2008 is put into motion, it 
is fair to say that the programs were relative successful, but did not in itself provide 
a ‘solution’ to the wicked problem of disadvantaged areas. The effects of the 
programs were somewhat unclear; evaluation of the programs draws attention to 
challenges of the municipal sector-based administrations in terms of cooperating 
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with each other in a way that mirrored the ‘holistic’ ambitions of the area based 
programs.  
Despite these mixed experiences and a lack of future agenda for these area-based 
programs, no other extraordinary program solution to disadvantaged areas has been 
put in its place, and governments has since the downscaling of the state-funded 
programs made legislation that de facto defines the problems as a social housing 
sector problem, by enforcing the Central Distribution Fund of the Danish social 
housing organisations to fund social and physical Comprehensive Plan. 
Furthermore, these types of programs do, despite their limitations mark a radical 
break with prior physical, top-down planning procedures, emphasizing citizen-and 
stakeholder involvement in the formulation of a holistic neighbourhood solution.  
So, the situation in 2007 is that two types of area based programs, both with a social 
focus and both having the possibility of being enhanced by funding for physical 
renovations and city renewal funding, are operating simultaneously in some 
disadvantaged areas, both having the ambition of providing a holistic solution to 
complex neighbourhood problems.  
 Having now described area based programs, I will turn to the 
organisational context of the City of Copenhagen.  
 THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT: THE CITY OF 5.3
COPENHAGEN AND THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF 
NEIGHBOURHOOD DEVELOPMENT  
In the empirical analyses below some of the civil-servants refer to the municipality 
as ‘the seven headed beast’, pointing to the fact that the municipality is divided in 
seven sector-based administrations, each having its own political committee and its 
own mayor. Accordingly, a strong background-narrative when doing my fieldwork 
and interviews is that working within this political and administrative structure is 
highly difficult and kaleidoscopic. In this section I briefly outline some explanations 
for this professional experience.   
Sector-divided municipal administrations in general seem to place some restraints on 
holistic types of programs such as area-based programs in types of ownership (see 
section 5.2). The administration structure in The City of Copenhagen seems to 
impose even heavier constraints on area-based programs. (Engberg & Larsen, 2010) 
have made an analysis of the early parts of the development process that I also 
analyse in this thesis, arguing that the coordination of place-based politics and 
programs suffers from problems due to the complex governance structure of the city 
administration (p. 555). According to (Engberg & Larsen, 2010), the consequence of 
the municipal governance system is that the mayors do not have the ruling authority 
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in their own committees or the ruling majority in the city council. The mayors 
negotiate all issues on a case by case basis. As a consequence, the administrative 
governance is divided between the seven mayors and the managing directors. Thus, 
each administration is subject to the authority of both mayor and standing 
committee. (Engberg & Larsen, 2010) argue that this governance system generates 
tensions and conflicts within administrations and between administrations, 
hampering cross-administrative coordination and integration.  
That the municipal governance structure in the City of Copenhagen is rather 
complex, difficult to navigate in and heavily politicised is further demonstrated by 
research (Berg, 2004) and by the fact that in 2006 the Financial Committee in the 
City of Copenhagen established a commission with the purpose of qualifying a 
political basis for assessing the need and wishes of a change of the municipal 
governance reform in Copenhagen (Københavns Kommune, 2007); the political 
process of a future change in the municipal governance structure was running 
concurrently with the collaborative innovation process that I studied. This process 
was met with resistance at the national governmental level, in which one of the 
governmental parties with relations to municipal politicians in the City of 
Copenhagen openly rejected the option of legislation concerning a reform of this 
type of municipal governance structure in the four biggest cities in Denmarkiv. This 
political process came to a final halt in 2013, in which the government decided to 
abandon this reform project altogetherv.  
The motivation for The City of Copenhagen to establish a commission looking 
critically at the rule of government is, according to the commission, that “in order to 
ensure a modern and dynamic municipal organisation” ((Københavns Kommune, 
2007), including comprehensiveness and coherence in the municipal service to 
citizens and business, the City of Copenhagen is in need of an organisation that 
supports the possibilities of holistic thinking and a coherent municipal strategy 
across municipal administrations (ibid. p. 6).   
Rikke Berg (Berg, 2004) provides explanations to why actors in the municipal 
organisation in The City of Copenhagen as well as nationally have an experience of 
sector-divided stove-pipes and lack of strategic possibilities across administrations. 
Berg assesses Danish municipal governance forms, comparing these with 
international examples. According to Berg’s typology, the governance in 
Copenhagen can be regarded as an instance of a ‘government by committees’ (in 
Danish: udvalgsstyre). In this type of municipal government, the municipal council 
is the superior body of decisions. The chair of the council meetings is being 
managed by a mayor, who has the responsibility for the political agenda, but 
otherwise does not have more formal power than the rest of the council. The 
administration is taken care of by a number of standing committees. The committees 
are composed according to a principle of proportion that guarantees a broad 
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representation of political parties. Each committee is being led by a committee 
chairman, elected by a majority in the committee. A defining characteristic of this 
type of government is that all politicians are both defining the principles for each 
administration and are also taking part in the executive functions in the municipal 
organisation. Copenhagen is a specific instance of this municipal governance form, a 
so-called ‘intermediated form’ (in Danish: mellemformsstyre) in which the 
committee chairs is selected by another method of selection, and are full-time 
employed. The administrative management is furthermore divided between the 
mayor and the committee chairs. These committee chairs are like the mayor 
automatic members of the finance committee (p. 14-15). 
According to Berg, the committee-model promotes different considerations. First of 
all the inclusion of layman, since all elected politicians are taking part in the 
executive functions. This consideration furthermore ensures a distribution of power, 
because much of the power ascribed to the executive power is distributed among 
mayors, financial committee, standing committees and the municipal council. The 
power is also distributed amongst politicians and civil servants. The third 
consideration that this type of government promotes is consensus, since the 
committees are expected to reach agreement concerning the use of public means. 
The fourth consideration is stability, related to the consensus aspects of this 
government model.  
However, according to Berg, such a government by committees also restrains other 
considerations (Berg, 2004). Firstly, since power is distributed it can be difficult to 
assign responsibility to decisions made. Second, because all politicians share 
responsibility there is no incentive for politicians to demonstrate a powerful political 
leadership. Accordingly, a weak political leadership actually promotes stability. 
Thirdly, the consideration of democratic control is also restrained by the fact that lay 
politicians are involved not just in terms of formulating political principles, but also 
in the executive affairs of government. This makes it difficult for politicians to 
control the administration. Accordingly, the political level is closely interwoven 
with the administrative level, an aspect that hinders the governability in the 
municipal organisation. According to Berg, the commission working with a given 
remit will identify with it, hence being advocates of spending instead of minimizing 
budgets. Through the work of the standing commissions high ranking civil servants 
have easy access to make alliances with the political level. These conditions both 
increase the level of spending within the specific sector, but also restrain the overall 
and cross-sectorial coordination.        
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 ORGANISATIONAL DIAGRAM OF NEIGHBOURHOOD 5.4
DEVELOPMENT 
Through four figures below I have depicted the organisational framework of the 
studied collaborative innovation. The first figure, Figure 9, is adopted from Berg’s 
general model for ‘Government by Committees’ (Berg, 2004), by simply stating the 
names of committees and administrations. This is the overall organisational 
framework.  
 
 
FIGURE 9: MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN THE CITY OF COPENHAGEN 
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In the subsequent Figure 10 I have depicted the administration (The Technical- and 
Environmental Administration, ‘TEA’ for short) in which the organisational unit in 
the focus of analysis, Neighbourhood Development, is located. As can be seen in the 
figure, TEA consists of an administrative management: a board of directors, a 
department for resources and a Town Hall secretary. Below this administrative 
management is ten Departments, (or centres), among which is Department for Urban 
Design, having a couple of hundred employees.  
FIGURE 10: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE TECHNICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
IN THE SUBSEQUENT FIGURE,  
Figure 11: Dept. for Urban Design, I have depicted Department for Urban Design. 
This department has its own director and secretariat and is divided in six sub-
departments, in which Neighbourhood Development is one of those sub-
departments.  
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FIGURE 11: DEPT. FOR URBAN DESIGN 
 
 
In the final Figure 12 below, I have depicted Neighbourhood Development. The 
office consists on the central-administrative level by a middle manager and staff, 
approximately two secretaries and about ten full-time employed civil servants at the 
central level. It is the central-administrative part of Neighbourhood Development 
which is the bottom-up leadership unit studied.   
Locally, at neighbourhood level, this central-administrative office supports the 
running of around four to six Area-Renewal programs on a running basis, in which 
two new area based programs are launched every year, all operated by full-time 
employed staff, each Area-Renewal Program having a local manager and around 
five employees. Furthermore, Neighbourhood Development facilitates, monitors and 
evaluates the social housing sector’s social Comprehensive Plans. The total number 
of employees has been increased during the case-study. In 2012 Neighbourhood 
Development has in total 65 employees, 20 employed centrally.  
 
 185 
 
 
 
FIGURE 12: ORGANISATIONAL DIAGRAM OF NEIGHBOURHOOD DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 THE CASE STUDY: A DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN THE 5.5
CITY OF COPENHAGEN 
Figure 13 below displays the major events for each year, from 2007-2012. The 
outputs marked with an asterisk denote parts of the process that I have chosen as 
suitable ‘embedded’ cases (Yin, 2009) for my study of  how collaborative 
innovation leadership is constructed and exercised by Neighbourhood Development. 
The first embedded case concerns the attempts of Neighbourhood Development to 
establish a cross-administrative evaluation practice in 2009. The second embedded 
case concerns the attempts of Neighbourhood Development and its allies to establish 
a cross-administrative policy (2010-2011). I use the term ‘embedded case’ in order 
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to emphasise that I have chosen to focus on specific parts of the process in the case 
study; arguably, these will  provide us with general knowledge of leadership in this 
specific part of the development process. These cases were chosen because they 
exposed the leadership challenges of Neighbourhood Development at two different 
points in time, thus providing us with knowledge of how this leadership changes 
over time in order to match the most pressing challenges. 
 
FIGURE 13: EVENTS AND OUTPUT IN THE COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION PROCESS 
(2007-2012) 
Year and headline Description of output 
2007: Initiation of 
strategy process 
Support is acquired for initiating a strategy process 
concerning the increasing number of area-based programs 
2008: Approval of 
strategy report 
Approval of strategy reportvi;  
Merging of area-based offices 
New name and leader for the newly established office - 
Neighbourhood Development 
2009: Implementation 
of strategy report 
recommendations 
 
*Cross-administrative  qualitative evaluation practice of 
the social housing sectors ‘Comprehensive Plans’* 
Cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice: 
‘The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map’vii 
Consolidation of the area-based remit in 
TEA/Neighbourhood Development 
2010: New cross-
administrative 
organisation,  
partnership, and 
commission for policy 
New Intra-Municipal Governance structure implemented 
New Partnership Forum Created between municipality 
and social housing sector 
Terms of reference acquired for a cross-administrative 
policy  
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*Initiating policy formulation process* 
New demands for municipal approval of the social 
housing sector’s  ‘Comprehensive Plans’viii 
2011: Policy Approval *Policy formulation process continued* 
A change in commission 
*“Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen” is 
approved ofix* 
2012: Policy 
Implementation 
 
 
Three out of six ‘Development Plans’ are approved of in 
the 2012-budget negotiations in  The City of 
Copenhagenx 
 
 
 
 
2007: Initiation of strategy process 
In 2007 a strategy process was initiated in close cooperation between TEA and the 
Employment and Integration Administration (EIA), concerning area-based 
programs. A researcher from Danish Building Research Institute was running the 
process and was responsible for producing an analysis and a set of recommendations 
to improve the area-based practice. The City of Copenhagen, The National 
Association of Local Governments, The Ministry of Welfare and the Danish 
Building Research Institute jointly financed this development project. The project 
was completed with a project report entitled ‘The Horisontal Pillar: a strategic 
development perspective concerning the coordination of area-based programs in The 
City of Copenhagen’ (Engberg, 2008). 
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This happened in a context in which two offices in TEA’s planning department 
‘Urban Design Department’ were experiencing increasing problems of cooperation 
and coordination of their programs operating in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
in the city. One of the offices, ’Area Lift’, was managing the area-based programs 
conducted by the City of Copenhagen itself. The other office, ‘The Comprehensive 
Plan Team’, part of the ‘Social Housing’ office was managing area-based programs 
run by the social housing sector, co-financed and approved of by the City of 
Copenhagen. In TEA, the Comprehensive Plan Team was experiencing problems 
with the very rapid increase in the number of Comprehensive Plans, going from 22 
to an estimated number of 34. The Team was experiencing that the other 
administrations were lacking in goals for these initiatives as the Comprehensive 
Plans were considered as belonging to TEA’s turf. This  hampered the provision of 
municipal resources to co-finance the Comprehensive Plans (Engberg, 2008).  
Not just TEA, but also the Integration and Employment Administration were 
operating policies and programs that addressed extraordinary welfare problems in 
the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. At this point in time, EIA was operating six 
area-based initiatives area-based, such as crime preventive Hot Spot initiatives, Job 
Patrols targeting citizens on social benefits, a Job Bus, outreach efforts targeting 
youth, a voluntary centre constituting part of an Area Lift, a Task Force aimed at 
counselling on integration and employment issues. Finally, EIA was involved in the 
area-based programs in general. These EIA initiatives were supporting EIAs 
emigration policy, in which a goal was to stop the trend towards more disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods (Engberg, 2008).  
2008: Approval of strategy report: ‘“The “Horisontal Pillar”. A Strategic 
Development Perspective for the Coordination of Area-Based Interventions in the 
City of Copenhagen’ 
The report was finally approved in ultimo 2008. The report presented six 
recommendations, based on interviews with middle managers, special consultants 
and civil servants mainly from TEA and EIA, and the recommendations were 
aiming at increased coordination. The report defined its strategic development 
perspective to be one that “contains an idea of a collective response to the 
coordination challenge. In this response there is both a common understanding of 
the problem, some practical, operational tools and an offer of coordinated and 
systematic management practices. Under the heading of The Horisontal Pillar, a 
concrete suggestion for a development perspective for better coordination of area-
based interventions in Copenhagen is presented” (Engberg, 2008). The report 
identifies several governance challenges. First of all, there is need for better area-
based governance, professionalization of the area-based programs, and an evaluation 
practice of the programs. Second, a horizontal challenge exists, in that the practices 
of the administrations are not coordinated. Third, there is a vertical challenge, in that 
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the local activities and central-administrative practices are poorly integrated (p. 49). 
The report further describes an institutional shortcoming, in that the area-based-
programs require a horizontal administrative practice in order to be successful; the 
horizontal practice is hampered by the silo-divided administrations. Further, the 
report describes that the area-based programs and the established municipal 
activities are difficult to integrate, due to their different perceptions of goals and 
types of means to reach these goals: typically, area-based programs are of a temporal 
character and logically focused on development, whereas already established 
municipal activities are of a permanent character, focused on steady operation (p. 
50). The report further states, that party-political disagreements lead to difficulties 
with prioritizing and working across areas of responsibility; that the size of the 
administrations makes it difficult to establish an overview of the many activities 
taking place in the disadvantaged areas; that it is unclear what the effect of the 
programs is, which makes it difficult to further improve the area-based program as a 
program, and which makes it difficult to argue that this type of program is the best 
program for dealing with the disadvantaged areas; and that the strategic level of the 
area-based-programs is insufficient, leading to a lack of shared goals across 
administrations. All of these conditions lead to a lack of coordination of the 
municipal activities (p. 51).    
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Front page, Strategy Report, ‘The Horisontal Pillar’  
 
The recommendations for addressing the problems described above, in order to 
generally coordinate a shared improvement of the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, 
are as follows:  
- A shared agreement and strategy running across the seven administrations 
in the City of Copenhagen 
- An enhancement of the city area level as a planning framework for area-
based programs 
- A unified governance structure for area-based programs between EIA and 
TEA 
- A shared negotiation and collaboration procedure between local and central 
parties of area-based programs in a new organisational structure.  
- A tool for evaluating and monitoring area-based programs 
- A socio-economic map of the city in order to coordinate and qualify the 
selection criteria for area-based programs (Engberg 2008: 18, my 
translation) 
As a result of the strategy report, two offices in TEA have merged: one team from 
the office that manages the increasing number of the social housing sector’s 
‘Comprehensive Plans’, and one office that manages ‘Area Renewal’ programs. A 
new leader has become appointed from the Comprehensive Plan team, and later on a 
new name has been given to the office: ‘Neighbourhood Development’.  
 
2009: Implementation of strategy report recommendations 
In 2009, the implementation of some of the recommendations from ‘The Horisontal 
Pillar’ began. The two offices have merged into one, called ‘Neighbourhood 
Development’ (in Danish, ‘Kvarterudvikling’). The central ND office consists of 
about five full time employed civil servants and their middle manager, previously a 
project manager at the office of the ‘Comprehensive Plan Team’; the local office 
comprises around 40 civil servants employed in Area Renewals.  The 
implementation of the evaluation tool and the appliance of the socioeconomic map 
began. External events influenced the implementation process. In end-2009, new 
legislation was passed concerning the social housing sector, the so-called 
‘Governance Dialogue’ (in Danish, ‘Styringsdialogen’), in which the supervision of 
the social housing sector was moved from state to local government level 
(Socialministeriet, 2010; Velfærdsministeriet, 2008). The governmental purpose of 
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this move was, among others, to force local governments and the social housing 
sector to cooperate more closely on issues such as urban planning and housing 
policies.  This influenced how the implementation of The Horisontal Pillar-project 
was carried out, in that both ‘Governance Dialogue’ and ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ 
emphasised closer cooperation and coordination among municipality and the social 
housing sector.   
The following recommendations from the strategy report were implemented in 2009:  
- A cross-administrative  qualitative evaluation practice of the social housing 
sectors ‘Comprehensive Plans’ 
- A cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice: ‘The 
Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map’xi’ 
- Consolidation of the area-based resort in TEA/Neighbourhood 
Development 
The evaluation practice was commissioned by an administrative intra-municipal 
steering committee, and was supposed to seek inspiration in ‘The Horisontal Pillar’. 
The evaluation practice was one of the recommended tools in ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ 
that was supposed to ensure increased quality in the area-based programs in general. 
The parties participating in the team responsible for implementing the evaluation 
template were TEA, EIA and SSA (The Social Services Administration).    
The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map was developed as a side-project parallel with 
‘The Horisontal Pillar’-process. The digital socio-economic map was supposed to 
support the ways in which different areas of the city were supposed to be politically 
and administratively prioritized due to their problem characteristics. In order to be 
used as an analytical tool suitable for detecting areas with complex problems, data 
sources across the municipal administrations are supposed to be integrated in the 
Map. Likewise, the map can perform quantitative track changes in the areas targeted 
by area-based programs, and thus functions also as an evaluation tool.  
Consolidation of the area-based remit in TEA was implemented by reducing the 
number of central steering committees for the different area-based programs, and by 
defining Neighbourhood Development as the body responsible for area-based 
programs.  
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2010: New cross-administrative organisation, partnership and commission for a 
policy 
As a consequence of the new legislation, the ‘Governance Dialogue’, The City of 
Copenhagen and the social housing sector was in need of a formalized partnership in 
which the activities and strategies of the actors could be formally coordinated and 
conflicts could be dealt with. This process began already in 2008, and gained 
momentum in 2009. As this coordination need had much in common with the 
coordination aim of The Horisontal Pillar, these two policy streams were merged in 
ultimo 2009.  
The implementation of The Horisontal Pillar-project was thus prolonged and to 
some extent re-invented. New working groups were established that were to redefine 
their functions within the new inter-organisational set-up across all seven 
administration units, involving a partnership with the social housing sector and a 
powerful top of decision makers, consisting of a ‘Mayor Forum’.  Before this 
external event interfered, ND had so far been successful and was about to gather 
political consent concerning a political steering committee.  
In June 2010, the new organisational structure was approved ofxii.  Consequently, in 
2010, The Technical and Environmental Administration suggested (April 2010) that 
besides coordinating activities with the social housing sector, the organisation 
should also have a policy to guide its future collaborative action. The Technical and 
Environmental Administration was commissioned by The Board of Mayors and The 
Intra-Municipal Steering Committee to run a cross-administrative policy formulation 
process, initially having the same aim as stated in ‘The Horisontal Pillar’: to produce 
a policy for area -based programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods.  In September 
2010, the Board of Mayors decided that a ‘policy for area-based-programs in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods’ should be outlined, with TEA as the coordinative 
administration, delegating the responsibility of this task to ND.   
The director of the Urban Design Department in The Technical and Environmental 
Administration, ranking above ND and their middle manager, had the idea that the 
policy should be a ‘toolbox’ policy. The policy should contain all the feasible 
instruments (methods, activities) that the administrations had applied successfully in 
the disadvantaged areas so far. The logic behind this was that when discovering a 
new disadvantaged neighbourhood or city area, the directors in the steering 
committee as well as the mayors could easily acquire an overview as regards the 
instruments to be used in the exact city area. 
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Organisational diagram, showing an organisation at three levels; from left to right, 
the internal governance in Copenhagen City (green boxes), the joint Partnership 
Forum between Copenhagen and representatives from the social housing 
organisations (Blue boxes), levels of agreement (white boxes), and levels of decision 
making (grey circles). The model is my translated version of the organisational 
diagram in (Københavns Kommune, 2010)  
 
Thus, the following outputs were created in 2010:  
-The new ‘Intra Municipal Governance’ structure was implemented as part of a new 
internal organisation in The City of Copenhagen. The new organisation was to 
satisfy the demands for a better intra-municipal overview, a new way of organising 
the cooperation with the social housing sector, and the political anchoring of both 
relations to the housing sector and the area-based programsxiii:  
 
 
 
 At level 1 the Intra-Municipal Governance and a Mayors Forum.  
 At Level 2 an administrative, cross-administrative Steering committee 
comprised by level 2 directors,  
 At level 3 theme groups. Level three is comprised by civil servants, 
including a ‘Cross-administrative Team’ (‘CUT’).   
The purpose of the Mayors Forum is to ensure a political anchoring of agreements 
and strategies; political focus on development of the social housing areas; a proposal 
for political prioritization of goals for area-based programs and the development of 
the social housing areas in general (ibid.: 5).  
-The New Partnership Forum was created between municipality and the social 
housing sector. The purpose of Partnership Forum is to provide ‘one shared 
entrance’ for the social housing sector to the municipality and vice versa; and to 
enable political prioritization of goals across municipal and housing organisational 
interests regarding area-based programs and the social housing areas in general 
(ibid.: 6). Here, mayors and seven representatives from the housing organisations’ 
National Association’s first circle are to cooperate.  
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-Commission acquired for a cross-administrative policy. In April 2010, a 
commission was applied forxiv. Here it was stated that the newly established Mayors 
Forum was supposed to initiate a ‘shared municipal policy for working with the 
area-based programs’ (ibid.3).   
-Finally, Neighbourhood Development developed (on the basis of its new evaluation 
practice) new demands for municipal approval of the social housing sector’s 
‘Comprehensive Plans’xv. These demands were supposed to increase the quality of 
the plans and ensure that the plans were coordinated with the municipal activities in 
the area. They emphasized that in the future, the City of Copenhagen will demand 
that the Comprehensive Plans are more extensive, thus making them less vulnerable 
to shifts in personnel; that the Comprehensive Plans should assess the implications 
of the plans more critically, and also be more thorough to ensure that initiatives are 
not launched in competition with municipal activities; that the plans should be 
regarded as development plans, but with the focus of developing and supporting 
already existing social housing and municipal activities; and that there should be an 
increased focus on the anchoring of developments as well as cooperation with 
municipal actorsxvi.   
 
2011: Approval of policy  
Half way through The Policy Formulation process (March 1, 2011), the director for 
the Urban Design Department got a new job in another municipality. The municipal 
election in November 2009 had resulted in the election of a new mayor of The 
Technical and Environmental Administration. The mayor left the position after 18 
months, and a new mayor was appointed in May 2011. For a period, ND 
experienced a leadership vacuum. This gave ND access to a higher ranking level-
2director in TEA. Jointly, this alliance allowed for ND to suggest a change in the 
commission for the policy, from a focus on area-based programs, to a focus of a 
greater scope – disadvantaged city districts.  
In September-November 2011, the Policy was approved in all seven committees. 
December 1, 2011, the ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’ was finally approved in the 
City Council (in Danish, ‘Borgerrepræsentationen’).  
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Double page from Policy for Disadvantaged Areas of Copenhagen, symbolically showing all 
seven mayors sitting side by side  
Besides the very important change in policy commission, the main outcome in 2011 
was the approval of Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen. The overall 
goals in the Policy were that the areas should be ‘lifted to a general Copenhagen 
level’ by 2020, focusing first of all on generating employment and education for all 
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residents. Each of the seven administrations has its own goals, such as satisfaction 
with culture and leisure activities, youth education for 95% of the youth, a varied 
resident composition etc. The core means to reach these goals are preferential 
treatment of the areas requiring development of the core operations in the areas; 
such development should be shared jointly amongst all seven administrations, in a 
partnership with the social housing sector. The overall tool is the so called 
‘Development Plans’: one Development Plan for each of the six disadvantaged city 
districts, identified by means of The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map, as displayed 
at one of the pages in ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’:  
 
Page from Policy for Disadvantaged Areas, demonstrating how The Socioeconomic 
Copenhagen Map was being put into use to identify disadvantaged areas 
 
The development plans are supposed to be formulated and implemented in ‘two 
waves’: the first three to be drawn up in 2012, the final three in 2013. The 
Development Plans are described as ‘a prioritisation tool for customized solutions’ 
(p. 28), and thus share a number of the holistic, context-sensitive characteristics with 
area-based programs, with the exception that the plans are developed by municipal 
professionals, not involving the lay residents. Each of the development plans is thus 
tailored to the city area, focusing on the municipal initiatives that should be 
prioritized in order to reach the 2020 policy goals. The policy includes no economy. 
The volume of the development plans, i.e. to which degree the administrations are 
willing to boost their core operations, is an issue in the annual budget negotiations.   
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2012: Policy implementation 
In 2012, three out of six ‘Development Plans’ were approved in the 2012 budget 
negotiations in The City of Copenhagenxvii.  
 
 DEPLOYING NEIGHBOURHOOD GOVERNANCE 5.6
CONCEPTS TO THE CASE 
In the sections above I have outlined insight into disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
provided by two scholars relevant for neighbourhood governance. I have also briefly 
explained national experience with area based programs, the organisational context 
for the innovation project as well as describing the process outputs of this innovation 
process in some detail.  
In this final context section I combine these different insights in an assessment of the 
institutional development with regards to the area-based approach to disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. I have in Figure 14 further down below depicted how the 
institutional setting has changed during the innovation process. Here I use the 
concepts developed by Archon Fung and Carmen Sirianni (Fung, 2004; Fung & 
Wright, 2003; Sirianni, 2009) in a heuristic fashion. Fung and Sirianni’s concepts 
are useful descriptors since they are developed on the basis of the conceptual 
challenges of linking ‘the local’ with ‘the central’: How central institutions can work 
better together with local stakeholders in order to produce more innovative and 
efficient solutions at the local level. The concepts allow us to understand the process 
in The City of Copenhagen as happening in three overall phases.   
The first phase in Figure 14 preceded the innovation process initiated in 2008, the 
second phase was from 2008-2010, and the last phase was in 2010-2012.  For each 
phase I have listed the institutional changes made in the row below the 
organisational images. Further, on the vertical dimension the model is split up on 
three levels: the central-administrative level, the local service level, and civil 
society; the first two levels thus denote the municipal activities.   
 
 
FIGURE 14: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA-BASED APPROACH TO 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBOURHOODS 
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Phase 1: Fragmented instances of area based approaches 
In the first phase, I have depicted an image of fragmented instances of the area-
based approach up to the development of the strategy report, The Horisontal Pillar. 
It is this fragmentation and lack of coordination that are addressed in the report. 
Here we see that three main actors, TEA (The Technical and Environmental 
Administration), EIA (The Employment and Integration Administration) and The 
Social Housing Organisations (SHO) each operate their own area-based programs 
for dealing with problems in the same disadvantaged neighbourhoods:  
In this phase, we also see that the area-based solutions span across both local service 
and civil society levels, thus focusing mainly on the local level. And we see how the 
area-based solution has some institutional capacities that are solely focused on the 
local level, in that they seek to empower local stakeholders and coproduce public 
goods at the local level through the cooperation between civil society and the local 
government.  
Phase 2: Developing central-administrative institutional design principles 
In Phase 2, we see the implementation results of The Horisontal Pillar–project and 
the leadership endeavours and entrepreneurship demonstrated by Neighbourhood 
Development (ND). We see the emergence of a strategic field consisting of (i) an 
Intra-Municipal Governance structure across all seven administrations (ii) a 
Cooperation Forum between municipality and the social housing organisations. We 
also see how the cross-administrative Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map, an 
evaluation practice and resort consolidation have been implemented, and how ND 
emerges as an example of area-based leadership that focuses on increasing the 
coordination of area-based resources at a neighbourhood level through centralized 
means.    
 
Phase 3: Consolidating the development of central-administrative institutions 
through Policy 
In phase 3, we see the core elements of the institutional design as it appeared when I 
completed my case study in 2012. The strategic field now has an approved, cross-
administrative Policy for Disadvantaged Areas to guide its actions towards 2020, 
and the Policy is being implemented by means of an area-based solution, but now at 
city district rather than neighbourhood level. We also see how, in this way, the 
Policy integrates the municipal activities, integrating the central-administrative level 
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and the local level. It appears that the area-based programs now have to relate to the 
Policy and Development Plans, not the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, in that the 
‘problem’ with, and solution for, the neighbourhoods has in this way been defined 
by means of the policy. We find that an institutional change has come about, in that 
the administrations and the social housing organisations are now working together in 
a fashion that is in align with the horizontal and coordinative ambition described in 
the report, The Horisontal Pillar. We also see how the Development Plans and the 
Policy remain within the municipal sphere. This also implies that the contact to civil 
society still is a function to be maintained within the area-based programs. And 
finally, we see that leadership is consolidated within TEA, in that the other 
administrations perceive of the innovation project as an initiative that needs to be 
managed by TEA and ND.  
 
 SUMMING UP  5.7
In this chapter I have described the context for the case of bottom-up leadership in 
the City of Copenhagen. The function in the research design is to illustrate how the 
City of Copenhagen has dealt with the wicked problem of disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods prior to the innovation process studied. The function is furthermore 
to enable the reader to understand the profession that has informed bottom-up 
leadership: how this profession perceives of disadvantaged neighbourhoods and how 
the professional development when working with area based programs has enabled a 
critical reflection concerning area based programs, providing the foundation for 
putting into words the  municipal performance gap in this welfare area. 
The research question that is to be answered in this chapter and the chapters below 
is:  
How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition 
in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
 
This chapter have contributed to answering this research question by:  
- Demonstrating what aspects of the development process that are in fact 
innovative when related to the wicked problem field 
- Describing what context bottom-up leadership navigates in  
- Describing what the profession underpinning bottom-up leadership is 
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- Describing what aggregated experience that has been available for this 
profession  
- How this professional experience has been interpreted critically in order to 
launch an innovation project that addresses a municipal performance gap 
when governing disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
I have done so by explaining how two key scholars within neighbourhood 
governance suggest developing institutional frameworks in order to enhance the 
governance of these neighbourhoods with the objective to produce increased value 
for citizens at the local level. I have briefly outlined the national experience with 
area based programs and described these program types. This outline firstly serves 
the purpose of making the reader familiar with context rhetoric and the profession 
that underpin bottom-up leadership. This outline also provides the necessary basis 
for making an assessment of how the Copenhagen Case can be considered as an 
innovation that has contributed with value. The deployment of neighbourhood 
governance concepts to the Copenhagen case demonstrates that prior to 2007, area 
based programs as an approach for dealing with the wicked problem of 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods had some institutional strengths and weaknesses. 
Area based programs has many of the strengths argued for by scholars of 
neighbourhood governance in terms of cross-sectorial solutions to a wicked problem 
as well as the involvement of citizens and local knowledge in problem solving. 
However, a weakness of this area based approach to disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
has been the lack of central-administrative solutions and the lack of a strategic field 
and an institutionalized solution for how to deal with this wicked problem. The 
deployment demonstrates that as a consequence of the innovation project in the City 
of Copenhagen, the area based programs have inspired a process that provides the 
City of Copenhagen with a new institutional framework that is both able to operate 
on the local level in an context-specific way, incorporating knowledge and 
perspectives of citizens and local stakeholders; the institutional framework has been 
able to enhance this area based approach to disadvantaged areas by providing a 
central-administrative framework that focuses on coordination, the establishment of 
a strategic field consisting of administrative and political decision makers across 
municipal and social housing administrations, tied to a cross-administrative policy, 
implemented through a city-district planning level solution, the so-called 
‘Development Plans’.  
In this respect, the ‘dichotomy’, as Archon Fung coins it, between the local and the 
central has been overcome, even though it remains an open question whether this 
solution is possible to stabilize.  
This section has furthermore provided the reader with an insight into the rather 
complex organisational reality that Neighbourhood Development is located within. 
Finally, the section has produced a timeline and description of events concerning the 
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collaborative innovation process. This description provides the reader with guidance 
to understand the events and context related to the analyses below.   
 
 204 
 
 
 205 
 
CHAPTER 6.                           
ANALYSIS A: THE EVALUATION 
CASE 
In this and the following chapter I analyse two embedded cases: The Evaluation 
Case and The Policy Formulation Case. For each case I make a brief introduction in 
which I describe and depict major events occurring at this point in time in The City 
of Copenhagen. Despite this introduction, the reader should consider reading 
Chapter 5, especially section 5.5, since the analyses below assumes the familiarity 
with events, names and intentions introduced in those sections.  
I analyse the qualitative data gathered in the period October 2009-February 2010 by 
means of the BUCIL model. These data were gathered in order to shed light on some 
conflicts in a team responsible for the evaluation work package in the innovation 
project ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ (the Pillar, for short).  
Below, I first describe the process conditioning The Evaluation Case – both external 
events and substantive issues discussed in the cross-administrative Evaluation Team. 
Next, I recapitulate analytical strategy. Next, I display my findings. I conduct my 
analysis in the following sequence: uncertainty, entrepreneurship, leadership 
recognition, making and giving sense. I conclude by condensing the analytical 
findings into abstract leadership dilemmas that I found dominant in this embedded 
case; these leadership dilemmas ultimately explain how leadership is constructed 
and transformed. The purpose of introducing the leadership dilemmas is to enable 
the knowledge generated by BUCIL model to be compared with, or inspire, other 
future studies of bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership in the public sector.  
 
 PROCESS DESCRIPTION: THE EVALUATION CASE 6.1
In this section I describe in brief the key events in the innovation process studied. 
These key events influence the task of The Evaluation Team. In this description, 
findings from the analysis are used to inform this description. In this respect, the 
description should not be regarded as a neutral description, but as a description that 
is implicated by the previous chapters of this thesis.    
As marked with bold in Figure 15 below, the evaluation case starts in 2009, and is 
part of a phase in which the strategy report recommendations from The Horizontal 
 206 
 
Pillar is supposed to be implemented. So, in parallel with this case, a cross-
administrative quantitative monitoring practice is being launched, the area-based 
remit is being consolidated in TEA, and in 2010, the work packages related to The 
Horisontal Pillar is being merged with the process of establishing an organisational 
framework for implementing the new legislation related to The Governance 
Dialogue.  
  
FIGURE 15: TIMELINE – THE EVALUATION CASE 
Year and headline Description of output 
2007: Initiation of 
strategy process 
Support is acquired for initiating a strategy process 
concerning the increasing number of area-based programs 
2008: Approval of 
strategy report 
Approval of strategy reportxviii;  
Merging of area-based offices 
New name and leader for the newly established office - 
Neighbourhood Development 
2009: Implementation 
of strategy report 
recommendations 
 
*Cross-administrative  qualitative evaluation practice of 
the social housing sectors ‘Comprehensive Plans’ 
Cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice: 
‘The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map’xix 
Consolidation of the area-based remit in 
TEA/Neighbourhood Development 
2010: New legislation: 
The Governance 
Dialogue. 
New cross-
administrative 
organisation,  
partnership, and 
commission for policy 
New Intra-Municipal Governance structure implemented 
New Partnership Forum Created between municipality 
and social housing sector 
Terms of reference acquired for a cross-administrative 
policy  
*Initiating policy formulation process 
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New demands for municipal approval of the social 
housing sector’s  ‘Comprehensive Plans’xx 
2011: Policy Approval *Policy formulation process continued 
A change in commission 
*“Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen” is 
approved ofxxi 
2012: Policy 
Implementation 
 
Three out of six ‘Development Plans’ are approved of in 
the 2012-budget negotiations in  The City of 
Copenhagenxxii 
 
In 2008/2009, the implementation of the recommendations from ‘The Horisontal 
Pillar’ report began. The evaluation tool and the socioeconomic map were 
implemented. External events influenced the implementation process. At the end of 
2009, new legislation was passed concerning the social housing sector, the so-called 
‘Governance Dialogue’ (in Danish, ‘Styringsdialogen’), in which the supervision of 
the social housing sector was transferred from state to local government level. The 
government’s purpose of this move was, among others, to force local governments 
and the social housing sector to cooperate closer on issues such as urban planning 
and housing policies.   
This influenced the outcome of The Horisontal Pillar-project. The City of 
Copenhagen and the social housing sector were in need of a partnership in which the 
activities and strategies of the actors could be formally coordinated and conflicts 
could be dealt with. Since this coordination need had much in common with the 
coordination aim of The Horisontal Pillar, these two policy streams were merged. 
The implementation of The Horisontal Pillar-project was thus prolonged and to 
some extent re-invented. New working groups were established that were to redefine 
their function within the new inter-organisational structure, involving a partnership 
with the social housing sector and a powerful top of decision makers, consisting of a 
 208 
 
‘Mayor Forum’.  Before this external event interfered, ND had been successful and 
was about to gather political consent concerning a political steering committee.  
Another external event in 2009 also affected the project, but mainly the team 
responsible for implementing the qualitative evaluation practice in The Evaluation 
Team. The government decided that the increasing number of ‘Comprehensive 
Plans’ in the social housing sector were in need of a national evaluation program, 
with a special emphasis on evaluating some of the complex effects of this type of 
area-based program. This decision influenced the team working on adjusting and 
developing a shared evaluation tool of exactly these types of programs; the team was 
based on an agreement between TEA, EIA and SSA. As a consequence, the 
troublesome task of measuring the effects of area-based programs was abolished, 
leaving this difficult task to the organisations which were supposed to conduct the 
national evaluation. 
 The task for The Evaluation Team was to make a shared evaluation 
tool, called the ‘Strategy Template’ (in Danish, ‘strategiskabelonen’) inspired by the 
recommendations from ‘The Horisontal Pillar’. It was now proposed to adopt the 
evaluation approach developed by (Fulbright-Anderson, 1995).  This adopts a theory 
of change evaluation approach to a neighbourhood community context. The purpose 
of the Strategy Template was to define the political or strategic goal of an area-based 
initiative, and define as precisely as possible intermediate mile stones in order to 
reach that goal. The Template was also supposed to define the activities on either of 
the levels of neighbourhood, organisation, network, family and individual. The 
theory of change behind a given activity can both be made more plausible, and its 
effects can be documented quantitatively and qualitatively on the proper level.  
The Strategy Template is supposed to enhance coordination in that it is a working 
document shared by all engaged actors, enabling them to adjust and discuss 
expectations. And further, it is applicable for the conveyance of complex 
information in an easily accessible format (Engberg, 2008). The Strategy Template is 
displayed below (empty template for the strategy report, The Horisontal Pillar, p. 65, 
my translation). On the horizontal dimension, it has steps from 1 to 5; on the vertical 
dimension, it defines the level of the activity.   
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Figure 16: Strategy template 
 [Year 0] 
Themes, 
activities 
and 
projects 
 
[Year 2] 
Short term: 
Milestones 
and 
success 
criteria 
 
[Year 3] 
Medium-
term: 
Milestones 
and success 
criteria 
[Year 4] 
Long term:  
Milestones 
and 
success 
criteria 
Political/ 
Strategic 
objectives 
 
 
 
 Step 5 Step 4 Step 3 Step 2 Step 1 
Neighbourhood      
Organisational 
issues 
     
Network and 
family 
     
Individual       
 (Source: Engberg 2008) 
 
Making a cross-administrative evaluation tool is no easy task, however, and for two 
reasons. As demonstrated in the lengthy analysis below, conflicts regarding 
leadership and uncertainty about, and resistance to, the content of the innovation 
project increases the level of conflicts in the team, and makes it difficult for the team 
to reach consensus about the desired purpose of the evaluation tool.  
But there are also tricky substantive discussions which are primarily centred on 
different administrative knowledge needs and mandates which reflect each 
administration’s sectorial focus and position taken in the innovation process. These 
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knowledge needs and related mandates become clearer as the team gathers 
experience while working with the template. In 2011 the negative experience 
gathered in the Evaluation Case made a positive contribution to The Policy For 
Disadvantaged Areas (See Analysis B), by informing the so-called ‘Mercedes Sign’, 
an illustration that symbolises the division of labour as well as administrative 
identity in relation to working cross-sartorially in disadvantaged areas (see section 
7.7.3, The acceptance of the introduced concepts, ‘The Mercedes Sign’).  
As a series of administrative documents from this period (autumn 2009) 
demonstrate, we see a specific development. The team set out in the autumn 
2008/spring 2009 with an assumption that, when using the evaluation template, the 
Comprehensive Plans could provide both numbers on the effect and at the same time 
produce more consistent change theories for their activities. Here, TEA/ND puts 
much effort into visiting the Comprehensive Plans, explaining about the logic 
behind the new evaluation tool, and helping the projects fill out the template.  
However, when the templates were assessed afterwards in The Evaluation Team, the 
experience was mixed: it became clear that the evaluation template was not useful 
for quantitative monitoring, since the plans did not include the quantitative 
documentation to measure effects, and also did not use the template in the same 
way. xxiii  It was also clear that the template generated frustration for the social 
housing professionals employed in Comprehensive Plans, as the format of the 
template was difficult to work with, and the logic behind the template was somewhat 
abstract. The projects and involved administrations experienced conceptual 
difficulties when distinguishing between for instance success criteria and 
milestonesxxiv.  
Further, the administrative representatives in The Evaluation Team also realised that 
the activities in the Comprehensive Plans were less specific when describing their 
activities than expected; and the professionals in the Comprehensive Plans applied 
and filled out the template in an uneven fashion. Also, some Comprehensive Plans 
welcomed the new tool, in that it qualified project management and the quality of 
the activities in accordance with the original intent of the template.    
This experience became a point of discussion in the autumn 2009 for the team, in 
that SSA and EIA had expected that their need to document effects of their 
engagement in specific Comprehensive Plans would be met. Conversely, TEA/ND 
was mainly concerned with the progress and the coordination of the overall 
Comprehensive Plans, having a good dialogue with the plans; the aim for TEA was 
to improve these area-based plans by making present and future Comprehensive 
Plans more tight and goal specific, using the change theory approach to effect the 
plans in order to make the plans more specific and realistic concerning the causal 
logic and effect of the programs. Altogether, in October 2009, TEA positioned itself 
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as a unit mainly focused on coordination and organisational development of the 
municipal system; as a result, TEA mainly used the template as an indicator tool to 
identify where the Comprehensive Plans and the municipality needed to improve 
their way of cooperating.  
This altered purpose of the evaluation template was new to SSA and EIA, and TEA 
was required to be more explicit about what they wanted from the evaluation, given 
the TEA/ND representatives’ new coordinative role.xxv  
As a consequence, a new vocabulary inside the team was launched, in which the 
‘evaluation [was] suggested to walk on three legs’xxvi. The team thus abandoned a 
holistic tool-approach; instead, the evaluation template was considered to satisfy 
only the knowledge needs of TEA, whereas SSA and EIA needed knowledge that 
focused on effect and on evaluating activities in order to inspire new methods usable 
for their respective administrationsxxvii.  
Much effort was put into revising the ways in which the template was supposed to 
be used, revising the Template - and writing a consensus document to the Steering 
Board about the experience with the Template xxviii . As a consequence of these 
numerous and painstaking discussions and attempts to improve the evaluation 
practice, the team begin to perceive of each other as operating on different levels and 
with different interests: TEA’s representative perceived of ND’s role as focused 
narrowly on coordination and organisational development, whereas EIA and SSA 
had a more activity-specific focus; they took a keen interest in documenting the 
effect of their engagement in the area-based programs and also in qualifying their 
future activities and methods for working in the disadvantaged areasxxix.   
In the end, SSA and EIA abandoned their evaluation activities completely, and TEA 
ended up continuing the evaluation practice themselves. The theory of change 
approach towards area-based programs was used from then on to monitor the 
progress of the Comprehensive Plans. Further, the concept of the theory of change 
was also used by ND in order to organize the different policies across 
administrations: in The Policy Formulation Case two years later, we see how ND 
was again mobilizing this way of thinking (Policy for Disadvantaged Areas, p. 32-
3)xxx. Applying this way of thinking provided the cross-administrative policy with 
the ability to integrate a consistent and strategic area-based approach that would 
underpin The Policy for Disadvantaged Areas.   
As the analysis below demonstrates, these substantive discussions also mirror the 
organisational identities and social constructed positioning of the involved 
organisations in this process: TEA moved from an activity-based organisation to a 
coordinative and organisational development-position, whereas EIA and SSA 
perceived of themselves as delivering specific services to individuals at the local 
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level. And as the evaluation experience demonstrated, gathering quantitative 
knowledge of ‘what works’ in the disadvantaged areas was so complex and 
contextual that this ambition was abandoned by the municipality. The team focused 
instead on qualifying the consistency of the local work of the area-based program by 
attaching the programs to existing policies and qualifying future methods and 
activities.   
   
 RECAPITULATION OF ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 6.2
The analysis answers the research question:  
How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition 
in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
The focus of my analysis is how the specific leadership challenge in the situation 
forces ND to develop its leadership by dealing with central leadership dilemmas. 
The situation is conditioned both by the empirical context, but first and foremost by 
the ND’s own entrepreneurship. ND’s entrepreneurship allows it to enhance its 
leadership by introducing concepts, establishing new combinations between already 
existing resources; in this respect, entrepreneurship allows ND to decide and alter 
the context of the collaborative innovation process.  
According to the operationalised version of the BUCIL model, there is a one-way 
causal connection between entrepreneurship and leadership construction: the 
innovative project introduces a novel combination of discourse concepts; in order 
make this package of concepts influential, leadership has to be established.  
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In more simple words, a hypothesis of BUCIL is that a specific innovation project 
also requires that the bottom-up unit transforms into a specific, yet not structurally 
defined, type of collaborative leadership. The innovation project thus both paves the 
way for a new subject position of the ‘collaborative innovation leader’ and is 
dependent on it. This specific type of leadership must be successful in creating 
certain social objects by means of giving sense – otherwise leadership will not be 
recognised, the concepts will not be accepted, and the innovation project will have 
to be either redeveloped or simply put to an end. As a consequence, I assume in this 
analysis that mobilizing support for a cross-administrative coordination practice 
involves shifts in ND’s leadership. 
The first part is an analysis of uncertainty.  Second, I analyse how entrepreneurship 
introduces certain discursive concepts that condition the positional development 
necessary in order for ND to be recognised as a collaborative innovation leader. I do 
this by operationalizing entrepreneurship as the capacities of making new 
combinations and acting proactively in conditions of uncertainty. I first investigate 
who acts proactively, and secondly how combinations of concepts generate a 
specific context; such context conditions future lines of conflict and sources of 
legitimacy of leadership.   
The third part of my analysis looks into leadership recognition; in this section I want 
to demonstrate how the specific context shaped by means of entrepreneurship 
generates a requirement for developing a new leadership position. I do this by 
operationalizing leadership recognition as a feature that develops through both 
conflicts and sources of legitimacy. In order to emphasize a focus on action, I further 
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operationalise leadership recognition as leadership related reflections on identity. 
Whereas conflict and legitimacy are generated collaboratively when new discursive 
concepts are introduced, the perception of leadership identity is an actor-specific 
phenomenon in which the lead unit makes reflections and choices that will affect the 
way in which it perceives of its possibilities to lead.  
The fourth part of my analysis is concerned with making and giving sense; in this 
section I want to demonstrate how the specific combination of entrepreneurship and 
leadership recognition conditions ND’s ability to influence collaborators. I do this 
by operationalizing making and giving sense on the basis of the concepts introduced 
by entrepreneurship that are turned into social objects, and thus collaboratively 
accepted. I also take into account the introduced concepts that are met with 
resistance.  
Finally, I conclude. I do this by describing the positional development of ND. I do 
this by re-interpreting the analysis, abstracting the findings into the most 
fundamental leadership dilemmas that condition the positional development of ND 
as the collaborative innovation leader. 
 
Having now elaborated on the task of The Evaluation Team, on some of the 
substantive discussions reflecting the administrations’ different knowledge needs, 
mandates and interests, and having recapitulated analytical strategy, I now turn to 
how ND in this period was emerging as a leader of a collaborative innovation 
project that emphasized increased coordination. 
 
 FINDINGS 6.3
The Findings-table below (Figure 17) is an answer to the research question, which 
is:  
How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition 
in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
I start by presenting the findings from each column, from left to right. Next, I 
conclude the chapter by relating the content of the findings table to the positional 
development by summing up the leadership dilemmas.   
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Concerning entrepreneurship, I find that this type of behaviour is mainly located 
within ND, which has the expertise in area-based programs, and the best overview 
of how the innovation project will affect the area-based programs. What is also 
remarkable is how valuable the strategy report ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ is in providing 
ND with meaningful concepts. The rhetoric of optimization of the municipal system, 
and the insistence that the neighbourhood should be the proper unit for coordination 
of the municipal activities in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods stand strong in this 
part of the innovation process. Likewise, ND is insisting strongly on another 
powerful image: that two layers of municipal activities are operating in the 
neighbourhoods, and that these layers are not connected. Lastly, ND emphasizes that 
the coordination problems cannot be solved locally, only centrally, by means of 
setting up political goals for the area-based programs.  
Concerning ND’s leadership and its recognition, the analysis demonstrates that 
ND’s subject position as leader begins with the contested leadership position of a 
value-based implementer. ND is firmly convinced that its project will make a 
difference for the area-based programs and the citizens living there, a conviction 
acquired through much experience with the running of area-based programs. During 
the innovation process, however, ND met resistance against this position, and was 
instead beginning to perceive of its leadership as having a coordinative, not 
profession-based, responsibility in the innovation process, leaving substantive and 
professional issues up to the collaborating administrations. Further, ND also met 
resistance regarding the implementation-related part of the leadership position, in 
that collaborators demanded more influence. Therefore, ND’s behaviour developed 
towards a position not of an implementer of an already finished product, but as that 
of a developer involved in more iterative processes of organisational development. 
As I have described in the Findings-table, this positioning of ND was a consequence 
of the fact that ND was in need of providing answers to certain leadership dilemmas, 
which were socially constructed as a result of specific resistance to their innovation 
project.  
Therefore, the leadership dilemmas were created when ND tried to direct the 
sensemaking of its collaborators. ND met both acceptance and resistance. Resistance 
in that by some, especially representatives for the Social Service Administration, 
their innovation project was considered an extra-layer organisation, generating too 
much coordination through an abstract and obscure mega plan, impeding the self-
management of professionals working at the local level. And accepted and 
welcomed by other professionals and decision-makers since the novel concepts 
introduced by ND was used to heavily influence the nature of the Cooperation 
Forum with the social housing sector; the responsibilities and role of the intra-
municipal, cross-administrative set-up; and the need for a policy for area-based 
programs.   
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Figure 17: Findings - The Evaluation Case 
Entrepreneurship:  
The production of ‘texts’, 
introducing novel concepts  
Leadership recognition: The 
social construction of the 
subject position of 
collaborative innovation 
leader 
Making and Giving 
sense: Transforming 
concepts into social 
objects 
Entrepreneurship as an in-
house, profession-based 
activity 
Key text introduced: ‘The 
Horisontal Pillar’.  
Genre: administrative 
Profession: area-based 
planning 
Concepts introduced: 
- optimization of the municipal  
‘system’ for dealing with 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
requires coordination across 
administrations 
- The city area is the proper 
unit of coordination and 
planning 
- The project activities and the 
day-to-day activities in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
are unconnected  
- There is a lack of political 
goals concerning how to 
improve the disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods 
Positional development 
(2008-2010): From ‘value-
and-profession-based 
implementer’ to  ‘developing 
coordinator’  
Leadership Dilemmas: 
How to strike a balance 
between horizontal and 
vertical organisational 
structures? 
How to integrate development 
and day-to-day operations in 
such a way that development 
work still remains? 
How to satisfy collaborative 
demands of a clear leadership 
position and direction while at 
the same time satisfying 
demands of co-creation and 
influence?  
How to satisfy collaborative 
demands of a clear leadership 
position and direction while at 
the same time running an 
innovation process requiring 
shifts of direction due to 
uncertainty and adaptation?  
Resistance:  
‘Micro-plan vs. Mega-
plan’ 
‘too much coordination 
vs. screaming need for 
coordination’ 
‘self-management vs. 
coordinative 
management’ 
Solution:  
- division of labour 
- Constructing a 
learning-by-doing-
approach to the 
collaboration 
process 
Acceptance:  
Cooperation Forum; 
 Intra-Municipal 
Governance 
Commission for a policy 
Socioeconomic 
Copenhagen Map 
 
 217 
 
In the next section, I start out with an analysis of uncertainty in order to justify my 
hypothesis that uncertainty in collaborative innovation processes generates a 
demand for meaning and leadership. Next, I analyse entrepreneurship, leadership 
recognition and making and giving sense before finally discussing and concluding 
this part of the analysis.  
 UNCERTAINTY AS THE CONDITION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 6.4
LEADERSHIP AND SENSEMAKING 
In this section, I exemplify how uncertainties dominate in this part of the 
collaborative innovation process. In the BUCIL model, my assumption is that the 
three types of uncertainties invoked when trying to solve a wicked problem 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) through collaboration interfere with the uncertainty of 
innovation journeys (Van de Ven, 1999). Overall, I argue that we have four types of 
uncertainties: substantive, institutional, strategic and journey-related.   
The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how these uncertainties jointly 
generate a demand for bottom-up leadership, in terms of profession-based 
entrepreneurship, leadership and making and giving sense. 
  
6.4.1. SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY 
Substantive uncertainty is focused on the aspect of the ‘what’: what is the nature of 
the problem? (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) state that a major source of uncertainty has 
to do with determining the nature of the problem. This problem arises both because 
of a lack of information, but also a lack of interpretation of information and the 
establishment of meaning (p. 19).  
 
In the quote below, a member of The Evaluation Team states the following 
concerning the process:  
”what also makes it [The Horisontal Pillar Project] difficult is the whole area-
based, around…that about the effects. That is, what…that is, I…Heck, I am very 
much in doubt about whether there is a municipal understanding of what it is…We 
need more time to discuss, well, days, just to …what is it that the area-based is? 
(EIA, civil servant, I9) 
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The quote demonstrates that the area-based approach as a type of initiative is 
difficult to handle in a cross-administrative framework. And that members of The 
Evaluation Team and people involved in The Pillar Project have a need for 
developing a shared understanding of what the initiative ’is’.  
The quote below from an ND civil servant demonstrates that this substantive 
uncertainty is also part of the talk in the ND office:  
”…something that we [Neighbourhood Development] are practicing right now is 
talking about, for instance, what is our working unit at all? It is something we call 
’area-based programs’ and what is that exactly? Because it…what we are about to 
be doing in our office is sitting and writing policies, so what is our working unit?” 
(Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, Focus Group Feedback, I1) 
This quote demonstrates that ND in 2010 is facing the task of formulating a policy. 
Therefore, the ND office needs to be very specific as to what the working unit is. 
The way I interpret the quote is that this is to some extent difficult, in that the area-
based approach is a flexible approach as regards the solving neighbourhood 
problems – the content of the programs may be many things. Second, ND has itself 
initiated a development process in which their focus is on coordinating central-
administrative processes in order to create synergy in the neighbourhoods. 
Therefore, the working unit cannot be defined unless ND’s leadership position is 
also defined – is it an office that operates area-based programs, an office that is 
focusing on disadvantaged neighbourhoods, or an office that wants to facilitate a 
certain change in the way the municipal administrations are cooperating? 
Consequently, this transition of the ND office towards a leadership position 
demands sensemaking processes.  
 
6.4.2. INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY 
Another aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the institutional. In some instances 
wicked problems cut across organisational boundaries as well as administrative 
levels and networks. This will often result in uncertainty about process handling and 
the development of interactions with other actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004 , p. 7).  
In the quote below, in the group feedback session on my pilot study, one person in 
ND responds to the concept of innovation by giving a picture of how to navigate 
within an inter-organisational framework:  
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"I still think about that capacity building... If we are to act as old municipal officials 
in such a system I at least need to get a more detailed definition of what the 
framework is and how big the margin is and how do you get such dynamics to 
function in some departments where they might not have had the discussion [that we 
have had] " (Neighbourhood Development, Focus Group Feedback Civil servant, 
I10) 
 
What seems to be a major challenge in this way of collaborating is the huge amount 
of talk and disagreements and the lack of action. Thus, the quote presents a 
dilemma: on the one hand, more action is needed in order to move forward; on the 
other hand, some sort of ‘capacity-building’ process is also required, which will 
again require much discussion and conversation. In this respect, there is a clash 
between entrepreneurship as a professional type of action focused on change, and 
the process of making sense of the project to others.       
The quote below is from a civil servant in EIA who has been engaged in both The 
Evaluation Team and a group that has produced recommendations on policy 
formulation and transversal collaboration. In the quote, the process is characterized 
by being extremely difficult and uncertain: 
 
“so as a starting point, it is ... It is insanely difficult. .. but also incredibly exciting ... 
people have been incredibly professionally engaged in it... That is the driving force 
... because I will say that the system around makes it hard ... what the area-based is 
and what the area-based objective is and what the various administrations want out 
of it is extremely uncertain. So therefore you as an official end up in a place where 
your framing conditions and the objectives of the collaboration and the outcome that 
must come out of such a process of collaboration, are extremely diffuse. (EIA, Civil 
servant, I9)” 
 
This quote tells us is that bottom-up innovation creates institutional uncertainty, in 
that the organisational decision makers do not know what the end goal is or should 
be. Thus, the division of labour is not determined, the roles of the actors not defined, 
but have to be negotiated. This also creates uncertainty, in that the point of departure 
of the innovation process is the area-based program type which all administrations 
are involved in, but whose purpose, or intended purpose, they are unsure about. All 
in all, the impression from the quote is an atmosphere of how to make an overview 
of this very complex and exciting process. And what the quote displays is an 
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understanding of a collaborative process in which it is up to the professionals to 
make sense of what is going on. In this respect, despite both the vertical and 
horizontal constraints described by this civil servant, bottom-up innovation actually 
places a lot of responsibility and a lot of possibility of influence on the civil 
servants.    
 
6.4.3. STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTIES 
The third aspect of wicked problem uncertainty are the strategic uncertainties.  
The quote below is from an ND employee responding to my pilot study:  
 
"You might also want to have a few pages concerning some infighting in TEA .. One 
thing is historic, another thing is present. We have neighbouring centres which think 
that area coordination... that it is some of the worst ever created... and that's an 
interesting barrier... that one cannot even agree and feel the support of one’s own, 
how to say, own administration .. In order to go to war with the other... to engage in 
dialogue etc., right?" (Neighbourhood Development, Focus Group Feedback, 
Special consultant, I10) 
 
This civil servant introduces a type of uncertainty that is based not on collaborative 
strategic uncertainty, but actually on internal strategic uncertainty as to whether 
decision makers in the TEA-organisation are willing to support the project. This is 
an important finding concerning bottom-up innovation, in that it demonstrates that 
bottom-up innovation projects are characterized by power struggles, both internally 
and externally.  
In the quote below, another civil servant relates to the uncertainty connected to 
conflictive organisational perspectives on the same phenomenon: 
 
“"Basically we still live in the time of the seven-headed beast. That is, the 
interpretation of the common task is all the time an interpretation based on the 
individual administrations. So I think that's a challenge, and that is what we are 
hoping now that……on the mayor and director levels, there has not been a ... I mean 
there are many interpretations going on down through the ranks – ”what do they 
mean up there?” These very broad signals that "now something must be done", 
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these signals crystallize down through the hierarchies, and offer some very different 
interpretations; to be able to short-circuit this process backwards and say, "Well, is 
this what you want?" - this generates difficulties. I am sure that the people I've 
worked with, to the best of their ability, have tried to interpret what signals they got 
from outside, but of course by their own self-understanding – well, this is what you 
do.” ((Neighbourhood Development, civil servant, I4))   
 
 In the quote the popular perspective on the City of Copenhagen as a ‘Seven-Headed 
Beast’ is invoked, with each administrative head fighting the others or not knowing 
what they are doing, pulling in different directions. In the quote, the ND employee 
refers to the emerging new organisation across administrations. In this innovation 
process, what is clear is that there is no shared vision of what the area-based 
programs should do in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. As a result of this lack of 
political consensus, ND and the collaborating professionals placed at the bottom of 
the bureaucracies have to spend a lot of energy on figuring out what ‘the top’ of the 
hierarchy actually wants, interpreting this from the perspective of each 
administration, producing conflicts in working groups.  
6.4.4. INNOVATION UNCERTAINTY 
Finally, the fourth aspect is the risk-taking end-point uncertainty, i.e. Van de Ven’s 
uncertainty of the journey (Van de Ven, 1999). Will it work? What is this ‘it’, i.e. 
where will the journey take us? Are we on the right track, or are we really on a 
detour? 
The Evaluation Case was a pilot project in this PhD study, and ND employees 
responded to some of my early considerations concerning innovation. I was 
interested in whether they could identify themselves with the perspective of 
innovation uncertainty. One person notes:  
 
”we get a lot of experience along the way…we are now running the project, and 
now we have come to understand on what kind of road we are driving…before, it 
was just planned…and that will perhaps dominate some of this discussion about The 
Horisontal Pillar…in this type of work, you change course and you change your 
goal as you go along, but that can easily become history (…)” (Neighbourhood 
Development, special consultant, I10) 
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What this person is suggesting out of courtesy is that it is of less use to 
Neighbourhood Development to think in terms of innovation uncertainty than in 
leadership. However, the interviewee also acknowledges the fact that the type of 
process he is involved in is a process characterized by increasing understanding and 
change of course as the project is being implemented.   
Another ND employee responds that ”what we can use it [my pilot presentation] for 
perhaps relates to what you write and what we are saying, that is: Enhancement of 
the cross-organisational collaboration. Yeah that is mighty fine, but what is it 
really?” (Neighbourhood Development, civil servant, Focus Group Feedback I10). 
 Similarly to the quote above concerning the institutional uncertainty related to the 
working unit, the purpose of the enhanced collaboration structure is still unclear.  
In the quote below, a civil servant makes reference to the Socioeconomic 
Copenhagen Map, and how the cross-administrative team managed to develop the 
map:   
”We tried to get an understanding of what we could do with this [map] .... the 
original formulations were very broad. It was something about how area-based 
interventions should be put more on the agenda. There was also a desire that it had 
to be an important tool that could appear in the overall municipal planning paper 
[Kommuneplan]. And it should still primarily be used for the selection of area 
renewals, but ... it has been very wide ... "we want this, but it must also be able to 
accomplish this." So it has been very diffuse, and the steering committee has not 
really demonstrated what they wanted to do with it. "”(ND, civil servant, I6)  
 
What this quote demonstrates is that once a mandate had been acquired for 
developing and implementing the map, uncertainty was dominating regarding the 
purpose of the map, i.e. what was the map actually supposed to do. The process was 
still a journey in which the destination had to be figured out. What the quote also 
demonstrates at the end is that the civil servants actually had much liberty to develop 
the map as they wanted, since the steering committee did not actually know what to 
use the map for. This quote thus demonstrates another important finding, supported 
by other quotes below, that the lack of hierarchical leadership creates a void in 
which the Neighbourhood Development unit actually has very wide degrees of 
freedom to fill this void. What this quote demonstrates is the opposite of popular 
visions of public sector innovation, which is perceived as being very restrictive. 
Bottom-up innovators’ strengths are to introduce an innovative project that produces 
uncertainty that actually seems to paralyze hierarchical leadership, giving room for 
much manoeuvring.   
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6.4.5. SUMMING UP 
The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how these uncertainties jointly 
generate a demand for bottom-up leadership, in terms of profession-based 
entrepreneurship, leadership and making and giving sense.  
I found that the innovation project generated substantive uncertainty concerning 
what the area-based program is. This uncertainty was also linked to ND’s leadership 
position, in that the innovation project concerning area-based programs both 
redefined the programs and forced ND to position themselves as a leader amongst 
central-administrative actors. Therefore, the working unit of ND could not be 
defined unless the leadership position of ND was also narrowed down.  
The innovation project generated institutional uncertainty, in that conflicts 
concerning action and sensemaking conversations arose. Further, the innovation 
project triggered institutional uncertainty, in that the administrations did not know 
how to relate to area-based programs; it was therefore difficult to attain a division of 
labour. The institutional uncertainty left it up to the civil servants to make sense of 
the innovation project and what was going on in general. This institutional 
uncertainty thus seemed to place a lot of responsibility and the possibility of 
exercising influence by civil servants. 
Concerning strategic uncertainties, one major strategic uncertainty arose from 
tensions within ND’s own administration, in that not everybody agreed that using 
the area as a unit for cross-administrative coordination was appropriate. Further, due 
to the institutional uncertainty, the civil servants across administrations interpreted 
the signals from decision makers in the light of their own administration’s interests, 
making conflicts rather tense at the level of civil servants.  
Finally, concerning innovation uncertainty, the lack of involved hierarchical 
leadership left it very much up to the civil servants to figure out how elements from 
The Horisontal Pillar were supposed to be implemented; this caused questions of 
leadership concerning how to navigate in the development process to arise in ND.  
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 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW 6.5
CONCEPTS AIMED AT INCREASING COORDINATION OF 
AREA-BASED APPROACHES  
In the section above I have described how uncertainties are influencing the process 
around the development of a shared evaluation tool across three administrations. 
These are conditions that the participants have to somehow manage in order to come 
up with answers that make sense, thus creating direction for collaborators. In this 
section, I analyse entrepreneurship as the motor that produces and introduces 
concepts; such concepts may be accepted or resisted as making sense by 
collaborators. The function in the analysis is to show first of all that a profession-
based entrepreneurship is able to both generate, and partly break, the deadlock of 
uncertainties characteristic of collaborative innovations by introducing concepts that 
generate a direction for collaborators. And second, how these discursive concepts 
condition the emergence of a specific subject position, enabling ND to be recognised 
as a collaborative innovation leader. 
I first analyse the professional basis for entrepreneurship in the case; the type of 
entrepreneurship explains why certain types of novel concepts are being produced. I 
then analyse the way in which proactivity is exercised.  
Figure 18 below displays the combinations made by means of entrepreneurship. The 
figure also displays how the combinations produce a certain situation for the 
collaborative innovation process, generating leadership dilemmas. The 
entrepreneurial combinations can be understood as connections made between 
socially constructed objects, connections that introduces a certain micro-discourse. 
As the section will demonstrate, these combinations produce dilemmas that require a 
change of leadership, in that central decisions have to be made in ND. To give an 
example the first leadership dilemma is invoked in that the combinations described 
in The Horisontal Pillar report formulate recommendations for the ways in which 
vertical and horizontal administrative structures can be better combined. As this 
section, and the leadership recognition section below will explain in more detail, 
when ND starts to implement the recommendations, the ND office has to discover 
how to strike a balance between a) enabling coordination horizontally by means of 
the novel coordinative unit – the city area, and b) allowing the rest of the 
administrations to engage in vertically specialised work. In this section, I analyse 
these combinations, and I demonstrate how certain of the combination challenges 
are dealt with by means of entrepreneurship and the direction of sensemaking. I 
demonstrate how certain combinations produce a micro-discourse in which more 
fundamental change in leadership identity is required in order to adopt the subject 
position of a collaborative innovation leader.     
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FIGURE 18: PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP - COMBINATIONS AND LEADERSHIP 
DILEMMAS IN THE EVALUATION CASE 
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How to satisfy collaborative 
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6.5.1. THE PROFESSION GUIDING HOW NEW 
COMBINATIONS AND CONCEPTS ARE GENERATED: 
THE AREA-BASED PLANNING APPROACH 
The profession underpinning entrepreneurship in the Copenhagen case is a planning 
profession that has the ‘neighbourhood’ as its working unit. As I described in 
Chapter 5, area-based programs have a certain profile, entailing a certain profession. 
The focus of the area-based profession is spatial, and it combines physical and social 
resources. It develops projects in close cooperation with local stakeholders, 
especially citizens, and thinks of itself as focused on, and giving voice to, the locals. 
It is a profession that has to introduce new solutions to existing problems, often by 
means of working across organisational and professional boundaries. It is also a 
profession that is in need of other professions and contributions from other 
stakeholders to fulfil its ambition of delivering holistic solutions to complex 
problems. In the City of Copenhagen, as in most municipalities in Denmark, this 
profession is placed in The Technical and Environmental Administration.  
The innovation process that I studied in The City of Copenhagen was a means of 
expanding the elements of the professional perspective described above. Not just to 
encompass the local level, but also the central administrative level. This is most 
clearly formulated in the Pillar report. Here it is emphasized, that even though the 
area-based programs have some local advantages, the potentials of the programs are 
not utilised to the fullest, in that the 1) cross-administrative way of working within 
an 2) area-based working unit in 3) close contact with citizens requires 4) 
adjustments at the central level in order to 5) create coordinative and integrative 
synergy at the local level:  
 
"Area-based programs can provide synergies at different levels: at the local level 
the programs typically build on a concrete problem - and resource analysis of the 
local context. Existing resources, qualities and preferences in an area are identified 
and incorporated in a new, coherent change strategy and utilised better. The 
municipal initiatives at the local level are mutually supportive when incorporated in 
a common strategic framework. At the municipal level, better coordination of area-
based programs strengthen the administration’s respective policy areas because the 
problems are addressed in close relation to citizens. Thus, there is a reason to 
consider how the pillars of the municipal organisation better coordinate and in 
some cases integrate their activities” (Engberg 2008, p. 10, my translation). 
 
’The Horisontal Pillar’ can thus be seen as both a creative and logical continuation 
of some core lead motifs in the area-based approach and its profession: the 
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horizontal holistic combinations of resources across stakeholders, tailored and 
adapted to specific instances of ‘the local’.  
FIGURE 19: FRONT PAGE OF THE STRATEGY REPORT ’THE HORISONTAL PILLAR’ 
(ENGBERG 2008)  
 
  
 The middle manager of Neighbourhood Development understands 
the project as essentially a project that has to strengthen the cross-administrative 
cooperation by applying the holistic understanding of problems in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods; but also as a project that makes the area-based profession much 
more clear:  
 
"It makes professionalism stand out much clearer. It tells you something about what 
the area-based interventions are and what they can do. I think sometimes it's been a 
bit like ’ let the thousand flowers bloom’ and ’hey there’ [Halløjsa]- it sometimes 
becomes a ’funny walk’ [gakket gangart] that you can pull out of your hat on festive 
occasions. This is where I think that the report nicely shows what kind of 
professionalism is embedded in this project (...) Part of that professionalism is also 
 228 
 
about moving beyond this project-making and make it contribute to developing the 
ordinary activities - both in the municipality, but also in housing organisations etc.” 
(Neighbourhood Development, middle manager, I7). 
 
In the dense quote above, it is clear that the Pillar Project is a radical break with the 
existing professional practice, and a break that is perceived of as a project with 
wide-ranging consequences for the way in which the municipality deals with 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods.  
A very influential value laden distinction is introduced here between ’project-
makerism’ and ’day-to-day operations’ – a distinction that draws upon, and affects, 
discourse to such a degree that ‘projects’ in general, including area-based programs, 
have a very bad standing amongst local politicians later when the municipal 
administrations are in the process of formulating a policy for area based programs 
and disadvantaged areas. Accordingly, the former local, experimental practice of 
introducing new solutions through projects is in this quote counterposed to the 
ordinary operations of the municipality. The Pillar Project and the profession that 
underpins it do not favour any of these positions, but rather a third mediating 
position. 
As the quote below demonstrates, the project is about combining the work in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods with an organisational perspective in a new way that 
entails a change of identity in the ND office. It is also about creating combinations 
between the social housing sector and the local governmental programs running in 
the disadvantaged neighbourhoods: 
 
"My involvement has perhaps been, or my efforts have been on the level that we 
became more aware of our role in this Neighbourhood Development in relation to 
not just all sorts of different facets of the work in disadvantaged neighbourhoods; 
but we tended to look more into what could be done about organisation and 
collaboration in a very broad sense...basically there is a close correlation between 
tasks in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and in the social housing sector. It’s not an 
absolute intersection [fællesmængde], but there is a large intersection." 
(Neighbourhood Development, civil servant, I4) 
 
The quote below is from a civil servant from The Evaluation Team, in which 
another combination is introduced: that between area-based instances of cross-
professionalism and increased ability to solve complex problems:   
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“But this is also why it is so good that we know, and we know this for a fact - that 
there is a field in the social Comprehensive Plans in which methods are developed 
and experience is gained. Basically this is perhaps also what has been in need of 
being elevated to a higher and broader academic discussion and awareness, and 
this I am quite sure about, that there is an extreme amount of hidden expertise in the 
social Comprehensive Plans” (Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4)  
  
What is being proposed here is seeing the evaluation practice as a combination of 
central administrative professional practice and the locally tailored way of working, 
a combination which could lead to much needed knowledge in the central 
administrations, and could also lead to much more efficiency and synergy. 
The quote below demonstrates another combination, that between different types of 
work: day-to-day operations and project work: 
“There are many facets to it, as it also is about finding out what the relationship is 
between project-work and operational work. The area-based programs in general 
distinguish themselves greatly by to some extent being people and initiatives that are 
to a considerable extent disconnected from everyday life in the areas where they are 
being implemented. They become projects, project staff and project content which 
from their point of origin are not aligned with neither the professionalism being 
exercised in the areas or general [municipal] activities in the disadvantaged areas 
... (..) exactly that dimension is what we need to work on, and it must be much more 
integrated into the municipal operation, so that people have a stake in it.” 
(Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4)  
 
 What is being explained in the quote is that these two types of work operate in 
parallel and disconnected manners; the area-based programs viewed in this 
organisational perspective is too uncoupled and not part of the work infrastructure 
already there in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In this respect, the combination 
is not antagonistic, but reconciling, coined in the concept of ’integration’. However, 
the same civil servant continues thinking about these uncoupled ways of working: 
that the synergy combination also preconditions that the two types of work, 
development and the day-to-day operations, are not integrated into one. In this 
respect, a leadership dilemma is generated here: how to integrate development and 
day-to-day operations in such a way that the development work still remains:  
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Finding the interface [snitfladen] ... if you integrate development work closely into 
operational work, it becomes difficult to find the interface between municipal 
operations and municipal development, and I have no solution to that right now, but 
I have some ideas about how to fix it, but conversely it must be said that the local 
network of employees from day-care centres, schools, you name it - that is the 
largest public human resource also in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
"(Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4) 
 
This quote demonstrates that there is a tension in the micro-discourse when 
implementing The Horisontal Pillar: that the holistic lead motif in the area-based 
profession could be conflicting, i.e. conceptually uncoupled, with its ambition of 
conducting local experimental work.  
6.5.2. SUMMING UP 
The objective of the analysis was to show first of all that a profession-based 
entrepreneurship is able to both generate, and partly break, the deadlock of 
uncertainties characteristic of collaborative innovation, by introducing concepts that 
generate a direction for collaborators. And second, how these discursive concepts 
condition the emergence of a specific subject position, enabling ND to be recognised 
as a collaborative innovation leader. 
In Figure 18 above, I have summarised the combinations made by means of the 
entrepreneurship based on the profession of the area-based approach. These 
combinations are both present in The Horisontal Pillar, as well as invoked in 
conversations afterwards. ’The Horisontal Pillar’ can thus be seen as both a creative 
and a logical organisational continuation of some core lead motifs in the area-based 
approach and its profession: the horizontal holistic combinations of resources across 
stakeholders, tailored and adapted to specific instances of ‘the local’. However, the 
analysis also demonstrates that in the process of implementing some of the 
recommendations, a possible discursive tension exists between two core motifs in 
the area-based approach: the horizontal-holistic and the experimental. If too much 
focus is placed on horizontal coordination of the day-to-day operations of the 
municipality, development work needs to be redefined.  
What I also find, however, is that the concepts introduced form a micro-discourse in 
which the subject position of the collaborative innovation leader needs to be further 
defined. In the situation of The Evaluation Case, ND’s discourse forces its members 
to relate to certain leadership dilemmas:  
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1. There is a legitimate rationality claim for working in silos. How to strike a 
balance between horizontal and vertical structures? 
2. How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and 
direction while at the same time satisfying the demands of co-creation and 
influence? 
3. How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and 
direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring 
shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation? 
4. There is a danger of integrating development work too much in the day-to-
day operations. How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in 
such a way that development work still remains? 
The choice of how to address these leadership dilemmas will define how ND’s 
leadership will be developed in order to be recognised. As the ‘Leadership 
Recognition’ section further down below exemplifies, ND do in this phase of the 
project makes sense of how to exercise leadership differently: Perhaps communicate 
a more closed set-up to collaborators; perhaps define a division of labour among 
administrations more clearly. So obviously, the introduction of new concepts 
provides ND with some strategic choices to make, with regard to how much to 
expand the innovation project, and how this expansion or stabilization of project 
should come about, in terms of communicating to collaborators more closed or open 
processes. Each of these possibilities will have different impacts concerning 
implementation success, and concerning what it is that is supposed to be 
implemented.  
6.5.3. PROACTIVITY: BASED ON THE AREA-BASED 
PROFESSION AND SPECIALIZATION 
In this section I will describe how, to some extent, the proactive type of bottom-up 
leadership action enables the innovation project to move forward, despite the 
uncertainties mentioned above.  
Some of the interviewees give explanations of proactivity and the ability to navigate 
in an environment of uncertainty. In the quote below, a civil servant from ND 
mentions the bureaucratic position and way of working as being essential for the 
ability to identify development possibilities: 
 
“This office is one year old, i.e., it has also had to find its own role, which has not 
been defined in advance, and it's a little easier to be innovative when you have to 
build something than when you have to limit yourself or tearing down something. ... 
The way we work we have relatively much contact with the local level, as we sit in 
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the control groups and are mingling with these people .... So we have an approach 
that makes it different for us in contrast to how the other administrations are 
structured: in a vertical column. This means that their staff and development 
functions are located to a relatively high extent in the central administrations" 
(Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant, I4) 
 
In this quote, the respondent understands the ND as a sort of hybrid office, being 
both local and central at the same time, and having network ties to many different 
professions. Another explanation given is that the ND office is very new, providing 
much room for developing the objectives and identity of the office. The quote 
demonstrates that the profession and proactivity in combination function as a 
reservoir for inspiration.   
The quote below shows features of proactive action at the time when the merging 
between The Horisontal Pillar and the Governance Dialogue began. Having already 
been working hard on implementing ‘The Pillar’, the ND office and its allies were 
able to see the Governance Dialogue as being interconnected. In fact, in the Pillar 
report, this event was actually taken into account, thus giving ND a head start for 
influencing the process: 
 
“I do not think they could have figured it out by themselves ... it's been obvious ... 
that the residential social work [boligsociale arbejde] in the neighbourhoods and 
the social problems are also highly visible in the social housing sector. Therefore it 
has been obvious from the start that all the efforts in residential social work in the 
public sector also played a very important part [in the process] and were very, very 
high on the agenda ... it [was] also obvious that we had been in that sandbox 
already since we had tried and experienced with the interdisciplinary work in 
relation to the Comprehensive Plans ....so, when it began to unfold, it made sense to 
see it as a cross-cutting way of collaborating.” (Neighbourhood Development, Civil 
servant, I4).  
 
In describing this as being both an act that requires entrepreneurship, leadership 
recognition and making and giving sense,  the quote demonstrates how the ‘Pillar’ as 
a profession-based development plan provides ND with possibilities  for acting 
when the more or less unforeseen consequences of the ‘Governance Dialogue’ 
emerged. 
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The quote below shows how the report The Horisontal Pillar is being used and 
slowly begins to function as a concrete tool for action:  
"The whole myth of Copenhagen City’s inability to work together across 
administrations was also something that I was influenced by to begin with. I was 
really pleased that The Horisontal Pillar has articulated that issue and set an 
agenda for moving forward. That is a major reason for why I think it's fun to be 
here. That is the agenda, and an agenda that we in Neighbourhood Development, by 
our one-year birthday, can see ourselves having a role in, and which makes more 
and more sense. Day by day it is becoming an increasingly workable and concrete 
professional to-do list for us. And an agenda which is also gaining increasing 
[momentum] ... there is a very positive dialogue around it ... you have a greater 
sense of the content of what the other colleagues are doing, and each project 
respects the other project .... " (Neighbourhood Development, Civil servant,  I4) 
The quote demonstrates a dual function of The Horisontal Pillar report: it reduces 
much uncertainty concerning collaboration across administrative boundaries and 
gives ND a head start in the direction of sensemaking. The quote also shows how the 
civil servant notices that the concepts introduced are beginning to become accepted 
by others. 
 
6.5.4. SUMMING UP 
In this section, I have analysed how proactivity as a type of action to some extent 
enables the members to move forward, despite the uncertainties mentioned above.  
In the analysis I find that the area-based profession and ND’s specialization in this 
profession function as a reservoir for proactivity. First of all, in that ND is a hybrid 
office with contacts to both the central and local levels. Further, the office is new, 
which ensures much space for developing objectives and identity of the office in 
conditions of uncertainty. Also, The Horisontal Pillar functions as a very important 
type of to-do-list for the office, enabling the employees to address the many 
uncertainties - not much doubt about the soundness of the project is shown in the 
interviews. It also allows ND to utilise unforeseen influence possibilities, such as the 
Governance Dialogue, in that ND already has developed concepts that can help 
themselves and municipal partners to make sense of this legislative demand for 
change.  
The overall entrepreneurship findings suggest that by introducing concepts,  
profession-based entrepreneurship to a large extent shuts down further processes of  
collaborative idea generation, helping to avoid some of the ‘collaborative inertia’ 
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often observed in collaboration literature (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). The concepts 
and perspectives of the ‘Pillar’ also helped ND to make a head start when other 
municipal processes were initiated, such as the Governance Dialogue, acting as a 
reservoir for making sense of unforeseen situations.  As the main driver of this 
innovation process, ND is the actor that both produces and utilises the collaborative 
uncertainty. The office members are the main drivers of the project and have the 
responsibility for running the project; ND is also the actor that is best able to take 
advantage of the collaborative uncertainty: as the Pillar-project is very specialised, 
we get the image of a bureaucratic leadership that is to some extent paralyzed, or 
perhaps intentionally unengaged, which implies that the civil servants and the ND 
manager have to figure out how to make sense of the process themselves. 
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 LEADERSHIP RECOGNITION: DEALING WITH 6.6
LEADERSHIP DILEMMAS 
In the previous sections, I demonstrated how profession-based entrepreneurship can 
be used to introduce a micro-discourse, composed by a specific configuration of 
concepts. I also demonstrated how the introduction of this micro-discourse in some 
instances generates unexpected leadership dilemmas. Solving these leadership 
dilemmas requires types of actions that are more fundamental as regards 
consequence than proactivity: they require identity shifts and a strategic discursive 
positioning despite the fact that the consequences of these actions are to some extent 
unknown.  
In this section, I focus on how the attempt to introduce this micro-discourse 
generates a leadership positioning landscape in which ND needs to perceive and 
adjust to points of leadership conflicts and sources of legitimacy in order to provide 
collaborators with direction, thus acquiring recognition as a collaborative innovation 
leader. Both conflicts and sources of legitimacy potentially lead to changes in ND’s 
leadership, in that they point out specific trajectories that ND could take in order to 
address what I call leadership dilemmas.   
I will first describe how people struggle with leadership and the collaborative 
innovation project. Second, I will analyse the sources of leadership legitimacy. 
Third, I will describe how ND staff and manager involved in The Evaluation Case 
process relate to their own leadership.  
 
6.6.1. LEADERSHIP CONFLICTS: DOUBT ABOUT 
COLLABORATIVE VALUE AND ILLEGITIMATE 
LEADERSHIP 
In The Evaluation Case, only three administrations were involved. EIA and TEA 
had a shared understanding of the Pillar-project, in that only these two 
administrations were willing to engage themselves in the project. Therefore, EIA 
and TEA were alliance partners. SSA had a wish to participate, but did not share 
coordinative ambitions of the Pillar-project. Therefore, when conflicts arose, this 
was mainly between representatives from TEA/ND and representatives from SSA, 
and mainly at civil-servant level.  As the conflicts below display, the main line of 
conflicts circled around the value of the Pillar-project, and of the Evaluation 
practice; but they also concerned leadership. It was not the task given to The 
Evaluation Team that generated conflict, even though professional disagreements 
did arise. Instead, The Evaluation Team is a catalyst for more fundamental 
innovation project- and leadership-conflicts.  
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First, I will analyse the arguments against the value contribution of the Pillar 
Project; next I will analyse conflicts concerning leadership. Finally I summarise the 
section.  
6.6.1.1 Doubt about collaborative value 
Unclear purpose 
In the quote below, an SSA interviewee responds to my question:  
 
“I: If we're about to say something about the process of cooperation ... what would 
some words then be if you had to characterize this process since March 2009? 
R: Well yes, it will be ... it will be two words, it will be contentious and it will be 
unclear.” (SSA, civil servant, I8) 
 
Concerning ‘unclear’, the interviewee gives the following explanation of ’practical 
preconditions’:  
 
"Something that I also reflected on was: have we even looked at organizing….are 
even the most basic psychological and common linguistic frameworks in place so 
that we can make innovation together? If we do not understand the same thing by 
the words we use, and if we do not agree on what we are talking about and what it 
means when we talk about it, is it then even possible for us to develop things 
together?” (SSA, civil servant, I8) 
 
What the quote demonstrates is that the conflicts have provoked a series of post-
conflict-reflections concerning ways in which to develop initiatives across 
administrations, as also demonstrated in other interviews. Not just in SSA, but also 
in EIA and TEA members of The Evaluation Team reflect on how to initiate such 
processes better, considering if it would have been better to create a new team which 
people from the collaborating administrations would be a part of in the development 
phase, thus enabling a shared understanding. 
Another aspect that is also unclear is The Horisontal Pillar-report itself:  
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“When I read The Horisontal Pillar for the first time, the first thing that came to my 
mind was: Damn it's hard to understand! Wow!  And I still feel that way every time I 
read it. I just have to say: Wow, there is a communicative task here that I believe 
has still not been completed.” (SSA, Civil servant, I5) 
That the report is not easy to grasp is supported by an interview with the former 
director for TEA’s Urban Design Department, interviewed almost two years later, 
explaining that he did not himself fully understand what the report was about. When 
I presented him with my impression that collaborators had a hard time understanding 
the report and the project, the now former director answered:   
"Well, that’s absolutely correct. We were running into a problem concerning the 
way in which the project was developed - it was impossible to communicate. It was 
completely like that, and I think that I still feel the same way - I have read it three 
times without understanding it. But, we and the National Association of Local 
Governments made a sort of a translation which I think was very good ... which just 
got it down to earth. And then, as we have now made the project into something 
more tangible, like saying ‘The Horisontal Pillar’, that was actually a very good 
metaphor. It indicates that we are a municipality which is divided in such and such a 
fashion, so we need to work together on the other dimension and be in it all 
together. "(TEA, former director, I29) 
What the above two quotes demonstrate is that the Pillar-report as a profession-
related, specialised report may have been very useful for ND as a leader, in that it 
reduced ND’s uncertainty (see above). It may also have been very ingenious in 
terms of actually presenting a new, consistent solution to a way in which to make 
progress in dealing with a wicked problem. However, it is also almost impossible to 
understand for outsiders. The report has functioned at a leadership level as a public 
strategy report with a reservoir for giving sense, causing the strategy to be 
inaccessible to others, thus in fact non-public. This public/non-public function of the 
strategy report is a leadership advantage in terms of giving sense, but at the cost of 
provoking misunderstandings and problems in communicating the nature of the 
problem.  
In the lengthy quote below, the EIA member of The Evaluation Team puts into 
words this ambivalent status of the Pillar report and the project:  
 
“R:It’s concerning the power to define, and where the hell is it? - it's so blurry. 
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I: The power of definition of what is innovative or what do you mean exactly? 
R: First, what is innovative, but also what needs to be innovated and why it must be 
innovated. This is usually the crisis question you ask about your project, right? 
Where are the external needs and internal needs then? Now if you took The 
Horisontal Pillar and made such a [...] project model in which you ask the question 
of what the need is, everything seems to be concerned with an internal need for TEA 
because it is simply the condition for doing what they can to solve the task they have 
been given. Therefore, they are also the people who are running around seeing the 
idea behind it all, which might be harder for us – do we get something out of it? 
How is it that we get something out of it? Will our citizens get more quality and will 
my job become easier or?”  (EIA, Civil servant, I2) 
  
What the quote demonstrates is that the Pillar Project enabled ND/TEA to see what 
the meaning of the project was, and to develop the project; however, collaborators 
had difficulties in seeing themselves as part of the project.  
This conflict demonstrated that at this point in time, what ND gained in momentum, 
they seemed to lose at the same time with regard to collaborative ownership of the 
project. 
 
Expanding, blurry boundaries of the project threatened sound professional work 
Another conflict that especially SSA displayed was the blurry scope of the 
innovation project. Different examples are given in which ND’s entrepreneurship, 
combining municipal resources in new ways, is perceived as a threat. TEA is 
considered as an actor that just cannot gain enough turf and tries to take control of 
professional areas in which they have no professional insight. In the quote below, 
this ‘turf fight’, which I described in my Pilot study, is corrected by a SSA civil 
servant in a feedback session:  
 
"R: The turf struggle was like this in my perspective: It was not that this remit had to 
switch to TEA because I think everyone here, from high to low, all agree that there 
was no interest in SSA in having  Comprehensive Plans or area renewals [as part of 
our remit]. ... What the dispute was about, and is about, is: what is area-based? 
Which of the residential social work [det boligsociale] must be in align with a more 
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general interdisciplinarity? And what's just our business like it used to be? (SSA, 
Civil servant, I3)  
The fear of the SSA-employee is how much of SSA’s social work is going to be 
included in the ‘Pillar’-project. The boundaries of the project are blurry and are 
disturbing existing professional practice:    
“... My experience is simply that there are some forces in TEA that will simply 
swallow everything raw, and they simply cannot get enough … and that makes me 
feel a bit like: ”you stick to what you know about and in fact have a professional 
insight into, and let us do our social work" (SSA, Civil servant, I3) 
This quote demonstrates that when ND introduces a new coordinative centre, that of 
the city area, they start to interfere with the professional boundaries of the other 
administrations, for instance what the objective of state-level, Social Reserve Fund-
means should be; should these project resources support SSA objectives or city-area 
objectives? The conflict is increased as for this SSA employee it is very unclear 
what the boundaries of the project are: a division of labour has not yet manifested 
itself at this point in time.   
 
Too much coordination: symptoms of a ‘mega-plan’ 
Another central conflict concerns the concept of coordination, demonstrated in the 
quote below:  
"I strongly believe in… that those who need to communicate with each other, they 
are the people who must perform a task together .. And all that about making extra 
layers of organisation, well, I just do not believe in it... we are killing ourselves by 
attending meeting after meeting... we must act, not attend meetings " (SSA, Civil 
servant, I3) 
The quote demonstrates a point that is to some extent similar to ’the blurry 
boundaries’-conflict above, since ND’s project is interfering with existing practice. 
However, the quote foreshadows a more radical critique, as ND is perceived of as an 
actor that simply generates negative value in terms of an ’additional-layer 
organisation’ at the central level. Furthermore, the quote may also reflect the sector-
based way the municipal organisation is organised, making coordination through 
numerous meetings a requirement when initiating strategies that cut across the 
sector-defined, organisational boundaries.  
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In the SSA-quote below, this critique is developed further:  
“I think there are great many people engaged in management who are thinking in 
’mega plans’ – ”Now we need to have a form and some measuring and then we’ll 
get everything under control” .. No you won’t. No one in this country or other 
countries will ever get everything under control; this is not how the world works... 
You asked me, ‘does it [the crosscutting collaboration] work well enough?’ By no 
means, and it doesn’t work in our own administration. But I believe that we should 
try to get this to work, this 'small-and-specific' to work. I just do not believe in mega 
master plans at all, but it may well turn out that I am wrong. But what I do believe 
in is, on the other hand, that you end up making a great many people incredibly 
tired of their work because they lose control, because they feel that there are others 
who turn up and express the viewpoint that they [i.e. the others] are smarter than 
they are” (SSA, Civil servant, I3) 
In the quote, we see that the coordination critique is a critique of master-plan 
coordination. We see a resistance to ND’s giving sense in that ND and their core 
mission of increasing coordination centrally is positioned as a centralistic, extra-
layer organisation that makes professional life difficult for professionals working at 
the local level. And ND as a coordinator who interferes in an playful and unserious 
manner: ” "It's really, really, really important when you're doing something here 
that you do not think that uh, that all of a sudden you implement your extra-layer 
organisation in all sorts of places where you yourself think it might be fun. (SSA, 
Civil servant, I8) ” 
The quest for coordination (Jennings Jr & Krane, 1994) is actually thought of by 
collaborators as legitimate; however, the Pillar Project should be implemented and 
adapted to the local level, in micro-relations, not in a master plan, as a ND-led 
implementation exercise, as demonstrated in the quote below:  
“It just has to be the right parties, we cannot have people sitting and coordinating 
us who have no idea what [our initiatives is about]. It is a professional distinction I 
make, so the logic of The Horisontal Pillar can be applied to a huge number of our 
initiatives, but we must be very precise about whom the relevant stakeholders are 
and who are the natural stakeholders and not least the natural process managers, 
right. And it must of course in no way be an administration with no professional 
share in it" (SSA, Civil servant, I8) 
 
We see a conflict between TEA and SSA, in that ND argues that there is a 
screaming need for coordination, whereas SSA argues that ND’s project is actually 
producing too much coordination, in that another cross-administrative strategy, the 
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Lord Mayor’s Finance Administration’s Safe City Strategy and ND are trying to 
coordinate what SSA is doing, as described also in another interview (I8).  
 
Phase conflict 
Another major conflict in The Evaluation Case was whether the report was one of 
implementation or development. SSA presented their view of the conflict as one of 
development, whereas the TEA considered it one of implementation. As the quote 
from SSA below exemplifies, SSA saw the Pillar-report as an opportunity for further 
development in order to create a shared understanding of the report.  
“I: So you would actually have liked to have had a process where you had discussed 
content to a higher extent? 
R: That we had made it our own. That in a very, very practical way we had said: 
Now we have this amazing presentation to inspire us and to find out how we will 
manage this area together in our municipality. Now we sit down and we write what 
is our problem – and with all this knowledge, what is our solution? .... There was no 
doubt ... that there was another agenda in TEA, and it was like, "Well the answer is 
here and that is what we will continue to aim at."” (SSA, Civil servant, I8)  
The quote demonstrates that ND is perceived of as a leader which already has the 
answer and just wants to implement, whereas SSA-employees argue in favour of the 
reinterpretation of the Pillar recommendations.  
As the ND quote further down shows, reflecting on my pilot study, however, there is 
an element of inconsistency in this argument:  
“R: But I think that there is another concept too ... When I read about phase 
confusion [in the pilot study] which I strongly agree with… Then I thought ... I think 
there is something you can explain with phase [confusion], but I also felt there is 
something that is about not taking responsibility and not being honest… SSA may at 
any time, if we now take them as an example, say: "Oh, we did not know" .. The 
steering committee had actually made a decision that now we were moving into the 
phase of plain operation [drift]. " ”(ND, middle manager, I7) 
The quote demonstrates that there is an atmosphere of distrust between SSA and 
TEA, and that in ND’s point of view SSA are resisting leadership attempts to 
implement the solution, despite the fact that, according to TEA, the steering 
committee demonstrated formal decision-making as a way of breaking the 
collaborative inertia in The Evaluation Team.    
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6.6.1.2 Illegitimate leadership 
In the collaborative value creation section above, issues related to the process and 
the substance of the project were analysed. In this section, I will go more into 
another theme occurring in the interviews when I was asking about the project, the 
process and how it was managed: Leadership. Two different, but interrelated, types 
of leadership were referred to in the interviews: how the TEA/ND managed the 
process and the absence of formal, hierarchical leadership in the previous period. 
Both types of leadership are linked directly to the level of conflict. Here, I will 
analyse the way in which the collaborators perceive of ND’s leadership. As the data 
material demonstrates, a key conflict point was the unclear roles of the participants 
involved. The level of conflict was highest in The Evaluation Team, whereas the 
team developing the ‘Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map’ (‘The Map Team’, for 
short) was less conflict-ridden, even though the question of roles was also present 
here.      
Resistance: Coordinator, not leader 
The first quote from an EIA civil servant explains why the civil servants experience 
themselves as having a vulnerable position in the collaboration: 
“Well it's a very vulnerable position to be in, because you are actually responsible 
for negotiations and the clarification of expectations on behalf of an entire 
administration. Here you may quite often be in doubt about what your own 
administration wants.” (EIA, civil servant, I9) 
Mostly, the individual administration does not know what it wants to do with the 
innovation project. The mandate that the individuals have is therefore highly 
uncertain, meaning that they cannot make decisions straight away in the teams in 
which they are involved. This absence of hierarchical leadership makes the 
individual’s own position very difficult to manage, increasing the level of conflict, 
since much depends on the individual civil servant in this part of the process. 
The second quote from a SSA civil servant addresses the lack of leadership, both 
from the TEA and the executive board in general, in relation to the high level of 
conflict:   
“To me this is not about people being stupid. But there are some quite trivial 
dynamics in organisations and between people, and we are all here to do the best 
for the organisation we come from, and we have some interests that we try to defend 
and if we get into a too vague space… Well, then any idiot will know that it will 
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generate... I have a sort of internal frustration in that I have been talking about this 
with my management several times, and I know that if I were sitting in that chair, I 
would have taken it up to the Executive Board a long time ago. That they haven’t 
done so, that’s so frustrating, and I think it's even more frustrating that TEA has not 
done so because they are the project managers.” (SSA, Civil servant, I8) 
The quote demonstrates that SSA representatives perceive of the problem of conflict 
as related to the fact that an undefined space of interaction exists for the people 
involved in The Evaluation Team, in that they are left to fight amongst themselves, 
due to lack of both hierarchical leadership and to ND’s failed process management. 
Thus, another conflict is that ND is simply inadequate as a process manager, as the 
quote below demonstrates:  
“in the same way, the project leader has to be able to accept that the participants 
are angry and complain, and deal with it. …. And you have to take responsibility for 
moving forward, so I think that they have a special responsibility” ((SSA, Civil 
servant, I5), 
TEA is seen as the ’project leader’ and is therefore expected to establish an overall 
management framework for the collaboration.  And this management requires that 
the project leader has to accept that the participants are complaining, and move the 
process forward: the leader has to be able to address conflicts, and reduce them –ND 
has not been able to do so.  
Another aspect of illegitimate leadership is that ND is perceived of as a 
collaborative leader that pretends to be inclusive, but actually knows all the answers 
in advance:  
 "The reason why it has been a weird process is that it has been like: ”we do this 
together, but in-reality-we-are-in-charge (...) you point towards a huge problem 
throughout the process that we have never actually articulated: ”who are you, who 
are we, what can you expect from us, what can we expect of each other across 
administrations”. It has constantly been running in an ad hoc kind of way" (SSA, 
Civil servant, I5) 
 
The quote also demonstrates that the role-confusion amongst administrations creates 
disappointment, in that the administrative representatives do not know what to 
expect of each other. The SSA interviewee later in the interview refers to a meeting 
in which she is supposed to just accept what has already been developed by others, 
despite the fact that she was invited in the first place to actually make decisions on 
the behalf of her administrations. This shows that representatives from SSA do not 
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recognise ND as their leader: they refuse to be followers. And they feel that they are 
wasting their time:  
 
” "I think we spend a lot of energy on those clarifications, both in The Evaluation 
track and in fact also in the Socio-Economic Map track. A great many meetings 
have also been spent on asking: what is actually negotiable in this working group 
because, well, there is no reason for us to provide all sorts of ideas that you are not 
interested in anyway – then we just don’t want to waste our time [on thinking of new 
ideas]"(I5) 
What the quote thus demonstrates is a critique of ND for not defining the space for 
negotiation. ND is perceived of as both a leader that wants other administrations to 
participate, all on an equal basis – and at the same time as a leader that already 
knows the answers, thus in reality not leaving any room for negotiation.  
In the quote below, we see how two different leader roles clash and co-exist at the 
same time, creating much ambivalence: the ’project manager’ and the ’facilitator’: 
"I cannot tell you clearly what it is that goes wrong [in the cooperation] but ... but 
my experience is that we do not agree on whether we are equal in the cooperation. 
That is where I find that [the ND representatives] perceive of themselves more as 
project leaders than as coordinators .... I actually think we should be equals, and 
then there should be a coordinating administration, but because we represent 
different administrations, we must be equal when cooperating, but I think that I feel 
that TEA experience that it is their process. So we do not agree on what the 
facilitator function [tovholderfunktion] is " (SSA, Civil servant, I5). 
The quote demonstrates that SSA had expected a facilitator type of leadership, in 
which parties are treated as equals; but what they experienced was a ’project 
manager’ type of leadership, in which the project manager ranked above the others. 
This resulted in open disagreement concerning how the process should be managed. 
It appears that ND’s leadership is not perceived of as legitimate.   
ND’s ambivalent leadership position is also assessed by an EIA-interviewee, who 
points our attention towards a leadership dilemma:  
“You can easily sit in a meeting and say, well, complain about not being properly 
included, while also...TEA should exercise greater control, right? And it gets 
extremely difficult for the facilitator/project manager [tovholder] to handle that 
complexity in relation to what is being expected of them. So we can say that we all 
seem to agree that we need to work across boundaries in a sort of matrix 
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organisation in which there is opportunity for everyone to affect this project, 
everyone should have ownership. But at the same time, there is also a need for 
someone to take the lead. And you might say that from the outset, two opposing 
rationales are at stake.” (EIA, Civil servant, I9) 
The quote demonstrates the ambivalence in the situation: ND is both expected to 
lead and take charge – but it is also expected to manage a process in which the other 
administrations can have as much influence as they want. This is a leadership 
dilemma, especially visible in The Evaluation Case:  How to satisfy collaborative 
demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same time 
satisfying demands for co-creation and influence? 
 
A final leadership dilemma is seen in this last SSA-quote; here ND’s leadership is 
criticized first of all for creating a direction, and holding on to it – and next, to some 
extent,  for acknowledging SSA’s critique of the evaluation template in The 
Horisontal Pillar-report, changing direction: 
  
"TEA has changed their position as I see it and that is basically fine - besides that it 
was super frustrating  to have spent six months, and then, because they get a new 
employee ... then we suddenly start all over again. That made me a little annoyed: 
now we have spent so many months talking about this, and then suddenly you [TEA] 
all of a sudden completely change course and then we have to start all over again” 
(SSA, Civil servant, I5) 
 
The quote demonstrates that for a leader to change position during a process, 
without the consent of collaborators, is perceived of as illegitimate when it happens, 
even though this may be approved of later on. The critique is actually a critique of 
the volatility, the inconsistency, and the brittleness of the leadership, in that a new 
employee can suddenly change the entire direction of The Evaluation Team. 
Consequently, this critique invokes another leadership dilemma: How to satisfy 
collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and direction while at the same 
time running an innovation process requiring shifts of direction due to uncertainty 
and adaptation? 
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6.6.2. SUMMING UP 
Conflicts to a high extent dominate The Evaluation Case. One major conflict 
concerns the fact that especially SSA has found it difficult to identify the purpose of 
the innovation project. Critique has also been raised regarding the fact that the three 
participating administrations do not have the practical preconditions for conducting 
this type of development work. Consequently, it is extremely difficult for the 
administrative representatives to develop a shared understanding.  
The unclear purpose is amplified by the profession-related, specialised strategy 
report of The Horisontal Pillar, which is very difficult to understand for especially 
SSA, but also for EIA. This also makes it difficult for collaborators to see 
themselves as part of the project, and to see what they gain from contributing to it. 
 Another major conflict is the expanding, blurry boundaries of the project; ND uses 
their concepts and emergent leadership position to gain access to new areas of 
responsibility. This provokes fear in especially SSA, in that the scope of ND’s 
project is seemingly without borders.  
A third major conflict is a resistance towards ND’s mission of increasing 
coordination. According to SSA, ND’s project actually provokes a situation in 
which there is too much coordination. The consequence of this resistance is that ND 
can be positioned as a centralistic leader that generates negative value in terms of 
overburdening their collaborators with a superfluous extra-layer organisation. 
Instead of ND’s ‘mega-plan’, the SSA-representatives favour a micro-plan in which 
the local parties themselves are the natural leaders, and ought to coordinate where 
they deem this to be appropriate.  
A further distinction is invoked here, that of ‘top-down’ vs. ‘bottom-up’. We may 
see this distinction as a battle between TEA and SSA concerning who has the 
legitimacy to speak on behalf of the ‘front line, local working staff’.  A further 
distinction is invoked in the quotes: ‘action vs. meeting’. SSA wants to act, not 
participate in meeting after meeting, stealing valuable time from client work. 
Finally, the conflicts also present us with an image of ND as a ‘know-all developer’ 
vs. the hard-working civil servant (the collaborating administrations); TEA runs the 
risk of making people tired by talking down to them, instructing them how to work.  
The fourth conflict concerns a definition of phases. SSA-representatives argue that 
they perceived of the evaluation process, and The Horisontal Pillar-project in 
general, as a report for inspiration, i.e. SSA argues in favour of an idea-generation 
phase. In contrast, ND argues that the recommendations from the report were 
supposed to have been more or less implemented, since both SSA and EIA have 
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formally accepted the report. This conflict produces an atmosphere of distrust and 
hostility, generating inertia in the team.  
In an overall perspective, this inertia may be seen as a struggle for power as ND will 
gain momentum from a straightforward implementation, whereas SSA will gain 
influence if the report recommendations are renegotiated. 
 So how does the above analysis of conflict points contribute to 
answering the research question: How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed 
through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public 
sector addressing wicked problems? 
First of all, we see how the conflicts above relate to four, rather abstract, leadership 
dilemmas discovered in the entrepreneurship-section:  
- How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical organisational 
structures? 
- How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that 
development work still remains? 
- How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and 
direction while at the same time satisfying demands for co-creation and 
influence?  
- How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and 
direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring 
shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation? 
 
Thus, the conflicts give flesh and blood to the concept of leadership recognition for 
an innovation unit placed at the bottom of a collaborative setting. The conflict points 
display issues that ND has to relate to in order to define and develop their subject 
position of a ‘leader’ in a micro-discourse that they themselves, in alliance with 
EIA, have introduced: are we to position ourselves as implementers or facilitators? 
How far can we stretch our legitimacy claim for coordination without provoking 
aggressive defence reactions from our collaborators? How to gather support for our 
solution? How to enable collaborators to see the value of the project, when the entire 
project may be regarded as a leap of sector-related, profession-based faith? The 
analysis also provides detailed descriptions of reasons why conflicts may escalate in 
situations generated by such an emerging leadership: that to a large extent decision-
makers are unengaged in, and unable to, set a direction; instead, due to a specialised 
solution to a wicked problem, the actual leaders are mainly specialised civil servants 
who are fighting to win the struggles for meaning across organisations.   
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 The Evaluation Case is riddled with conflicts. Therefore, the points 
of conflict are many, and the sources of leadership legitimacy few. In the section 
below, I will describe these sources.  
6.6.3. SOURCES OF LEADERSHIP LEGITIMACY: PROJECT 
MANAGEMENT, LOCAL COORDINATION AND SHARED 
PROCESS UNDERSTANDING  
In the section above I displayed the issues of conflict in the leadership positioning 
landscape. In this section I will focus on leadership legitimacy. As I have argued 
elsewhere in this thesis, the concept of recognition (Griffin, 2002)  is useful in two 
ways: first of all, it focuses on conflict and power: how meaning is generated 
through conflicts. But the concept of recognition also enables a focus on the fact that 
existing patterns of power not only generate opposition and resistance to new 
discourses or themes, but that these patterns of power are also sometimes susceptible 
for influence and actually demands to be influenced. This susceptibility to be 
influenced I conceptualize as legitimacy: it is an element in the micro-discourse that 
people find makes sense to them when trying to reduce the uncertainty they 
experience; it also enables them to see how these elements might generate value to 
them. 
In the quote below, I ask an ND employee about the implementation of the Pillar, 
once the project was approved of in ultimo 2008. Did the fact that only EIA 
contributed to begin with reduce the ownership of the project in the steering 
committee, in which managers from the remaining administrations were 
represented?  
“No, but that could very well have been the result. But I really don’t think that was 
the case. To some extent I believe they seemed a little relieved that we knew very 
well what we wanted. But at the same time they would also like to modify and 
qualify the [project-]design, etc. " (ND, Special consultant, I10) 
The quote thus demonstrates that leadership showing direction is actually 
appreciated by managers from the other administrations; but that they also want to 
influence the way in which it is supposed to be implemented. This type of leadership 
displayed by ND is in some respect ambivalent.   
 
Project management 
In the first quote below, a civil servant from SSA talks positively about a change of 
management:  
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"What she really is capable of, and that I sometimes missed here [in relation to The 
Pillar project/the Evaluation Case], is that banal understanding of the fact that 
project management is also about making sure that everyone is happy. I have 
experienced a different kind of trample style, and I am just very happy to be greeted 
that [other] way. And I think it's really, really important when you think of 
cooperating in flat structures, the flatter structure you want, the more aware you 
have to be that everyone want their demands fulfilled. The less you do that, the less 
people bother to play along, play with a flat structure. So it is just strategically very 
sensible to try and create inclusion." (SSA, Civil servant, I8) 
 
The background of the interview statement is that the ‘Governance Dialogue’ has 
implied that the ND office and their ‘Pillar’-project are to be redefined within a 
larger project. This project is also a development project, but in contrast to the 
‘Pillar’-project, the ‘Governance Dialogue’ is founded on legislation. As a 
consequence, a neighbouring office to ND, ‘Social Housing’, now has the 
responsibility for running the cross-administrative process of involving the 
administrations. ‘Social Housing’ runs a standardized process management model, 
which is approved of in this interview as the proper way of doing things when 
working across administrative boundaries. The quote raises another question: is the 
present smoother-running collaboration process a result of better process 
management or as a result of The Governance Dialogue process having much more 
political and administrative attention, enabling it to define the role of the 
administrations much more clearly? The Governance Dialogue may actually, despite 
its cross-administrative nature, reflect that things are now ‘business as usual’ – 
bureaucratic, formal leadership is once again involved.  
In the SSA quote below, it is also perceived as a source of leadership legitimacy that 
ND/TEA is now doing much more of the work themselves; and they are perceived 
of as being much more professional:  
“it [the leadership] is different. I think that TEA is taking more ownership. They 
have also got a completely different organisation to base their work upon, both in 
terms of expertise and the number of resources. And in that process it certainly 
seems as if TEA is going to be more inclusive than it sometimes has been. 
They're doing more of the work themselves and that seems fair. I think we in the 
beginning stood up to a lot. I think you need to write something about the fact that 
TEA was expected to perform one task at a time when they had only three employees 
[centrally] – it very quickly became huge. Therefore they did not know anything 
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about evaluation or .. so I  just mention this to say that they've to a much higher 
extent joined the struggle [kommet ind i kampen]” (SSA, Civil servant, I3) 
 
Furthermore, a more clever way of using collaborative resources is also approved of. 
In the section above, the waste of resources in meetings that produce much 
discussion but no progress was highly criticized. However, as a result of observed 
professionalization in ND, and the TEA in general, the TEA now does a lot of the 
work themselves, and run the process much more professionally. In response to the 
Pilot Study Paper which I presented to the informant, the informant mentions that to 
begin with, the ND office had no capacity to run the type of process they did: too 
little manpower and experience. But at this point in time (November 2010) they are 
perceived of as being much more professional, resourceful and competent.   
 
Demonstrating the value of the project to other professionals 
In the sections above, I have described how the lack of direct hierarchical 
involvement leads to conflicts and negotiations amongst the civil servants 
themselves. A crucial element for bottom-up leadership is demonstrating the 
collaborative value of the project. As the TEA quote below exemplifies, a tool like 
the socioeconomic Copenhagen map can be used as a means to exercise influence:   
“I: So if I understand you correctly then, in order to get the other administrations 
more engaged  you have created a form of cooperation based on trade? If they could 
see some more benefits of being part of it, they would also engage in it? 
R: Yes, that has clearly been my goal. Also because I was informed that TEA might 
provide  DKK 500,000 for the development of the Map in 2010: ”Perhaps you 
would like to run it and develop it?” So it was also a little like a sales [talk] The 
Culture and Leisure Administration has always been saying:" We are not area-
based. "But anyways I really think that the representative thought it was very 
interesting: "How exciting it must be for you to be able to go in and see where the 
sports facilities are located. If you can see that there are many children in this part 
of town, aren’t you then interested in seeing how many sports facilities are located 
in the area? So the representative has actually been modestly engaged in it”. (ND, 
Civil servant, I6) 
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The quote demonstrates that it is important that the other administrations get 
something specific out of the collaboration, such as a tool that allows them to 
present progress to their own decision makers. And furthermore, the map acts as a 
tool for influencing the civil servants, in that the it is a part of the pillar-logic: 
viewing the problem of the disadvantaged neighbourhoods as a spatial problem 
entails that it makes sense to create maps that allow for spatial interpretation of how 
problems in these neighbourhoods can be solved. Thus, the map produces a certain 
kind of knowledge, in full accordance with the discursive elements of the Pillar 
Project. 
The second TEA quote also demonstrates that it is important that the locally 
working civil servants buy in on the vision of the Pillar Project:  
“It [the project] needs to be much more integrated into the daily municipal 
operations, so that you have a task in it. I think that as soon as you see yourself as 
having a task to perform in relation to the project and also perceive it as having a 
potential, that if across all these external and extraordinary project grants you can 
see an opportunity to develop your own talent as a part of it – the interest will be 
much bigger. ... There is a need for the reflection of The Horisontal Pillar 
concerning crosscutting collaboration to be implemented in every library and every 
nursery there is. That’s necessary. Not least in times of recession where you feel that 
you are being squeezed from the one side, and then there is someone across the road 
running around and playing amusement park". (ND, Civil servant, I4) 
The locally working civil servants have to be able to make sense of the project, i.e. 
experience that it creates value in their daily work, otherwise the project has failed. 
What the quote also displays is that, if not improved in some way, the area-based 
programs are at risk of being positioned as a ’all fun and games’  in which numerous 
activities are initiated without contributing to a higher goal. For ND, it is important 
to do something about this image.   
Shared process understanding: ‘Learning by doing’ as the legitimizer of interest-
based conflicts 
In the quote below, a civil servant from EIA reflects upon some of the dominating 
discussions across administrations in the wake of collaboration experience so far. 
What the quote shows is that this particular process has been very conflictive at the 
civil servant level, leading to reflections about how to improve collaboration in the 
future. The civil servants, especially from SSA and EIA, feel very exposed, in that 
they feel they have to negotiate by themselves on behalf of a whole administration.  
What the quote demonstrates is that the collaborating parties at this level deal with 
the conflicts by constructing a shared understanding of what has been going on. This 
shared understanding is a way of de-personalizing the conflicts, thus objectifying it 
 252 
 
to simply a rational matter of interests and mandate. This shared understanding thus 
shares some of the entrepreneurial elements described above. I interpret this finding 
as a way of both being able to continue collaborating at a lower emotional cost, and 
as a way of ‘making peace’, thus re-establishing the subject position of ‘the 
professional’: 
“[when] we have to make some terms of reference we should at least remember to 
make it [the cross-administrative working relation] a recurring theme. So we 
constantly confront those conflicts, and above all, use them in a positive way. To 
develop things instead of it being a hindrance. Like when criticism is raised from the 
SSA about the lack of something, well, then you have to ... instead of saying 
"Arhg!!", or .. or feel offended at heart, so simply say, “well it's not me, Brian,  
sitting as a representative from EIA saying [while he is knocking impatiently on the 
table]: "I must have some impact measurements because I must! " (EIA, Civil 
servant, I9)” 
In the quote above, a civil servant from EIA explains how the experience concerning 
the massive conflicts gathered in this collaborative process can help others in the 
future. Also, when interviewed in round two, giving feedback to my pilot-study, 
both SSA-informants replied something in style with the following when describing 
the process experience, that ‘this is how it is in these types of processes.’ In other 
words, the civil servant from EIA and civil servants from SSA even mentioned a 
desire to make a handbook for working across administrations. The quote 
exemplifies that a process perspective on what the administrations have been 
experiencing has to some extent produced a more relaxed atmosphere.  
 
6.6.4. SUMMING UP 
In terms of sources of leadership legitimacy, we find that as an administration TEA 
gains more recognition when the now merged processes of The Horisontal Pillar and 
The Governance Dialogue are managed by another TEA office. This office is doing 
professional ‘by-the-book’ project management, and is doing a lot of the work 
themselves. This type of cross-administrative leadership is highly approved of by 
SSA. Further, another source of legitimacy seems to be simply a professional and 
experienced staff in ND, which in number matches the task. We see that if the 
bottom-up leader is perceived of as too vulnerable or too inexperienced; if they do 
not have the sufficient manpower to take on as much of the hard work as expected, 
support from sceptical collaborators is harder to acquire. Further, what also seems to 
provide the emergent leader with recognition is the fact that the civil servants from 
the other administrations need to take some ‘value’ with them back home – either an 
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event for their mayor to demonstrate results or a tool like the socio-economic map 
that may prove of value in their own internal evaluations or professional work. 
 In the next section, I turn to the way in which ND-staff have decided 
to position themselves as leaders across these leadership dilemmas, conflicts and 
sources of legitimacy.   
 
6.6.5. LEADERSHIP IDENTITY: MOVING TOWARDS A 
COORDINATIVE ROLE 
In the sections above I have explained how a specific type of profession-based 
entrepreneurship has formed the basis for leadership emergence. I have also 
analysed how people constantly judge and negotiate the project and the leadership 
position. Finally, I have analysed how ND/TEA has navigated in power struggles by 
dealing with the resistance to both leadership and project and by being engaged in 
discussions and achieving legitimacy by demonstrating value for the other 
administrative professionals. Thus, a visible leadership is easily identifiable in the 
case of ND/TEA, despite the fact that not all agree that TEA should be the leader, or 
has the legitimacy or the necessary skills to be a leader. A question is still 
unanswered:   
- How does ND understand its own leadership and its development so far?   
This is an important dimension of leadership emergence. Even though in this project 
I conceptualize leadership as socially constructed, emerging through conflicts with 
collaborating parties, leadership emergence hinges both on the entrepreneurial 
project, but also on the way in which the lead unit takes action in order to transform 
itself from a unit with a strong entrepreneurial and conceptual basis to a unit 
recognised for its leadership. This is inevitably an identity transformation which 
emergent leaders have to fulfil by themselves, by defining their own roles, reflecting 
on sources of legitimacy and points of conflict. As Griffin (2002) notes, leadership 
hinges on providing direction by answering the question: who are we, and what are 
we doing?  
 
In the quote, I have asked the manager from ND why decision making was so 
difficult to obtain in The Evaluation Team, and report how the manager explained 
my observations - that decisions were difficult to sanction, resulting in inertia:  
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"Perhaps it’s TEA’s and thus also my own levels of ambition that have been too 
high, as I have always insisted that the cross-administrative and the inter-
disciplinary ways of collaborating were possible .... I thought it would be easier. I 
thought most definitely that we had a common cause which would have supported 
the process in one way or another. This I also expected in relation to the Children 
and Youth Administration, and those people we have never managed to include, 
despite the fact that the one thing which dominates the Comprehensive Plans and 
the area renewals are exactly activities for children and youth " (ND, middle 
manager, I7) 
 
In the response, we see an interesting experience in leadership making: that the 
outset for the innovation project and the leadership position was value based – that 
the wish to do something for the disadvantaged neighbourhoods was expected to be 
enough in order to acquire legitimacy for the project, and thus allowing the members 
of The Evaluation Team to come up with a joint solution.  However, as the conflict 
with SSA shows, the means to acquire this goal are contested, perceived of as an 
extra-layer activity, actually being counterproductive. 
In the quote, I ask what ND has learned from The Evaluation Case:  
 
“R: I think that we will try to draw some other lines concerning for instance the 
Copenhagen Map, where we say: this is TEA, which has received half a million to 
develop the map. 
I: So you set up a frame, and then invite people in? 
R: Yes as long as they want to participate.”  (ND, middle manager, I7) 
 
The response signals that more direct leadership will be used in the development of 
The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map. So, as a response to the conflicts in The 
Evaluation Team, a less flat leadership structure will be the way forward. Later in 
the interview, the manager refers to an episode of success in which ND uses the 
distinction between ’project-layer/day-to-day municipal activities’ to influence a 
funding process for new projects. For ND, this type of funded projects is exactly 
what is to be coordinated by using an area-based perspective:  
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“I also think we have moved very, very far on cross-government collaboration in 
Copenhagen while I've been here, and I think this has been because we have dared 
to articulate our really high ambition concerning this agenda (...) I think also that 
you can look at some of the new things that we are experiencing now. There is now a 
different understanding that if we make a Social Reserve Fund application 
[Satspuljeansøgning], then it should actually contribute to what we're doing already 
– so there is an organisational structure that to a higher extent refers it [such an 
application] to an area-based level” (ND, I7, middle manager) 
This quote demonstrates the powerfulness of a new micro-discourse as an influence 
tool, in that it allows ND to try to forcefully address the insufficient way in which 
the municipality deals with disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The quote also 
demonstrates that the micro-discourse enables ND to influence processes of which 
they have not so far been a legitimate part. In other words, ND is expanding its 
sphere of influence by means of the discourse.   
As hypothesised by the BUCIL model, leadership has to be engaged in discussions 
and conversations in order to gain an influence and in order to compensate for the 
lack of hierarchical power. As the sections above have displayed, many discussions 
arise all the time: in The Evaluation Team, The Map Team, as well as in discussions 
with other administrations concerning funding processes etc. In the TEA quote, the 
civil servant tries to put some words on issues of the numerous discussions, 
negotiations and conflicts in relation to the lack of decision making: 
“R: For example, if you take SSA, their line manager is very remote concerning our 
work. But at the same time, this manager has at least 4-5 officials who cooperate to 
an incredible extent with us. And for us it is, then, extremely difficult to get decisions 
taken because we always negotiate with various officials and on very, very few 
occasions get to speak to her. And when we do reach her, then she’s always far from 
the concrete tasks, because she, well, I just think that it [The Horisontal Pillar 
project] is a small part [of her work] 
I: So she cannot be part of the dialogue in an active and specific professional way? 
R: No, she will say, "I'll bring this or that official of mine”. So we haven’t really…., 
it's very, very rare that .... The way things are running here is not like it could be in 
other places in which the bosses sit down and say –”where are we going”? And then 
decide for specific tasks to be performed.” (ND, special consultant, I10) 
What this civil servant points to, also later in the interview, is the fact that the 
middle manager in SSA is not very much engaged in the Pillar Project due to its 
’nice-to-do’ status as a development project, and due to the fact that the manager in 
SSA does not have much knowledge of the project. As a consequence, negotiations 
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are conducted with the civil servants of SSA instead. What ND is trying in this part 
of the innovation process is to cope with a key challenge of bottom-up innovation: 
how to mobilize hierarchy in order to acquire support. However, this influence 
strategy is blocked by the civil servants of the other administrations, in that the SSA 
manager is assisted by the manager’s own civil servants.   
In the quotes from TEA below, several understandings of ND’s own leadership are 
presented. In the first quote, the middle manager from TEA explains how they have 
become more aware of their own role as people who are capable of handling issues 
concerned with ‘organizing and level of collaboration’:  
"This has been an exercise which is also about shutting things down - what we 
should not do. As regards the Safe City strategy and The Social Reserve Fund’s 
applications [Satspuljemidlerne] we have the same academic reflections which are: 
what can we do here, how far we can go, what is our role? We can help in some of 
the preventive work, we can work at the area-based level, we can try to coordinate, 
and we have some viewpoints concerning the organisational set-up – These are 
some of our strengths, and then there is a lot which is more relevant for social 
professionalism and which concerns citizens at the individual level, which is not our 
part. I think this might also be a relief for some of the other administrations - the 
fear of whether we would spread all over the place and have an opinion about 
everything. Here we say, "No, this is your field of responsibility - this is what you do 
best ". I definitely think that some of our professionalism lies in being capable at the 
organisation and collaboration levels." (ND, middle manager, I7) 
 
What is introduced here is a powerful division of labour distinction which reappears 
later in the ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen’, a distinction between 
‘Area/individual’. This distinction is basically a way of making sense of the central-
administrative world, in that it helps reduce the conflicts between the 
administrations which are perceived as having an individual focus (such as SSA, 
CLA, EIA) and administrations which are perceived as having a spatial focus, such 
as TEA. According to my field work, this distinction was not present to begin with 
in TEA or among SSA and EIA. Just like the introduction of the ‘learning-by-doing-
process’-concept (see ‘sources of legitimacy’ above) as a ‘shared third’ that allows 
the administrations to cooperate, the ‘Area/individual’ helps facilitate a division of 
labour in which the other administrations can relax: TEA does not wish to 
coordinate everything (such as The Social Reserved Funds), a fear that I described in 
the section above. What is also relevant in the quote is how ND defines itself as the 
player of a more coordinative role, rather than as a value-based implementer.  
In the quote, the identity of the coordinator is elaborated by a civil servant from ND: 
 257 
 
“Well but that's the system. The responsibility to improve the situation in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods becomes a joint responsibility for developing the 
municipality as well, including the administrations. It is not just a responsibility to 
optimize some client-oriented problem-solving efforts …That's what really matters. 
Because The Horisontal Pillar simply deals with the system's ability to handle these 
problems. That is what it deals with. " (ND, civil servant, I4) 
ND perceives of its role as working at a system level: enabling the municipality to 
work across administrative boundaries. This is also a coordinative role, but on a 
meta-level, in that ND perceives of the municipality in general as an organisation 
with a system failure. ND is representing the entire municipality and its capability 
(or lack of) to work together as one efficient unit. Thus, ND takes on a self-critical 
role, being aware of its own system’s limitations, and having as its professional 
expertise a systems development role. This is in contrast to its former professional 
role, which was limited to neighbourhood development at a local level, making as 
efficient an area-based program as possible.  
In the next quote, a civil servant from the ‘map’-team interestingly notes that she 
was actually unaware of the nature of ND’s role in relation to the Map-team: 
“I: And your role is to lead or to be the coordinator? How do you understand your 
own role? 
R: That has been little unclear. It has been a bit ’guess a task’- like, as there really 
hasn’t  been someone who has said what they wanted - other than the Map needed to 
be developed... so we spent quite a lot of time on also reaching a common 
understanding of what this is, and what can do with it? Why is it that this does not 
work?” (ND, civil servant, I6) 
Two things are important to note in this quote concerning leadership identity. In this 
team they more or less figured out the purpose by themselves, since there wasn’t an 
agenda from the outset. The example demonstrates that some elements of the Pillar 
Project are seemingly more tightly connected to questions of leadership identity than 
others. For instance, in the Map-team, the civil servant had no knowledge as to what 
the overall purpose of the Pillar Project was. In fact, the civil servant explains later 
in the interview that she needed the assistance of another ND civil servant in order 
to ‘frame’ the purpose of the Map for the Map-team. Thus, in contrast to The 
Evaluation Team, we see a civil servant with no explicit mission to lead the 
development of the Map based on identity issues. In this part of the Pillar Project, 
more room for negotiation existed, which gave less conflict, and thus less need to 
negotiate identities. This finding is important to reflect on, in that is suggests why 
certain parts of the Pillar Project spurred more conflicts than others. It also reflects 
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how all civil servants in ND are undergoing an identity change, in that all ND-
employees are expected by others to lead.    
In the quote below what is also clear is the reflection in ND that the ND manager 
and some of the ND employees thought that they would have an easily 
implementable report after the Pillar formulation process had been completed at the 
end of 2008:  
"After I was made manager, and the report itself had been completed and we took 
over and had to implement it, I became the project owner of it, so it is anchored in 
my department - the implementation of it: how much are we going to implement, and 
how to go about it.... I think they [the report recommendations] were and are really 
good, and I also think that they really made a lot of sense to our professional field. I 
also think some of the recommendations appeared very complete. When we had 
completed the Pillar report, it was like: "well, now we are ready to get started," but 
when we dug into it, I think that we spent nine months on taking another turn with it. 
We were sitting with this report at the beginning, thinking that ’now we should 
really get going and implement it’, but it was actually really difficult. The report 
seemed very concrete, but there was a huge distance between the level that was in 
the report and then going out and implementing it in a municipal reality. " (ND, 
middle manager, I7) 
However, when the implementation process began, problems appeared with regard 
to actually implementing the recommendations.  This also explains why SSA 
experienced shifts in strategy: an entrepreneurial and sensemaking process in the 
ND happened ‘backstage’, while on the front stage, ND maintained that the 
recommendations from the Pillar report, such as the Evaluation Tool, were the right 
ones to use. This is an important finding, in that it show us something about the 
difficulty of running a narrow collaborative innovation process from the bottom and 
up, at least when the journey was initiated by making a thorough analytical report 
with a set of recommendations; as soon as the ‘innovation journey’ (Van de Ven 
1998) changes course, due to trial-and-error learning, there is only the leader to 
blame, which makes it very expensive in terms of leadership recognition. This cost 
is also amplified when the change of course is accompanied by a leadership identity 
change from implementer to coordinator. 
In the ND-quote below, we see how the identity of coordinator is also linked to 
being a development office: 
"I have not regretted it [the evaluation work], because then I would revise my 
strategy. I still believe that it can help us to move closer to the Comprehensive Plans 
and that we can pick something up and capture something along the way that is 
important to capture. We can live out our role as coordinator ... but there is no 
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doubt that it is a big mouthful. I also think that one of the good things about it was 
that it has helped to sharpen the understanding of people in the department - that 
our office is a development office... I also think that we are beginning to build up a 
team which is actually capable of handling it and thrive on it and think that it 
actually is a fantastic and cool working day to have when speaking professionally as 
it offers so many different tasks. I also think that the other administrations are 
beginning to figure out how we go about it, and that we also go out and deliver what 
we promise. "(ND Manager, I7) 
Two things are important to note in this quote. First, that ND sees its work as 
development work on a continual basis, for instance by using the evaluation practice 
as a tool for constantly refining and informing their role as coordinator for the area-
based programs, such as the Comprehensive Plans. Second, that the ambition of 
being a development office has a required a change in the staff in a way, which has 
allowed the ND office to actually manage development work. This description 
denotes an identity change from an operations office to a development office; I 
interpret this change as being the result of some of the conflicts that I have 
demonstrated throughout this part of the process, by means of my analysis of The 
Evaluation Case. As a consequence of this identity change, according to the 
manager, ND is beginning to develop a leadership profile that the other 
administrations can relate to: a stable provider of a certain product with a delineated 
field of responsibility.    
 
6.6.6. SUMMING UP LEADERSHIP RECOGNITION 
The understanding of leadership emergence in the BUCIL model is that it is socially 
constructed. What is of interest here is how the emergent leader becomes recognised 
by others, i.e. seen as a force to be reckoned with. The point of recognition is 
reached through processes of conflict, in that conflicts provoke identity development 
in the lead unit.  
As presented above, we see that the emergent leader’s (ND) initial self-image was 
one that I call a ‘value-based implementer’. This positional label does not sum up 
bottom-up leadership’s total self-understanding; in fact, ND also thought of itself as 
a development organisation to begin with. However, the image of a development 
organisation was not accepted by SSA or others, presumably because when ND was 
moving from observable talk to action, for various reasons it handled the task as one 
of implementation.  
In the period from end-2008-2009, conflicts over leadership position occurred, in 
which the position of ND was not accepted by others. A discrepancy existed 
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between self-image and the collaborators’ perception of the leadership. Accordingly, 
‘value-based implementer’ is a social-constructive leadership label in the sense that 
it both captures collaborators main perception of leadership and ND’s own 
leadership outset in terms of identity.  
In the process that I construct as ‘The Evaluation Case’, i.e. mid-2009 to start 2010, 
ND’s has become better defined. Rather than in a role as value-based implementer, 
we find that the legitimate basis of influence lies in a much more defined and also 
recognizable role in the City of Copenhagen: As a coordinator that still develops, but 
also ‘facilitates’, interaction by accepting and working with the different ‘interests’ 
and ‘cultures’ in the other administrations.  
This type of leadership defines its own role more narrowly as one with no 
responsibility and professional insight in the expertise of other administrations, but 
only operating on an organisational and collaborative level; this definition of 
leadership also defines the scope of the innovation project, making collaborators 
relax, in that the blurry boundaries are defined much more clearly. A division of 
labour has been established, and the administrative roles have been defined. This 
causes uncertainty to become greatly reduced.   
ND and its collaborators begin to construct and share an understanding of the 
‘process’ as a development process which is slow, due to bureaucracy and 
collaborative discussions; but also marked by uncertain surroundings, requiring a 
perspective of ‘learning’, ‘transformation’ etc. in order to address and lead the 
process.  
Further, ND still perceives of itself as a true development office, now also capable 
of actually fulfilling this role, in that ND staff is beginning to get accustomed to this 
identity. I call this leadership position ‘developing coordinator’.  
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 MAKING AND GIVING SENSE 6.7
In the sections above, I have demonstrated that different types of certainty dominate 
The Evaluation case process and its environment. I have demonstrated how 
entrepreneurship deals with some of these uncertainties by making new 
combinations, introducing novel concepts. And I have demonstrated, how 
introducing these new concepts produce a landscape of possible leadership 
positioning that provokes identity changes in ND, pushing them towards a more 
delineated leadership identity in terms of coordination, facilitation and continual 
development. And I have argued that ND has acquired recognition by moving from 
being a value-based implementer to becoming a developing coordinator, which 
entails a more defined role distribution across administrations. I have also 
demonstrated how trying to introduce certain concepts in The Evaluation Team met 
severe resistance; but also that novel distinctions and concepts are powerful tools for 
expanding a bottom-up leader’s sphere of influence.  
In this section of the analysis, I focus on elaborating on the causal link of the BUCIL 
model between the social construction of leadership recognition and the ability to 
give sense. 
To summarise my hypothesis concerning making and giving sense: In the BUCIL 
model, I hypothesize that leadership initiated at the bottom of one of the 
collaborating organisations has sensemaking as its primary power tool. This concept 
originates from Weick. However, in contrast to Weick’s conception, I give the 
concept a more strategic twist by connecting it causally with leadership emergence. 
According to the BUCIL model, directing how collaborators make sense of the 
collaborative innovation process is conditioned on whether or not the leadership is 
recognised. Leadership recognition is defined as follows: Leadership recognition in 
the context of collaboration is acquired when the introduction of your discourse of 
change reaches such a momentum that your emergent leadership and innovation 
project cannot be ignored, but has to be reckoned with in the strategic power games 
within and between organisations. The main logic of the BUCIL model is 
conditioned by uncertainty – the uncertainty that collaboration and innovation 
generates. As soon as this discursive process is initiated, collaborators are forced to 
relate to the project and the emergent leader – either by doing nothing, by being 
hesitant about the project or the strategic goals of the leader, being supportive to 
some extent, or by trying to stop the project or discredit the leadership etc. However, 
no matter what action is taken by collaborators, the collaborators are forced to make 
sense of the project. And the bottom-up innovators’ influence tool is to direct this 
sensemaking.   
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In the remaining part of the section, I mainly give a systematic summary of what I 
have already discovered in the analytical sections above. In this section I take the 
liberty to adopt a more analytical story-telling style, and only introduce new quotes 
if I have to make a point not already contained in the sections above.   
In the sub-analyses above, I have demonstrated that uncertainty prevails. We see this 
in the many explanations people try to come up with concerning leadership, 
conflicts in relation to The Evaluation Case etc. People ask themselves: what is 
going on, who are we, and what are we doing? People are confused and puzzled 
about what they are actually doing, who they are, what the innovation project is 
about, in what phase they are, whether or not the merging of The Horisontal Pillar 
and Governance Dialogue will push the project further, whether this merger will 
actually manifest itself as a new project, whether a sort of political consensus 
concerning the policy-to-come will be helpful, why there are so many conflicts, etc. 
All in all, these considerations justify the use of the term sensemaking – people are 
making sense of the turbulence they already experienced, what they are experiencing 
now, and what they will come to experience in the future. All of these considerations 
are essential for the interviewees in order to discover how to act, i.e. how to position 
themselves in relation to the innovation process.  
So, what is the relation between leadership recognition and giving sense? ND has 
been able to direct this sensemaking in some collaborative interactions manifesting 
themselves in the period 2009-2010, but not in others. What sites of interaction have 
I described in the above sections? We have the following sites mentioned by the 
interviewees:  
- The Evaluation Team 
- The Map Team 
- Steering committee 
- Governance Dialogue process 
- General discussion concerning The Horisontal Pillar 
- The Social Reserve funds 
It is only possible to analyse The Evaluation Team in some depth, since this is the 
only site of interaction in which I have collected data from all involved team 
members. However, in order to make sense, the respondents often relate to the other 
sites of interaction for comparison, and they describe and explain these sites of 
interaction in very different ways, either comparing or contrasting these sites of 
interaction with The Evaluation Case, focusing on a certain issue, such as leadership 
legitimacy, confusion about the innovation project or the maze-like governance 
structure of the municipality. It is worth considering why sensemaking was possible 
in some sites of interaction and not in others.  
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Below, I therefore first describe and analyse the sites of interaction, with a special 
emphasis of The Evaluation Case. Second, I discuss the conditions for giving sense 
by comparing sites of interaction with the Evaluation Case.   
The Evaluation Team 
If we take The Evaluation Team, making and giving sense was not possible. To be 
sure, a lot (!) of sensemaking was going on, and new collaborative sense was created 
(the ‘learning by doing’-construction as well as the division of labour distinction of 
‘individuals vs. areas’, embodying also wide identity distinctions between 
administrations with legislative responsibilities for citizens/clients vs. 
administrations with physical/coordinative/strategic responsibilities ). But ND did 
not manage to persuade SSA of the value of the project. In fact, collaborative sense 
was created as an emergency response to an unbearable situation for the 
professionals: the conflicts were becoming too personal, so collaborative sense had 
to be made in order to be able to continue working together. This is evident in that 
respondents in the interviews regularly describe the collaboration in ambivalent 
ways: the behaviour of the other administration is not appropriate (antagonism), 
BUT this-is-how-it-is-given-the-conditions-of-the-collaborative-interaction 
(reconciliation). These two explanations co-exist, the antagonistic being mainly 
emotional and the reconciliation rhetoric mainly dominated by a casual 
rational/professional attitude.     
The collaborative sensemaking was in fact a type of sensemaking that did not create 
a shared platform in terms of a ‘we’ that is doing something. This is first of all very 
apparent when comparing the interview transcripts related to The Evaluation Team 
with the response of the single interviewee in The Map Team: in both instances, 
‘we’ is used quite often. The difference is that in The Evaluation Team ‘we’ does 
not refer to the team, but to each respondent’s own administration (we the TEA, we 
the SSA); whereas in The Map Team, ‘we’ is not this ‘mandate’-we, but the ‘team’-
we. So in The Evaluation Team, the efforts of ND to give sense created sensemaking 
characterized by opposition. This does not mean that the team disagreed on 
everything. As the interviews and my field notes document, the team agreed that the 
original evaluation tool was inadequate, and that the ‘theory of change’ evaluation 
approach introduced in The Horisontal Pillar report provided valuable insights into 
how the ‘Comprehensive Plans’ works – that the plans often have a weak strategic 
approach across activities.  
This oppositional sensemaking takes on different expressions. First of all, as my 
field notes document, and as explained by the respondents from EIA and SSA, in the 
end The Evaluation Team decided to split up the evaluation practice. Thus, we see a 
change from a shared evaluation practice to a split evaluation practice. As the 
informant from SSA states in an interview, ‘the evaluation is now walking on three 
 265 
 
legs’ (One leg for SSA, one for EIA, and one for TEA). Thus, the conflicts created a 
division of labour, resulting in a situation in which the people involved were not 
forced to interact. And eventually TEA ended up conducting their own evaluation 
process, whereas EIA and SSA abandoned their evaluation practices altogether.  
Both respondents from SSA and TEA stated almost in unison as a consequence of 
their interaction in The Evaluation Team and other sites: ‘We have discovered what 
we are NOT’. Thus, we see a movement from collaboration to a traditional division 
of labour in which no shared practice is present. Consequently, The Evaluation 
Team moved from a situation of what we might in (Keast & Mandell, 2011; Sowa, 
2008)’s collaboration-spectrum call potential ‘collaboration’ (i.e. sharing resources) 
to coordination to ad hoc cooperation.  
Another expression of the oppositional sensemaking in The Evaluation Team that I 
have touched on in the analysis sections above circles around the main discursive 
positions invoked by the ‘pillar’ and ND: Coordination, leadership, the advantage 
for the frontline staff working locally in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods. As an 
example: ND/TEA justify their innovation project by what an interviewee calls a 
‘screaming need’ [in Danish: ‘skrigende behov’] for coordination in the 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods, a ‘need’ revealed by the  complaints often heard of 
the ‘local professionals’, in which they criticize the Seven Headed Beast of the 
Municipality. This is an act of legitimization in which an implicit argument is that 
people ‘close’ to the ‘problem’ are the most superior assessors of strategic 
relevance, as they feel the immediate deficiencies of the municipal ‘system’. This 
act of legitimization is countered by the civil servants from SSA. They see 
themselves as ‘defenders’ of the ‘locally working professionals’ who are being 
overrun by an extra-layer organisation, also a deficiency of the system. Another 
example: The leadership position of ND is being challenged. ND argues that the 
‘area’ is an appropriate object of coordination and planning, making it obvious that 
ND is supposed to coordinate some of the activities of the other administrations. 
SSA argues that no master-plan leadership is needed and definitely not any master 
plan that invokes area-based activities such as a local coordinative secretary. In fact, 
the administrations are coping by themselves, people are in no need of a master-plan 
leader, but in need of ‘micro-tools’ of ‘self-management’: the Horisontal Pillar 
points to important issues, but it has to be implemented by the professionals, the 
‘natural’ leaders, where they think that it is relevant – and not by TEA.   
The Map Team 
In The Map Team, the opposite picture seemed to apply, compared to The 
Evaluation Team. Instead of a sense-overwritten slate, ‘the empty slate’ seemed to 
be the problem, according to the TEA interviewee. Here, there was actually a need 
of someone giving sense. Thus, a ‘sense maker’ from TEA who had been part of the 
Pillar process to begin with was pulled in to frame the context of the map. The roles 
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of the collaborators were much more equal, everybody being confused as to how to 
further develop the Map. A collaborative ‘we’ dominates the narrative of the civil 
servant explaining issues of collaboration. Again, in this case sensemaking is not to 
be found in discussions about the nature of the tool– according to the interviewee, 
somebody just suggested that ‘each administration should be allowed to contribute 
with three statistical indicators to the map’. The Map do has some sensemaking 
qualities mentioned by the interviewee. The administration of Culture and Leisure 
(‘CLA’) is repeatedly mentioned by the interviewees as an ally of SSA and EIA, but 
not of TEA. CLA is perceived of as being quite sceptical about the area-based 
approach. In relation to the Map, CLA is also mentioned as a unit which is not 
interested in participating. However, the interviewee mentions that the participator 
from CLA saw some ‘exciting’ possibilities in the spatial display of CLAs activities, 
as the quote below demonstrates. So, what is of importance here is that the power of 
making and giving sense was to a high degree conditioned by whether or not the 
professionals find the new perspective interesting. Professionalism and the 
development of professional engagement are what make the direction of 
sensemaking possible. The Map story also points to the fact that the Map-tool is part 
of the exercise of making and giving sense: the other administrations are beginning 
to think in spatial terms and are considering how spatial elements relate to each 
other. Furthermore, the other administrations are in need of various data to 
demonstrate the effects of their initiatives, a need which the Map can fulfil.  
The steering committee 
The steering committee is not well described in the interviews. Because of the 
explorative purpose of the pilot study concerning The Evaluation Team, I was also 
not focused on the committee, since it was not very often mentioned in the ND 
office as a site of conflict. What we did hear about the steering committee and the 
middle managers was that they were unengaged, due to the developmental ‘nice-to-
do’ character of the Pillar Project. We also heard that the steering committee as a 
group knew very little about area-based programs, which made it difficult for these 
middle managers to make profession-based, qualified decisions. All in all, this 
committee is spoken of in very uncontroversial terms, its main function being to 
oversee that the Pillar Project is implemented – not to set a direction. This is, in 
other words, not a site of interaction in which making and giving sense is a problem 
because of oppositional sensemaking as in The Evaluation Team. What is difficult 
for ND is that sensemaking generally requires access to powerful fora and time to 
influence these decision makers. 
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The Governance Dialogue 
The Governance Dialogue is spoken of in very positive terms by ND – we get the 
impression that the Governance Dialogue is to some degree an unequivocal hallmark 
of ND’s ability to give sense. The Governance Dialogue was already anticipated in 
‘The Horisontal Pillar’. Thus, many of the thoughts already developed in the process 
of making The Horisontal Pillar report, as well as in the attempts of implementing 
the report, are carried over in the Governance Dialogue process. Several civil 
servants mention that the Governance Dialogue could not have been run so smoothly 
without the involvement of ND. ‘Suddenly’ things run smoothly, with no resistance, 
since the Governance Dialogue is a piece of legislation, and since the top of 
hierarchical leadership (mayors) is involved – there seems to be a demand for 
answers. This mobilizes the entire bureaucracy, creating steady mandates throughout 
the municipality. The combination of sense already made and stable bureaucratic 
structures make the Governance Dialogue a pleasant process for everyone, including 
SSA. As I have described above, we also see that another TEA office runs the 
Governance Dialogue process in a very skilful, by-the-book project management 
style, which to some extent restarts the process, giving ND a more withdrawn role to 
play.  
The Horisontal Pillar 
‘The Horisontal Pillar’ as a report has played a very important role in sensemaking – 
a symbolic role. In the entrepreneurship section I have already explained how the 
report internally functions as a safeguard against uncertainty, acting as a solid 
roadmap that just needs to be implemented. It thus removes the uncertainty in ND. It 
also has an  unapproachable air about it. Throughout the interviews, newcomers 
(both TEA and SSA and EIA), have difficulties in understanding what is being 
described in the report, and some collaborators have not even had the time to read 
the report. The report also has strong sensemaking qualities. As the middle manager 
of ND notes in the interview, people throughout the municipality talk about ‘The 
Pillar’ as a symbol of working across boundaries, although only few have actually 
read the complicated report (I7). 
As also stated in my field notes, The Horisontal Pillar is used repeatedly in 
interactions when people from other administrations are confused about the nature 
of the innovation project. ND civil servants refer to the report as an answer, along 
with a statement like: ‘NDs role is to strengthen the cross-administrative cooperation 
in the municipality. ‘The Pillar’ shows that…”. The Pillar thus begins to take on a 
structuring role due to its complex, unapproachable and thoroughly analytical status. 
In the eyes of others, the Pillar is complex and highly specialised. We see this when 
people from SSA refer to it. Thus, the Pillar is used for reference purposes in 
interactions as an objective source of knowledge, an analysis which gains legitimacy 
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from the fact that coproducers of the report recommendations are civil servants from 
the municipality. Being complex, specialised and difficult to grasp, the Pillar is 
difficult to challenge in the daily interactions. Thus, ND uses the pillar to direct the 
sensemaking in specific interactions. It is no coincidence that one of the most 
involved civil servants from ND has often made comments like this: “The Pillar has 
been our bible. I often return to it, the analytical points are brilliant.” In the very 
confusing process, the Pillar report generates sense to ND, it acts as a storage and 
repertoire of meaning which is otherwise difficult to remember and navigate in on a 
daily basis.    
The sensemaking advantage in interactive settings is indicated in the quote below:   
”we are now working to get an organized municipality in the horizontal pillar (...) 
basically there is a high correlation between tasks in disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
and in the social housing sector. (…) And the nature of the task is to look at cross-
cutting and interdisciplinary efforts.” (ND, civil servant, I4)” 
Here we see how an ND civil servant clearly couples the Governance Dialogue and 
the Pillar, using the rhetoric of the Pillar to understand and conceptualize to others 
what the governance dialogue should be about. 
Another ND representative involved in the Governance Dialogue explains the 
connection between the pillar and the Governance Dialogue like this:  
“R: Because we had to implement ‘the Pillar’, we had these project meetings where 
the steering committee discussed how many resources they had. And we ended up 
having four meetings in the project (...) We have tried to create an organisational 
framework. This makes it possible to reuse the thoughts from The Horisontal Pillar-
report. And now that we are moving into the larger organisational structure, it 
becomes an even greater challenge to ensure that the intellectual baggage does not 
disappear more and more. It is clear that we would probably still, at the very end, 
be able to see the main lines, but it could end up being nothing but guidelines. 
Because, after all, many thoughts have been made. 
I: Is it a challenge do you think? That you have learned a lot and you have struggled 
a lot with implementation and how to then get the package transferred to the new 
design? 
R: Yes. And it is especially a great challenge if changes occur in the entries in the 
working group, project, etc. Because you cannot really remember the arguments for 
the various proposals. And before you know of it, you may soon become convinced 
that some of the other models might be just as good and so there is a risk of losing 
the common thread.” (ND, Special consultant, I10) 
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Here we see that in an interaction setting, only four meetings are permitted by the 
steering committee to implement part of the Pillar in the Governance Dialogue. 
What the quote says is that ND is highly involved in making a coherent story about 
what the project is about, influencing the processes, so that the Pillar thoughts are 
used to influence the much bigger Governance Dialogue process, especially 
concerning the organisational form of the Governance Dialogue. Here, ND is 
fighting for an enlarged horizontal ‘Pillar’, running across all seven administrations 
at three levels. The quote also illustrates the fragility of sensemaking: when new 
people become involved, the influence disappears. Thus, new people need to be 
introduced to the thoughts of the Pillar again and again, and representatives from 
ND who know the arguments in detail need to be present constantly in order to 
exercise influence.     
The Social Reserve funds 
The example with The Social Reserve Funds has already been explained above. 
From the data we know very little of this site of interaction. Here we see how 
forceful the giving sense is: a new perspective on The Funds is taken, in which funds 
produce isolated layers of project activities in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, 
which actually breeds fragmentation instead of coordination. In order to create 
coordination, funds need to support what is already going on in the neighbourhoods. 
However, this attempt of making and giving sense was not accepted. As the SSA 
interviewee mentions, this perspective was seen as an act of turf imperialism and as 
‘extra-layer’-disturbance. Despite this, ND used this site of interaction to connect 
with the more powerful Finance Administration (FA), thus trying to influence FA’s 
‘Safe City’-strategy.  
6.7.1. WHY ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN THE ABILITY TO 
GIVE SENSE? 
When comparing the different sites of interaction in terms of why making and 
giving sense was possible, we will come up with a joint answer to the leadership 
conditions for making and giving sense.  
In Figure 20 below I have summed up what we know about the ability to give sense 
in relation to different sites of interaction occurring in this phase of innovation 
project, i.e. 2008-2010. On the vertical dimension, I have put in generic key 
categories that I have discovered in the analytical sections above. One can criticise 
the categories for being somewhat self-referring and overlapping, However, I have 
found that the summarising strengths of the categories make up for their generic 
character. First of all, is bureaucratic leadership dominant in the setting in order to 
guide the interaction of participants?  Second, is the emergent leader redefining its 
role in parallel with an on-going activity? Third, is the scope of the innovation 
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project defined? Fourth, are identity issues dominant? We know by now that a 
combination of these factors has led to such severe cooperation conflicts that people 
were almost unable to cooperate. And that these cooperation conflicts thus were 
blocking the way for making and giving sense. On the horizontal dimension, the 
sites of interaction are listed. However, as the ‘X’s signify, some sites of interaction 
is too poorly referred to in field notes and interviews to be used for comparison. This 
goes for The Social Reserve funds, general discussions concerning the ‘Pillar’, and 
the steering committee.  
FIGURE 20: ABILITY TO GIVE SENSE ACROSS SITES OF INTERACTION 
 The 
Evalua-
tion Team 
The 
Map 
Team 
The 
Social 
Reser-
ve 
funds 
The 
Gover-
nance 
Dialogue 
process 
General 
discus-
sions 
concer-
ning The 
Horisontal 
Pillar 
Steering 
Commit-
tee 
Bureau-
cratic 
leadership 
dominant 
No No No Yes No No 
Emergent 
leader 
redefining 
his/her role 
through/in 
parallel 
with the 
activity 
related to 
the site of 
interaction 
Yes No Yes No X X 
Defined 
scope of 
innovation 
project 
 
No No No Yes X X 
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Identity 
issues 
dominant 
Yes No Yes No X X 
 
We can compare The Evaluation Team as a site of interaction with the remaining 
two sites of interaction mentioned by the interviewees. So, in the evaluation site of 
interaction, ND and its collaborators are up against a brick wall. Hardly any progress 
is made in the team. The Steering Committee is mobilized by ND in order to 
command progress, but with no effect.  The factor combination seems to be that first 
of all, hierarchical leadership is absent, AND the emergent leader is redefining 
his/her role through the activity level, AND the scope of innovation is not yet 
defined, AND identity issues are dominant.  
Hierarchical leadership is absent, in that the steering committee is unable to provide 
guidance for the civil servants. Instead, the civil servants have to make sense of the 
evaluation themselves: “We were happy lions, that’s what I prefer to call us, not 
hungry, but happy, lions, forced to fight amongst ourselves”, as a frustrated SSA-
interviewee states (SSA, civil servant, I8). Making and giving sense is complicated 
by the fact that ND and EIA change team members; new people are brought in that 
re-interpret the situation. What we see from the analysis of the empirical material is 
that first, ND takes the position as a leader who firmly believes that the 
recommendations from the Pillar-report are implementable in a straight-forward 
manner. However, when implementation is started, things turned out differently, the 
evaluation tool did not deliver as hypothesised, new people were brought in to 
provide more power to the ND office, context factors conditioned the purpose of the 
evaluation tool, since other actors were also engaged in a larger, national evaluation 
of the ‘Comprehensive Plans’. 
Thus, the original purpose of the evaluation tool is no longer feasible, and an ND 
employee is being sent on an evaluation course, with the implication that instead ND 
starts to see its own role as that of a ‘co-evaluator’ of both the Comprehensive Plans 
of the social housing organisations, but also the municipal role and its ‘systems 
ability’ to collaborate across administrative boundaries. Thus, as an emergent leader, 
and by means of entrepreneurship and sensemaking, ND adapts and redefines its 
role and its identity through the evaluation activity. This is experienced by SSA as a 
mysterious turn-around, propelling issues of identity issues: Who is in charge, what 
is the role of ND, and who decides what the purpose of The Evaluation Team is? 
Finally, in the eyes of collaborators the scope of the innovation project is still a 
mystery: what is the purpose of the Pillar, will it provide us with value, and who will 
ultimately gain from the innovation project? Well, obviously TEA, but how about 
the citizens and the participating administrations? In this respect, the members of 
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The Evaluation Team are interpreting their activity in the light of the overall purpose 
of the ‘Pillar’-project.     
Now we turn to The Map Team for comparison. The difference here is that as an 
emergent leader, ND does not redefine its role through the further development of 
the Map, and identity issues are not perceived of as dominant. Yes, much talk and 
sensemaking regarding the purpose of the map are found, but overall, there is a 
shared ‘we’ in the group, and there are no battles around a fixed tool. Thus, despite 
the absence of hierarchical leadership, progress is being made. What seems to 
further propel the progress of The Map Team is that ND has learnt something from 
the inertia of The Evaluation Team. As a consequence of the absent hierarchical 
leadership, in the future ND will take a more firm leadership position, backed up by 
a development grant from its own organisation. In conclusion, no explicit attempt of 
making and giving sense is made here by ND, in that the ND civil servant involved 
is not really aware of the overall nature of the ‘Pillar’ project. As a consequence, the 
Map as a director of sensemaking is much more subtle, in that it takes on the 
character of an easy ‘win-win’ for the involved administrations, while 
simultaneously underpinning the spatial discourse of the Pillar.  
Finally, we have the Governance Dialogue process. Here, ND is successful in 
heavily influencing sensemaking. ND’s ‘sister’-office, ‘The office of Social 
Housing’ are formally running the process. Bureaucratic leadership is heavily 
present due to the legislative commissioning of the process. At this point, ND does 
not redefine its role through the activity, since much of the past process can be re-
used. The scope of the project is also well-defined, in that the Governance Dialogue 
requires close cooperation between the social housing organisations and the 
Municipality, requiring a powerful organisational set-up. Finally, identity issues do 
not seem to dominate. The office of Social Housing is praised for its skills in 
exemplary process management, both by ND and SSA. It is also clear that this is a 
process run by TEA, since the supervision of social housing standards etc. clearly 
falls within TEA turf.  
The comparison shows that between The Evaluation Case and the Governance 
Dialogue, large contrasts exist. In the Governance Dialogue interaction, questions of 
roles are never brought up by the interviewees. Turf-fights are not displayed by EIA 
and SSA concerning the blurry boundaries of the innovation project. We also see 
ND in a more withdrawn role, leaving the process management to The office of 
Social Housing. And finally, the process of the Governance Dialogue receives 
bureaucratic attention, making bureaucratic leadership dominant and engaged.  
In between these two sites we have The Map Team. The ND civil servant engaged 
does not at the outset have a clear agenda concerning the way in which to develop 
the Map. In contrast to The Evaluation Team, no attempts were made here to give 
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sense, only to have people involved. In this site ND does not redefine its role 
through the activity to make a change in direction. Thus, the conclusion concerning 
the ability to give sense from the bottom and up seems, at this point in the analysis, 
to be that the decisive factors are whether or not the appointed leader redefines 
his/her role through/in parallel with the activity, while at the same time trying to 
influence sensemaking from the leadership position of a value-based implementer.  
 
6.7.2. SUMMING UP 
 At the beginning of this section, I assumed that a causal relation 
exists between leadership recognition and the ability to give sense. The main logic 
behind this was that when an entrepreneurial unit initiates a change process within 
the conception of its own narrow profession, uncertainty will dominate, and a 
bureaucratic leadership void will arise, with the implication that the bottom-up unit 
will have an unsteady mandate.  
In order to acquire a more powerful and steady mandate, the bottom-up unit is 
forced to direct the sensemaking of collaborators. In order to do so, the bottom-up 
unit has to fill out the bureaucratic leadership void by building up a leadership 
position itself. This assumption is to some extent confirmed: when the Governance 
Dialogue is initiated, innovation and collaborative uncertainty disappear, 
bureaucratic leadership is dominant, and the process is running smoothly, compared 
to The Evaluation Case. As one of the ND interviewees states: “we are about to be 
part of mainstream”, i.e. the normal strategic life of the organisation.  
At the end of February 2010, in alliance with The office of Social Housing, ND was 
about to be recognised as a leader, in that the offices had initiated a strategy process 
for initiating the Governance Dialogue, which in the end was going to have political 
implications for all administrations. However, at this point, the process was still only 
in its infancy. The Governance Dialogue stands in stark contrast to The Evaluation 
Team. ND’s leadership is not accepted, a fight between TEA and SSA is initiated, 
concerning whether the innovation project of the Pillar is still being developed, and 
thus possibly redefined, or whether the project is indeed ready to be implemented. In 
this respect, I would argue that ND is still not recognised as a leader, i.e. ND is not 
seen as a sufficiently powerful actor to fill out the bureaucratic leadership void, and 
is thus incapable of making and giving sense in this site of interaction.  
This leads to conflicting sensemaking attempts, which renders the innovation project 
doubtful and the leadership illegitimate. Being successful in making and giving 
sense in other sites, however, enables ND to acquire recognition. Thus, this section 
concerning the direction of sensemaking makes an important contribution to the 
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research question, in that it tells us about the mutual interplay between leadership 
position and making and direction of sensemaking.  
The character of this interplay is vital for being recognised as a leader, thus enabling 
the direction of sensemaking. An important general finding is, as seen in this case, 
that profession-based, collaborative innovation focused, informal leadership cannot 
entirely substitute the formal, bureaucratic leadership. Recognition is further 
acquired when the informal leadership is connected to formal leadership.  
Another important finding that provokes resistance is that ND is redefining its 
leadership position through the activities it is performing, provoking uncertainty 
concerning the direction of the innovation journey. Also, an important finding is 
that, due to its innovative character, the blurry and undefined boundaries of ND’s 
project provoke resistance and uncertainty.           
 
 DISCUSSION 6.8
In this section, I relate the empirical findings to my own expectations, and to the 
way in which they answer the research question. In the discussion section in Chapter 
8, I make a more elaborate discussion concerning how the findings across Analysis 
A and B can be interpreted and situated within existing research.  
My own expectations regarding conflict points when exercising bottom-up 
collaborative innovation leadership were to some extent met in the analysis of The 
Evaluation Case. This was particularly so concerning conflicts around whether the 
project is really a value-contributing innovation, and whether the solution is the 
most appropriate one. I believe that these are fundamental challenges for most 
innovations. And the findings are in alignment with single-organisational 
comparative studies (Van de Ven, 1999).  
My own expectations concerning the emergence of leadership were somewhat more 
abstract, due to the fact that I have not found other studies with the same approach 
as in this thesis. I would have expected conflict concerning who should be in charge, 
and I had also expected that to some extent the lead unit would have been more 
confused about what they themselves were doing. Concerning the first issue, these 
conflicts appear to a high extent in The Evaluation Case. What was somewhat of a 
surprise was how ambivalent the exercise of bottom-up innovation leadership was, 
in that in my interpretation and presentation of rationalities, the criticism from 
collaborators was highly rational and understandable. 
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I find that the descriptive approach of a discourse analytical approach is highly 
relevant in such a setting. The discourse approach enables us to understand how the 
recognition of ND’s innovation project and their leadership is acquired by different 
means.  These means are both strategic and power related. But leadership is also 
acquired through actual struggles of meaning, in which it is by no means possible as 
researcher to have an objective point of assessment to judge to what extent and in 
what ways the involved actors are ‘right’ concerning their approach to ND and their 
innovation project. In this respect, my answer to the research question fully counters 
the possible favourable bias towards ND and the ambitions that could have been a 
consequence of my methodological choices of focusing narrowly on ND’s 
leadership construction.  
Concerning the second issue, I would have expected ND to be more in doubt or 
confused about their own project, due to the fact that they themselves would fall 
victims to the mounting uncertainties stemming from both wicked problems and 
innovation processes. What this analysis demonstrates is that despite its obscurity 
and unapproachableness in the eyes of collaborators, the biblical status of the 
research report ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ has provided ND with a firm belief that the 
recommendations were natural implications of the development of their own 
development. So, despite the fact that ND is indeed also a victim of uncertainty, this 
is mainly concerned with their own identity development, not with doubting whether 
or not their project is sound.  
This firm belief is a key factor for enabling ND to break the typical collaborative 
inertia (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). What was somewhat surprising in this analysis 
was thus that to a high extent ND’s sensemaking circled around an interpretation of 
themselves and their own role in the inter-organisational landscape. In a sense, we 
have the metaphoric image of the innovation project ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ being 
pushed forward by ND, while ND as a small office to some extent have difficulties 
redefining its identity soon enough to keep up with the speed of the process. We see 
here, and this is important, how difficult it is for a small, newly established office to 
both exercise and make leadership at the same time. This match between the 
introduced micro-discourse and the subject position is earned through harsh conflicts 
in which ND perceives of itself as a development focused leader and is being 
recognised as such a leader.   
If we now turn to issues of ownership of the innovation project, I would have 
expected that bureaucratic management would have played a more dominant role in 
settling disputes and showing direction. What is surprising in this analysis is how 
distanced management is, and how much space for manoeuvring ND and their 
collaborators have. This may have been a deliberate management decision made by 
the steering committee, but it is quite striking that such a leadership vacuum exists 
between the administrations. This is an important finding, in that on the one hand it 
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provides ND with space for developing a leadership position, but on the other hand 
it also amplifies conflicts.  
Finally, concerning the direction of sensemaking, I would have expected that the 
somewhat complex strategy report of ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ would have generated 
resistance. This was also the case, but what was an important finding was how 
influential the novel concepts written down in the report actually was in such change 
processes. In this respect, ND acquired influence, not by necessarily translating 
concepts into a shared frame of reference, but rather by explaining the concepts and 
the purpose of the innovation project again and again in a way that proposes a 
profession-based, highly specialised perspective on a new way in which to handle 
the wicked problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.   
In the next section, I conclude on Analysis A.  
 
 CONCLUSION: POSITIONAL DEVELOPMENT  6.9
In this section I summarise and conclude on the findings in the analysis above. I do 
this by presenting leadership dilemmas and the actions (not) taken by ND. I answer 
the research question:  
How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition 
in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
Leadership is recognised in The Evaluation Case first of all by making and giving 
sense. The direction of sensemaking requires the production of ‘texts’, in this 
embedded case,  the ‘Pillar’-report; but also concepts made in the process. These 
texts are produced by means of entrepreneurship. The analysis of The Evaluation 
Case shows that some elements of the texts function as sources of legitimacy for the 
emergent leader, allowing ND to give sense.  
ND positions itself as a unit which responds to the needs of the ‘locals’. ND knows 
of these needs inform its close contact with local stakeholders through its 
professional work. Another source of legitimacy derives from presenting a project 
which has as its focus the promotion of collaboration across the administrative units. 
Furthermore, standardized project management which assumes ownership by doing 
most of the development work itself is another source of leadership legitimacy, 
which moves ND closer to attaining the status of a recognised leader. And finally, 
merging the Pillar and the Governance Dialogue is a major source of legitimacy, in 
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that bureaucratic leadership, including political leadership, provides formal 
leadership legitimacy to ND’s innovation project.  
Another aspect of making and giving sense is to make sense in an environment of 
uncertainty. ND firmly believes that its innovation project is a natural implication of 
its own profession. For this reason, ND’s sensemaking activities are to a high extent 
not focused on their own role in relation to collaborators. This identity turbulence 
also makes the boundaries of the innovation project more blurry, and is thus 
perceived of as a threat by some collaborators. In this case there is intense dialectic 
between the resistance to ND’s attempts to give sense and ND’s reflection on its 
own identity. There is a mismatch between ND’s perception of itself as a 
development unit and being recognised as such a unit.  
So despite the sources of legitimacy present in the case, the combination of the 
sources allows for discursive resistance. The innovation project is by some 
positioned as a mega-plan with a confusing content in which the value for the locals 
is highly dubious, and with blurry boundaries. TEA is positioned as turf ‘greedy’. 
The link between the sources of legitimacy and ND’s emergent leadership is 
basically questioned, causing both project and leadership to be illegitimate. ND is 
positioned as a unit which acts as a leader, but should only coordinate. And even this 
coordinative role is questioned, in that too much coordination actually exists; 
perhaps the local working professionals would fare better if they managed the 
transversal way of working themselves in their current micro-organisations.  
Furthermore, ND is perceived of as an unprofessional process manager, who says 
something but suddenly changes its course when new people are employed, and 
when new insights are acquired. All points of conflict contribute to pointing out 
discursive subject positions of leadership recognition: they reflect collaborative 
expectations, though sometimes inconsistently, to how such leadership ought to act. 
As a consequence ND is undergoing a positional development from ‘value-based 
implementer’ to ‘developing coordinator’. 
The leadership dilemmas are:  
1. How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical structures? 
This dilemma presents itself repeatedly through the interviews. The vertical chain of 
command produces politically defined professional boundaries and turf that are 
clashing with horizontal concepts introduced in the Pillar report and by ND in the 
process. This is leading to the question: what is to be coordinated, and how? The 
response is a division of labour between TEA and the administrations with a focus 
on clients. This distinction reduces conflict. In the process, a distinction is socially 
produced that develops administrative identities. TEA has as working unit the ‘city 
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area’, whereas SSA and EIA have the ‘individual’, i.e. the citizen. This distinction 
involves much more than just a definition of working unit, it also defines roles and 
identity. TEA/ND are focusing on organisational, coordinative aspects of the ‘area’, 
attained by means of facilitation, and therefore have no responsibility for the 
individuals in a professional sense. In contrast, SSA defines itself as a non-area 
administration with individuals as their responsibility, attained by means of a deeply 
specialised professionalism. Thus, this dilemma pushes towards an area-based 
coordinator.  
As I will demonstrate in the analysis of the ‘Policy Formulation’ case, this 
distinction becomes part of the policy, at least in some of the early drafts, called the 
‘Mercedes-sign’, in that it symbolizes three different administrative types of work in 
the disadvantaged areas: individually focused development activities, area focused 
development activities, and the daily operations activities. The ‘Mercedes-sign’ 
merges two logics: the division of labour-distinction and the perception introduced 
by ND: that two different, sometimes conflicting, layers exist in the disadvantaged 
neighbourhood: project layers and the daily operations activities of the municipality.   
 
2. How to satisfy collaborative demands for a clear leadership position and 
direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring 
shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation? 
This dilemma manifests itself firmly in The Evaluation Team. AS a new, young 
office, ND starts out with an idea that the “Pillar”-report has easily implementable 
recommendations. However, when testing the recommendations in real life, things 
turn out differently. This generates the impression of a somewhat rigid leadership-
figure that holds on to the report recommendations until a new, more experienced 
employee is brought in, which leads to redevelopment of the evaluation tool. This 
change of leadership course generates much frustration amongst SSA participants. 
This experience makes ND realise what it means to be a development unit: that it is 
a ‘learning-by-doing’-process in which everything cannot be planned in advance. 
This experience of conflict in The Evaluation Team leads first of all to a ‘shared 
third’ conception of the way of working together – that the collaborators are part of 
a ‘learning’-process in which phase-position cannot be known in advance, only in 
retrospect. The experience, which is also reflected in other of the work packages of 
the ‘Pillar’-report, alters ND’s positioning of itself. It no longer positions itself as an 
implementer (of the Pillar), but as a developer (in which a space of something 
‘unplanned’ exists between strategy and realization of the strategy).  
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3. How to satisfy collaborative demands of clear leadership position and 
direction while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and 
influence? 
This dilemma shares some features with the dilemma above. This dilemma 
manifests itself for ND as a kind of illogical collaborative demand: “we want you to 
take charge and to make our own clear structure so that we don’t become confused – 
but we want to influence the way of taking charge, and we want to co-construct the 
structure we are about to build”. This is the most delicate dilemma seen in the 
analysis of The Evaluation Case, and it remains unresolved. The dilemma is rooted 
in the fact that the informal leadership of ND cannot totally substitute bureaucratic 
leadership. The dilemma disappears for a moment when ND merges its Pillar Project 
with the Governance Dialogue, but it re-enters the stage later on, as displayed by the 
analysis of the ‘Policy Formulation process’. ND as a sensemaker fills out the 
bureaucratic leadership void by making and giving sense: convincing people of the 
coordination problems in the disadvantaged areas, using sources of legitimacy as 
discursive positions to convince collaborators and would-be stakeholders, such as 
the social housing organisations. However, the leadership is not enough to fill out 
the void, conflicts emerge because the leadership can always be perceived as 
illegitimate, in that the direction of sensemaking provokes resistance, invoking re-
interpretation of both innovation project and leadership.   
Instead, ND manages the dilemma by trying different tactical moves in order to 
circumvent the dilemma when it emerges. Hardy & Phillips argue that when 
thinking of the relationship of discourse and power from an agent perspective, 
agents can mobilize resources as a type of action that influences struggles for 
meaning. They call this mobilization of resources ‘episodic power’.1   
ND’s management of this dilemma can be seen as a way of using episodic power.  
First of all, some work packages of the Pillar are successfully implemented, moving 
the implementation process forward, despite stalemate in The Evaluation Team. 
Presumably, acquiring recognition in some sites of interaction pushes the process 
forwards, making critique more and more risky. 
                                                          
 
1  Hardy & Phillips (2004) define this type of power as: ‘the use of the formal power 
and authority, the manipulation of scarce resources, coalition, co-optation, and even 
physical coercion that are part and parcel of everyday life” (p. 306).  
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Second, ND holds on to the overall wisdom of the Pillar, ‘patience-ing’ people out 
by means of entrepreneurship, re-interpreting the evaluation solution, suggesting 
new options for improvement.  
Thirdly, as seen in the future events in The Map Team, ND tries to position itself as 
a less inclusive, setting up a more firm frame for collaboration. Fourth, ND uses its 
ally EIA to demonstrate the willingness to demonstrate that not only TEA is in 
favour of the change. Thus, in some instances EIA and TEA agree that some 
proposals should be delivered by EIA, even though TEA has also shared in their 
production.   And fifth, as seen in the Governance Dialogue, ND uses bureaucratic 
leadership as a way of legitimizing the implementation of some of their own ideas; 
by heavily making and giving sense in the Governance Dialogue, ND is able to 
create successful proposals for a new, powerful, cross-administrative structure, 
commissioned at the highest level (mayor-level). This is a structure in which the 
design is in line with The Horisontal Pillar-recommendations, albeit at a much 
higher level than anticipated.  The approval of this cross-administrative structure 
leads to the next step, in which ND and its allies in the TEA suggest that the new 
structure should also have its own policy, a ‘Policy for area-based programs in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods’.     
 
4. There is a risk of integrating development work too much in the day-to-day 
operations. How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in 
such a way that development work still remains? 
This dilemma has not yet manifested itself very clearly, and it is only mentioned 
directly by one ND civil servant. However, the dilemma becomes crucial to address 
when the Policy for Disadvantaged Areas is formulated.  
 The dilemma is rooted in the fact that ND is trying to maintain a 
middle position. One extreme in this position is maintaining a vital element of their 
profession: Area-based programs as an experimental profession, i.e. the ability to 
introduce new solutions for dealing with local problems in the disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. At the other extreme is the image and rhetoric introduced by ND 
itself: that a problem with the municipal way of governing the disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods has been a too heavy reliance on externally funded activities, 
producing a split in layers between daily operations activities and project activities. 
The ‘Pillar’ proposes to merge these layers by moving the project activities closer to 
the governance logic of the day-to-day operations in the municipality. This could 
create more efficiency, in that the projects are adapted to already existing policies 
and strategies, thus contributing to these goals. However, are the projects still 
supposed to suggest new solutions, and what to do with these new solutions? We 
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begin to see the contours of a split in the area-based approach: one actor still 
operating as before, running area-based programs at the local level; and a central-
administrative, organisational restructuring process focused on enhancing horizontal 
and holistic municipal administrative processes around the city area. At this point, 
these two actors of the area-based approach are not related to each other in that the 
central-administrative restructuring has not been completed. At this point, the 
dilemma remains unsolved.  
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CHAPTER 7.                          
ANALYSIS B: THE POLICY 
FORMULATION CASE 
In this section I analyse how ND and collaborators managed to formulate a cross-
administrative policy. I will demonstrate in the analysis below how vulnerable The 
Policy Formulation process was for ND as an office that wanted to give sense in a 
collaborative innovation context conditioned by uncertainty, both in terms of 
making progress and in terms of maintaining a mandate for the policy. And I will 
explain how the overcoming of this challenge of leadership can be explained by 
using the BUCIL model.   
The analysis answers the research question:  
How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition 
in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
  
The analysis is structured as follows: First I describe the process of The Policy 
Formulation. The purpose is to provide the reader with a line of events. Second, I 
present my findings in the Findings-table (Figure 21). I use this table to structure the 
analysis.  
The first part of the analysis is concerned with entrepreneurship; in this section I 
want to describe how entrepreneurship exercised by bottom-up leadership introduces 
certain discursive concepts that condition the positional development required for 
ND to be recognised as a collaborative innovation leader. I first analyse the type of 
uncertainty in question; second, who is acting proactively? Third, how do 
combinations of concepts generate a specific context for The Policy Formulation 
process, a context that conditions future lines of conflict and sources of legitimacy 
of leadership?   
The second part of the analysis relates to leadership recognition; in this section I 
want to demonstrate how the specific context generated by entrepreneurship 
generates a requirement for developing a new leadership position.  
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The third part of the analysis deals with making and giving sense; in this section I 
take the liberty to draw on the analytical points already made. I do this by analysing 
which of the discursive concepts, introduced by bottom-up leadership, are turned 
into social objects, i.e.  becoming collaboratively accepted, and which of the 
introduced concepts meet resistance.  
Finally, I conclude by describing the positional development of ND. I do this by re-
interpreting the analysis, abstracting the findings into the most fundamental 
leadership dilemmas that condition the positional development of ND as the 
collaborative innovation leader.  
  
 PROCESS DESCRIPTION 7.1
In this section I give a short description of the key events in the policy process 
studied.  
As marked with bold in Figure 21 below the Policy formulation process began in 
2010 and was finally approved of in December 2011.  
FIGURE 21: TIMELINE - THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE 
Year and headline Description of output 
2007: Initiation of 
strategy process 
Support is acquired for initiating a strategy process 
concerning the increasing number of area-based programs 
2008: Approval of 
strategy report 
Approval of strategy reportxxxi;  
Merging of area-based offices 
New name and leader for the newly established office - 
Neighbourhood Development 
2009: Implementation 
of strategy report 
recommendations 
 
*Cross-administrative  qualitative evaluation practice of 
the social housing sectors ‘Comprehensive Plans’ 
Cross-administrative quantitative monitoring practice: 
‘The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map’xxxii 
Consolidation of the area-based remit in 
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TEA/Neighbourhood Development 
2010: New legislation: 
The Governance 
Dialogue. 
New cross-
administrative 
organisation,  
partnership, and 
commission for policy 
New Intra-Municipal Governance structure implemented 
New Partnership Forum Created between municipality 
and social housing sector 
Terms of reference acquired for a cross-administrative 
policy  
*Initiating policy formulation process 
New demands for municipal approval of the social 
housing sector’s  ‘Comprehensive Plans’xxxiii 
2011: Policy Approval *Policy formulation process continued 
A change in commission 
*“Policy for Disadvantaged Areas in Copenhagen” is 
approved ofxxxiv 
2012: Policy 
Implementation 
 
Three out of six ‘Development Plans’ are approved of in 
the 2012-budget negotiations in  The City of 
Copenhagenxxxv 
 
In the analysis of The Evaluation Case, I described how ND influenced the cross-
administrative process of implementing the Governance Dialogue. Part of this 
influence was to give sense in such a way that the organisational structure for the 
Governance Dialogue was in accordance with the concepts and recommendations 
introduced in ’The Horisontal Pillar’.  I also described how ND, in a front-stage 
fashion, altered its leadership position, exemplified by ND’s constant re-
interpretation of the knowledge that should be generated in the evaluation in order to 
match its emerging leadership position as an organisational developer and 
coordinator.  
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In June 2010, this new organisational structure was approved of (‘Udkast til 
Kommisorium for Borgmesterforum’; ‘baggrund for politik for udsatte byområder’). 
In September 2010, the Board of Mayors decided that a ‘policy for area-based 
programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods’ should be made with The Technical 
and Environmental Administration as the coordinator. In September-November 
2011, the Policy was approved of in all seven committees. December 1, 2011, the 
‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’ was finally approved of in the City Council (in 
Danish, ‘Borgerrepræsentationen’). A change  had been made in the title, signifying 
a change in policy scope: from area-based programs to disadvantaged (city) areas. A 
vital part of my analysis is to describe how this change came about due to the 
leadership-related activities of Neighbourhood Development and its allies.       
So, in April 2010, The Technical and Environmental Administration suggested that, 
besides coordinating activities with the social housing sector, the new intra-
municipal organisation should also have a policy to guide its future collaborative 
action. The Technical and Environmental Administration was commissioned by The 
Board of Mayors and The Intra-Municipal Steering Committee to run a cross-
administrative policy formulation process with the same initial aim as stated in ‘The 
Horisontal Pillar’: to produce a policy for area-based programs in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods.   
The director of the Urban Design Department in The Technical and Environmental 
Administration, ranking above ND and their middle manager, had the idea that the 
policy should be a ‘toolbox’ policy. The policy should contain all the feasible area-
based instruments (methods, activities) that had been successfully applied in the 
disadvantaged areas. This would enable the directors in the steering committee as 
well as mayors to acquire an overview concerning instruments to use in a specific 
city area, when a new disadvantaged neighbourhood or city area were documented. 
Things turned out differently, however. In the middle of The Policy Formulation 
process (March 1, 2011), this director got a new job in another municipality. In the 
municipal election in November 2009 a new mayor had been elected for The 
Technical and Environmental Administration. This new mayor did not demonstrate 
any great interest in the policy. The mayor left the position within 1.5 years, and a 
new mayor was appointed in May 2011.   
Thus, in the spring 2011, ND experienced a leadership vacuum and a new political 
leadership: their immediate superior had left, and the appointed mayor had been 
substituted. As a consequence, in this period ND gained access to the Level-2 
director in the Technical and Environmental Administration, who supported the 
Policy.  
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As a consequence of The Policy Formulation process, ND had the growing ambition 
that the policy should not just be a tool-box policy for area-based programs, but a 
policy for disadvantaged city districts. This idea was embraced and developed by the 
level-2 manager in The Technical and Environmental Administration, as well as by 
the newly appointed mayor, whom ND also made contact to. 
 
Another unforeseen event was the right-wing governmental Ghetto-plan that was 
launched in October 2010xxxvi. This plan identified 10 ghettos in Copenhagen, and 
created a demand for a counter-response from the leftist-led City of Copenhagen in 
terms of a strategy for disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This provided ND/TEA with 
a political momentum for formulating a new policy related to disadvantaged city 
districts.  
As a result of the strong vertical alliance between The Technical and Environmental 
Direction, ND, and the mayor, ND proposed that the terms of reference for the 
policy were altered, making the policy much more ambitious. This also made the 
policy much more controversial, as it was potentially conflicting with the strategic 
aims of the Lord Mayor’s Finance Administration, such as the initiative launched 
jointly by the mayors, the ‘Safe City Program xxxvii ’ and ‘Focused City 
Development’. The Safe City Program was initially seen by representatives from the 
Finance Administration as a potential rival of the Lord Mayor’s ‘Safe City 
Program’, in that this program was primarily targeting some of the same areas as 
Policy For Disadvantaged Areas, and because it was also a cross-administrative 
initiative. The ‘Focused City Development’ initiative is part of the Municipal Plan 
(‘Kommuneplanen’), the overarching planning tool for municipal development. 
TEA’s policy is seen as a potential rival, in that it covers a large part of the city, but 
other districts than Focused City Development, which focuses on developing growth 
areas. Thus, as representatives from the Finance Administration note in a policy 
formulation meeting, introducing TEA’s policy could result in a city development 
which is actually unfocused.  
At the end of the process, the ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas of Copenhagenxxxviii’ 
was approved of. The overall goals were that the areas should be ‘lifted to a general 
Copenhagen level’ by 2020, focusing primarily on generating employment and 
education for all residents. Prior to the approval, ND had been gathering policies 
from each administration in order to find sector-specific policy aims to guide the 
goal development of Policy For Disadvantaged Areas.  
So, in the final policy, each of the seven administrations have its political objectives, 
such as satisfaction with culture and leisure activities in the area, education for 95% 
of the youth, a varied resident composition etc. The means to reach these objectives 
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are preferential treatment of the areas, requiring the development of the core 
operations in the areas, shared jointly amongst all seven administrations in a 
partnership with the social housing sector. The overall tool is the so called 
‘Development Plans’: one Development Plan for each of the six disadvantaged 
areas, formulated and implemented in ‘two waves’: the first three to be drawn up in 
2012, the final three in 2013. The Development Plans were described as ‘a 
prioritisation tool for customized solutions’ (ibid., p. 28), and thus share a number of 
the holistic, context -sensitive characteristics with area-based programs, with the 
exception that the plans are developed by municipal professionals, not involving the 
lay residents. In the policy there is no economy. The volume of the development 
plans is an issue in the annual budget negotiations.   
 FINDINGS 7.2
The Findings-table (Figure 22) is an answer to the research question:  
How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition 
in a collaborative innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked 
problems? 
I start by presenting the findings from each column, from left to right. Next, I 
complete this ‘findings’-section by relating the content of these categories to the 
positional development related to leadership dilemmas.   
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FIGURE 22: FINDINGS - THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE 
Entrepreneurship:  
The production of ‘texts’, 
introducing novel concepts  
Leadership recognition: The 
social construction of the 
subject position of 
collaborative innovation leader 
Making and 
giving sense: 
Transforming 
concepts into 
social objects 
Entrepreneurship as shared and 
leadership-related proactivity: 
navigating in environments of 
institutional and substantive 
uncertainty 
Key text: ‘Policy for Disadvantaged 
Areas in Copenhagen’ 
Genre: political 
Profession: Area-based planning 
Uncertainty: institutional and 
substantive uncertainty 
 Concepts:  
Preferential treatment for the 
disadvantaged areas 
Strengthening of the core operations, 
less of  projects 
City district as planning level 
Consolidation of local networks and 
local steering committees 
The Yellow Clouds 
Individual/area-based distinction 
 
Positional development (2010-
2012): From ‘developing 
coordinator’ to ‘strategic 
implementer’.  
Leadership dilemmas: 
How to maintain both 
‘innovation’ and the 
strengthening of ‘core 
operations’ as key policy 
concepts?  
How to avoid that both policy 
and leadership are positioned as 
‘remote centralists’?  
How to avoid being positioned 
as an unstable, inconsistent 
leader? 
 
Resistance:  
No local 
decision making 
authority 
A minimal 
focus on 
innovation 
 
Acceptance:  
Change of terms 
of reference for 
the policy 
Development 
Plans 
The approval of 
the policy as 
cross-
administrative 
‘meta-policy’ 
Policy for 
Disadvantaged 
Neighbourhoods 
‘Mercedes sign’ 
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 UNCERTAINTY AS THE CONDITION OF 7.3
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, LEADERSHIP AND SENSEMAKING 
In this section, I analyse the uncertainties that dominate The Policy Formulation 
process.  My assumption is that the three types of uncertainties invoked when trying 
to solve a wicked problem through collaboration (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) 
interferes with the uncertainty of innovation journeys (Van de Ven, 1999). Overall, 
we have four types of uncertainties: substantive, institutional, strategic and journey-
related uncertainties.    
The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how these uncertainties jointly 
generate a demand for bottom-up leadership.  
  
7.4.1. SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY 
The substantive uncertainty is focused on the nature of the problem. This problem 
arises both because of a lack of information, but also due to the interpretation of 
information and the establishment of meaning (p. 19).  
This substantive uncertainty is most clearly present at the beginning of The Policy 
Formulation process, especially at The Policy Formulation meetings. Different 
layers of discussions are present simultaneously in the meetings: the meeting 
agenda, mandate and terms of reference-discussions, discussions concerning the 
problem, as well as discussions concerning the scope of the policy, and what the 
political aim should be.   
The most visible layer is a ‘meeting agenda’-structure. An ND special consultant 
structured the process by relying on project management approaches, such as 
formulating a vision and setting goals. However, the immediate output of vision-
exercises and establishing a goal-hierarchy from vision down to activities was 
disappointing, cumbersome and to some extent frustrating for some of the 
participants. It did not provide the participants with an opening for how to formulate 
a policy. As noted by the ND Consultant at one of the first meetings, the results from 
the members’ brain-storm are surprisingly vague and very general, like “having a 
green neighbourhood”, with “safe environments” and “healthy citizens”. The 
consultant reflected openly about this fact in the team:  
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"I really expect that when we finish this work, we've got ten recommendations which 
say that: ‘if you have to make an effort in such an area in which there are problems, 
then it may be most profitable to work with better education and health for kids’, ... 
(...) I was a little surprised that we actually ended up with such an abstract focus. I 
had truly believed that each of us had come up with many more [statements], such 
as ‘there should be less unemployment in my area’ or .... that each one of us really 
had contributed with more of our administrative preferences [in Danish: bagage] 
"(Policy formulation meeting, 2011, part 3) 
The quote demonstrates first of all that the administrative members are having 
difficulties in relating to the problem with their own administrative strategies, in that 
the problem to be solved is not defined. This produces inertia in the group, as none 
of the proposed goals and visions provide the team with any guidance for future 
direction.  
The ND consultant facilitating the meeting sessions says the following with regard 
to the problem:  
"What I miss is a problem formulation (...) I miss that we agree on why it is, in fact, 
that we are sitting here? Why do we have area-based interventions? (…) We'll have 
to be able to explain to people why it is essential. It is because we think there are 
some fundamental problems that need to be solved. We cannot yet explain that to 
others in words. And if we cannot do that, we cannot persuade anybody to provide 
us with a big bag of money (…) The question is that perhaps we should be careful 
not to indicate to them [decision makers] that we are about to make a huge analysis 
of these city districts, because we have no time for that in four meetings. I am aware 
that it is easier to do what you suggest, just to jump straight on to the policy level. 
But we should at least agree ... 
Team member: no, but that was not what I said. 
TEA: no, no, then it was maybe just what I heard. But ... next time we are going to 
have to agree on what types of problems we can solve with the area-based 
interventions. And the problem is that we can almost everything. This is, of course, 
the next problem. (11, part 3 – 147) " 
The quote illustrates several things going on in the team, related to the substantive 
uncertainty. First of all, that it is difficult for the team members to come up with a 
consensual agreement on what the problem is as regards the disadvantaged areas. 
Second, the team has difficulties in establishing an approach as to how to unlock this 
problem: some propose that it is necessary to conduct more in-depth analyses of city 
districts, some propose to focus only at political objectives.   
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The reasons for this vagueness is further demonstrated by discussions in which more 
fundamental types of uncertainties other than just the substantive come to the fore. 
Especially the combination of the substantive and institutional uncertainties in 
combination is difficult to handle. Here the representatives in The Policy 
Formulation Team are confused about disadvantaged areas and the supposed relation 
to the holistic character of the policy, due to the use of area-based programs.  In the 
discussion below from one of the meetings, the holistic approach of the area-based 
programs is to some extent too vague and with no narrow goal definition; therefore, 
making the policy subordinate to existing administrative strategies will not solve the 
problems either:    
“Representative CYA: "we must have a look at the strategies that we already have. 
And so we've actually also some individual policies that cut across sectors. We have 
a Children & Youth policy, which is in need of a revision here in 2011, but after all, 
it is still a policy which has been approved of by The City Council 
[Borgerrepræsentation]. And it has some statements in relation to what we are 
really thinking about, for instance that there should be decent bike paths to school ... 
and all those things. There are quite a number of things. But we also have a large 
number of other things in the individual administrations that point towards the types 
of wishes and hopes we have for each of our areas. So I think we really could use 
what we already have to inform this work here (…)  
Rep. Finance Administration: I think we should really be aware of not making a 
policy for the whole of Copenhagen. Because if we screen all of our administrations 
and strategies then yes, there must be green trees everywhere, yes there must be bike 
paths throughout the city, etc.. I also think that our last brainstorm was 
characterized by the fact that we do not yet have the answer to what types of 
problems we want to solve here (...)But otherwise the efficient goals are absent. I 
think you know that we must be able to say, uh ..the politicians should be able to go 
out there and say that ‘when I have worked in an area and put an area-based effort 
into my work, when I am leaving there are no more criminals, everyone can read, 
everybody should be able to sleep safely at night and everyone has a job. I know that 
it is unrealistic, but there must be some concrete things”…(11, part 3) 
 
The dialogue above demonstrates that the dustbin strategy for moving The Policy 
Formulation work forward is not the solution in order to formulate a policy, in that 
this will just turn the policy into a policy for everything. The general substantive 
uncertainty paralyzes the group, making it difficult for the participants to start 
formulating the policy. This uncertainty is also demonstrated rather late in The 
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Policy Formulation process, when after several meetings the ND special consultant 
again presents the issue of what the ‘problem’ to be solved is. The quote below 
demonstrates the difficulty expressed by a Finance Administration member of The 
Policy Formulation Team in an interview later on as regards the pinning down of the 
problem; this provoked discussion after discussion. And now, even when the policy 
has been approved of, it still seems to be a rather vague problem that lacks further 
clarification: 
“Well I thought how striking it was that at this advanced stage in the process we still 
could not agree on what the problem was (...)I think many colleagues were really 
frustrated at times that we chatted and chatted around things. And this part about, 
well, what's the problem? (…)And I think, in fact, still so. ... (...) Well so now we 
have formulated a problem which is that some areas are lagging behind on a 
number of socio-economic parameters (...) But we might still ask why this is a 
problem?(…) Perhaps it is really a question of where one stands politically or as a 
human being.” 
 (I20, member of The Policy Formulation Team) 
What the quote tells us is that defining the ‘problem’ of a wicked problem is 
essentially the challenge of agreeing and accepting a consensual solution, despite the 
fact that this solution is essentially a leap of faith. So, even when the problem has 
been defined, it may still be questioned whether or not the framing of the problem is 
correct. For this reason, support for solutions to a wicked problem can easily wither 
away.  
7.4.2. INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY 
Another aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the institutional aspect. Wicked 
problems cut across organisational boundaries, as well as administrative levels and 
networks. This will often result in uncertainty about process handling and the 
development of interactions with other actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004 , p. 7).  
At the beginning of The Policy Formulation process, the institutional uncertainty has 
less to do with the strategic uncertainties of collaboration; rather, it is a question of 
the mandate given as well as the implications. Many discussions focus on the wishes 
of decision makers (The Lord Mayor, Intra-Municipal Steering Committee, the 
director of Urban Design Department) and on what is expected of the team:  
“Heck I do not know what they want, specifically not with regards to this 
neighbourhood. But I do know what my politicians want, and how it should be 
presented to them, and if it is to progress further through the system, it must be 
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digestible [spiseligt]. And it will not do any good if we then choose a solution that 
transcends the policies and strategies we already have” (group interview 11, part 3) 
The quote demonstrates that The Policy Formulation process of such a wicked 
problem prompts uncertainty about mandate and what part to play in the policy 
process.  
In the quote below, the members are also discussing the division of labour 
concerning the fact that it is special consultants who develops the policy:  
“R. (a): I think that the policy should begin by having a pool [of propositions], 
which might require some changes.…. if nothing else, the Director could easily, of 
course, just remove those kinds of things. “..(group interview 11, part 3) 
 The quote reflects that the cross-administrative policy formulation challenges 
existing institutional structures, making it unclear what role the stakeholders in the 
policy process have. This is essentially an institutional uncertainty about division of 
labour and roles: what are the roles of The Policy Formulation Team members in 
this process vis á vis decision makers such as politicians and steering committee? 
The quote demonstrates institutional uncertainty about scope: how ambitious can the 
policy be? 
 
7.4.3. STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 
The third aspect of wicked problem uncertainty is the strategic uncertainty. Due to 
the unique character of perceptions held by some actors, other actors may not 
acknowledge or be aware of these; and therefore, a large variety of strategies may 
develop around a complex issue, making it difficult to predict what strategies actors 
will choose (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
This type of uncertainty is present in the entire process, but becomes visible to all at 
the end of The Policy Formulation process. To be sure, collaborative, strategic 
problems are also present at the beginning of The Policy Formulation process. This 
strategic uncertainty is a conflict regarding the nature of the coordinative unit: 
should already existing, cross-administrative policies be enhanced, or should the 
policy be further developed (see 7.6 for elaboration of this point of conflict). 
A second reason why strategic uncertainty is also generated is that ND mobilizes 
hierarchical support in its own administration to change the terms of reference for 
the policy, as I described in the introduction to The Policy Formulation case. This 
makes the policy potentially much more powerful, but also more vulnerable to 
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strategic considerations. For instance, the former director of Urban Design 
Department mentioned that is was essential that all the mayors in the Forum of 
Mayors felt that the present, now more powerful, policy was relevant to them, which 
required hard work on the parts of ND and the Centre:  
“Where there might be a little scepticism… someone asked: Haven’t we created a 
huge complicated organisational structure here, which is almost larger than what 
we had before? And we had used the argument that we needed to clean up the 
organisational proliferation.  So we insisted, ‘no, we believe this structure is 
transparent and therefore usable’. I remember when we were having the first 
meeting [in the municipality] ... If it had seemed meaningless to the actors involved 
in some of these sessions, we would have lost it, and there were signs of this. For 
example, a Children and Youth mayor saying "why am I sitting here?". And the 
Mayor of Culture was perhaps also present. In this case we then made a speedy 
decision and opted for a culture theme the next time. So, if people could not see that 
this was very important, we wouldn’t have been able to move up [to that level]. So it 
was really, really important that the meetings were prepared in detail, and that 
there was some substance in it” (...) (TEA, director, I29) 
What the quote shows is how vulnerable the policy process is in terms of 
maintaining and sanctioning support at top decision makers’ level, because of ND’ 
bottom-up leadership position. What the quote also demonstrates is the challenge of 
stabilising the mandate for the policy throughout the process. The quote further 
reflects the fundamental ambivalence of the project in terms of potential 
inconsistency: the purpose is to increase coordination by merging some of the 
unstructured organisations concerning the area-based programs  – and at the same 
time, the means to do this is a very huge internal administrative structure which is 
perceived by some stakeholders to be just as incomprehensible as the previous ones. 
And the quote demonstrates the workload that is required to give sense when the 
number of collaborators is increasing. This strategic uncertainty is reflected 
throughout the process, also at the end of The Policy Formulation process, as the 
quote below exemplifies:  
“It was about to go wrong at the end. I think the fact is that almost a week before it 
was being discussed politically, Frank Jensen [The Lord Mayor] after he had read it 
through once and had no comments, then - well, I don't know, actually, why he got 
the policy again- but he did - and said he did not agree with the vision. And it's 
called something including green growth & quality of life. And that he will not 
allow... He doesn’t want it to be called green growth, he just wants it to be called 
Growth & quality of life. And we have a mayor who puts green growth really, really 
high on the agenda. So he will not yield, and our Board of Directors will not yield, 
our CEO will not give up. And then it’s running like that for 10 days, where we 
simply do not know whether we can get it landed. And my consultant and I we’re 
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ready to do almost anything. Because if it is not being approved of jointly, then all of 
it  ... would have been for nothing, right? And then it succeeded because we found a 
compromise which was Green, Healthy and Creative Growth. (ND, middle 
manager,” I15) 
In the quote an episode is mentioned in the approval process, in which there is a 
disagreement with the lord mayor and his administration, in that Policy For 
Disadvantaged Areas used the words green growth, which the lord mayor felt was at 
odds with the Municipal Plan – even though the policy was to focus on ‘green 
growth’. What the quote tells us is that a conflict is provoked in that the two most 
powerful administrations, TEA and The Finance Administration, both want to 
promote themselves as having ‘green’ political aims, and that a conflict in this minor 
part of the policy is potentially jeopardizing the entire policy enterprise. This 
strategic uncertainty and conflict also reflects the fact that the policy has reached a 
level close to FA-turf, since it is FA that has the remit of strategic urban planning.  
 
7.4.4. INNOVATION UNCERTAINTY 
Finally, the fourth aspect is the risk-taking end-point uncertainty, i.e. Van de Ven’s 
uncertainty of the journey (Van de Ven, 1999). Will it work? What is this ‘it’, i.e. 
where will the journey take us? Are we on the right track, or are we really on a 
detour? 
This is keenly discussed in The Policy Formulation Team:  
"And so I think maybe we should have a discussion on what it is then ... What are we 
doing here? Is it a policy? Or is it to dig further down and provide them with 
something else, which in fact are, perhaps, recommendations for something? But a 
policy is something that is located higher up and not at the level of a real plan for 
action." (policy formulation meeting, I11, part 3) 
Several interviewees mention this uncertainty of the journey during the interviews. 
One consultant argues that the process was ‘very unclear’ from the beginning (I25). 
Also, an ND consultant argues that in fact there were very wide boundaries for the 
policy process, with no direction to begin with, which generated much uncertainty:  
“I: Did you experience periods or critical situations when you really had to make an 
extra effort to perform some type of leadership, or when some precarious situations 
arose where there were doubts about the direction in which to go? 
 297 
 
R: there were many. There was the whole start-up phase [of the policy], when I was 
thinking "now we have these sessions, now we almost have to, you know, guess what 
our task was, right?” And we were fidgeting a bit, thinking we should try to start the 
group up in a good way and get them… build some social relationships and so on, 
with Christmas cards. With Christmas cards and mulled wine and so on.(…)So it 
was about putting the train on the right track and then there was this uncertainty: 
what type of task should we get started with, concerning resources and all that? 
There might have been many directions to take. And also because, well, it is quite 
clear that none of us had said in advance "this is where we’re going, ya’ll.[In 
Danish: Hvor skal vi hen, du]" Exactly. 
I: I'm actually a little unsure about how much liberty you had in the group? 
R: a very great deal” (ND, Special consultant, I19) 
 
What the quote tells us is that the direction of the policy was very uncertain to begin 
with, which is linked to the wicked problem uncertainty, in that decision makers 
themselves have no very fixed idea of the purpose of the policy. The team ends in a 
leadership vacuum, much like in The Evaluation Case, in which it is up to the team 
themselves to decide how ambitious the policy is supposed to be, and what the 
purpose of this should be.  
Another interviewee mentions that the existing solution may only be temporary, and 
in fact is a transition model, in that the Intra-Municipal Governance structure is too 
heavy (see section 7.5.1.2). A third interviewee speculates whether the Intra-
Municipal Governance set-up is proposed with the intention of paving the way for a 
different administrative structure with only one mayor, a so-called unity-
administration as a solution to cross-administrative collaboration problems:  
“R: It is about the issue of the seven mayors and this underlying silence all the way 
through – is it in fact an exercise of paving the way for a unity-administration in the 
long run?.  This issue is also present… 
I: you mean that it is a sort of proto-type or a model or what are you thinking? 
R: I don't know if it’s something like that, but it is definitely something down that 
road ...Whether it has been said out loud so explicitly in some places at any time, I 
will not be able to say. But if you look generally at what is going to happen, then this 
process fits in very well as a guinea pig in relation to... well yes just all the hurdles 
that you were faced with when so many administrations must work together. But at 
the same time also, what is it that we get out of it?” (CYA, civil servant, I24)  
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What the quotes tell us is that it is very difficult for collaborators, ND included, to 
figure out what the result of the process will be, and whether the project has actually 
been completed or is a precursor of something else. This also makes it difficult for 
some collaborators to make up their minds concerning whether or not to support the 
innovation project. As a consequence, the combination of the institutional and 
journey-related uncertainties allows ND to continue developing and running their 
innovation project, with the hesitant consent of collaborators.   
 
7.4.5. SUMMING UP 
Wicked problem uncertainty in a collaborative innovation context calls for answers 
that make sense to collaborators. In order to produce these sensemaking answers, a 
recognised leader is required who is able to produce and introduce new concepts. 
Four different types of uncertainty have been applied to map out a trajectory of 
uncertainties. 
 The analysis above contributes to answering the research question in 
several ways. First of all, the analysis demonstrates that the combined uncertainties 
of the substantive and institutional aspects at the beginning of The Policy 
Formulation process have a paralyzing effect on the participants. The participants 
are in need of producing answers that make sense; however, the ND facilitated 
framework does not in itself enable the participants to move forward. In fact, the 
participants are making such slow progress that the political support for the policy is 
about to wither away. This paralysis calls for leadership that is able to generate a 
direction for collaborators.  
Second, the analysis demonstrates that as a consequence of ND and the efforts of 
allies to alter the terms of reference for the policy, strategic uncertainty dominates 
the conclusion of The Policy Formulation process, in that the more ambitious policy 
is potentially in conflict with already established plans and strategies of the 
Financial Administration. This is an important finding, in that this change of 
uncertainty context calls for more strategic types of leadership and action.  
And third, at the conclusion of The Policy Formulation process, when the policy was 
approved, the uncertainty of the journey characteristic of innovations was dominant: 
collaborators try to figure out where they are in the process; is Policy For 
Disadvantaged Areas and Cross-Municipal Governance the final solution, or is this 
solution only a temporary model, already in transition? What this finding tells us is 
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that the leadership displayed by ND in The Policy Formulation process generates the 
need for new collaborative answers in a highly strategic environment.    
There are several steps in this trajectory of uncertainties: first a phase of substantive 
& institutional uncertainty within a defined terms of reference and ownership; 
second, a strategic and journey-related uncertainty in which a solution has been 
defined, but in which the future is uncertain, and in which the policy is perceived of 
as a strategy that is competing with other strategies. All in all, the combination of 
the substantive and institutional uncertainties impact the team’s ability to make 
visions and goals, and thus the kind of product that should be produced. Should this 
be a product which is non-controversial, in that the product has already been defined 
as being focused on ‘what works’, and therefore is non-ambitious and already 
settled? Or should the product be more ambitious, leaving it up to the steering 
committee and other political bodies to remove unwanted parts of the policy?  
 
 
 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS SHARED AND LEADERSHIP-7.4
RELATED PROACTIVITY: NAVIGATING IN ENVIRONMENTS 
OF INSTITUTIONAL AND SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY  
In this section, I analyse how entrepreneurship exercised by bottom-up leadership 
produces and introduces discursive concepts, which may be accepted or resisted as 
making sense by collaborators. More specifically, I analyse how a specific 
constellation of entrepreneurship leads to the introduction of specific concepts. The 
function in the analysis is to show that entrepreneurship is able to introduce concepts 
that generate direction for collaborators, despite uncertainty. I also study how these 
discursive concepts condition and call for the emergence of a specific subject 
position which will cause ND to be recognised as a collaborative innovation leader. 
I first analyse the type of entrepreneurship present in the case, focusing on why 
certain types of novel concepts are being produced. I next describe how the 
production and introduction of concepts produce a discursive text that defines the 
lines of conflict and sources of legitimacy for leadership.   
Figure 23 below displays the combinations made by entrepreneurship. The table also 
displays how the combinations produce a certain context for the collaborative 
innovation process which appears to be a challenge for the collaborators. The table 
further displays the type of action applied to address the challenges created when 
altering the context. And finally, the table describes how this type of action 
contributes to producing a discursive concept in some instances. In the summing-up 
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section, I explain which of the context challenges are addressed by means of 
profession-based entrepreneurship, and which of these challenges can only be 
addressed by means of leadership. These challenges are thus socially constructed 
leadership dilemmas that require of ND to alter its leadership. In this respect, the 
table also allows us to see more clearly the differences between the two action types 
of entrepreneurship (as conceptual development) and leadership (as positional 
development).   
The analysis is structured by the two types of entrepreneurial action that I find 
dominant in The Policy Formulation case: shared proactivity and leadership-related 
proactivity. Each of these types of proactivity addresses some context challenges 
which are producing leadership dilemmas and concepts. 
 
FIGURE 23:  PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP - COMBINATIONS AND LEADERSHIP 
DILEMMAS IN THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE 
Combinations are made between the 
socially constructed objects of…. 
Process context 
produced 
Type of action 
addressing the 
context challenge 
Concept 
introduced 
Policy for area-
based programs 
in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods 
Intra-Municipal 
Governance 
How to create a 
horizontal 
infrastructure that 
can deal with a 
cross-
administrative 
policy?   
Shared proactivity ‘CUT’ 
 
The ‘Mercedes’ 
sign 
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Yellow clouds The persistence 
of the problems 
in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods 
So far, the area-
based programs 
have been too 
insufficient and 
too 
uncoordinated. 
How to make a 
more powerful 
area-based 
solution?  
How to avoid a 
situation in which 
the politicians 
see nothing but 
new types of 
‘plans’ in all 
policy proposals?  
Shared proactivity 
 
Leadership-related 
proactivity 
Development 
Plans 
 
Core operation 
 
Enhanced 
central-
administrative 
set-up 
Policy of Safe 
City (FA) 
Policy for 
Vulnerable City 
Areas 
How to avoid a 
direct conflict 
between two 
seemingly 
identical 
policies? 
Leadership- related 
proactivity 
 
Investments in 
‘Focused City 
Development’ 
(FA) 
Investments in 
‘Development 
Plans’ (The 
Technical and 
Environmental 
Administration) 
How to avoid the 
picture of an 
unfocused 
municipality with 
‘focused’ 
development 
plans in the 
entire city?  
Shared proactivity 
Leadership- related 
proactivity 
Preferential 
Treatment 
 
 
Policy for 
Vulnerable City 
Areas 
‘The 
Copenhagen 
Tale’ 
How is the 
improvement of 
physical and 
social distress 
linked to 
economic growth 
Shared proactivity Social cohesion 
 302 
 
and quality of 
life?  
‘The municipal 
core operations 
(in Danish: 
‘kernedriften’) 
The solution of 
‘the problem’ 
(Policy for 
Disadvantaged 
Areas) 
How to display 
the value of this 
solution? 
How to maintain 
both local 
innovation and 
system-
optimization in 
the policy?  
Leadership 
dilemma 
Innovating intra-
municipal 
governance 
Governmental 
ghetto-policy 
Policy response  How to produce 
an alternative 
response to the 
governmental 
‘ghetto policy’ 
Shared proactivity 
Leadership- 
Related proactivity 
 
Policy for 
Disadvantaged 
Areas 
Yellow Clouds The fear of too 
much 
coordination 
How to avoid 
being positioned 
as remote 
centralists, 
overburdening 
locally working 
professionals 
with competing 
layers of 
coordination?  
Leadership 
dilemma  
Shared proactivity  
Leadership- related 
proactivity 
Local decision 
making 
competence 
 
7.5.1. PROACTIVITY: SHARED AND LEADERSHIP RELATED 
PROACTIVITY 
In this proactivity section, I describe how this type of action to some extent enables 
the members to move forward, despite the uncertainties mentioned above.  
I find that two types of proactivity are present in the process formulation case. I call 
these ‘shared proactivity’ and the ‘leadership related proactivity’ of ND and FA.  
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The shared proactivity is formally delineated by mandate, and denotes that all 
members in The Policy Formulation Team are active in making suggestions of how 
to make a policy. The members are participating actively in order to reduce 
uncertainty and make progress, both when the policy is written and also a year after 
when the policy is approved of and becoming an organisational reality. Thus, the 
members do what they think is expected of them, which is a difficult exercise, since 
parts of bureaucratic and political leadership in the respective administrations find it 
difficult to relate to Intra-Municipal Governance (i.e. the institutional uncertainty).  
ND and FA’s proactivity, on the other hand, is much more subtle and strategic: ND 
actually manages to alter the terms of reference for the policy, altering the target unit 
of the policy: from a focus on area-based programs to a focus on disadvantaged 
areas, as is seen in the approved policyxxxix.  And ND and FA manage to avoid some 
conflicts between the two administrations, especially by developing a division of 
labour with the Safe City strategy. I call this type of proactive leadership related 
proactivity, in that this type of proactivity is closely connected to ND’s leadership 
position as policy responsible.  
7.5.2. SHARED PROACTIVITY 
The shared proactivity of The Policy Formulation Team members has two aspects. 
First of all, members in The Policy Formulation meetings are making huge efforts to 
make substantive links between policy propositions and the strategic and political 
landscape of their own administrations and the municipality in general, in order to 
ensure that the policy produced actually contributes to horizontal and vertical 
coordination, and not to more fragmentation. Second, the members, most of them 
also part of the Intra-Municipal Governance team, ‘Cross-Municipal Team’ (‘CUT’) 
(in Danish: Tværgående Team) are facing challenges with regard to establishing the 
infrastructure necessary in their own administration. The infrastructure is part of a 
municipal organisational change process, which is necessary in order to manage the 
now formalized, inter-organisational relations, generated both by the policy and the 
partnership with the housing administrations.  
I could have avoided categorizing this behaviour as a type of proactivity, since these 
members seem to be doing only what is expected of them. However, this description 
would be incomplete. As the section below will demonstrate, supported by the 
leadership emergence analysis, the members do to some extent become advocates of 
the policy and the cross-administrative vision for the municipality; and they do 
actually handle uncertainties in a very skilful way, being able to see many 
development opportunities. In this respect, to a considerable extent they have an eye 
for what (Bardach, 1996) calls ‘collaborative turf’, i.e. are able to see the 
collaborative advantages (professional, strategic, career-related) of being part of the 
collaborative innovation project. 
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 In The Policy Formulation meetings, most members contribute to 
moving the process forwards, mainly by delineating the task by tying the policy up 
to already existing policies. For instance, some suggest that they construct the policy 
in such a way that it contributes to the newly appointed Lord Mayor’s ‘The 
Copenhagen Tale’xl , a vision for the entire city of Copenhagen that focuses on 
solving the paradox that Copenhagen is one of the most attractive cities to live in, 
concerning quality of life, but is lagging behind when it comes to economic 
growthxli. Here, the members consider positioning the policy as one which improves 
the ‘social cohesion’ in the City, so that the city does not fall apart. Other 
suggestions are to position the policy as a special type of investment strategy, much 
similar to The Finance Administration’s growth-focused ‘Focused City 
Development’; or to relate it to the new policy of CYA, since many problems in the 
disadvantaged areas have to do with adolescents making the streets unsafe and 
lagging behind in terms of education. Connecting The Policy Formulation task to 
existing policies and visions is a way of providing the policy with a certain amount 
of probability for success and legitimacy, since the policy under development in this 
respect contributes to something that is already approved of by politicians. 
Accordingly, an aspect of the shared proactivity is to make linkages to other policies 
in order to have a starting point for positioning the policy in the policy landscape of 
the municipality, partly by adopting concepts.  
 In parallel with The Policy Formulation meetings, ND also seeks to 
push the agenda forward, basically by taking on more of the cumbersome job of 
writing and modifying the policy. ND also gathers policies from the other 
administrations in order to enable each administration to see its own political goals 
and strategies represented in the Policy. ND has also made a breakthrough as regards 
reducing the substantive uncertainty of The Policy Formulation Team by using the 
formerly developed data tool, ‘The Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map’, to conduct an 
area-based data analysis of the disadvantaged areas of the city. ND presents the 
surprising results of the analysis to the team, especially the finding that even though 
specific neighbourhoods of the city have been the focus of many projects and area-
based programs, the problems remain within the same city district. ND calls these 
six areas ‘The Yellow Clouds’ of the city, which reflects the conclusion that the 
problem of the city area will remain if targeted at a neighbourhood level (see image 
below).  
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Source: Policy for Disadvantaged Areas 
 
Programs need to be launched at a larger scale in the city area. This analysis thus 
supports ND’s sensemaking efforts, in which the lack of ‘coordination’ and the 
unconnected layers of ‘operations/project work’ result in nothing but shifting the 
problems round within the same city area. 
 In order to highlight this distinction between different types of municipal activities 
in disadvantaged areas, the team also introduces a figure labelled ‘the Mercedes 
sign’ (see below). The sign is a direct consequence of the conflict with The Social 
Administration, as I have demonstrated in my analysis of The Evaluation Case. 
Introducing the Mercedes sign enables the different administrations to see 
themselves in the joint policy, despite the differences in their working units. As I 
described in The Evaluation Case, most of the other administrations work at an 
individual level when making extraordinary activities in the disadvantaged areas, 
whereas ND’s administration focuses mainly on the areas. And finally, some of the 
activities in the areas are not extraordinary but are part of the municipal operations. 
As we saw in The Evaluation Case, combining and coordinating these different 
layers of initiatives are vital in order to acquire more effective problem solving.   
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Source: Policy for Disadvantaged Areas 
The Mercedes sign enables all of the administrations to perceive of their efforts as 
contributing to the same objective – preferential treatment of disadvantaged city 
districts.  
 Introducing The Yellow Clouds, preferential treatment of the ‘yellow cloud areas’ 
and the Mercedes sign is a breakthrough in the Policy Formulation Team, in that it 
gives the team an idea of what the problem to be solved by the policy should be, 
especially concerning the size of the problem. However, this also poses a potential 
problem for the team. Could the finding lead the politicians to stop all extraordinary 
activities in the disadvantaged areas, since the last 10 years of project efforts have 
seemingly been in vain? Jointly, the members support the argument, which draws on 
ND’s sensemaking, in that the uncoordinated problem solving at the local level has 
been insufficient, and that an enhanced, cross-administrative set-up is needed if the 
problems are to be dealt with. What this observation tells us is how much of the 
knowledge attained by ND in the work with The Horisontal Pillar can be used in 
order to produce a sophisticated argument.  
‘The Yellow Clouds’ becomes one of the shared concepts in the groups, and the 
identification has implications later on when the policy is finally formulated and 
implemented, in that each ‘cloud’ is to be addressed by a city area ‘Development 
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Plan’, indicating that six Development Plans should be financed by the municipal 
administrations.      
 I identify another aspect of the shared entrepreneurship in the 
retrospective interviews a year later as having the character of lobbyism, developing 
an intra-administrative infrastructure at civil servant level, as well as dealing with 
conflicting mandates.  
It is important to note that many of the permanent members of The Policy 
Formulation Team are well-known cooperation partners with ND, some also being 
part of the Pillar Project (ND, special consultant, I19). Second, as part of Intra-
Municipal Governance at three levels (mayor, director- and civil servant levels), the 
permanent members of The Policy Formulation Team are also part of the new 
organisation, meeting monthly in the ‘Cross-municipal Team’ (‘CUT’). The 
interviewees are thus part of both The Policy Formulation and Cross municipal 
Team. As the interview session demonstrates, the task of making the Policy for 
Disadvantaged City Areas and the new organisation meaningful rests with these 
civil servants/special consultants. Despite variations in position, the civil servants 
display a very autonomous behaviour, which is very similar to that of the special 
consultants: they plan much of their work themselves, having their immediate 
superior’s confidence that they are doing their jobs, and they have few routine tasks. 
As one respondent phrases it, “Most of us in the team decide for ourselves what to 
do with our time. Of course if we don’t produce anything, we have a problem, but 
otherwise…” (I20, member of Policy Formulation Team). 
What this quote tells us is that much of the cross-administrative work and its success 
or failure depends on how these consultants/civil servants manage this interaction, 
both in relation to the representatives from the other administrations and in their 
own administrations.  
One civil servant from the Health and Care Administration sees the Cross-municipal 
Team as both a channel for lobbyism and a facilitator of enhancement of elements in 
her own administration’s Health Policy: 
“I believe that the reason why I am allowed to do this is because it is stated in the 
Health Policy that if you work with health, then you should deal with this task across 
administrations. And this [policy for vulnerable urban areas] is in particular a task 
to work on across administrations. And you might say the work that I do, wherever I 
participate, is of course always lobbying. It is about constantly ' nudging ' and 
constantly getting people to think about the health dimension” (HCA, Civil servant, 
I17)  
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 In the quote, we see how CUT is not only a one-way influence channel for ND – it 
also works the other way round, providing the members of the team with a platform 
from which to influence the other administrations. In this respect, I find that the 
members participating in The Policy Formulation Team display proactivity, in that 
they are constantly forced to figure out how the emerging policy can support their 
own administration’s agenda. In the quote, The Policy Formulation Team and 
‘CUT’ become an arena for influencing the other administrations.  
This respondent is the only one out of the seven members from CUT being 
interviewed who speaks in such positive terms about the entrepreneurial possibilities 
in this new political and organisational set-up. The other interviewees give different 
assessments of the policy and the team and the effects of it. For instance, one special 
consultant mentions in a laid-back manner that: "This is, of course, what this policy is 
in fact trying to look at. That we’ll have to take the long tough haul. We will have to 
simply upgrade the level, and thus upgrade the people there, in order to avoid 
getting these problems. And that is really, really, really good. And it is in fact very 
visionary” (I25). A second consultant comments in relation to the policy that 
“everything collides right here ... I've never been inside something that makes so 
much sense in one way or another if we could just make it work - and that at the 
same time collides with so many other things that it’s almost impossible to stay 
afloat [in Danish ‘træde vande’]". (I24) And a third says that "I think there are many 
perspectives in this ... positive perspectives ...  in many respects we in Copenhagen 
are the lead dog [in the sense: leader of the pack] in relation to the rest of the 
country ...it’s sort of a development laboratory, right” (I23).  
What the diversity in the quotes displays is that the use and adaptation of the policy 
varies across administrations, highly dependent on the perspective of the individual 
consultant/civil servant and how they are establishing connections between the new 
policy and already existing policies and strategies. The involved officials are able to 
make sense of the project and what they are doing, and to some extent are able to see 
some future perspectives in it.  
To give an example of the entrepreneurship displayed by the administrative 
representatives, a special consultant mentions a telling episode in which her 
administration, The Children and Youth Administration, is invited to a meeting in 
The Technical and Environmental Administration. The purpose of the meeting is to 
agree on what the Children and Youth Administration can provide for the 
Development Plans in the Policy for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods. In the quote, 
the description of the event demonstrates how the new cross-administrative set-up 
generates an ambivalent assessment for collaborators, in that it conflicts with the 
traditional structures that people meet at different levels. But it also makes a lot of 
sense. And further, in the final part of the lengthy quote, we see that the CUT 
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members have a very difficult key role in communicating centrally across 
administrations:   
"So we go to them [ND, TEA] ... We say that we can contribute with the analytical 
part (...) and then it stops there. (..) We cannot start launching new initiatives before 
we know what our chosen Mayor wants to do (…)And that understanding ... they do 
not have that in the other [administrations] ... that when I, in fact, go over there and 
when I am utterly hopeless – this is because I must be hopeless."(Consultant, CYA) 
This quote demonstrates that the innovation project is starting to make sense to 
collaborators. But it also demonstrates that some of the administrative challenges of 
initiating a cross-administrative process are simply to learn to accept the 
organisational reality of their collaborators and not to react emotionally when 
collaborators are unable, for various reasons, to contribute with as much as you 
might have wanted. In this learning process, administrative representatives are fully 
aware of the fact that their collaborators perceive of them as ’hopeless’, in that they 
cannot contribute with as many resources as ND wants. Overall, this is obviously a 
frustrating experience for some CUT-members, in that they are being squeezed from 
both sides: having an ambiguous position both in relation to collaborators and their 
own administration. Dealing with this ambiguous position requires proactive 
behaviour.     
 Members of The Policy Formulation process team and CUT 
describe the consequences of the new set-up and the related ambiguities. Some of 
them describe how the structure has demanded the development of an intra-
administrative infrastructure in their own administration. The descriptions reveal 
that the future policy influence depends on the abilities of these individuals to bridge 
the gap between Policy for Disadvantaged Areas and the objectives of the respective 
administrations. In the quote below, a special consultant reflects on the perspectives 
in making cross-administrative policies. The overall conclusion of the reflection is 
that most often, even though the wording of a policy is cross-administrative, it is 
perceived by the other administrations as sector-bound. Two openings exist to 
bridge the gap between cross-administrative boundaries: the annual budget 
negotiations, and the work of the civil servants at the bottom of the organisation:  
"Cross-cutting policies do get approved in The City Council, but (...)It is really 
difficult to get them to play (...), in essence we consider each other's policies 
sectorial policies. Even though they are formulated as transversal policies. (…) So 
one thing is the nice words from above. The crunch of the matter is this: how will 
this policy be translated into budget proposals (...) Further down [the hierarchy] a 
lot of officials are trying to coordinate. And there it makes sense. There you can do a 
lot. You can adjusts some screws and handles and get the cooperation to work and 
produce some synergies and interfaces and some working relations. There I think 
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that it has significance. But it depends, of course, enormously on [the CUT 
MEMBER] (...); that she can see that what we are doing is being strengthened by 
cooperating in this and that way, where she can spot the possibilities for doing so.” 
(Special consultant, HCA) 
This quote shows that making an infrastructure depends on the single civil 
servant/special consultant being able to bridge the gap and see the possibilities, as 
displayed by the HCA civil servant. But it also demonstrates that despite working 
cross-administrative ‘on paper’, cross-administrative policies in the City of 
Copenhagen are traditionally located in one sector-administration, reducing 
ownership to policies in general.  
Another challenge is to make managers aware that there is a need to make this 
infrastructure. These are acts of proactivity. The quote below demonstrates the 
highly complex landscape in which these CUT-members are navigating. The civil 
servant described how this happened in an ‘ad-hoc fashion’, finally triggered by a 
sort of coincidence. For a period, the formation of the new Intra-Municipal 
Governance structure was overshadowed by the fact that new mayors were elected, 
perhaps making the cross-administrative set-up politically uninteresting at that point:  
"And this is where I start  ... We have in fact formed the Mayor's Forum, but in 
reality there was no awareness in this administration, besides perhaps in our 
Mayor, about what it really should be used for, it was a little unclear (...)you might 
say that this in fact is turning out perhaps to be an advantage ... because it enables it 
to live a life without too much attention (...) and then all of a sudden we get a new 
Director. And he literally stumbles over the policy, and he thinks to himself 
"Whoops! We are at risk here" and then starts to show an interest. And this is where 
we begin to develop a whole set-up here [in this administration]" (Member, CUT, 
CYA) 
The quote shows how difficult it is for collaborators and their directors to predict the 
consequence and the meaning of the new set-up. The quote thus demonstrates how 
the institutional and the journey-related uncertainties converge - it is impossible to 
know how the project will develop. Collaborators may be able to be part of the 
innovation journey in terms of the shared proactivity, but they do not have the 
ability to influence where the project is taking them, that is, they have little insight 
in the course of the journey.  The quote thus supports O’Toole’s (OToole, 1996) 
hypothesis: that collaborative configurations to some extent paralyze collaborators’ 
ability to figure out the purpose of the strategic game they are participating in; and it 
supports my assumption that this paralysation creates the opportunity to influence 
collaborators by giving sense. The quote also demonstrates that an infrastructure in 
the administrations is highly needed in order to synchronize the newly approved of 
Policy for Disadvantaged Areas with other transversal strategies, such as FA’s Safe 
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City. And this synchronization of policies is a highly complex matter, requiring 
much proactivity in order to couple all these different policies, programs and 
projects. 
 Implementing this infrastructure is not necessarily a one-time event. 
Another civil servant also explains that the vertical hierarchy clashes with the new 
horizontal hierarchy. The clash is provoked when one order is given by the new, 
cross-administrative steering committee, and another order is given by the civil 
servant’s immediate superior. In the example provided in the quote, the civil servant 
is asked about the leadership challenge of making cross-administrative 
collaborations. The civil servant describes that suddenly he serves two masters, each 
with a legitimate claim to make decisions, although the legitimacy of the cross-
administrative hierarchy is not always recognised:  
"... with CUT [Intermunicipal Team] a team similar to a steering group has been 
formed. So the managerial level is of course represented. (…) But at the same time, 
of course, you as civil servant have as your immediate superior a manager who is 
not represented in the Steering Group. And the orders you are given from one place 
and the other place do not always harmonize in relation to your work tasks (...) 
CUT’s legitimacy obviously must be retrieved from the Steering Group and of 
course, at the top, the Mayor Forum. And if other managers do not believe that this 
[Intra-Municipal Governance structure] is legitimate, then you have a problem.” 
(CLA, member of The Policy Formulation Team, I25) 
 
The quote shows that the new Intra-Municipal Governance structure challenges 
vertical management structures, creating conflicts between two types of leadership 
structures, vertical and horizontal.  
 
7.5.3. SUMMING UP 
The analysis of profession-based entrepreneurship contributes to answering the 
research question in several ways. First, in the analysis I find that proactivity is 
shared amongst collaborators, in contrast to the finding in The Evaluation Case. The 
way in which they share proactivity helps to address some of the challenges 
generated when new combinations are made, as described above. Some of the 
challenges concern creating a horizontal infrastructure, as well as coming up with 
responses to how the policy can contribute to the Lord Mayor’s ‘Copenhagen Tale’; 
but also in general to reflect on how a Copenhagen response to the governmental 
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‘ghetto policy’ can be formulated. Thus, the shared proactivity mainly addresses the 
institutional uncertainties.   
Second, I find that the actual concepts and arguments are still mainly produced by 
ND, in order to address the substantive uncertainty – but with the consent of 
collaborators. It is ND that introduces the concepts of the ‘Yellow Clouds’ as well as 
re-uses the rhetoric from ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ in terms of introducing the concept 
of ‘Development Plans’ and by re-introducing the notion of improving ‘the 
municipal core operations’. Thus, the main generator for producing concepts is still 
profession-based entrepreneurship, focused on optimization of the area-based 
approach for solving complex problems through a holistic approach.  
Overall, this analysis thus demonstrates that a heavy need remains for a profession-
based entrepreneurship in order to address the substantive uncertainty in a 
collaborative innovation process. This implicates that ND still is forced to produce 
and introduce concepts in order to maintain and develop its leadership. The analysis 
also demonstrates that the collaborative efforts in producing an intra-administrative 
policy creates institutional challenges for collaborators that must be dealt with; 
otherwise frustration and potential resistance will emerge.   
7.5.4. LEADERSHIP RELATED PROACTIVITY 
In the section above I have analysed the implications of shared proactivity – how 
this element of entrepreneurship enables The Policy Formulation Team to respond to 
the uncertainties related to their task.  
In this section I will focus on what I call leadership related proactivity, which is 
tightly connected to ND and the strategic network alliances that are identified and 
established parallel to The Policy Formulation process.  
In The Policy Formulation meetings that I observed, leadership related proactivity 
was not present. Two members from ND participated, and they took on the role of 
sensemaker and facilitator in the team, but otherwise they participated in the 
discussions on par with the rest of the participants without having the answers at 
hand for formulating the policy from the beginning.  
ND mainly acted proactively in between the meetings. As an example, when 
conducting my field work, I was asked by the ND consultant running the meetings, 
if I wanted to be part of a series of interview sessions with the directors from The 
Cross-Municipal Steering Committee with the argument that “you are a PhD and 
all”. My task was to make an interview guide and carry out the interviews. The 
responsible ND consultant had a main agenda with the interview sessions: to gain 
direct access to the directors, asking what they thought the policy should be, and 
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also to inspire The Policy Formulation Team. It was important that the interview 
sessions appeared ‘neutral’, i.e. that a researcher carried out the interviews (field 
note 2011-01-25); it was also a way for the ND consultant to question the directors 
about the possible paths the policy might take, which was demonstrated during an 
interview with an SSA director (I32). Overall, this was a way of reducing the 
uncertainty of The Policy Formulation Team and clarifying what was expected of 
them; and it was a way of finding out how to create a “burning platform” by making 
visible the strategic layers across and within administrations through the interviews. 
There was a need to establish a burning platform; as the ND consultant mentioned, it 
is “obvious that we need to change gears; but some members of the team are 
already in doubt whether the policy will be a change of gears at all” (field note 
2011-01-25). Overall, this example of leadership related proactivity illustrates the 
fluent, brittle and strategic position of the policy: the consultant desperately needs an 
overview of the strategic landscape of the policy, and what the top management 
wants, while keeping both the top management and the civil servants engaged in the 
process.    
The process of the interview sessions was quite telling. Two ND representatives and 
I carried out two interviews, and a third appointment was cancelled. When I asked 
about the remaining four interview sessions, the ND consultant replied that he had 
already met with the relevant directors face to face. This process illustrates the 
changing interfaces between the formal exercise of formulating a policy in the team 
and the informal, more network related, exercises of navigating quickly and with 
sufficient speed in a strategic landscape. The interview episode perhaps also 
demonstrates that discrete bilateral meetings were more useful for the consultant 
than the formalized interview set-up. Furthermore, it mirrors the fact that at this 
point, in the spring of 2011, ND increasingly took on the task of formulating the 
policy to speed up the process, so the policy could be approved by each of the seven 
political committees of each administration sooner. Thus, a movement from a formal 
policy formulation process to a more informal, network based process of strategic 
negotiations played out in numerous discrete, bilateral meetings between special 
consultants from the involved administrations as well as in meetings with directors.  
Additionally, another example of ND’s proactive behaviour is the way in which they 
seek to influence the terms of reference for the policy by forming alliances with a 
director from The Technical and Environmental Administration in February and 
March 2011 (I15), and later on with the newly appointed mayor (I19).  
The ND consultant describes examples of this leadership related proactivity in an 
interview. The consultant states that while alliances with the top management are 
important, strong alliances with the project team are even more so. In fact, the low 
level of conflict was a result of ND having handpicked the team members: “we had 
asked most of them to join the team (…)because they are our regular cooperation 
partners” (ND, special consultant, I19). Handpicking members with some 
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knowledge of urban planning for The Policy Formulation Team is an important 
influence tool: the members have a prior understanding of an innovation project; and 
conflicts are reduced because they already are attuned to thinking in area-based 
concepts.  
Also, the numerous bilateral meetings with the team member from The Finance 
Administration were also important in order to ensure that this administration would 
approve the negotiated policy content:  
“We had many bilateral meetings (...) So I could be sure that she would not cause a 
deadlock when I proposed something (...)And ever since, she has proved to be an 
enormously good alliance partner” (ND, special consultant, I19). 
The ND is highly dependent on alliance partners in The Finance Administration, in 
that a consequence of changes in the terms of reference is that Policy For 
Disadvantaged Areas has a scope and content that is perceived of by The Finance 
Administration as a possible competitor to the administration’s existing strategies.  
Bilateral meetings between these two administrations help establish a division of 
labour, creating synergy, as the quote below demonstrates. The Finance 
Administration’s Safe City professionals discover that Policy For Disadvantaged 
Areas could play a preventive role, whereas Safe City could focus on short term 
initiatives:  
"Another very important alliance partner I have had all the way is Safe City [from 
FA]. (…) They perceive this as contributing 100% to their agenda (…) We have not 
worked so closely together, but we have had a great alliance and they have been 
pushing a lot through in their administration, arguing that it [the policy] was 
important work and that the thoughts behind it were proper ones etc. (...) Because 
they can see that we are talking about the same area, and that they mainly work on 
the short course. But they can also see that we are working with the prevention of 
the crime, which they struggle with in their everyday life” (ND, special consultant, 
I19). 
What the quote shows is that leadership related proactivity is vital in order to figure 
out how to avoid conflict and create synergy. When The Finance Administration can 
see the value of the emerging policy, the support for the policy enhances. In this 
respect, the quote illustrates a formalized power distribution in The City of 
Copenhagen, in that ND’s administration needs the approval of the more powerful 
Finance Administration when formulating an ambitious policy.  
Furthermore, the core of this type of proactive action is to be able to relate to 
sensemaking, understood as making sense of what ND and its collaborators are 
doing. During The Policy Formulation process, an ND employee reflects on the 
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terms of reference for the policy and the confusing relation between area-based 
programs and disadvantaged areas and suddenly realises that the terms of reference 
perhaps should be different:  
”It was a time of transition, when all of a sudden Sam begins to talk about, well, 
shouldn't we rather call it something else, because what we are really talking about 
is those areas, but are constantly saying that we are looking at the initiatives. So 
why not call it what it was supposed to be called? And that, I must admit, no one 
else has questioned. So again it is, in a way, plainly to take leadership upon 
yourself” (ND, special consultant, I19).  
The quote shows that ND does not have the answers of how to solve the tensions 
within the initial policy framework; instead, they are dependent upon their own 
ability to make sense of what they are doing in the process, the numerous 
discussions with collaborators, and then come up with new solutions and concepts. 
The solution for the tension is to remove the focus from area-based programs, and 
instead focus on the problem: the disadvantaged neighbourhoods.  
An ND middle manager further comments on how the Director of the Urban Design 
Department obtained a new position in another organisation, creating a leadership 
vacuum. This meant that ND had contact to a level 2 director in The Technical and 
Environmental Administration. The ND manager and the director jointly decided 
that the policy could be much more than a ‘whatever works toolbox’ of area-based 
programs, a mandate which was dictated by the now absent director. The level 2 
director had stronger visions for the policy and used her bureaucratic influence to 
change the mandate of the policy: 
“during the process, a space for leadership emerges  (...) I will say that Nettie [the 
director] and I pushed it through (...)If she had not done so,  we had not been able to 
continue (...) So what she saw was a clear opportunity (...) that  this here, this is a 
new kind of lodestar [in Danish: ‘ledestjerne] for Copenhagen as a metropolis(…). 
She could see that ‘well, this is the answer to the Government’s ‘Ghetto Strategy’ 
and that we will not be a part of” (ND, middle manager, I15) 
The quote thus demonstrates that this proactive behaviour is about utilizing windows 
of opportunities; both in terms of using the government’s ‘ghetto plan’ as a 
positional lever for a new, ambitious policy in contrast to the governmental strategy, 
but also for redefining the mandate for the policy, actually changing the policy 
radically. Redefining the terms of reference, however, requires new alliance 
partners. With reference to Keast & Mandell’s (Keast & Mandell, 2011) typology of 
coordination-cooperation-collaboration, the alteration of the mandate moves focus 
of the policy away from coordination of extraordinary activities to actual 
collaboration around a shared type of program. Finally, the quote demonstrates the 
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limits of the power of the social construction of bottom-up leadership. Despite its 
informal nature in terms of sensemaking and entrepreneurship, it is a type of 
leadership bound to a subordinate hierarchical position, making it possible for 
superiors to both limit and expand the range of influence considerably, being highly 
dependent on stabilising the innovation project by having alliances with directors at 
the top. As the ND consultant states: “Benny [the former director] he is a very bright 
guy, he definitely is, but I guess he would have insisted that the task was to make a 
policy for those six Area Renewals and the 34 Comprehensive Plans (..) He wouldn’t 
have bought it, he definitely had intercepted that one, if he had still been here – 
that about that the policy all of a sudden was a policy for disadvantaged areas” 
(ND, special consultant, I19).  
Thus, the immediate superiors of bottom-up innovations play a crucial part in 
defining the scope of innovation processes from bottom-up leadership. Bottom-up 
leadership is highly sensitive both to change in higher ranking management as well 
as of the objectives of this management. In this case, we would have witnessed a 
less radical public sector innovation in so far as the line manager would have 
remained in his position.  
 
7.5.5. SUMMING UP  
The analysis of profession-based entrepreneurship contributes to answer the research 
question in several ways.  
First, in my analysis I find that in order to counter institutional and strategic 
uncertainty, ND and its FA-ally demonstrate a leadership related proactivity that 
remove potential conflicts while the policy is being formulated. ND does this by 
making contacts with directors and the FA administration, in order to figure out 
what is possible, and thus producing a division of labour and a shared understanding 
of each other’s strategies.  
Second, in my analysis I find that this type of proactivity is necessary, in that the 
policy is vulnerable as regards changes in political support. Leadership related 
proactivity is a way of interpreting and adapting to the signals from decision makers 
in a political organisation.  
Thirdly, I find that this type of proactivity is necessary in order to act on 
sensemaking during the process. This is most evident when ND decides to alter the 
mandate of the policy, partly based on the numerous discussions in The Policy 
Formulation Team, in which the discussions constantly circles around the 
disadvantaged areas, not the area-based programs.    
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Leadership related proactivity thus helps ND to navigate between institutional, 
substantive and strategic uncertainties, in terms of combinations made and 
introduced that will have the biggest chance of success.  
Fourthly, I find that leadership related proactivity also generates new leadership 
dilemmas that cannot be handled by this type of action alone. These dilemmas relate 
to the overall project and the overall leadership positioning of ND: how might they 
display the future value of the policy proposition, maintain both innovation and 
system optimization in the same discursive ‘text’, figure out the future connection 
between the different types of area-based plans and programs, and avoid being 
positioned as a remote centralist that overburdens local working professionals with 
competing layers of coordination. 
These leadership dilemmas thus require more fundamental changes in the types of 
action for the bottom-up leader in order to gain recognition. The next section focuses 
on constructing these leadership dilemmas. 
 
 LEADERSHIP RECOGNITION: DEALING WITH 7.5
LEADERSHIP DILEMMAS 
In the previous sections, I have concluded that different forms of uncertainty create a 
demand for answers. ND’s profession-based entrepreneurship as well as overall 
shared proactivity enables the production and introduction of novel concepts in a 
highly uncertain context with an unstable mandate. Entrepreneurship further enables 
a production of concepts that are not on direct collision course with existing major 
strategies in the City of Copenhagen.  
This section has another focus. The implications of introducing these novel concepts 
are the emergence of a new micro-discourse, in which certain leadership 
positionings are possible to take and develop. In this section, I focus on how the 
attempt to introduce this micro-discourse generates a leadership positioning 
landscape, in which ND needs to perceive and adjust to points of leadership conflicts 
and sources of legitimacy in this landscape in order to provide collaborators with 
direction, and thus acquiring recognition as a collaborative innovation leader. 
Conflicts and sources of legitimacy may lead to change in bottom-up leadership, 
depending on the actions that the lead agency takes in relation to address leadership 
dilemmas.  
I list these leadership dilemmas in the conclusion of the analysis. In this section, I 
analyse the conflicts and sources of legitimacy that construct these leadership 
dilemmas.    
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I first describe how people struggle with leadership and the collaborative innovation 
project, in this case, the Policy for Disadvantaged Areas. Secondly, I analyse the 
sources of leadership legitimacy. Thirdly, I will describe how ND staff and 
managers involved in The Policy Formulation process relate to their own leadership, 
and how they deal with the leadership dilemmas by reflecting on their identity.  
7.6.1. POINTS OF LEADERSHIP CONFLICTS: THE 
COORDINATIVE CENTRE, INTRA-MUNICIPAL 
GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION 
In this section, I will focus on conflicts: how these are related to issues of 
recognition in terms of making a leadership position legitimate.  As I described in 
the theory section, entrepreneurship is needed in order to find an innovative solution 
in a uncertain environment, introducing a new micro-discourse; whereas the social 
construction of leadership is necessary in order to be able to adapt to the changing 
demands of both the innovation journey as well as collaborators expectations of such 
leadership, expectations that to some extent are generated by the micro-discourse. 
Conflicts are important to analyse, in that they first of all describe potential sites of 
power struggles in terms of resistance to the micro-discourse and the related 
leadership position. Conflicts thus make visible certain leadership dilemmas that 
need to be handled by ND, otherwise collaborators’ support for both leadership and 
project may wane. Secondly, conflicts are also conversations where discourse is 
negotiated and sense made.  
I have found three main conflicts in my data. These concern the coordinative centre, 
Intra-Municipal Governance and the contested role of innovation. I will describe 
these conflicts in the section below and reflection how these conflicts provide 
further answers to how leadership is recognised.         
 
7.5.1.1 Fighting over the coordinative centre: horizontal and vertical 
struggles  
The vertical struggle: the fear of too much coordination of the local working 
professionals 
 
A conflict point similar to the critique in The Evaluation Case is a fear of too much 
local coordination as a consequence of the policy. In the first quote, a participant in 
The Policy Formulation Team raises a critique of the policy as being centralistic and 
burdensome: 
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"I'm just not entirely sure I agree that all projects in an area necessarily must be 
coordinated, so ... I simply foresee an extreme kind of bureaucratization of the 
system ahead of us" (13, part 1). 
The quote demonstrates that there is a vertical struggle regarding the position of the 
coordinative centre: at the local or the central level. Here, ND’s project is in danger 
of being positioned as centralistic and bureaucratic. This critique is a similar to one 
raised in The Evaluation Case.  
ND tries to counter this positioning by arguing that more bureaucracy is not the 
answer. In fact, the purpose of the focus on increased coordination is to reduce the 
amount of bureaucracy by devolving power to the natural stakeholders in the 
‘yellow cloud’ areas:  
"No, but that is not at all how it is conceptualized. For example, I find it obvious 
that it should be a local, social centre manager who should be a part of a steering 
group in such a yellow cloud- city district. And he sits and discusses what the 
problems are in this city area here, what projects we have, and whether we should 
in fact be helping to manage the projects, perhaps more than the municipal 
operation. These local managers have to ensure that the projects underpin the day-
to-day operation in such a way that we all are working together in a joint direction. 
Well, doesn’t that make sense? So it's not just all chaos?" (13, part 1). 
As the quote demonstrates, ND  intends to establish a local organisation with 
decision making power in each ’yellow cloud’, thus giving the coordinative 
responsibility for each city areas to the local manager with most activities in the 
area. This idea seems to be in alignment with ND’s ’lessons learned’ from the Pillar 
Project, in which ND only wants to coordinate, leaving the ’how’ up to the local 
parties. And this solution also mirrors the context-sensitive focus that area-based 
programs have, in which all relevant stakeholders are involved in order to address 
the major problems identified in each individual neighbourhood. Here, this logic is 
applied to the city district level of the ‘yellow clouds’.  
In another interview, a civil servant fears that when all decisions concerning the 
policy goals are made centrally, there is no flexibility on the local level to address 
the problems. Thus, this civil servant fears that the Intra-Municipal Governance 
structure and the policy might be too rigid, and thus blocking for solid professional 
work (I27). This conflict makes visible one of the most persisting leadership 
dilemmas for ND’s leadership and project: how to avoid that ND’s innovation 
project and leadership are being positioned as  detached and centralistic? 
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The horizontal coordination struggle: the new policy or the existing policies? 
In the policy meetings, two administrations try to influence the policy by arguing 
that it ought to support already existing strategies. One administration representative 
suggests that the policy ought to support greening strategies, and the other 
representative suggests that the policy ought to support the Children & Youth 
Policy:  
 "We must have a look at the strategies that we already have.  We actually also have 
some individual policies that cut across regions. We have the Children & Youth 
Policy, which is in need of a revision here in 2011, but after all, it is still a policy 
which has been approved of by the City Council [Borgerrepræsentation]. And it 
comprises statements in relation to what we really think about, among other things, 
that there should be decent bike paths to school ... and all those things. There are 
quite a number of things. But we also have a great deal of other things in the 
individual administrations that point towards  the kinds of wishes and hopes we 
have for each of our resort. So I think we must use what we already have” (CYA 
representative 11, part 3) 
Instead of developing an entire new policy, the representative argues that the policy 
might as well support the existing policies. However, this is defied by a 
representative from the Financial Administration in the policy formulation meeting, 
since there is a risk that the boundaries of the policy will be difficult to delineate, 
exactly because it is area-based. Consequently, many municipal activities could be 
regarded as area-based.   
There is a key conflict that circles around the status of the policy: is the policy to be 
perceived as something that will improve transversal coordination by being a 
helping hand to already existing policies – i.e. a subordinate position; or is it to be 
perceived as similar to the existing policies, that is, just another policy, pulling in its 
own direction, actually increasing the uncoordinated mess of the City of 
Copenhagen? The Finance Administration pulls in the direction of an independent 
policy, whereas the two critical administrations, The Culture and Leisure 
Administration and The Children and Youth Administration pull in another 
direction. The dispute was not settled at this meeting. This conflict demonstrates that 
each member tries to pull the policy in a direction to favour their own interests: FA 
and ND want to develop something new, a new centre of coordination. CLA and 
CYO want the policy to contribute to coordination, by supporting existing policies 
and making these policies the centres of coordination.  
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As I noted in my field work, a director from the Finance Administration had 
considerations of whether the policy should be a part of the FA strategies concerning 
‘Focused City Development’ (Field work note 2011-09-15). Again, this observation 
demonstrates that if there are too many coordinative, cross-administrative city 
development plans, the city ends up having no strategic focus at all.  Furthermore, 
the new policy risks threatening already existing strategies, especially the FA 
strategies which are cross-administrative, strategic and large-scale in nature.  
 
7.5.1.2 Intra-Municipal Governance: cumbersome and politically 
illegitimate 
Intra-Municipal Governance is cumbersome  
Another point of conflict is that the Intra-Municipal Governance structure is 
perceived of by some actors as too heavy first of all. One director notes that there is 
too much information for the directors in The Cross-Municipal Steering Committee 
at the meetings, some of it even irrelevant. This leads this director to wonder 
whether the future structure is going to change - or whether it is solid enough in the 
long run. In fact, the director sees it is as a ’colossus with feet of clay’ (EIA, 
director, I18): “In that in the past, you had no Intra-Municipal Governance structure 
or policy; and now you have a governance structure with all mayors involved, 
including a policy. In this huge structure, there is a risk that the ordinary politicians 
on the Board of the Social Housing National Organisation, and a member of the 
Cooperation Forum, to some extent do not believe that they have been involved 
enough, and if this is the case, the entire support for the policy could fail” (I18). 
There is a tension between making the necessary progress through alliances while at 
the same time a risk of excluding certain stakeholders. In the quote below, the 
director responds to my question of what the central points of conflict has been on 
the journey from The Horisontal Pillar to the upcoming approval of the policy:    
“It is a very huge structure that we have been building. It is a very huge structure. 
And now we are sort of only beginning to test how it works in relation to the local 
actors, right. Because now we are beginning to work on the Development Plans. 
Now we have overtaken this strategy and now we…now a lot of people have 
gathered, right? And then I saw the template for it, and I just thought; Oh no, now 
they are not going to launch all sorts of new empowerment movements or bottom-up 
processes, not in all these [policy] areas that we now on a general level, through 
budgets and other things, have made closure on, right, and which have already been 
politically approved " (EIA, director, I18),  
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The statement above is a director’s reaction to the initial work of the Development 
Plans for Policy For Disadvantaged Areas. Here, the key balance and point of 
conflict is the cutting edge between top-down and bottom-up. Seemingly, given the 
huge governance structure with representatives from the social housing sector, 
disagreement concerning the centralistic top-down approach might arise. 
Furthermore, the quote also demonstrates that it is challenging to work in a 
collaborative governance structure with many stakeholders and cross-sector issues. 
Finally, the quote also reflects  that the municipal system has difficulties in 
maintaining the logic developed in the innovation process: that even though the 
governance structure is perceived of as huge and top-down, it is a response to earlier 
days, in which the initiatives in the disadvantaged areas were characterized by 
fragmentation and bottom-up driven projects. The speculations of this director 
reflect that key stakeholders are considering whether the balance struck between 
bottom-up and top-down in the policy is the right one.  
The Intra-Municipal Governance structure also has the deficit that it is part of a 
centralistic set-up. The consequence is that it is important that what is being fed into 
the new structure from the locals is in alignment with the centrally made decisions. 
This is the point of conflict for ND, in that the leadership exercised has excluded 
some actors, who somehow may need to be made part of the innovation project. As 
a consequence ND risks being positioned as a centralistic leader.  
Similarly, another director argues that the cross-administrative structure is only 
temporary, in that it is too heavy and too abstract. However, the structure is also 
perceived as necessary, since the disadvantaged neighbourhoods mainly are located 
in areas owned by the social housing organisations, a condition which has made the 
inter-organisational structure the way it is:  
“…But conversely, I think that it is right and necessary, or at least something in the 
style here is right and necessary, because of course we cannot do anything in the 
exposed urban areas (...) So we [the municipality and general housing sector] have 
a shared destiny here (...) it gets too heavy. And of course, it is also something you 
need to think through whether it should be here in the long-term, but it does serve as 
a sort of temporary transition structure [in Danish: overgangskonstruktion] to get 
the right agenda set” (SSA, Director, I18). 
The quote demonstrates several points. First of all, the fluency and brittleness of the 
collaborative innovation process: the new policy has just been approved and not 
even been put to work, and already key stakeholders are beginning to reconsider 
whether its administrative basis is good enough. The quote thus points to the 
massive pressure that ND and TEA are under in order to keep up with the speed of 
the process and the way that people are beginning to make sense of what they are 
doing. The quote also points to fact that the cross-administrative structure is 
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perceived of as highly ambivalent, in that it is both necessary but also unmanageable 
in the long run. In that case solutions for wicked problems seem to require constant 
vigilance from the lead actor, otherwise support for the collaborative solution seems 
to disappear. Finally, the quote reflects some stabilizing factors in terms of the 
partnership with the social housing sector – that this partnership needs an intra-
municipal governance structure.     
A third leader points to this stabilization: That in order to keep people engaged, you 
need to make it relevant for people to be in The Cross-Municipal Steering 
Committee. One way to do this is to provide scope for influence for directors and 
mayors, so that they do not feel that they are wasting their time: 
"So from my perspective, there is only one way forward and that is to get the leaders 
to want to take responsibility. They (ND/TEA) must continue to make it sufficiently 
interesting to sit in the forums. And to encourage people to actually show up, 
because when people show up they are indeed committed.  
In: How can they continue to make it interesting? 
R: That’s a good question ... professionalism should definitely be included in this 
‘equation. And that implies, of course, that management and monitoring [in Danish: 
opfølgning] are in order, but I don't think that’s sufficient. It is vital that people 
experience that important decisions are being made.."(EIA, Manager, I22) 
The quote demonstrates that the new governance structure and policy seemingly do 
not have enough scope for influence, especially for keeping the administration 
directors engaged. In my interpretation, TEA needs to create true collaborative turf 
by making the decisions of a key TEA resort open for other administrations, 
enabling them to interlink these decisions with their own strategies.  The 
interviewed leader contrasts the TEA project with FA projects, in which all relevant 
stakeholders show up because of the fact that FA to some extent can provide this 
scope for influence.  
Bottom-up leadership as short circuiting vertical management  
In the interviews, it seems that the type of bottom-up leadership that ND is 
exercising to some extent short circuits vertical leadership. As the quote below 
demonstrates, ND to some extent had a standing disagreement with the director of 
the Urban Design Department. ND wanted a more engaged director. As I have also 
described elsewhere, this director wanted a policy that focused on ’what works’. The 
disagreement was solved when the director found a new job in another municipality. 
Thus, for a period, the Urban Design Department, which ND is part of, had a 
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constituted director, the level-2 director. This director plays a crucial role for 
pushing ND’s agenda forwards, changing the terms of reference for the policy:   
"You don't get someone like her, or a Board or directors in general, to join to start 
with. Our former director for Urban Design Department was of course also with us 
throughout the process (…)And I think he thought ‘well, okay’ (…) but it [the 
directors engagement] wasn't something that seriously moved anything (...) for him 
it was another kind of story, because it [the innovation project] was one among a lot 
of other cases and steering groups he was part of. "(ND, Middle manager, I15) 
The quote demonstrates that the formal immediate superior for bottom-up leadership 
is crucial as a gateway in granting access to higher ranking directors. And if this 
level of management is overburdened, the innovation project does not get the 
attention it requires in order to become radical.    
The quote below demonstrates that when running a process from the bottom and up, 
with a steering committee at the administrative top of the new inter-organisational 
set-up, the civil servants’ immediate superior to some extent has no control over his 
or her employees, in that the civil servant is given orders from higher ranking 
directors:  
"... with CUT [Intermunicipal Team] a team similar to a steering group has been 
formed. So the managerial level is of course represented. (…) But at the same time, 
of course, you as civil servant have as your immediate superior a manager who is 
not represented in the Steering Group.(...) CUT’s legitimacy obviously must be 
retrieved from the Steering Group and of course, at the top, the Mayor Forum. And 
if other managers do not believe that this [Intra-Municipal Governance structure] is 
legitimate, then you have a problem.” (CLA, member of The Policy Formulation 
Team, I25) 
In my interpretation, the quote demonstrates that two simultaneous types of 
leadership create conflicting legitimacies, vertical and horizontal, which are left to 
the civil servants to handle.  
In only two administrations is this bypassing of intermediate leaders mentioned as a 
problem. However, in an interview with the ND middle manager (I15), the matter of 
conflict is exactly giving the CUT members/policy formulation members resources 
enough to make the Intra-Municipal Governance structure effective. So, what the 
quotes above suggest is that a profession-based development project such as the 
Pillar, leading to alliances with the top management, poses a challenge for the 
intermediate management level, in that they have no control of their employees, to 
some extent. This could be a potential barrier if these directors are not included in 
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some way, and if the ambitions of the professionals (here the ND office as well as 
members of ’CUT’) are not matched by their immediate superior.   
 
The collaborative governance structure is in conflict with the nature of politics 
A critique raised of the ND leadership is the way that the office gained influence 
through its alliance with both top directors and politicians. This critique to some 
extent resembles the critique of the conflicting leadership legitimacy. In the quote 
below, a director explains how another part of the municipal bureaucracy, the 
politicians, to some extent has been pacified and a victim of the new Intra-Municipal 
Governance structure. The critique is also a critique of the new cross-administrative 
structure and policy: that these two organisational aspects, to some extent, rank 
higher than even mayors. Thus, the administrative structure has become too 
extensive, destroying the conflictive and voluntary nature of politics by forcing 
people to work within the new structure:   
In the Committee and ultimately in the City Council, you have a system for how to 
reach agreement. In the end you vote, and the majority wins. And politicians are 
good at this and it is a set-up that we are familiar with. And sometimes you barter 
and negotiate, and compromises will be made, and that is how it is. [BUT] When 
you put seven mayors into a room and say: "now you have to agree". That is not the 
nature of politics. And it's not natural for mayors to agree on something and then go 
out as a joint Executive Board. (…)So in this way, I think that somebody have been 
trying to get everyone to agree, not only administrative but also political; and these 
mayors have been placed in a strange forum, where they can't really act, while at 
the same time the formal system is running parallel. (Manager, I26)  
The quote demonstrates several things. First of all, it reflects a critique of the 
division of labour between administrative and political decision making. Seemingly, 
TEA’s project is here perceived as an administrative reform strategy which has 
expanded into the field of politics, requiring all mayors to agree on specific issues. 
This quote thus also reflects future challenges for bottom-up leadership of wicked 
problems, for example the almost impossible task of stabilizing horizontal 
collaborations by means of cross-organisational strategies. This entails, among other 
things, that politically appointed leaders to some extent in a given a policy field 
agree that a particular solution is the only right one. Seemingly, this strategic move 
from ND and TEA is perceived of as even more illegitimate because the solution has 
been developed in the administration.   
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Innovation:  a policy is not a profession-related playground 
Another dispute concerns the concept of ‘innovation’ in the policy. As described in 
the analysis of The Evaluation Case, experimentation and development are part of 
the Pillar Project as well as the ND profession and leadership position. The concept 
of innovation, especially on the local level, is emphasized in some of the early 
policy drafts. However, it is rejected by The Finance Administration member since 
the  ‘innovation’-agenda was not part of the mandate given. Instead, the focus of the 
policy should be ‘what we know, the well documented’, it should not give the 
politicians the impression that the professionals just want a playground:  
There was one issue I was hesitant about. It is that in this paper there is a lot of 
focus on innovation and developing new things and I think we've got a clear order 
that we should focus on what we already have: what we know, what is well 
documented (...) I think we must be very careful to get it described in a proper 
manner, so that the Steering Group and our mayors do not get the impression that  
‘now we would just like to have a playground to do new and exciting things.’ " (I14, 
part3) 
At this point in time, the ND’s ambitions are at odds with the mandate given to 
them. The quote also reflects that ND as the leader of a policy is supposed to find 
answers, not point out more areas for development.  
  
When demands of effect assessment clashes with the necessity for developing new 
collaborative work forms  
Another conflict presented in the interviews is that parts of the municipal 
organisation have difficulties in handling the cross-administrative way of 
collaborating. As the statement from The Finance Administration below 
demonstrates, there is a strong focus on ’effect’ in the municipality: what will the 
effect of the policy and the new organisational set-up be? A main challenge for this 
special consultant has been to construct the argument that it will only be possible to 
increase the effect of the municipal efforts by collaborating in a new way – even 
though it remains uncertain what specifically  will happen. In this way, the insight 
from ’The Yellow Clouds’ is also used by The Finance Administration member to 
defend what is happening in The Policy Formulation Team, thus making and giving 
sense. The quote also demonstrates how difficult it is to initiate collaborative 
innovations across administrative boundaries, in that the administrations, especially 
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the Lord Mayor’s most powerful administration, have difficulties dealing with the 
unpredictable end-point of innovation:  
My primary role has been to keep the FA involved in the collaboration. Because at a 
very early stage there was great scepticism concerning whether to make this policy, 
and what type of monster we are creating, right? And is it really budget-maximizing, 
and are we going to use a lot of resources to meet and talk about a lot of things.(…) 
and also a concern about, well, what will it lead to in terms of concrete outputs, 
right, will we get some effect out of it? So it [my role] has been to insist that if we 
want an increased effect, we have to go through this period where we find out how 
to collaborate in a new and more co-ordinated way. (…)This is the burning 
platform, right? And this has also been my role - to clarify the burning platform and 
tell the story that ‘now we will do it in a new way and it will have an enhanced 
effect, but exactly what we are doing I cannot say yet’ (FA, I20) 
Most importantly, the quote demonstrates the difficulties that parts of the 
organisation of The City of Copenhagen have in dealing with cross-administrative 
innovation projects targeting wicked problems. Nevertheless the rhetoric of 
innovation shared in The Policy Formulation Team is heavily mobilized and applied 
by  this special consultant with the intention of keeping FA involved in the 
collaboration.   
7.6.2. SUMMING UP 
In this section, I have demonstrated that three points of conflicts dominate The 
Policy Formulation process: the coordinative centre, Intra-Municipal Governance 
and the contested role of innovation. 
The conflict of coordination comprises a vertical and horizontal struggle of 
coordination. The vertical struggle concerns some collaborators’ fear that increased 
coordination demands of the central level will make it more difficult and 
bureaucratic to work at the local level. The horizontal struggle is also a fight over 
the coordinative centre: whether the policy should be a new coordinative centre, or 
support existing coordinative functions, such as existing policies and strategies in 
the respective administrations.  
The conflict concerning the Intra-Municipal Governance structure is that ND’s 
bottom-up type of leadership, making allies with top politicians and top directors, 
short-circuits the vertical chain of command in the administrations. This is efficient 
in acquiring power, but at the expense of generating reluctance at the intermediate 
leadership levels, rendering the horizontal Intra-Municipal Governance structure 
illegitimate. A related critique concerns the nature of politics: that the governance 
structure pacifies mayors, who are forced to work within a consensus structure. This 
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intra-municipal structure is at odds with the voluntary and conflictive nature of 
politics. A related conflict is that despite the fact that ND and the administrations 
have managed to make a cross-administrative, horizontal structure, some of the 
directors perceive the structure to be too big and cumbersome to work within, and 
the Intra-Municipal Steering Committee feels overburdened. Throughout the 
interviews, this structure is regarded as ambivalent: it places heavy demands on the 
staff members involved, but at the same time it is also seen as necessary because of 
the Governance Dialogue and the need for a partnership with the social housing 
organisations. 
The conflict concerning maintaining an element of innovation in the policy clashes 
with collaborative demands of effect assessment. Especially the Lord Mayor’s 
strategic Finance Administration is sceptical as to whether the Intra-Municipal 
Governance structure and the policy will produce any results, and to some extent FA 
is not willing to accept the fact that no answers as regards the consequences of the 
innovation project can be given in advance.  
   
ND is perceived as responsible for running The Policy Formulation process. Despite 
the cross-administrative elements, it is clear from the assessment of ND and The 
Technical and Environmental Administration’s leadership that the final 
responsibility for the collaborative innovation project rests on the shoulders of ND 
and The Technical and Environmental Administration. In the BUCIL model, I 
assume that the innovation project and leadership are intimately related. This also 
means that criticism of the project is an implicit critique of ND’s leadership. 
Accordingly, some parts of ND’s leadership are clearly being perceived of as 
illegitimate by some collaborators, although the strength of the criticism varies 
considerably, and with few people uttering the critique directly. ND’s leadership and 
the conflicts concerning their innovation project can be seen as counter-discursive 
positions of critique that may or may not be forceful enough to generate resistance 
across collaborators. Thus, despite that the criticism varies and does not represent 
the full picture of ND and their project, the criticism is presented here because it 
points out dilemmas that may have an impact on ND’s leadership. 
The criticism is also described here in order to compare the discursive resistance to 
other studies of bottom-up collaborative innovation leadership. ND is criticized for 
inconsistency, or perceived as being inconsistent:  
- ND wants to increase coordination, but they actually risk doing the 
opposite when launching a new project that aims to be a new 
centre of coordination.  
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- ND wants to focus on the ‘core operations’, only allowing new 
projects when these contribute to the goals of the ‘core 
operations’, but they also want to be innovative at the local level 
(at least in the early phases of The Policy Formulation).  
- ND is criticized for seeking influence through a collaborative governance 
structure which is in conflict with the autonomy of politicians, and which 
forces people to collaborate. 
- ND is perceived of by the Finance Administration as a ‘disturber of the 
peace’ by not adhering to the demands of effect assessment.  
- ND is perceived of as launching a type of ambivalent coordination that has 
a character of a necessary burden: it risks wasting people’s time, while at 
the same being necessary as a consequence of the Governance Dialogue; 
and the type of coordination is perceived of as potentially centralist in 
nature, a centralism which both short-circuits traditional line management 
as well as possibly interfering with the work of local professionals. 
    
7.6.3. SOURCES OF LEADERSHIP LEGITIMACY: SAME 
DIRECTION, CONSOLIDATED MACHINE, NO TURNING 
BACK, INNOVATING GOVERNANCE 
In the previous section, I described the points of conflict in the leadership 
positioning landscape. These conflicts are one aspect of the leadership dilemmas. 
In this section, I will focus on the other aspect - leadership legitimacy. When 
collaborators from the administrations assess ND and TEAs leadership and the 
collaborative innovation project, I find two main themes as a result of these 
questions. The most important theme concerns the collaborative project. The second 
theme concerns the present and future leadership of ND and TEA.  
 
7.5.4.1  Assessments of the collaborative innovation project 
In the following sections, I will describe the sources of legitimacy that collaborators 
suggest. These are walking in the same direction, a consolidated machine, no 
turning back now and innovating governance.  
 
 
 330 
 
’Walking in the same direction’ 
Across administrations and positions, an overall agreement exists that both the 
policy and the Intra-Municipal Governance structure make sense. One of the 
respondents mentions at a policy meeting that “the municipality has 56 different 
strategies, depending on what administration and maybe even what department 
you're in. But the point is I guess, well at one time or another, and this is true not 
just concerning the area-based approach, but in general, that the City of 
Copenhagen at some time must begin to walk in the same direction” (member, 
policy meeting, 2011, part 3).  
 ND’s ambition of enhancing cross-administrative collaboration is by almost all 
interviewed participants in The Policy Formulation process regarded as legitimate, 
not only in the area-based field, but as a guiding principle for local governance.  
Another interviewee sees the policy as an attempt to address a main challenge in the 
municipality: how to make cross-administrative policies that makes a substantive, 
collaborative contribution, and not just a symbolic collaboration:  
R: “Our health policy ... I did not agree with the way it was designed, if I may say 
so, because we tried to keep the political-strategic level to ourselves for a long time, 
as a HCA development, while at the same time saying it was cross-sectorial. So we 
kept the development strand of the policy in our own office for a very long time. And 
we involved the others in a more particular way [....]. 
I: (a): Hm-m. So do you think that this policy has involved the other administrations 
more in relation to the policy area?  
R: Yeah, I think so, in a way. It is, of course, also dependent on whether the 
individual administrations actually pick up the initiatives from TEA, how much they 
have been involved, I assume” (HCA, I16, special consultant) 
The quote demonstrates that ’true’ collaboration is what makes a difference – but 
many cross-municipal policies only have symbolic value. One explanation is that 
policy development is mainly done in-house, and the other administrations are only 
included when the policy has been made. In a sense, the Policy for Disadvantaged 
Neighbourhoods is assessed as being broader and more inclusive; but it remains to 
be seen whether or not the administrations will acknowledge the policy objectives as 
their own goals, and not only the goals related to their own sector. The quote also 
demonstrates that this type of policy partly depends on whether the administrations 
are able to make sense of the policy in relation to their own strategies and sector-
specific policies. This point is elaborated in the quote below:  
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“I just thought that the policy here is such a policy ... our health care policy perhaps 
could have been such a comprehensive policy. 
I.a: so you think this [policy] is broader than your own, in one way or another? 
R. a: Yes, I think so, because it attempts to embrace all the policies for all 
administrations under one umbrella. It is, after all, very much a shared platform, 
you might say…… But in relation to both CYA and TEA, they have many other 
goals. ... It may well be that I'm overly optimistic, now when I sit here and talk about 
it. But that's just because I think it's a super important area. And that I see an 
opportunity to work with the health dimension in relation to, well, it will not be 
something fragmented. Now it [the health dimension] will be part of something” 
(HCA, Civil servant, I17) 
In the quote we see how the cross-administrative element in Policy For 
Disadvantaged Areas is perceived of as contributing to sector-specific goals such as 
health; this cross-policy creates a structure for combining various strategies to other 
sector-strategies that require collaboration in order to address wicked problems. 
Thus, Policy for Disadvantaged Areas is also an opportunity for other 
administrations to coordinate their own activities better. The policy is perceived of 
as an overarching policy, which can help improve the efficiency of other 
administrations.  
 
A consolidated machine: moving initiatives/projects towards the core operations 
A related theme to the one above is the metaphor of a machine which can be 
optimized. We saw the precursor for this image also in the ‘Pillar’-project in which 
the word ‘coordination’ was dominant. Here, the machine is the municipal ‘core 
operations’. We see this when interviewees use words such as the ‘system’ or the 
‘core operation’, as in the quote below:  
“I think it's [a] wise move which has made good sense throughout [the process]. 
The move that TEA, or that the new policy is making,  by saying 'this is about to get 
aligned the projects towards the municipal core operation’  –  to consider 
development work as being close to the day-to-day operation, and to make sure that 
we don't initiate development projects and such things which are outside the day-to-
day operation. Because we know from experience that those things will die. So I 
guess all the way around, including our CEO, is supportive of thinking in that way. 
So in that way there is a resonance here, I think, also in the system, that this is the 
way we must think about it” (HCA, special consultant, I16) 
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In the quote we see a stark contrast to the oppositional image of projects and earlier 
generations of area-based programs as being unfocused and too experimental, as we 
saw in the analysis of The Evaluation Case. As the quote above demonstrates, the 
body of the municipal ‘core operation’ has joints, and projects are limbs too far 
away from the joints. So they have a tendency to wither away and die. This quote is 
not representative for all interviewees concerning the dramatic vein. But it does say 
something about how strong the antagonistic relationship between the ‘projects’ and 
the ‘core operation’ can become when using this discourse. And why one informant 
mentioned that the focus on ‘core operations’ has almost become so dominant in the 
municipality that it is too much: suddenly it is almost forbidden to undertake 
‘projects’ (I27).   
The second quote demonstrates the overall professional ambition behind the 
antagonism: that it is the core welfare services that are able to solve the problems of 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods: 
“R: Yes, because if you see it from my perspective it can't be the Area Lift that 
makes the biggest difference. It can't possibly be four employees out there [in the 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods]. And it can’t possibly be the Social Comprehensive 
Plan, no matter how great they are. It can't be DKK 5 million per year in the area of 
Mjølnerparken [disadvantaged social housing area] which really makes the 
difference. What make a difference are the primary schools out there, it's the day-
care institutions, and it is about whether the library actually manages to attract 
some people. 
I: And that is what it [the Policy] says? With its focus on core the operations? 
R: Yes, it is, and in this way they have seen quite right: to avoid doing it project 
based. That is the big mantra in the City of Copenhagen at the moment because we 
might have had a tendency in the past sometimes to believe in quick fixes, so it's the 
right focus” (EIA, manager, I22) 
In this respect, the quote also explains that the antagonism underpinning the 
‘project/core operation’ is also a symbol for the new political leadership as a way of 
marking a radical break with the former decision makers’ practice. Because of this it 
is perceived of as legitimate by ND to utilise this antagonism.      
However, as several directors note, despite the fact that the policy and Intra-
Municipal Governance structure are to some extent accepted in the central 
administrative and political systems, and indeed also demonstrate a big leap forward 
in being able to solve the problem of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the vocabulary 
of ‘coordination’, ‘core operations’ and ‘central strategies’ is perhaps not something 
that locally focused people can see themselves in. Perhaps what the residents in the 
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socially disadvantaged areas remember the most is actually the frivolous 
experiments such as ’going to the fun park “BonBon-Land”’, and not the strategies 
(I28).  ND’s project aims at centralized plans and decision making, suggesting fixed 
goals to be achieved.  But (local) politicians have no use for machine ’images’: they 
want something that evokes feelings. As a result the image of administrative 
optimization (the machine image) generates resistance.  
In the quote below, a director describes some of the weaknesses of the policy. One 
possible weakness is that locally focused stakeholders such as residents and local 
politicians have no ownership of the policy. In order for the policy to become 
relevant, it has to become more concrete. One way of doing this would be to make a 
show-case, enabling the rest of the policy to be implemented.  A show case could be 
targeting only problems related to youth, fear and crime, or business related 
investments in the areas. This may create ownership of the policy, which is now 
lacking: 
“I think we generally have a challenge in this field of the exposed urban areas with 
respect to our objectives. They are not, how can I put in, they are not [articulated] 
in sufficiently simple political language. I think there are a lot of actors related to 
this who cannot figure out what the ultimate goal really is, what is that we want .... I 
don't think it comes by itself. I think that there's going to be produced a great many 
useful things and I also believe there will be a perspective in it. But I don't think 
there will, in any case if we were to take your headline called ‘innovation 
leadership’, arise more radical changes from that level.... it may well happen that 
the proposals will be coming forward, but they will not be given priority in such a 
political process, because who is it really, who is it really that kind of owns these 
cases? You probably know the way that things are being managed in a budget 
prioritization process in the City of Copenhagen - therefore, there must be some 
politicians who own this here, so that they can be given priority” (Director, SSA, 
I28, my bold)  
In my interpretation the quote demonstrates, that sensemaking is constantly 
happening in the City of Copenhagen concerning “the monster” (I20) that has been 
created. The quote also reflects that it is of vital importance for maintaining 
legitimacy that the strong administrative vein in the policy is transformed into 
specific political projects to which politicians can have an ownership.  
Another consequence of the image of the consolidated machine is the future role of 
area-based programs. As a civil servant (I24) and a director state (I18), it is unclear 
what the role of the area-based programs are in the future, since ‘projects’ now have 
to be tied to core operations. Consequently, the area-based programs are in a 
vulnerable position, in that they have a status of ‘projects’, and in this respect must 
be able to show that they can contribute to the goals of the policy. This perspective 
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is interesting from bottom-up leadership perspective, in that ND has used their 
critical insights of the area-based programs in order to inspire a policy making 
focused on coordination. However, this exercise has to some extent partly left their 
point of professional origin in a limbo. Consequently it is important to highlight that 
such bottom-up leadership may require a redefinition of that profession and its 
operations.   
So, concerning leadership legitimacy, the image of the machine being optimized 
through an antagonistic relationship between ’core running’ and ’projects’ is closely 
linked to the cross-administrative set-up, in terms of centralization and formalisation 
of decision making. For centrally focused stakeholders, this discursive element in 
the policy and the cross-administrative organisation are legitimate. However, locally 
focused politicians and residents may not find this positioning legitimate, and the 
ownership of the policy is mainly to be found amongst the involved stakeholders at 
the central level.  
 
No turning back now 
Another aspect that relates to the ’same direction’ theme is that cross-administrative 
collaboration is a necessity. A number of interviewees explain the necessity of 
working cross-administratively by referring to past developments: There was quite 
plainly a need for improved coordination and leadership concerning the area-based 
resort in TEA, because they overtook this turf from FA, consequently needed to 
define how the administration would administer these area-based programs, 
especially because of the explosion in The Social Comprehensive Plans: 
“I will say, it was the whole experience, both for social housing organisations, 
administrations and for politicians that there was not sufficient coherence and 
coordination in what was happening. And neither were there any broad outlines for 
what kind of landmarks there was present in this type of program. (…) There was a 
lack of an overall set-up, right? And then TEA decided to establish that working 
group, initiating the project [The Horisontal Pillar]. (Director, I18, EIA)” 
The quote demonstrates that an aspect that has legitimized the leadership of ND and 
TEA is an actual demand from the municipal system to create some order and 
structure in this administrative field.   
The quote below points to another source of legitimacy:   
“It is right and necessary, or at least something in that style here is right and 
necessary, because of course we cannot do anything out in the disadvantaged areas. 
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It is indeed thought-provoking that the vulnerable urban areas, it’s social housing 
urban areas that we are talking about here, it is not a private rental sector, investing 
in some large area, which has ended in disaster. So we have a shared destiny here 
which is special (SSA, director, I28)”. 
The reason why ND and TEA’s project is granted legitimacy in relation to the cross-
administrative set-up is that both the municipality and social housing organisations 
have a need for being able to talk to each other as unified actors; this need to some 
extent contributes to legitimize the policy and the new governance structure. 
However, as we saw in the conflict section (7.6) above, this cross-administrative set-
up is highly ambivalent for stakeholders to relate to.   
Another necessity mentioned is the fear of riots as happened in London 2011. As the 
interviewee argues, working across administrations is necessary in order for the city 
’not to break in two’. And further, that the cross-administrative practice is a clean 
break with the existing practice six to seven years before (I18).  What this comment 
illustrates is that the policy and the new governance structure are perceived of as 
legitimate by some involved stakeholders in that the municipality are doing things 
on a much more qualified capacity level than before.  
 
Innovating governance 
Another aspect of cross-administrative cooperation in relation to legitimacy is that it 
is perceived of by several respondents as innovative: as the capitol, the City of 
Copenhagen has a duty to be first-mover in finding solutions to the problems of 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The development of new ways of collaborating is 
innovative. This cross-administrative development also improves the professional 
capacity of the civil servants involved, in that they gain knowledge of how isolated 
phenomena are actually interlinked in the disadvantaged areas. This is also assessed 
in a positive manner. Professional drive and development are issues that the civil 
servants in the interviews often mention; likewise, these are considered factors that 
legitimize both the project and leadership (I20, I23).  
 
 
7.5.4.2 Summing up 
In this section, I have found four positive assessments of the collaborative 
innovation project run by ND and its collaborators. These are walking in the same 
 336 
 
direction, a consolidated machine, no turning back now, innovating governance and 
the disadvantaged areas approach.  
Collaborators find it highly relevant to work across administrative boundaries and 
collaborate with the social housing sector. In this respect, ND’s project has become 
a shared object, in the sense that most respondents agree that collaboration is 
necessary, and that the governance structure in the City of Copenhagen has 
problems when it comes to true collaboration, in that most policies continue to be 
perceived of as sector-bound, despite their cross-administrative intention. And not 
only in the field of disadvantaged neighbourhoods is this agenda relevant, but also in 
general, when addressing complex problems such as health and employment. 
Furthermore, some perceive of the Policy for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods as a 
meta-policy, on which employment and health can be hinged, thus using the policy 
as a cross-administrative infrastructure.  
The image of the municipal governance as a multi-layered initiative machine that is 
in need of consolidation is also present in some of the interviews: the number of 
projects needs to be reduced and instead moved closer to the ’limbs’ of the core 
operations. Otherwise municipal governance will remain unfocused, and the project 
limbs will wither away and die. Projects must be connected to, and clearly 
demonstrate, how they enhance the core operations of the municipality. This image 
is what underpins the ’Mercedes sign’ in the final policy, as I have described in the 
Entrepreneurship section. However, collaborators also reflect on the possible 
consequences of using what I call the ’consolidated machine’, rhetoric of 
’coordination’, ’core operations’, and ’central strategies’. The rhetoric  might cause 
difficulties for local politicians and citizens in them taking ownership of the policy 
because it  does not generate emotions.  
Collaborators also find that in the field of disadvantaged areas and neighbourhoods, 
there is no turning back. The municipality has a shared destiny with the social 
housing sector, in that most of the disadvantaged areas consist of social housing 
dwellings. Thus, Intra-Municipal Governance and the policy are necessary in order 
to define the future role for this shared destiny. If the municipality and the social 
housing sector do not succeed in making progress in the disadvantaged areas, the 
problems is in risk of escalating, with unforeseen consequences.  
Finally, some respondents perceive the collaborative endeavours positively and as a 
sign of innovation: that the municipality is innovating its way of collaborating 
between administrations; and that the municipality is actually ’a first mover’ in 
dealing with the complex problems of disadvantaged neighbourhoods.  
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7.5.4.3 Leadership assessments: ND and TEA as the driving force 
In the section above, I have analysed what sources of legitimacy that conditions the 
way that stakeholders relate themselves to TEA’s innovation project. In this section, 
I will turn to how ND/TEA’s leadership is assessed. An assumption of the BUCIL 
model is that bottom-up leadership may lead to either that leadership may be 
distributed, or a consolidated leadership in the lead organisation in which the 
entrepreneurial unit is located.  In this section, I will explore who is perceived of as 
leader, and the sources of legitimacy that supports this leadership.  
ND as the driving force 
It is strikingly clear all interviewees perceive ND and TEA as the driving forces of 
the process. This is reflected in the quote below:  
“I: If such a policy is to be successful in the long run, should TEA maintain pressure 
on all levels, or? 
R. a.: Yes, there is no doubt about it. There is no doubt about it. They are the only 
ones who can do it. A policy such as this one here will not result in anything without 
a ferocious information pressure. 
I. a: Constantly and all the time? 
R. a: Constantly and all the time. I am absolutely sure about that (HCA, special 
consultant, I16) 
 
What the quote demonstrates is that the policy, despite being cross-administrative, is 
perceived of as being the responsibility of TEA. This is also reflected below:  
“This is a large bureaucracy, and it can result in something good …But there is a 
need for creating momentum ... so they [TEA] must for God's sake not breathe a 
sigh of relief over there, from my perspective. It is okay to take a breathing pause, 
but it is now they must ensure that it keeps going, ... and here I speak from my own 
experience with this system about how difficult it can be to keep the pot boiling – 
exactly to get the small things made up in such a way that people can do things a 
little bit differently, to get the necessary partial agreements made, to supplement 
small bits to budgets that enables you to make a difference …to nurse those 
stakeholders that now believe that they’ve been heard, but who now are beginning to 
think that nothing is changing” (EIA, manager, I22) 
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In this quote it is perceived of as a sole responsibility of ND and TEA to keep the 
other administrations engaged. The quote also illustrates that this engagement 
requires much labour from TEA and that this task is not perceived of as a 
collaborative task.  
Obviously, the expectation that TEA and ND are supposed to lead grants the 
leadership in TEA some legitimacy, in that the project now is a part of the usual 
business in the City of Copenhagen. However, the transversal and cross-bar element 
of the policy has not resulted in a distribution of leadership, nor did any interviewees 
mention an ambition to take on some of the leadership. Accordingly ND and TEA 
are isolated as the driving force of the Policy for Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods.   
 
Avoiding conflicts by using a by-the-book leadership style: servicing, advocating, 
acknowledging, facilitating and creating a shared identity   
Another aspect that grants ND legitimacy is a by-the-book leadership style. During 
the four meetings that I participated in, I was able to see leadership enacted. ND 
took on the role of the by-the-book leader, making several positional moves that 
reduced the level of conflict. First of all, the ND consultant took on the role of 
providing service to the other administrations, making things as easy as possible for 
them. As I demonstrated in my description of the meetings, if criticism of The 
Technical and Environmental Administration or the project was voiced, the ND 
consultant would take on the position as the responsible party. If something was 
unclear, especially concerning mandate, the ND consultant provided the group with 
strategic knowledge and repeated the formal mandate to group members; the ND 
consultant also invited the project owner, the director of the Centre for City Design, 
to make a presentation about how he viewed the policy, and how he would suggest 
that the group could relate the policy to The Copenhagen Tale or the Governance 
Dialogue. The ND consultant also urged The Finance Administration member to 
give a presentation of the results from the Cross-Municipal Steering Committee 
meeting recently held, providing the group with information about what the ‘7 
director’ wants;  and he gave The Finance Administration member the task of 
presenting ‘The Copenhagen Tale’. The ND consultant also brought in skilled, 
locally working people in area-based programs, boosting the members’ knowledge 
concerning problems in the neighbourhoods and shortcomings of existing practice. 
The ND consultant was also very clear about acknowledging the other members’ 
expertise, for example saying “we [in TEA] have to be better when making area 
boundaries, so that the Children and Youth Administration has their viewpoints 
represented beforehand” (policy meeting, I11 part 1). Additionally, the ND 
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consultant and the FA alliance took on advocacy for members present, such as “we 
have to make sure that with respect to SSA your needs have been met”(policy 
meeting, I13, part 1). Another type of leadership behaviour was to facilitate 
interaction and knowledge by making a Christmas card exercise, in which each 
member wrote his/hers vision of  a good neighbourhood. Finally, the ND consultant 
also took actions providing direction for the group by creating a shared identity, for 
example stating “we’re in this mess together, we have to make the policy” or “we 
have to give the steering committee the numbers they want” or introducing a 
them/us division of labour: “it is not up to us to make the decisions; that is up to the 
politicians”. This ‘we’ and ‘us’ positioning is in contrast to some group members, 
who consider ‘we’ to refer to the administration they represent.  
ND was not alone in exercising leadership. The Finance Administration member, 
representing the most powerful administration of the Lord Mayor, also took on a 
supportive leadership role, especially concerning advocacy for SSA, as well as 
providing valuable strategic knowledge, for example on  the ‘talk’ of the Lord 
Mayor, and concerning  The Finance Administration’s strategies that might be in 
conflict with the policy that the team were  developing.  The FA member also 
discussed whether the term ‘Development Plan’ for targeting the ‘Yellow Clouds’ 
was an appropriate term, in that city development and master-planning is considered 
The Finance Administration’s turf, and stated that it might confuse and tire 
politicians, if yet another type of ‘plan’ was to be made. Furthermore, when a ND 
representative, (very keen on the idea of local innovation) presented a policy draft 
full of innovation paragraphs, The Finance Administration member acknowledged 
the draft, but also remarked that ‘the Lord Mayor is very tired of new funny projects, 
he has made that very clear’.  This knowledge gave the group direction and helped 
them to develop the policy.  
In overall, the leadership of ND is unchallenged and accepted, ND positioning itself 
not as a hierarchical leader, nor a substantive leader of an already defined project, as 
was the case in The Evaluation Team.  
 
Broader and more inclusive 
Another aspect that serves to legitimize the policy and the new organisation is that 
both process and output is perceived as broad and inclusive (I16, I25, I17) - even 
though a respondent also categorizes it as ‘top-down’ and  having been ‘altered in 
the 11th hour’, i.e.  a subtle critique that ND altered substantive parts of the policy at 
the end of the process. Despite this, some ownership across administrations is 
demonstrated in the interviews. This relates to the leadership position of ND, but it 
also relates to the policy as a product. Both contributing to the substance of the 
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policy, being heard, as well as ND’s boldness to, late in the process, involve 
members of The Policy Formulation Team once again asking what ‘problem’ needs 
to be solved. These are all aspects that legitimise the project and the leadership.  
 
7.5.4.4 Summing up 
I would have expected from the interviews that some respondents would state that 
different actors would or should take leadership, or at least participate in running the 
process.  Surprisingly unanimous, however, all respondents state that ND and The 
Technical and Environmental Administration are the main driving force for the 
process in the future. This is also a surprise when considering the fact that the 
analysis above has shown that some interviewees find ND and The Technical and 
Environmental Administration’s political project legitimate. To some extent, this 
finding reflects that collaborators in this case may approve of the project, and even 
may see some strategic advantages in it, but it is not their task to run the project. 
This is an important finding in this section, because it gives us an idea of the 
challenges that other BUCIL processes might come across despite.  
Another important finding is the respondents’ difficulties in actually describing and 
assessing the leadership – they have few directly critical remarks concerning 
leadership abilities. Furthermore, the interviewees actually have no vocabulary for 
describing the type of leadership. The leadership of ND and The Technical and 
Environmental Administration was overall assessed as uncontroversial. The few 
conflicts concerning ND’s project and their leadership behaviour have been analysed 
in the ’Conflict’ section. This uncontroversial nature is in stark contrast to their 
collaborative innovation project. And it is also in stark contrast to The Evaluation 
Case. No matter whether the interviewees are being strategically polite or not, or 
whether the interviewees are unfamiliar with assessing (this type of) leadership, 
what this tell us is that ND’s leadership at this point has been recognised as a regular 
leadership in this specific context. 
In The Policy Formulation meetings, most conflicts are actually avoided by a by-
the-book leadership style. Here, ND has a leadership style that is effective in 
avoiding collaborative conflicts. ND and the ND consultant position themselves as 
leaders with a keen eye for the needs of the group, by servicing the members, 
advocating for members, acknowledging the members’ need and professionalism, 
facilitating interaction and attempting to create a shared identity amongst members.  
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7.6.5. LEADERSHIP IDENTITY 
In the previous sections I have analysed what kind of a landscape that ND as a 
leader is conditioned by in its attempts to introduce new concepts, exercising 
influence in terms of making and giving sense. Points of conflicts and sources of 
legitimacy point to possibilities for leadership positioning, as well as what the 
possible future consequences these positioning possibilities will have for the future 
trajectory of the innovation process.  
As the above sections have demonstrated, many positionings are possible in the 
landscape of conflict points and sources of legitimacy. These positionings depend on 
the choices taken by ND. So how does ND make sense of what is going on, and who 
they are?   
The following markers of identity stand strong in the interviews:  
- Moving from development unit to strategy unit 
- Creating and utilizing windows of opportunity 
- The will to lead on the basis of professional insight 
- A differentiation of leadership roles 
- A bottom-up approach 
 
7.5.5.1 Moving from development unit to strategy unit 
In the interviews with key people from the ND office, I asked the interviewees to 
reflect on how they perceived of their own office’s leadership, both in relation to 
The Policy Formulation process and in general, and whether they could express how 
they perceived their own leadership.  
In terms of the general development that the ND office has undergone, perhaps the 
most striking development is from being an office focused on operations to being a 
strategic office. In my field work, I noted that the middle manager casually 
mentioned the following: “We have developed from being an operation office to a 
strategy office…I have my secretary, Mary, monitoring all the other political 
committees…no surprises”. I found this distinction between an operations office and 
a strategic office central in order to describe the positional development before the 
Pillar to the office’s leadership position at the time of interview (2008-2012). And 
probing into this, I asked the middle manager to reflect on this earlier statement. The 
response given was that this development has altered the status of ND from being a 
central service facility for area-based programs to being an office that develops 
strategies for disadvantaged areas, which has required a new role in relation to the 
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area-based programs. Now, the main objective is not the neighbourhood plans of the 
Area Lifts, but ‘Policy For Disadvantaged Areas’, to which the programs have to 
adjust:  
“It [that identity change] is very significant indeed, I must say. Concretely, you 
could say that it is something our own projects, that is, the area renewals, really 
have difficulties in understanding. Because ... and that may say little about the 
development, that in the past, this office has been an office which supported, 
serviced, enhanced concrete projects. Firstly, area renewal and subsequently also 
the Comprehensive Plans. So what we are doing today is much more policy 
and strategy development. And today, we would not be seen as an office for 
area-based interventions, we would be seen as an office for disadvantaged 
areas, right? 
(…)Our mission is to continue having a point of departure in the specific area based 
projects, but being able to use them for something more. So today we're still there 
when a neighbourhood plan in an area renewal is created. But then we will 
constantly hinge it on the nine goals in the Policy. (…) Today, I know much more 
about the strategies, policies, politicians, and when something comes up in a 
committee, e.g. what would they be interested in,  or what we can use the Think Tank 
for Integration for, etc. (I15) 
As a consequence, the roles of ND has changed in relation to the area-based 
programs of ’Area Lift’ and the Comprehensive Plans, and the roles of the area-
based programs have changed, in that before, the success criteria was an approved 
Neighbourhood Plan for an Area Lift program. Now, the programs have to see 
themselves as supporters of a policy with fixed goals. In terms of the development in 
leadership, the focus is not to support citizen involvement or bottom-up processes in 
the neighbourhoods. Instead, the policy is a central means for improving the work 
locally. As such, we also see that instead of a self-perception of a development unit, 
in the future, strategic skills and a stable, visible, collaborative profile is necessary in 
order to make the policy valuable at the local level. In order to do so, ND has to 
have a stable and reliable actor profile. The image of ’products on the shelves’ [in 
Danish: ‘varer på hylderne] stands strong in this narrative: what is it that 
collaborators can expect of ND? This needs to be very clear. As the middle manager 
notes: “I do not see the policy as something involving citizens (…) It’s the opposite. 
As something that is about first of all ‘now we have to figure out how we cooperate 
well together’, and second, how is it that we, I mean, what are the exact products on 
our shelves? (I15)”  
Furthermore, the middle manager also reflects on the future shift in roles, because 
until then, ND had been a development unit. If the future challenge is less 
development and more steady deliverables, then it may be a challenge for the ND 
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office and the leadership involved because the ND employees enjoy being a 
development unit (I15).   
A further characteristic of ND’s leadership is that the main leadership still is to be 
found in ND and in their mayor – this alliance has to keep pushing forward their 
agenda, especially at the political level. Supportive factors are the new organisation, 
in which the social housing sector has a major interest in maintaining the political 
dialogue with the City of Copenhagen (I15).  
A final overall challenge for ND’s leadership is the constant uncertainty concerning 
resources. ND has been asked several times how many man hours it will take to 
make the so called ‘Development Plans’, the key instrument in Policy for 
Disadvantaged Areas. An explanation for this inability to accept uncertainty is given 
by the middle manager in ND: “the less people understand of the change project 
you are doing, the higher the formal demands” (I15). Instead, the Development Plan 
is supposed to be a facilitated process, in which the different administrations can 
provide feedback concerning the  needs of specific areas. So, ND constantly has to 
reply that the content of the Development Plans is up to the locally working 
professionals and managers; ND mainly provides the frame for the process. Being 
able to handle these formal demands can be a challenge for a development unit. 
Thus, what we see here is a continuation of the facilitative, coordinative role, 
coupled with an understanding of the project as a development project. However, in 
terms of the focus on the strategic dimension, we also see a greater awareness of the 
need for closure regarding development identification, and more focus on 
implementing and utilizing what has already been produced.  
Another aspect of leadership in the ND office is, according to the middle manager, 
establishing channels for communication between the middle manager in ND and 
other stakeholders. A precondition is to trust the work of the employees in the office, 
and ‘sometimes give them room for failing’ (middle manager, ND). Thus, the role is 
to translate the ‘considerations’ made at the professional level, in such a way that 
people higher up the hierarchical ladder, including the politicians, are able to see its 
necessity. As the middle manager figuratively describes it, ‘the product has had to 
be sold several times in the process, despite the fact that we didn’t have the product 
on our shelves. But I have trusted that they would in time make the product, so 
(I15)…’ A part of this translation process of a leader is also to be able to explain the 
necessity of the project, why it needs to be developed, and why it was not there 
beforehand. This is necessary in order for The Technical and Environmental 
Administration directors to convince the board of directors of the other 
administrations to make room for development amongst their own civil servants; 
also to encourage politicians to see that the project is ‘a winning case’ for them. All 
of these different layers of leadership and stakeholders have to be coupled by the 
middle manager in ND:  
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“So there are at least a whole lot of levels which will be connected, I think, when I 
look back at the process, through my course of leadership. And my leadership has 
also been about that I have been able to sell the case to my management board, in 
such a way that they have given me enough leadership space to work with it" 
(middle manager, ND, I15). 
The image of the policy as something that couples different municipal resources 
stands strong.  
A precondition for exercising this leadership is also the personal intention to develop 
a professional area, and having visions for it. The middle manager describes a 
distinction between her type of leadership and a less developed leadership style: 
‘whether you are focused on managing your resort and the working procedures, 
doing what you must, or whether you also push an agenda forward, taking the lead. 
And my aim has very specifically been saying, ‘well, we are the biggest municipality 
with the most areas on that famous ghetto list, and we…we have many 
administrations and a lot of money and a lot of other different stuff, so we must, you 
know, be an example, right? 
What this quote also tells us is that an important part of the ND identity has been the 
identity of a developer and a first mover in a national context.  
Another identity mark of the ND leadership is what I will call the will to lead. At the 
time, there was a great awareness amongst the three interviewed ND members that 
ND is a leading unit. This identification stands stronger than in The Evaluation 
Case. The leader also acknowledges that she has been of the driving forces; 
otherwise the project would not have been pushed forward at all. In order to do so, a 
genuine desire to develop this professional area must be present.  
In relation to running the process, the resource demands of the employees have been 
huge. The mission in the office has been to carry everything through themselves, 
avoiding giving ultimatums:  
"Well, the process has been fuelled by the fact that people have been dedicated to it, 
you might say. And that has also included weekends and evenings and at-odd times. 
And it has also demanded an incredible willingness from my staff and myself to say, 
well, we personally take care [in Danish: ‘håndbærer’] of everything that is in need 
of making its way through the municipal system (...) It would have been dropped 
with a bang, if we were to have sat down and said: 'You have a deadline on 
Tuesday. If you do not stick to that, well, bam, bam, bam'. So instead it's been like 
everything from to jumping on a bike and going off to another local actor and 
saying ‘just listen and see, and we could do such and such and such’ to going to a 
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director meeting and saying: ‘Listen to this here, it's damn important and’ ... So we 
have simply been sending tracks in all directions almost at the same time" (I15 ). 
In order to be bottom-up leader, different tools of power must be applied, which to a 
high extent is giving sense to others by making numerous contacts, especially to the 
local level in order to acquire legitimacy.  
 Despite having come this far, many challenges lie ahead in terms of 
strategic decisions. Especially concerning whether or not the other administrations 
will support the policy aims financially in the future budget negotiations.  
And also, whether ND can maintain support from the top management and top 
politicians. This seems to be a vital support in order to keep running the process 
from the bottom of The Technical and Environmental Administration. In the 
example given, the new director for the Urban Design Department was not fond of 
the idea in the policy concerning ’preferential treatment’, and wanted this element to 
disappear from the policy. However, having just talked to two mayors about it, 
including The Technical and Environmental Administration’s own, the ND manager 
succeeded in maintaining the ’preferential treatment’ ambition in the policy. This, 
and other examples, demonstrates the importance of constant alliances with the top 
management in order to maintain support for the policy, and the vulnerability of the 
policy project. As the middle manager from ND noted, hard work and luck are also 
involved to maintain this support, due to the high number of policies in ND’s own 
administration: “It is also about luck … The Technical and Environmental 
Administration has… [a great number of policies and strategies]. So you really have 
to fight in order to keep, you know, attention….” 
What the quote demonstrates is how much bottom-up leadership is dependent upon 
the constant making of alliances and influencing collaborators; otherwise this 
bottom-up leadership is vulnerable to turnarounds and new strategies in the 
hierarchical leadership. 
 
7.5.5.2 Creating and utilizing windows of opportunity 
In the interviews with key people in ND and the former director of the Urban Design 
Department, I asked about critical events during the innovation journey. There is 
agreement concerning these critical events:  
- The importance of the former director leaving his position, allowing ND to 
get in contact with the two highest ranking directors in the administration 
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- The importance of using the alliance, especially with one of the directors, 
to alter the scope of the policy 
- The importance of making the first meetings in the board of mayors 
meaningful to the mayors 
- The importance of making a successful alliance with the Finance 
Administration 
 
Taking action in these events, combined with the ability of making and giving sense 
around these events, has allowed ND/TEA to evolve from a coordinator of a 
‘toolbox of what works’ policy to being a coordinator of a full-blown meta-policy. 
This meta-policy potentially involves being a meaningful framework for how 
welfare service delivery and sector policies for a third of the population of the City 
of Copenhagen are supposed to transform disadvantaged neighbourhoods into areas 
which on certain scores is on average with the rest of the city. As I described 
elsewhere, this is one of ND’s cross-roads of leadership: whether the policy should 
be a subordinate policy supporting already existing policies;  or whether the policy 
should be a superior policy that is  a cross-sectorial framework for other sector-
related policies. This is a cross-road concerning leadership recognition, meaning that 
opting for a less ambitious policy would not  have required ND to acquire another 
type of recognition, because the role of the developing coordinator in the phase of 
The Evaluation Case would have suited a subordinate policy, whose main focus 
would remain the area-based programs. However, as we have seen above, making 
powerful alliances with top management enabled ND to make a much more 
ambitious meta-policy, but it has also required ND to alter their identity in order to 
acquire recognition, which their manager terms ‘strategic’.   
 
The will to lead on the basis of professional insight 
The interviewees in ND give different descriptions concerning their leadership. But 
a red thread in explaining how they made it this far is the combination of two 
elements: a will to lead and to develop a solid professional foundation. One of the 
interviewees refers to one of the director interviews made in parallel with policy 
formulation meetings. This interview has been an inspiration in terms of 
understanding the power available in the municipality - the agenda setting power: 
“R: I think, kind of like he said [the director] when we went there to interview him, 
that there is not much available power in the structure here in this municipality and 
someone must take responsibility and emphasize substantive matters. And that if you 
show leadership, then you will also to a high extent get support (...) intuitively, we 
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were well aware that this here was network-based management, and network 
management is about everyone having the right of veto in this structure. Everyone 
has the right of veto, but people only participate in this as long as they can see there 
is something in it for them, and what we then have done is that we have allied 
ourselves greatly with the top management (I19). “ 
Both the statement concerning ND’s role and the reference to the conversation are 
important, in that they demonstrate that the awareness of ND’s own position also 
rests on the many conversations and conflicts with stakeholders and people 
involved. Thus, the relationship is not only ND giving sense, but also ND being part 
of a collaborative sensemaking process, in which ND picks up pieces of meaning as 
they move forward – especially concerning their own role. We also see this when an 
ND member reflected on the conversations in the policy group, and subsequently 
decided to try to alter the scope of the policy in a way that matched the direction of 
the collaborative conversations. The quote further demonstrates an important 
finding: that abstract concepts, in this case ‘networked leadership’, provided to the 
interviewee in a leadership training program, is essential for ND as an office to 
making sense of their own project – similarly to The Evaluation Case, in which 
abstract concepts such as a ‘systemic’ perspective on evaluation and the ‘strategy 
template’ provided ND members with new ways of understanding the municipality 
and ND’s project. Finally, the quote demonstrates that the agenda setting power in 
terms of demonstrating leadership can provide momentum for an emergent leader. 
This is an interesting finding, especially in a complex organized municipality as the 
City of Copenhagen, in that it to some extent challenges the image of public sector 
bureaucracies as factors that themselves inhibit the creation of new solutions. What 
the quote reflects is that the agenda setting power, or what I call the direction of 
sensemaking by means of the BUCIL model, is the type of power that can influence 
stakeholders, despite bureaucratic constraints. The quote thus also points to the fact 
that demonstrating leadership is indeed in itself a positional act that can generate 
recognition under specific circumstances.   
In describing the alteration of the policy mandate from a small to a large mandate, 
an interviewee explains that: 
 ‘it was a time of change. Sam [ND civil servant] suddenly started talking about 
whether we shouldn’t give the policy another name, because we always ended up 
talking about the [city] areas [when discussing the policy](….) so we simply 
postulated this professional necessity (…) we produced a PowerPoint for the board 
of mayors, and no one questioned the change…. Again, it is about taking 
leadership” (I19).   
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What the quote tells us is that when this ND employee describes how it was possible 
to exercise this profession-based leadership, a relation is made between 
sensemaking, network based alliances and the direction of sensemaking, justified by 
a professional claim. In terms of leadership, the decision to make this move was an 
act of leadership. 
What is also present in the ND perceptions of their own leadership is the conception 
of it as bottom-up leadership. Despite that leadership is exercised on many different 
levels, the project is something that ND has been developing, and has ‘pushed 
through the system and created support for and made alliances around (…) 
Leadership happens on many different levels (...) But I see this project as leadership 
from the bottom and up (...) it's the same kind of network management that I have 
always talked about "(ND consultant, I19).  
Another reflection in ND in the quote below is that they have an ability to describe 
their role in a leadership context – that it is leadership from the ’middle’ that is the 
driving force of development:  
“It is the administrative officer level, the level of CUT, it is, in fact here that the 
driving force is. And they are the ones who create organisational development up 
and down and they also have relationships to the projects. So it's really in there that 
it's going on. So it can be said from the managerial point of view that it is us who 
influence our leaders ... But it is not something that comes from the Heavens ... 
because they [the area-based programs] have had that character... It is the area-
based interventions and Comprehensive Plans (...) It is, after all, down in that 
engine room that things have been formulated and posted up and down in the 
system”. (ND, civil servant, I21) 
In the quote, we see again that the inspiration from the area-based programs has 
worked as a platform for initiating change, and that has influenced the leaders in the 
municipality. Despite the fact that ND’s identity is moving towards being more 
strategic, there still is a strong identity in the office concerning development, as the 
quote below demonstrates:  
“It is such that when the Policy [for Disadvantaged Areas] is formulated, it is half-
solved. It should of course generate the natural ’what’s  next’. And that is what we 
have achieved... to get that. And so you might say that we do not know the answer to 
that yet.(…)But it is also a huge advantage – exactly that a direction and a point of 
view are created, but that no final solutions are created.” (I21).  
 
 349 
 
This quote is important for several reasons. First of all, we see an ND member 
reflect on some of the point of conflicts that the existing governance and policy set-
up has produced concerning the collaborative governance structure and its hugeness, 
as well as the problem with the lack of ownership due to the administrative 
centralistic top-down character in the policy (see above). Quite important in the 
quote is that the collaborative difficulties of grasping what the innovation project is 
about can also be perceived of as an advantage, in that the uncertain horizon of the 
journey and the institutional uncertainty create a demand for more answers, which 
may allow ND to continue the project and thus produce these answers. The 
ambivalent consequences of this way of exercising influence become clear in that an 
increasing number of actors are demanding answers, but if these are not met quickly, 
strategic support may wither away. Moreover the quote reflects that the bottom-up 
leader in this case is in need of an increasing number of staff to satisfy the demands 
of the collaborators by giving sense and explaining the purpose of collaborative 
enterprise to them.  
A differentiation of leadership roles 
An important finding is an explicit internal division of labour concerning leadership 
aspects. The three interviewees were also the people who were mostly engaged and 
visible in running and defining the process at the ND office throughout the period 
from 2009 to the beginning of 2012. But in contrast to The Evaluation Case, they 
now seem to have their own leadership role to play almost without overlap.  
The special consultant running the process formulation meetings did so more or less 
alone, deciding who to make alliances with in parallel to The Policy Formulation 
process, etc. The role of this special consultant has thus been mainly pro-active in a 
leadership related way, building  networks strategically. The area in which this 
leadership is exercised is in The Policy Formulation Team; but equally important 
also in informal, bilateral settings, such as meeting face-to-face with important 
stakeholders (CEO’s and special consultants), negotiating the wordings and goals in 
the policy. This special consultant is in contact with the area-based professionals at 
the ND office.  The consultant is having routine tasks as well, playing here an 
informal leadership role in the office, but from the perspective of what is 
strategically and politically achievable.  
The middle manager has moved away from the profession-based, entrepreneurial 
substance, and consequently has a more formal leadership role, exercising leadership 
in formal settings, while having an overview of all ND activities and employees. In 
relation to the policy, she has an explicit formal position comprising tasks such as 
making presentations in steering committees and for the social housing 
organisations, approaching the new mayor and a director from The Technical and 
Environmental Administration, and making the tough decisions on which way to go 
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concerning how to manage leadership dilemmas. Therefore she fills out the 
leadership vacuum of the former director of the Urban Design Department, and has a 
‘championing role’ (Van de Ven, 1999). This director functions as a channel for the 
work produced by her employees, and has the final responsibility of handling the 
fundamental leadership dilemmas. Finally, this leader also defines the leadership 
position of the ND office to a great extent, for instance when reiterating the ND 
identity as a ‘strategy’ office.  
The civil servant also engaged as a member, and not as a project leader, in The 
Evaluation Team and in The Policy Formulation Team describes his own leadership 
as a ‘narrative’ type of leadership:  
“R: I have had a tremendous influence and very little responsibility.(laughing)  
In: Well that sounds nice  
R: I am good at having an overview and I get good ideas, coupling them to 
traditional ideas in a transversal way. So it has very much been my role to draw 
lessons from elsewhere and illuminate them using storytelling and it has largely 
been...  
I: is that a leadership role?  
R: it's more of a.. There is some professional development and professional 
leadership in it, but at all times I work relatively consciously at not sitting at the 
head of the table very often. I do so in periods but I withdraw whenever possible - 
partly because young people have a career where they'd like to go out and show 
leadership and responsibility, and partly because my skills are to float on top of 
systems and connect things together and draw attention to potentials.”(I21) 
This civil servant is very much engaged in sensemaking, the direction of 
sensemaking, entrepreneurial activities, and he often gives presentations in 
professional settings such as visiting other professionals in Sweden  (Field notes 
2010-09-06) and telling about the project (Field notes 2010-09-06). He reflected 
mostly on The Policy Formulation process, thus fostering the idea that maybe the 
policy should not be focused on the area-based programs, but on the city districts 
themselves.  He also plays an informal leadership role in the ND office, especially 
concerning explaining substance of the innovation project to new employees, and 
what to expect in the future (I21).  
So, another important finding is the specialised development of leadership in all 
three key persons at the ND office. The middle manager moves towards a more 
formalized, strategic and professional leadership role, exercising leadership in 
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formal arenas, leading all activities at the ND office, and making the tough 
decisions, such as deciding when to finish The Policy Formulation process. She is 
largely supported by both the strategically networking consultant and the 
entrepreneurial sensemaking civil servant.  The special consultant defines his role by 
means of concepts attained in a leadership training program, the main word being 
‘network management’ and ‘change management’. The civil servant with keen skills 
in entrepreneurship and sensemaking defines his role as a ‘narrative’ leadership, 
contributing to keeping the growing ND office together by explaining what the 
project, and the last three to four, has been about.  This development is not only an 
individual related specialization, it is also an actor related specialization. The ND 
office now formally has the responsibility for a policy process and its 
implementation. For this reason each member of the office is perceived of as a 
leader in all engagements with other actors, and is required to take the lead in each 
and every instance.  
7.5.5.3 Summing up  
With regard to ND’s perception of their own leadership, I have demonstrated three 
types of findings. The first important finding is an explicit internal division of 
labour concerning leadership aspects, which was not present in The Evaluation 
Case. The three interviewees were also the people who were mostly engaged and 
visible in running and defining the process at the ND office throughout the period 
from 2009 to the beginning of 2012. But in contrast to The Evaluation Case, they 
each had their own leadership role to play almost without overlap. Thus, another 
important finding is the specialised development of leadership in all three key 
persons in the ND office. The middle manager moves towards a more formalized, 
strategic and professional leadership role, exercising leadership in formal arenas, 
leading all activities at the ND office, and making the tough decisions, such as 
deciding when to finish The Policy Formulation process. She is largely supported by 
both the strategically networking consultant and the entrepreneurial sensemaking 
civil servant.   The special consultant defines his role by means of concepts attained 
in a leadership training program, the main word being ‘network management’ and 
‘change management’. The civil servant with keen skills in entrepreneurship and 
sensemaking defines his role as a ‘narrative’ leadership, contributing to keeping the 
growing ND office together by explaining what the project, and the last three to four 
years, has been about.  This development is not only an individual related 
specialization, it is also an actor related specialization. The ND office now formally 
has the responsibility for a policy process and its implementation. Consequently 
each member of the office is perceived of as a leader in all engagements with other 
actors, and is required to take the lead in each and every instance.  A change in 
leadership can be detected when ND begins to realise that the policy could be a 
meta-policy. Entrepreneurship is displayed in terms of utilizing ‘windows of 
opportunities’, combined with the ability to give sense, produces crucial key events, 
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such as the importance of the former director leaving his position; using an alliance 
with one of the directors to alter the scope of the policy; making the first meetings in 
the Forum of Mayors meaningful; making a successful alliance with the Finance 
Administration 
Thus, this leadership related type of proactivity denotes an important shift in how 
concepts are produced: the concepts are still based on professional insights, as in 
The Evaluation Case, but are to a greater extent modified and negotiated in bilateral 
meetings with ND’s powerful allies, such as ND’s directors and The Finance 
Administration. 
The second important finding is that ND perceives the motivation behind their 
leadership to be the will to lead and develop on a professional basis. The 
interviewees describe their type of leadership as bottom-up leadership, in which it 
has been important to allow development of ND staff, and in which ND staff are 
running the process. ND perceives their leadership as having the agenda setting 
power, based on demonstrating the will to take the lead in the professional field.  
This is an understanding produced in conversations with a director, who emphasized 
the fact that ND does not only give sense, they are also forced to make sense of what 
they are doing, and picking up pieces of meaningful statements while running 
process. 
In terms of leadership positioning, a third important finding is that ND perceives 
itself as having developed from an operations office, servicing the Area Lift 
programs, to a strategy and policy office. In relation to this new role, we also see 
that instead of a self-perception of a development unit, in the future, strategic skills 
and a stable, visible, collaborative profile is necessary in order to make the policy 
valuable at the local level. In order to do so, ND has to have a stable and reliable 
actor profile, in which ND needs recognizable products on its shelves. Furthermore, 
a vital ND understanding of itself and its leadership is that they, backed up by the 
Pillar-report, always have been sure of which direction to go, while not having all 
the answers on how to get there. They have thus managed to have half of the 
answers, thereby creating a collaborative need for more answers. Thus, a more 
diverse self-perception of leadership is visible in ND. They are strategic in order to 
maintain support for the policy and acquire resources for the Development Plans in 
the future budget negotiations, and they constantly maintain alliances by means of 
networking. The facilitative role is necessary when trying both developing and 
implementing the policy at the local level, while involving local managers in 
qualifying the Development Plans.  
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 MAKING AND GIVING SENSE 7.6
In the sections above, I have demonstrated that different types of uncertainty 
dominate The Policy Formulation process. I have demonstrated how 
entrepreneurship deals with some of these uncertainties by making new 
combinations and introducing novel concepts. Also, I have demonstrated that 
introducing these new concepts produce a landscape of possible leadership 
positioning that provoke identity changes in ND.  
In the BUCIL model, I assume that uncertainty creates the possibility for influencing 
collaborators by giving sense. In this section, I will demonstrate this directing of 
sensemaking in terms of describing the reception of the concepts introduced.   
In the extensive analysis above, sensemaking has already been described in terms of 
entrepreneurship, in which ND breaks the substantive uncertainty by introducing 
certain concepts; and also in terms of the sources of leadership legitimacy. These 
points will be only briefly mentioned in this final part of the analysis  where I will 
analyse the approved policy paper and document the influence of ND. Secondly, I 
will exemplify the resistance to the influence that ND tries to exercise through its 
leadership; and I will exemplify how ND exercises this giving sense through 
numerous conversations with stakeholders. In this section, I will also analyse and 
reflect across the analytical sections above in order to demonstrate the direction of 
sensemaking.  
7.7.1. RESISTANCE TO SENSEMAKING: BYSTANDER 
EFFECTS, LESS INNOVATION, NO LOCAL DECISION 
MAKING 
 
7.6.1.1 The extent of making and giving sense: advocacy and 
bystander effects 
The interviewees from The Policy Formulation Team and CUT are the most positive 
towards the policy. They can see the value of the project, they find it exciting and 
professionally relevant, also for their own administrations, and they seem to be 
proud of it. Managers and directors from  administrations other than The Technical 
and Environmental Administration usually use a more modest vocabulary, 
describing the project along the storyline of ‘something that had to be done’; ‘let’s 
see what we can do with it’; ‘it is cumbersome work to some extent’; ‘the future 
challenges are many’; ‘perhaps the project is too big’ etc. This difference is perhaps 
not surprising: the professionals focus on professional issues and development 
possibilities, while the managers and directors focus on the strategic challenges that 
lie ahead. In this respect, the limitations to the extent of exercising influence by 
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means of sensemaking is that the project may be based on the right premises, but it 
is still uncertain whether it will produce value - this remains to be demonstrated. The 
project needs a stable leadership, and it is still uncertain whether the other the 
administrations will continue to support the policy in the budget negotiations – this 
is one of the most important signs of whether or not the project is accepted and 
approved. Also, the project needs to be more specific. In this respect, the members 
of The Policy Formulation Team and CUT in some instances take on the role of 
advocacy, whereas this is more limited in the interviews with managers and 
directors from other administrations – they rather take on the role of the bystander. 
They find the project necessary, but they do not champion the project, at least not in 
the interviews. In general, two of the directors who were willing to participate in the 
interviews see the project as part of an overall capacity building project in the City 
of Copenhagen ; as a test and a development of the ability to cooperate across silos. 
In this respect, the cross-administrative part of the project is widely accepted across 
most interviews, as demonstrated in section 7.6.3.  
 
7.6.1.2 No local decision making  
In general ND’s sensemaking has not, as I have argued elsewhere, resulted in a 
leadership distribution. Across all interviews, the conclusion is that ND and TEA are 
those who should lead and run the process. Hence the remaining administrations, at 
least in terms of the strategic layers of directors, take on the role of the bystander. 
This could be perceived as a limitation of the direction of sensemaking by ND. 
Another limitation to sensemaking was ND’s ambition concerning how the 
Development Plans for The Yellow Clouds should be managed. ND had the idea 
that the natural official stakeholders and leaders in the area should have decision 
making authority themselves. For as demonstrated in section 7.6 concerning 
leadership conflicts, the fear of too much coordination at the level of locally working 
officials has been a persistent critique all the way from the phase of The Evaluation 
Case and throughout the phase of policy formulation. As we also saw in that section, 
ND’s ambition to make the natural leaders the decision makers would have made 
their leadership more consistent in terms of countering the critique of generating 
extra layer of organisations. And it would perhaps also have struck a better balance 
between bottom-up and top-down, allowing some layers of politicians and other 
stakeholders to be involved in the policy by proposing specific projects. However, 
things turned out differently. As we saw in one of the interviews with one of the 
directors from EIA, the micro-discourse that ND has been mobilizing could not 
align the image of the consolidated machine with more bottom-up processes (see 
section 7.5.1.2).   
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In the quote below, I asked the ND consultant about the outcome of the 
Development Plans:  
“R: Hm hm, why did it turn out that way? It was, of course, because ...I think it 
makes the most sense if there are some overarching objectives. If you are going to 
make a policy for such an urban area, then it’s natural that it is a political priority 
of what we'd like to do with those areas. In other words, it gives the sense that there 
are some overarching objectives that politicians can nod to and which they think 
they can make theirs. When you're talking about why the local management network 
didn’t get more influence on the process itself, and perhaps involved in the project, 
then it was because that the ones in the executive boards didn’t want anymore, they 
would prefer not to disturb the hierarchical structure. So it was vetoed to give them 
power locally” (I19). 
The quote reflects that the main ambition of ND’s project from The Horisontal Pillar 
was to have the political level more engaged. On the other hand, as I mentioned 
above, it also made sense to give the local management networks the decision 
making power. In between these two choices, the cross-municipal steering 
committee, i.e. the directors, decided that the goals should be political and centrally 
fixed. The quote illustrates the leadership dilemmas that ND is facing during the 
innovation process in a clear way. It becomes impossible to produce an innovation 
project which can contain both a bottom-up and top-down position at the same time.  
7.6.1.3 A reduced focus on innovation 
Similar to the local decision making, another element that did not become as 
powerful as ND hoped was the local innovation part. As I have already 
demonstrated ND met resistance concerning the strong focus on local innovation at 
the beginning of The Policy Formulation process.  
As it turned out, innovation is not mentioned anywhere in the final policy. Instead 
the rhetoric of the ’municipal operations’, ’coordination’ and ’synergy’ stands strong 
(p. 11). This is in contrast with some of the earlier drafts of the policy (edition 2011-
02-13). Here, one of the main headlines of the policy content is ’Innovation, testing 
and development’ (p. 7). My interpretation of this draft demonstrates that the 
innovation angle, much in alignment with the contextualised, area-based approach, 
was part of the original ND intentions. However, the outcome of the innovation 
angle in the policy was similar to that of the local decision making power: it could 
not be contained within the micro-discourse introduced by ND, as this was at odds 
with the governance structure developed and sanctioned by the steering committee.  
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7.7.2. SUMMING UP 
As discovered during my fieldwork, ND did not succeed with some vital types of 
discursive actions. Especially two are worth noting, since these also have 
consequences for the future of ND’s collaborative innovation project based on the 
area-based approach as well for the recognition of their leadership.  
First of all, ND’s attempt to make ‘local innovation’ part of the policy did not win 
the discursive conflict against the social constructed object of ‘the municipal core 
operation’. The latter discourse draws on the discourse of ‘system optimization’ and 
‘coordination’, two main facets of the Pillar Project.  
As demonstrated in The Evaluation Case, this conflict was actually perceived by one 
of the ND civil servants as producing a leadership dilemma. To some extent, this is 
ironic, in that ND was very successful in mobilizing support for this system 
optimization discourse.   
Secondly, ND also sought to distribute leadership amongst administrations by 
arguing that the management and development of the Development Plans should rest 
on the local managers with most stakes in the specific city area. Most likely, this 
would have had the consequence that the locally working professionals and directors 
from the other administrations would be left to develop the Development Plans, and 
the local parties would have to develop on their own, while at the same time having 
to contribute to the overall goals of the policy. In that case the fear and oppositional 
sensemaking displayed in both embedded cases of ‘extra layer organisation’, ‘mega 
plan’ and ‘too many coordinators’ would to some extent have been acknowledged. 
However, this attempt was also unsuccessful.  
All in all, success and failure in specific areas provide the policy and the total 
innovation project with some specific strengths and weaknesses. 
 
7.7.3. THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE INTRODUCED CONCEPTS 
ND has to a great extent been able to give sense in The Policy Formulation process. 
One way to demonstrate this is to backtrack from the final policy to The Policy 
Formulation process nearly a year earlier. Both in terms of the discursive content of 
the policy and how the policy is supposed to be implemented. If we look at the final 
product of the policy, “Politik for Udsatte Byområder”xlii, or the English version 
“Policy for Disadvantaged Areas of Copenhagen” xliii, key terms for problem-solving 
are (p. 5):  
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- “Binding partnerships with everyone involved” 
- “Preferential treatment of disadvantaged areas” 
- “Increased focus on what works: unified core operations” 
 
The first quote reflects the Governance Dialogue set-up. The second that these areas 
will receive preferential treatment, which was one of the main efforts of the ND 
office, who had the idea that the services provided in the disadvantaged areas were 
of lower quality than in other parts of the city. Likewise, the focus on ‘unified core 
operations’ (my emphasis) reflects first of all the ‘strengthening of the transversal 
cooperation’ identity marker of the ND office, as demonstrated in The Evaluation 
Case. Secondly, ‘unified core operations’ (my emphasis) reflects the ‘system 
optimization/coordination’ discourse promoted by ‘The Horisontal Pillar’ project.  
This is not to say that the ND office has made all of this discourse-related sense all 
by themselves. The ‘showdown of the project making’ (in Danish: 
‘Projektmageriet’), which is a part of the ‘core operation’ rhetoric obviously had a 
resonance with the Lord Mayor and his administration, as displayed in the ‘Shared 
proactivity section’ above. Where this discourse came from, my data material cannot 
explain, though one manager mentions that this change of rhetoric concerning 
‘projects’ is related the current Lord Mayor’s attempt to make a political edge to his 
predecessor. But what my analysis does explain is that the ND office used this 
discourse to make a direction for the policy, and that this discourse had strong 
connections with the ‘Pillar’ project.   
Furthermore, another marker of the ND office in the policy is the ‘customized 
solutions’ in the disadvantaged areas, taking the form of ‘Development Plans’. This 
is in direct connection with the profession underlying this collaborative innovation 
project, that of the ‘area-based program’. Furthermore, the proposal for 
implementation of the policy in terms of ‘Development Plans’ is a heritage from the 
‘Pillar’ report, where it is stated that a strengthening of the city area level to a 
planning level is recommended, in that ‘a shared prioritization of areas or city parts 
is created, linking them to the municipal plan process. The most disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods and city areas of Copenhagen are to be objects for a unified effort 
with the participation of all administrations’ (Engberg 2008, p. 56, my translation). 
And on page 16, it is stated that ‘it is obvious that development plans for the 
prioritized city areas are made’ (ibid.).   
As demonstrated in the proactivity section, uncertainty dominated the team, in 
particular the substantive uncertainty. All in all, the team were seeking answers, and 
making room for a co-creation of sensemaking. As demonstrated in the 
entrepreneurship section, most members in the team displayed entrepreneurship in 
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coming up with answers for how to solve their problem of making a policy. This co-
creation of sensemaking was most dominant when they tried to tie the policy to 
already existing strategies, such as the ‘Safe City’ policy, the Green Growth 
Strategy, The Copenhagen Tale etc. However, in the substantive discussions, little 
progress is made, as demonstrated in previous sections.  
As the team undertook meeting after meeting, weariness began to show, and the 
participants seemed somewhat disillusioned. On this background of uncertainty and 
inertia, ND was able to deliver answers, for example:  
- Introducing the ‘yellow clouds’ 
- Introducing the concept of ‘preferential treatment ‘or  ‘affirmative action’ 
(in Danish: positiv særbehandling) 
- Introducing the concept of ‘core operation’ 
- Introducing the concept of ‘transversal cooperation’  
- Introducing the ‘Mercedes sign’: a division of labour 
 
Some of these elements have already been introduced and commented on in this 
analysis; therefore I will merely summarise these instances of making and giving 
sense roughly.   
 
Introducing the concept of ‘yellow clouds’ 
As described in the proactivity section, ND was able to introduce the concept of 
‘yellow clouds’, identifying six disadvantaged areas in the city. ND did so by 
applying the tool already developed during the implementation of the Pillar Project, 
that is, the Socioeconomic Copenhagen Map. Backtracking the map analysis, ND 
was able, on a professional basis, to argue, that the municipal actions taken thus far 
had remained on a project level, and therefore only pushed the problem from 
neighbourhood to neighbourhood within the areas. The disadvantaged areas 
persisted. Thus, the ‘yellow clouds’ as a concept is  an argument for moving the 
policy to another level, arguing that large-scale plans will match the area-based 
challenges. Also, this would result in more focus on the core operations. The Yellow 
Cloud-analysis thus laid the foundation for the later Development Plans, in that each 
cloud is supposed to have its own Development Plan.  
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Introducing the concept of ‘preferential treatment’/’affirmative action’ (in Danish: 
positiv særbehandling) 
Preferential treatment was a concept also championed by ND in order to give the 
policy political content. As already described elsewhere, The Policy Formulation 
Team had vast problems in defining what the problem was. Introducing this concept 
both helped to establish the problem and the solution. The problem was that the city 
was ‘breaking in two’, meaning that some parts of the city were ‘lagging behind’ in 
the positive development that the city was witnessing. Preferential treatment could 
be the answer in order for this not to happen.  
In the first policy formulation meeting, the group discussed to which areas a policy 
should apply, and on which criteria the areas should be selected: those with 
problems or those in which there was a synergy between programs?  
As the quote below demonstrates, an ND civil servant uses area-based insights to 
argue that the most well-off areas of the city also have the best quality of core 
operations. Thus, in order to counter the poor quality of welfare services and to 
upgrade the disadvantaged areas to a level equal to the rest of the city, preferential 
treatment is in fact necessary:  
"According to the best of my knowledge, you cannot make a forward-looking policy 
which relates to what we must fight against it. You will need to make a policy based 
on a vision and a tale of Copenhagen, which has a forward-looking element in it. 
(...) Equality is indeed positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged areas. It is 
a positive way to say it." (policy formulation meeting, I11 part 3) 
The quote further demonstrates that the discourse drawn upon here concerning 
preferential treatment relates to a geographic approach to exclusion mechanisms of 
society, in which the welfare state needs to make up for equalities structurally by 
means of preferential treatment to certain groups of citizens. 
In the fourth Policy Formulation Meeting (I14, part 2), the concept of preferential 
treatment started making sense in a key argumentation promoted by ND in relation 
to the Development Plans. In the argument the area-based approach is linked to 
preferential treatment. This argument is linked to coordination, to non-extra layer 
organisations, to being in control in which funding resources to use, making these 
serve the core operations, and giving the City of Copenhagen an argument for 
deciding which projects to approve. This is an argument in which the local 
government, not the national government, knows best. The ND consultant summed 
up the argument of the policy because the other administrative participants were 
unsure of what the formulation team had decided, and what the policy was about. 
This episode demonstrates several things. First of all, prior to the explanation, 
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people were still confused about what they had agreed on and on what they should 
focus on in the remaining part of The Policy Formulation process. Therefore the ND 
consultant provides direction and directs sensemaking by summing up what the 
policy is about. What the episode also demonstrates is that the consultant did so by 
drawing on concepts from The Horisontal Pillar, as well as rhetoric that was 
influential in the municipality in that point in time, such as the antagonistic 
relationship between projects/operations, and the extra layer organisations/increased, 
consolidated coordination.  
 
Introducing the concept of ‘core operation’ 
The introduction of the concept of ‘core operation’ was a direct consequence of the 
rhetoric of the Pillar report, and of the increased demand for coordination. Whether 
or not this discourse was mobilized by ND or whether it was part of a more cross-
administrative, direct showdown with the former way of governing the City of 
Copenhagen (as suggested in one of the interviews), focusing on the core running 
was at that point highly influential. And using this concept helped ND to identify the 
‘problem’ as to why the disadvantaged areas continued to be disadvantaged: too 
many projects, too little emphasis on core operations, and too little coordination in 
the top management.   
 
Introducing the concept of ‘transversal cooperation’  
Similar to ‘core operation’, the concept of ‘transversal cooperation’ was also 
introduced by ND, and it pointed out another deficiency in the former approach to 
disadvantaged areas: a lack of coordination. This positioning was also evident in 
The Evaluation Case, in which a conflict arose around whose task it was to ensure 
coordination: the ‘centralists’ (The Technical and Environmental Administration) or 
the localists (SSA).  
 
Introducing the ‘Mercedes sign’  
The ‘Mercedes sign’, as it was named by The Policy Formulation Team, is part of 
the final policy (p. 22). Here, the conflict on division of labour with the Social 
Administration made it necessary to depict the different roles of each administration.   
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As the former director of the Urban Design Department commented in an interview 
(I29), The Technical and Environmental Administration did not to begin with, i.e. in 
the early Pillar days, know enough on how the other administrations worked. 
The Mercedes sign helped to create a division of labour which allowed The 
Technical and Environmental Administration to have the coordinative role and  the 
area-based programs as resort, whereas SSA could focus more narrowly on the 
individuals and families. Furthermore, the Mercedes sign also had a third element, 
that is, the ‘core operations’. Thus, as a consequence of the conflicts with SSA 
especially, the Mercedes sign helped to create a distinction between two types of 
extraordinary project activities hitherto applied in the efforts to improve the 
disadvantaged areas: individual and area-based projects. And the Mercedes sign 
visualized the distinction between projects and core operations, as described in The 
Evaluation Case. This sign thus reduced the level of conflict, in that the fear of the 
turf-greedy Technical and Environmental Administration was dampened.  
   
7.6.4.1 Summing up 
In this analysis, we have seen how ND and The Technical and Environmental 
Administration have managed to acquire substantive influence: a new inter-
organisational set-up; an ambitious policy across all seven administrations, which 
were approved by all mayors and all politicians in the City Council. The BUCIL 
model builds on the hypothesis that the uncertainty produced when trying to find an 
innovative solution to a wicked problem by means of collaboration undergirds both 
the need for leadership emergence as well as making collaborators open to ways of 
making sense of what is happening around them; in general, making collaborators 
open to a profession-based, entrepreneurial project. Overall, I find that this 
hypothesis is supported by my analysis.  
The ability to give sense is of course dependent on many factors.  Plain luck is 
mentioned as a factor in some of the interviews, also ND interviews: that the Lord 
Mayor decided to accept the policy; that the director of The Urban Design 
Department applied for a new job; that the right-wing government when launching 
its ‘ghetto plan’ provoked the left-wing political leaders in the City of Copenhagen, 
and thus created a burning platform for an independent Copenhagen answer for how 
to address the neighbourhoods on the governmental ‘ghetto list’; and that the policy 
was launched immediately after a municipal election, which meant that politicians 
and mayors were open to new projects and ideas.   
The analysis has also demonstrated that there are severe limitations to how far an 
emerging leader can go in terms of distributing leadership. The conclusion is that 
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everyone expect The Technical and Environmental Administration and ND to 
continue running the process; giving sense in the City of Copenhagen did not create 
actual leadership distribution, but rather a consolidated, vertical leadership in ND’s 
administration. As we have seen, both the mayor and directors of The Technical and 
Environmental Administration have embraced and heavily championed the 
collaborative innovation project. The conclusion seems to be that, in this process 
analysed by means of BUCIL, someone had to stand up as the leader – and remain 
the leader. In the final discussion in this thesis, I will reflect on this finding and on 
the distribution of leadership in more detail.   
 
 DISCUSSION 7.7
In relation to my own expectations in the theory section, it is evident that with 
regard to the innovation solution proposed by ND, the main challenge in this part of 
the collaborative innovation process is not as much if there is need for a novel 
solution to wicked problems, but more whether the proposed solution will solve the 
problems. To some extent, collaborators accept that collaboration is necessary, and 
that the solution is legitimate. Seemingly, collaborators also go along on the journey, 
although hesitantly, as long as their uncertainties are moderated by ND’s new 
answers. The main conflict lines are whether the solution actually will work, and 
whether the project is worth the risk. Thus, to a great extent, ND’s leadership is 
recognised, but it is also criticised for being inconsistent.  
My expectations that there would be translation problems concerning enabling 
collaborators to make sense of the project are also met. In the BUCIL model it is an 
open question whether leadership will be distributed or consolidated. As my analysis 
documents, disputes arise among TEA and FA concerned the ownership of the 
policy, and who should be in charge. As a result, ND and TEA are being perceived 
of as main leadership. This ’obviousness’ of ownership in one administration relates 
to the fact that in this case, despite the fact that the governance system in the City of 
Copenhagen enhances sector-divided pillars, the administrations have a shared 
infrastructure and shared systems of division of labour, which to some extent block 
for a formally distribution of leadership.    
The findings also support Sandford Borins’ (Borins, 2002) research findings 
concerning bottom-up innovation, in which leadership is made and enacted along the 
way. The findings also support Huxham & Vangen’s research of collaborative 
leadership, in which leadership often uses all kinds of formal and informal means, 
including collaborative ’thuggery’, in order to move the collaborative agenda 
forward. This was evident in this process, in which The Policy Formulation case 
clearly was an ordered and well-facilitated front stage, while, in parallel, ND made 
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great efforts in forging alliances, gathering strategic information, and thus in fact 
actually striking the difficult balance between ‘collaborative ideology’  and 
‘collaborative thuggery’ well (Huxham & Vangen, 2000)  in order to satisfy 
collaborative demands of progress.  
This study, using another type of rhetoric and concepts than Huxham & Vangen, 
allows us to see that thuggery is actually called for and expected by collaborators, 
and that there actually is a demand in the municipal system in general for progress, 
and to a high degree also an acceptance of this collaborative thuggery – it is, to a 
great extent, perceived of as ’the way to go about the task’.  
Concerning the field of collaborative innovation, the study of The Policy 
Formulation case to some extent supports the hypothesis of Sørensen & Torfing’s 
research model (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011), since ND is given a mandate that 
allows it to facilitate interaction. However, my analysis based on the BUCIL model 
generates some other perspectives on this case. First, findings related to the 
preconditions for such leadership, and second, findings regarding the future 
consequences of such application of facilitation.  
Sørensen and Torfing’s hypothesis is that a meta-governor type of leadership is able 
to create novel solutions in a collaborative innovation setting by facilitating 
collaborative involvement. Actually, The Policy Formulation Team, and the 
facilitative approach deployed by ND, is emblematic of this type of leadership; the 
ND consultant exactly applies network leadership tools learned on a leadership 
course. However, what my study demonstrates is that in a wicked problem setting, 
the stacking uncertainties of wicked problems and innovation journey uncertainty in 
fact paralyze The Policy Formulation Team, with the implication that support for the 
policy is about to wither away. Accordingly, my study demonstrates that a vital 
history of leadership emergence and sense making in the context of wicked 
problems actually precedes the rise of the meta-governor as a leadership figure. And 
that it is this vital history that actually manages to break the deadlock of uncertainty 
– in this case by drawing on lead motifs of a sector-specific, but holistic and cross-
disciplinary profession.  
Second of all, concerning the future consequences of bottom-up leadership applying 
a facilitative leadership may have some repercussions that deviates some from 
concepts of network governance based leadership for collaborative innovation. As I 
demonstrated in the theory section, bottom-up leadership driven innovations may be 
challenged after its immediate implementation (see section 2.4.1): the innovation 
project could be difficult to create ownership to; or bottom-up leadership may be a 
necessary companion for formal management since bottom-up leadership (as these 
analyses demonstrate) is what functions as a container for all the sense made during 
the collaborative innovation process. Accordingly, since the novelty-power relation 
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is different for bottom-up leadership (see section 1), the innovation process before 
and after the application of facilitated leadership differs from network governance 
approaches to collaborative innovation. Hence it remains a question for future 
investigations whether these two different research approaches can be combined in a 
research design, as each analytical model may point to different ‘motors of change’ 
(Poole & Van de Ven, 2004) in different parts of the process, and on different levels.   
In a broader perspective, concerning the micro-oriented, action-related perspective 
on discursive action and institutionalisation (Phillips et al., 2004), this study can be 
perceived of as testing this framework. However, the study in this thesis 
supplements the framework by further incorporating the innovation perspective of 
uncertainty and the iterative character of how to make and give sense at the same 
time when exercising leadership. This is somewhat in contrast with Phillips et al.’s 
model that has a linear approach, rendering discursive action for change a highly 
rational and deliberate type of change and management.  
The results also may point to the challenges emergent leadership (Griffin, 2002) has 
in maintaining and expanding the organisational conversations across organisations 
in order to maintain the new ’theme’ that is being introduced as the innovation 
project is expanding. Similarly, in The Policy Formulation case, ND faces 
considerable challenges in both maintaining focus on the central and local level, 
requiring of them to continue to explain to new stakeholders who they are and what 
they are doing.    
The findings further provide a perspective on how to perceive of this leadership, and 
the study provides a perspective to management in municipalities concerning how to 
understand profession-based leadership and innovation. The study is also relevant to 
studies of area-based programs, and how these programs can be used to inspire 
bureaucratic reform strategies for striking a better balance between bottom-up and 
top-down, and what type of dilemmas emerging leaders may encounter during this 
innovation journey. In this respect, the findings are relevant to the discussion raised 
by Fung and Sirianni (Fung, 2004; Sirianni, 2009) concerning how to enable a better 
connection between bottom-up and top-down dynamics. This study demonstrates 
that leadership should be considered as a crucial variable in developing more 
efficient and innovative institutional designs.  
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 SUMMARY OF THE POLICY FORMULATION CASE: 7.8
POSITIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP 
 
In this section, I will summarise and conclude on the findings from the analysis. I do 
so by means of presenting leadership dilemmas. The description of the leadership 
dilemmas is an answer to the research question which is: How is bottom-up 
leadership socially constructed through processes of recognition in a collaborative 
innovation process in the public sector addressing wicked problems? 
 
The answer is that ND’s leadership is recognised when ND consolidates its 
leadership in a way that is consistent with the innovation project and in a way that 
makes sense to collaborators. Every time ND uses its abilities of entrepreneurship to 
create situations which enables choices, for instance concerning the level of 
coordination, collaborators’ expectations change, and new leadership dilemmas are 
created that require ND to find new answers in order to give sense.  
Accordingly, ND is constantly forced to reflect on its identity in relation to the 
choices that have to be made in relation to the dilemmas. Therefore ND transforms 
its identity on the basis of an interpretation of collaborators’ expectations, but in 
alignment with the content of the innovation project. The innovation project 
perceived of as a micro-discourse requires a consistency in terms of the novel 
concepts introduced; otherwise the direction of sensemaking is not perceived of as 
creating collaborative direction, and the leadership is brought into doubt. For 
instance, in the long run it is impossible to maintain both bottom-up and top-down 
discursive distinctions in the same innovation project, such as ‘local decision 
making and political and administrative centralization’, and ‘local innovation and a 
consolidated machine’.  Accordingly, ND’s leadership has to change towards a more 
strategic identity, which is supposed to deliver concrete value and answers to a 
greater extent, and to a lesser extent create new territory for development.  
This entire social construction of leadership and its recognition is conditioned on 
ND’s ability to expand the range of entrepreneurship: collaborators are to some 
degree forced to go along and to develop bureaucratic structures that are in 
alignment with the cross-administrative infrastructure suggested by ND.  
That implies that actions of shared entrepreneurship, able to address the institutional 
uncertainty, are required. This shared entrepreneurship is generated by means of a 
by-the-book facilitative leadership in which collaborators feel included and in which 
there is room for discussion. The weariness and massive uncertainty that come from 
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these policy formulation discussions provide an opportunity for ND to give sense, 
breaking the deadlock of the substantive uncertainty and innovation uncertainty.  
The social construction of leadership is also conditioned by ND’s ability to perform 
a leadership related proactivity, which has as its core function to explore and depict 
the strategic administrative landscape in the municipality. This has the implications 
of improving the development process of a policy, thereby reducing the strategic 
uncertainty of collaborators.  
Finally,  being able to make sense of what ND and collaborators are doing is a vital 
condition for opening up new paths of development, and thus to give sense. Making 
sense throughout the innovation process is related to the professional leitmotifs 
providing the basis for the entire innovation project, in this case the holistic, cross-
disciplinary, geographical and contextual leitmotifs of ‘the area-based programs’ 
profession.  
So what have the main leadership dilemmas been during The Policy Formulation 
process? To begin with, some discursive struggles both mobilized by ND, but also 
conditioning ND’s behaviour, are present in the case.  
The first dilemma relates to the discursive clashes between innovation and 
coordination. The distinctions underpinning this clash are:  
- project vs. core operation 
- development vs. system optimization 
 
The dilemma is: how to integrate innovation and coordination?  
The ND answer to this is to maintain a middle position: that development is 
necessary in order to optimize. And that innovation consequently is the improved 
ability to collaborate across administrative boundaries and in partnership with the 
social housing sector. This middle-position manifests itself as a social construct in 
form of ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’, being a meta-policy for other sector 
related policies and aims. This position further manifests itself in the Development 
Plans; these plans exemplify a combination of fixed political objectives and a 
possibility for local professionals and managers to adopt the plans to the specific 
city districts. The position manifests itself as one of the most legitimate leadership 
sources, according to collaborators in the municipality: an improved ability to walk 
in the same direction; the position manifests itself as a ‘fact’ in the interviews that 
the municipality necessarily must be able to solve this problem in another way than 
previously. 
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The second leadership dilemma relates to the discursive clashes between centralists 
and localists. The distinctions underpinning this clash are:  
- top-down vs. bottom-up  
- too much vs. too little coordination 
 
The dilemma is: how can it be avoided that ND’s innovation project and leadership 
are positioned as remote and centralistic?  
The ND answer is that top-down enforced coordination is necessary in order to 
improve the quality of local work. The social object constructed to assure the answer 
is the Development Plans, in which local professionals are involved in formulation 
processes, consequently both making room for influence as well as the ability to see 
that the plans generate value. The second solution is to create less coordinative 
forums by merging already existing professional networks in the areas.   
 
A third dilemma is: how can ND avoid being positioned as an inconsistent leader? 
As we saw in collaborators’ perception of leadership, several of the leadership 
challenges relate this critique:  
- How can a new coordinative centre be considered improved coordination, 
when in fact too many attempts at coordination are present in the central 
administrations? 
- How can ND both be a leader and still have no answers to direction of the 
process? 
 
The ND answer is first of all a differentiation and specialization of leadership 
functions in ND, enabling ND to maintain several leadership positions at the same 
time, but in different sites of interaction:  
- facilitation and narrative leadership for the local working professionals as 
well as The Policy Formulation Team 
- strategic mobilization, network management and a clear strategic profile at 
the central level 
- minimizing the development ambition 
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We see this in the minimization of the innovation angle in Policy for Disadvantaged 
Areas. We see the manifestation of this in The Policy Formulation Team, in which a 
by-the-book collaborative leadership is visible. We see this in that ND does not 
develop their identity in a visible way through their activities as they did in The 
Evaluation Case. Accordingly there is much better correlation between ND’s self-
perception of identity and collaborators’ expectations of this leadership in The 
Policy Formulation case, which in the end also grants less resistance and more 
leadership recognition.    
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CHAPTER 8.  DISCUSSION 
 GENERALIZABILITY OF FINDINGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR 8.1
BOTTOM-UP LEADERSHIP 
Given the scope of the empirical study I will limit myself to discuss the 
generalizability of findings concerning the most important aspect of the BUCIL 
model: how leadership is socially constructed through processes of recognition. I do 
this by discussing each of the leadership dilemmas that I have constructed by means 
of the analyses.  
An overall finding is that regarding leadership development we see a positional 
development that has a general character: establishing – influencing – 
mainstreaming. This positional development is made visible by having two cases, 
each located in a different phase of positional development. First the leadership has 
to be established, then influence can be increasingly exercised. Subsequently, the 
space of further development has to be delimited and finally shut down; this enables 
the innovation project to be mainstreamed in the strategic-political organisational 
context.  
So, the certain dilemmas, revealed by the analysis, are of a character that other 
bottom-up leaderships should keep in mind as they display a range of choices that 
the emergent leadership has, concerning the interplay of innovation project re-
development and options of leadership positioning.  
Related to this finding of a positional landscape for bottom-up leadership, the study 
demonstrates the intimate relation between stabilisation and uncertainty:  
stabilisation of the collaborative configuration may come at the cost of further 
utilisation of uncertainty. Consequently, risk-taking and tactical choices are crucial 
for bottom-up leadership.  
In this respect, the study demonstrates that Neighbourhood Development has opted 
for the maximum scope of the project through a certain response to each of the 
leadership dilemmas. For instance, by positioning ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’ 
as a cross-administrative meta-policy, the Policy takes on the administrative 
function of a new coordinative centre. This is risky approach that results in a lack of 
leadership distribution horizontally. Neighbourhood Development at the end of the 
case study becomes aware of a demand for a closure of further developments. 
Collaborators do not want more development perspectives but want value out of 
their efforts. Accordingly, opting for maximum scope has the implication of a 
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discursive positioning of innovation project and leadership as centralistic, 
administrative and huge.  
This positioning comes at the cost of a bureaucratic leadership and local politicians 
that have not been included hence perceive of the project as abstract and unspecific; 
it is difficult for these stakeholders to make sense of the project in terms of how the 
innovation project can generate collaborative advantage in terms of specific projects. 
As several interviewees reflect on openly in the Policy Formulation case, there are 
speculations of what value the entire enterprise has generated.  
Accordingly, bottom-up leadership may run the risk of ‘skating the thin ice’ for too 
long, stretching the utilisation of uncertainty too much, with the possibility of 
generating great project scope; but bottom-up leadership in this way runs the risk of 
expanding the scope of the project to such a volume that the innovation project 
remains trapped too long in a development phase, making the collaborative system 
exhausted and impatient before the project enters the value-generating phase of 
implementation and dissemination.   
Another important finding worth discussing in relation to dilemmas and bottom-up 
leadership is the organisational function of bottom-up leadership. On the basis of the 
detailed analyses above, I interpret bottom-up leadership as a flexible form of 
leadership. Bottom-up leadership navigates in a very agile way by tailoring a 
profession-based innovative idea to a collaborative, political-strategic context. 
Bottom-up leadership does so by making sense of its organisational environment 
and creating sensible niches by giving sense, enabling bottom-up leadership to make 
alliances,  mobilising and utilising already existing organisational discourses.  
The on-going social constructionist nature of the leadership is what delivers this 
flexibility: Bottom-up leadership adapts its own leadership as well as its project 
through an iterative process between making sense, giving sense, experiencing 
resistance, and uses this sensemaking to inform new actions of entrepreneurship, 
combining organisational resources in new ways, within the evolving interpretation 
of its own profession. These interpretations of its own leadership are what make 
Neighbourhood Development develop from a value-based implementer, over a 
developing coordinator, towards a strategic implementer, adjusting its leadership to 
the specific challenges of the collaborative innovation process.  
Accordingly, another important finding of this study is more detailed knowledge 
about what distinguishes this leadership from other collaborative innovation 
leaderships in terms of flexibility. Flexibility is made strategic by being anchored in 
aggregated profession-based insights; these insights are maintained throughout the 
entire innovation process, providing a reservoir for making sense of the 
collaborative environment, consequently enabling bottom-up leadership to make 
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sense of the collaborative environment. As a result, the aggregated profession-based 
insight functions as a safe-guard against the risk of being paralyzed by uncertainty.  
This is clearly demonstrated in this study, in which the cross-disciplinary element of 
the area-based program-profession is used as a platform for arguing that 
administrative structures should be aligned with the local insights that this 
profession has of the complex character of disadvantaged areas. This insight in a 
wicked problem is made sense of, carving out niches in the political-strategic 
environment and adapting leadership and innovation project to these niches. 
Accordingly, a related finding is that the sense made is contained by bottom-up 
leadership throughout the entire collaborative innovation process. What the 
implication of this flexibility is in a long-term, institutional perspective is an 
empirical question: Is it possible to embed all the sense made by bottom-up 
leadership in the discursive fabric of the collaborative configuration? Is this type of 
embeddedness tactically desirable for the bottom-up driven innovation project in 
terms of diffusion and leadership distribution?    
 
Below, I discuss the findings related to leadership dilemmas, focusing on 
generalizability.   
 
Dilemma one: How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical 
organisational structures? 
This dilemma demonstrates that the necessarily undefined, blurry boundaries of the 
innovation project will be regarded as a potential threat by collaborating parties, 
because it is uncertain, how many resources the new cross-organisational solution 
will require. It is important to remember that bottom-up leadership is characterised 
by working with an unsteady, stop-and-go mandate for the innovation project, a 
mandate which is constantly up to negotiation. 
This study demonstrates that this dilemma is particularly dominant in collaboration 
between public agencies or administrations, since public resources are limited and 
consequently, a collaborative innovation project causes a collaborative zero-sum 
game. Consequently, the sooner the interface between cross-organisational issues 
and vertical, intra-organisational issues can be defined, the sooner well-known and 
productive working relations can be established.  
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Dilemma two: How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a 
way that development still remains as part of the profession underpinning bottom-up 
leadership?  
One way to perceive of this dilemma is to interpret it as something specifically 
related to the area-based program profession that is the professional platform of the 
studied innovation project. Accordingly, this dilemma mirrors that the area-based 
profession at its core thinks of itself as an experimental profession. Not all bottom-
up leadership professions need to have this self-perception in order to initiate 
bottom-up leadership collaborative innovation processes, not even all urban-
planning professions. In this interpretation, the explanatory power of this dilemma 
for other bottom-up leaderships is somewhat limited.  
However, another, interpretation is also possible. What the above analyses 
demonstrates is that the informal boundary spanning activities (Williams, 2002) of 
the area based program-profession is being used as an inspiration for designing the 
features of a central-administrative reform. As a consequence, the informal 
boundary spanning activities that has so far been deployed in order to making the 
program type holistic are being formalised in administrative structures. The 
implication of this administrative formalisation is that the profession has to redefine 
itself, but now in accordance with a self-imposed, strategic-administrative, political 
agenda, and with less informal room of manoeuvring. This implication is 
demonstrated in this study because the professionals working in the area-based 
programs now have to adjust their programs in accordance with a new institutional 
role. As such, bottom-up leadership of collaborative innovation have more or less 
unintended consequences for the profession that initiated the innovation journey.     
 
Dilemma three: How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position 
and direction while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and 
influence?  
This dilemma demonstrates ambivalent collaborative requirements: A clear 
leadership-position and fixed project on one side, on the other side live up to 
demands of co-creation, inclusion and unforeseen adjustments. This dilemma will be 
a constant challenge for bottom-up leaderships. As the analyses demonstrate 
collaborators will remain vigilant as to whether bottom-up leadership can deal with 
the leadership challenges, and will also have an interest in affecting the project, as a 
consequence of the increasing impact of the innovation project.  
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This dilemma was mainly dominant in the initial phase of the innovation project, in 
which the struggles of leadership were most intense, and in which bureaucratic 
leadership was most absent. Accordingly, the struggle of meaning concerning the 
framing of the innovation project in terms of giving sense and issues of resistance to 
these attempts are strongly related to collaborators’ demands of co-creation and 
influence. As was seen in the second analysis, when bureaucratic leadership was re-
entering the stage, the framing was much less contentious. Accordingly, it seems 
plausible that this type of dilemma will dominate in the beginning of a collaborative 
innovation process. 
 However, much depends on how consistent the concepts are that form the core of 
the micro-discourse. In this study, the core was very consistent, given the fact that a 
detailed report was made to begin with in 2008. This provided bottom-up leadership 
with a sense-making advantage, providing bottom-up leadership with a ‘bible’ to 
consult when the process became confusing and challenged. This, however, also 
hampered the inclusion of new perspectives. Attempts were made to begin with to 
include representatives from the other administrations in the initial phase (2007) of 
the project, but not until 2008 did all seven administrations agree to be involved in 
the project.  
So, this dilemma is at its core truly contentious as it reflects several complex 
interplays: Small-scale projects, initiated by bottom-up leaderships, located within a 
sector-specific approach, have difficulties communicating in a ‘multi-lingual’ way 
(Crosby & Bryson, 2010) in order to display ‘collaborative turf’ (Bardach, 1996). 
However, bottom-up leadership of these small-scale projects also has to accept the 
ambivalent fact that despite efforts of inclusion and co-creation and multi-lingual 
efforts, recognition is intimately related to the scope of, and power behind, the 
innovation project. Consequently, collaborators will not pay attention to the 
innovation project until it reaches a certain scope. As a result, collaborators are 
necessarily entering the process rather late. As a result, bottom-up leadership has to 
prepare tactics for how to deal with demands of project re-invention and co-creation 
in a way that does not result in collaborative inertia (Huxham & Vangen, 2005).          
 
Dilemma four: How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position 
and direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring shifts 
of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation? 
This dilemma has some overlap with Dilemma Three above. However, this dilemma 
differs as it accentuates collaborators’ expectation to what a ‘leadership’ is, whereas 
dilemma three above is mainly related to the innovation project. This dilemma is 
located in the first, initial phase of bottom-up leadership in which leadership is 
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adapting to the first leadership ‘shock’, triggered when bottom-up leadership for the 
first time positions itself in a collaborative configuration; bottom-up leadership will 
accordingly experience collaborative demands to leadership. In this study the impact 
of this shock is that ND is abandoning its position of a value-based implementer to a 
position of developing coordinator.  
The main challenge is making sense of discrepancy between collaborative and 
bureaucratic expectations and bottom-up leadership identity. Remember that in this 
face the leadership is in its formative phase, having barely managed to gather 
consent to initiate a project. In a collaborative innovation process, in which bottom-
up leadership is both development unit and leader, an obvious clash exists between 
these two elements of bottom-up leadership’s profile in an organisational 
perspective: An entrepreneurial function and a leadership function. These functions 
perceived within a discourse analytical perspective denotes both an emergent 
discourse and a related, yet not fully determined, subject position. The relation 
between these elements is up to the emergent leadership to develop, define and 
choose. Bottom-up leadership has to realise that it navigates in a landscape of tactics 
and strategic options for leadership positioning.  
As seen in The Evaluation case, the leadership sets out on the entrepreneurial, 
profession based platform, and it is this platform that dominates part of the first 
phase. What is dominating the sense-making activities of bottom-up leadership in 
this case is the project, with capital letters. Accordingly, strategic and institutional 
uncertainties are by Neighbourhood Development being made sense of, and handled, 
by means of substantive means. However, the substantive uncertainty is only part of 
the puzzle. Accordingly, when bottom-up leadership insists on the merit of the 
innovation project for dealing with disadvantaged neighbourhoods (the leadership 
position of ‘value-based implementator’), but suddenly alters the project as a 
consequence of a necessary adjustment to the structuring elements of the micro-
discourse introduced (the leadership position of ‘developing coordinator’), 
leadership in the eyes of collaborators appears fragile and inconsistent. This 
increases the potential for conflict. 
     
Dilemma five: how to integrate innovation and coordination?  
This dilemma reflects a discursive struggle that emerges when ND by means of 
entrepreneurship strives to combine a discourse of ‘core operations’ with the ‘Policy 
for Disadvantaged Areas’. ND argues for the important role of local governance 
networks for each disadvantaged area. This self-organizing element in the Policy 
design would first of all make the Policy seem less centralist, and would accordingly 
minimize the critique that the project imposes centralistic coordination on the local 
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civil servants; second of all, the local governance networks could enhance the 
development of local innovation. However, as the analysis of the Policy Formulation 
Process demonstrates, the collaborating administrations simply cannot opt for such a 
devolvement of power, both out of historical reasons, but also because demands of 
stabilisation are strong in the municipal system, especially among directors.  
Interpreting this dilemma I find that the dilemma nicely captures what Archon Fung 
terms ‘the dichotomy’ between top-down and bottom-up in urban governance. 
Accordingly, the dilemma reflects an institutional design challenge. In this case-
study, the dilemma is resolved by minimizing local governance networks and, 
accordingly, enables local innovation as an element of the ‘Development Plans’. The 
result therefore is an increased coordination of municipal resources through the 
formulation of Development Plans, Development Plans whose objectives are defined 
by the ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’. In this way, an institutional arrangement is 
made that enhances the local coordination of municipal resources in the 
disadvantaged areas through central-administratively and -politically defined 
objectives.  
So, in a broader perspective, this dilemma opens up for a relevant discussion 
concerning institutional arrangements that defies the distinction between top-down 
and bottom-up. As Fung notes, stabilisation seems to be central in these 
arrangements. As both Fung and Sirianni’s analyses demonstrate, this stabilisation is 
difficult to attain. What the Copenhagen case demonstrates is a process of 
institutionalization.  As I have depicted in Figure 14 (p. 198), in the two first phases 
we see an institutional development concerning first developing bottom-up-
elements; next we see ND’s leadership emphasis on developing complementary top-
down elements, and in the third a synthesis is generated, having both a central 
element (a policy) and a local element (development plans, supported by area based 
programs). The Copenhagen collaborative innovation process accordingly has left 
institutional marks, but these marks are not time-resistant. However, the process do 
demonstrate a development in which the municipal organisation actually develops in 
a way towards an institutional arrangement that is able to deal with both bottom-up 
and top-down dynamics related to the challenges of disadvantaged areas  in one 
institutional framework. As such, the collaborative innovation has succeeded in 
coming up with support for a solution for a wicked problem, in this way overcoming 
substantive, institutional and strategic uncertainties. In comparison with Fung and 
Sirianni’s frameworks, this study demonstrates that leadership efforts of giving 
sense on an iterative basis are crucial for attaining stability. Accordingly, Fung and 
Sirianni’s suggestions for stabilisation by means of ‘cultural’ and ‘institutional’ 
arrangements draw on a bed-rock assumption – that stability of complex institutional 
arrangements can be ensured if novel organisational arrangements embedded ‘deep’ 
enough in urban governments. What this thesis demonstrate concerning the 
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development of such organisational arrangements is that these strategies needs to be 
supplemented by design principles that emphasizes leadership.    
Dilemma six: How to avoid that both policy and leadership are positioned as 
‘remote centralist’? 
Bottom-up leadership in my conception is a group or team of professionals, and 
possibly their immediate manager, that are part of a big, public central 
administration or an agency. Accordingly, some of these professionals have well-
established relations with front-line staff, i.e. relations to where service is actually 
provided to citizens. Consequently, bottom-up leadership must be aware that as soon 
as the innovation project is initiated, this collaborative innovation process has some 
central-administrative repercussions that will be perceived by front-line staff as 
centralistic and remote. A standing challenge for bottom-up leadership is to 
communicate the value of the necessity of the central-administrative change. For as I 
hypothesize, and as the study demonstrates, the main source of legitimacy when 
initiating a collaborative innovation project is to speak on behalf of ‘the locals’, i.e. 
those who have contacts ‘with the reality’. If this bond to ‘the real world’ is cut, 
bottom-up leadership will lose its legitimate claim for change.      
 
Dilemma seven: How to avoid being positioned as an unstable, inconsistent leader, 
who both wants to operate a meta-policy and at the same time develop new 
initiatives? 
The seventh dilemma is arguably also a general challenge for bottom-up leadership: 
to position one’s own leadership as both strategic and at the same time focused on 
development. This dilemma manifests itself in the end of the process. The dilemma 
demonstrates in my interpretation that there is a limit to how long a collaborative 
configuration can endure being in a development phase.  But the dilemma does, in 
accordance with the complex responsive processes theory underpinning the concept 
of leadership recognition, also point to a limit for how many relations to 
stakeholders that bottom-up leadership can maintain in order to keep winning the 
organisational battles for meaning. In continuation of this point, the dilemma point 
to a limit of giving sense: As the process unfolds, the history of the process grows, 
and so there is an increasingly complex story to be told to collaborators, concerning 
‘who we are, and what we are doing’. The collaborative push towards 
mainstreaming and formalisation of the innovation project solves this problem by 
sanctioning making and giving sense with formalised bureaucratic power.  
So, at some point collaborators will demand (i) a value-demonstrating realization of 
the innovation project, in this case a value that can be exchanged to political or 
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administrative capital, as well as (ii) an administrative, managerial stabilisation, 
mainstreaming and specification of the project. Ultimately, this dilemma signifies 
the ruptures that arise when the innovation project is initiating its delivery from an 
informal bottom-up type of leadership to a bureaucratic type of leadership.    
 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 8.2
I have produced this thesis using the following key elements, which are tightly and 
consistently connected:  
- the objective of making both a theoretical and empirical contribution 
concerning an emergent perspective on bottom-up leadership 
- a unique opportunity to study an ongoing development process 
 
This ambition of developing theory abductively while at the same time doing an 
empirical investigation in a fast-moving, highly dynamic process within an 
emerging research field (i.e. collaborative innovation in the public sector) has 
affected my choice of methods, having consequences for access to informants and 
my choice of how to do my fieldwork. The access to informants, especially decision 
makers across administrations, was made difficult related to the policy formulation 
process due to the fact that the policy formulation process was highly contentious.  
Out of ethical reasons I decided not to intervene in this process by starting asking 
questions of leadership and innovation in the middle of this highly unsteady process, 
but instead wait for the process to finish. However, a limitation of the cross-
administrative interviews made afterwards was that the CEO-level and the political 
level had decided to support the Policy, having the consequence that the 
interviewees did not utter much critique about the Policy or about ND’s leadership. 
As a demonstration of this, an interviewee asked whether I could turn off my 
recorder at the beginning of the interview, in order for the interviewee to ‘speak 
freely’ about how the informant assessed the high-profiled policy formulation 
process related to ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’.  
What this incident demonstrates is in my interpretation that more conflict points 
could have been discovered if other methods or research strategies had been 
deployed. What this limitation of the study points to is first of all the trade-off of 
studying on-going processes vs. doing retrospective studies, and second of all the 
limitation of doing research in highly political organisations. The access to in-
process meetings, participant observations and field notes are means to counter the 
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closure of conflicts that may arise when a collaborative innovation process is 
finished. Accordingly, future process studies should consider upgrading these 
ethnographic methods, enabling these ethnographic methods rank higher in the data 
collection strategy.  
Furthermore, the fact that the thesis was co-financed by Neighbourhood 
Development could also have affected informants’ perception concerning my role in 
the process and my credibility as a researcher. However, even though future studies 
should avoid this financial problem if possible, it remains a challenge to appear 
unbiased in the eyes of collaborators when studying bottom-up leadership, since 
researchers most likely will have to spend a considerable amount of time in the 
company of the bottom-up leadership professionals, unless other methods are 
applied that require less fieldwork.  
   
 FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDAS 8.3
In this section, I identify three research agendas.  
Theoretically, I have in this thesis identified several future research agendas. 
Concerning bottom-up leadership, Chapter 2 describes discrete steps in my theory 
building strategy. Hence, it is possible to look at these steps and make other 
interpretations concerning theory building. For instance, Sandford Borins’ research 
could be interpreted in other ways; or other concepts could be deployed for a 
theoretical interpretation. More specifically, I have in Chapter 2 emphasized that the 
relationship between utilisation of uncertainty and stabilisation is the main 
conceptual challenge for leadership concepts of collaborative innovation. I have 
argued that the concept of uncertainty warrants further theoretical developments 
given a context of collaborative innovation. This could inspire future leadership 
conceptions. Another research agenda concerning collaborative innovation 
leadership in general is to focus more on the aspect of the social construction of 
leadership.  
Empirically, it is necessary with more research concerning bottom-up leadership 
deploying the BUCIL model. First of all, other analytical approaches can be applied, 
such as narrative analyses. This could further contribute to a discussion of whether 
the BUCIL framework is appropriate for cross-case comparisons, or whether other 
causal relations or variables should be applied. Future studies should also consider 
deploying the BUCIL model more narrowly, such as mainly focusing on a single 
causal relationship of the model, enhancing the literature studies concerning the 
chosen causality. 
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Another research agenda is to deploy the BUCIL model in other contexts and/or 
related to other wicked problems. A relevant research agenda is to test the BUCIL 
model in a setting in which the central conflicts were located outside a public 
authority context, for instance, if bottom-up leadership in a public agency or 
municipality engaged with civil society and/or private sector stakeholders. Would 
this different context trigger other leadership dilemmas? It would also be highly 
relevant to deploy the BUCIL model in a setting in which another wicked problem 
was the objective of the collaborative innovation project. Would another wicked 
problem require other institutional design ‘dichotomies’ to be overcome than the 
‘central-local dichotomy’ (Fung, 2004) identified in this thesis?  
Finally, concerning future research agendas in a broader perspective, BUCIL studies 
can benefit from being located within other research fields besides collaborative 
innovation leadership. Starting from the level of practice and to the abstract level, 
this study can benefit from being more thoroughly compared to other types of 
leadership conceptions of area-based programs, for instance area-based leadership 
(Hambleton & Howard, 2010). This study can also be compared to leadership of 
other types of wicked problems (Beinecke, 2009). And furthermore, the study can 
contribute to, and benefit from, being localised within coordination studies (Jennings 
Jr & Krane, 1994; Jennings Jr & Ewalt, 1998; Peters, 1998; Reff Pedersen, Sehested, 
& Sørensen, 2011), especially concerning how coordination can be achieved across 
organisations by means of certain leadership designs, and to engage in the debate of 
how we should perceive value-contributing coordination efforts. For as this study 
shows, doubts of the collaborative value are in fact not only an a priori, theoretically 
constructed process characteristic concerning how to navigate in innovation 
processes; it is also related to the entire innovation project launched in The City of 
Copenhagen that argues that a specific collaborative framework will result in value 
in terms of increased coordination among sector-specific programs and policies.  
That implies that the study can contribute with empirical results concerning the 
value of coordination efforts, and whether to perceive these merely as instances of 
moments in which collaborative decision making is possible (Reff Pedersen et al., 
2011), or whether inter-organisational coordination is an end-state that can achieved 
(Peters, 1998). Further studies of collaborative innovation leadership may also focus 
more narrowly on the institutional consequences, given either the bottom-up or top-
down origin of collaborative innovation journeys. Further, this study demonstrates 
how some institutional design properties, focused on more effectively integrating the 
local and the central level of governance (Fung, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003; 
Sirianni, 2009) are actually constructed through struggles of meaning across 
organisations.  
Now, concerning the more theoretical discussions of bottom-up leadership for 
collaborative innovations, it would be fruitful to conduct literature studies of 
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different theoretical bottom-up approaches to managing change across organisations 
and the institutional ramifications. Other approaches have the ’from the small to the 
grand’ metaphorical causality as explored in this study, as demonstrated by the 
discourse approach taken in this thesis (Phillips et al., 2004). This is also true of an 
approach such as institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 
2009). Finally, I believe this study and the results can contribute further to the 
theoretical approaches to the on-going discussion of the social construction of 
leadership (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010), especially because both collaborative 
innovation and wicked problems are context factors that actually create a demand 
for a construction of such a leadership.  
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 
This thesis opened with a puzzle: How can new forms of public leadership 
contribute to solving complex problems in today’s welfare societies through 
innovation? Empirically I have studied a central-administrative, ongoing 
development process in The City of Copenhagen from 2009-2012. The aim of the 
development process was to increase the coordination of area-based municipal 
activities in disadvantaged neighbourhoods through collaboration across 
administrations and across municipal and social housing organisations. The main 
challenge related to this ‘wicked problem’ of disadvantaged city districts is to 
overcome the ‘local-central dichotomy’ (Fung, 2004) between neighbourhoods and 
sector-divided municipal administrations. Accordingly, my objective has been to 
produce theoretical and empirical research knowledge of how leadership displayed 
in the case study can be conceptualized and analysed within the research agenda of 
collaborative innovation in the public sector (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011).   
I pursue this objective by making two contributions, a theoretical and an empirical. 
Theoretically the thesis provides an answer to the following research question: How 
to theorise a bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation in a public 
sector addressing wicked problems? Empirically the thesis provide an answer to the 
following research question: How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed 
through processes of recognition in a collaborative innovation process in the public 
sector addressing wicked problems? 
 
Theoretical problems of collaborative innovation: Undifferentiated leadership 
conceptions  
The main theoretical challenge that drives theory development in the research field 
of collaborative innovation is the following: to conceptualise a balance between 
stabilising a collaborative configuration, on the one hand, and de-stabilising parts of 
the collaborative configuration, on the other hand, in order to utilise uncertainty. 
Conceptions of leadership have to pay attention to this fundamental, conceptual 
challenge and to explore it creatively.  
New conceptions of leadership should pay attention to some specific design 
demands that can be used as an inspiration for such a conceptual exploration. First 
of all, to consider drawing on other theories than network governance. Further, to 
investigate both advantages and disadvantages of bottom-up, top-down and lateral 
innovations. These advantages should be related to different types of innovation, 
adopting a process perspective of the innovation journey. New conceptions of 
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leadership should also pay attention to both initial conditions as well as the outcome 
of these various innovation conditions, in terms of explaining how an innovation 
emerges, how innovation is sustained and diffused. Finally leadership conceptions 
need to conceptualise the distinctive collaborative dimension of related to 
innovation that penetrates the boundaries of involved organisations. Accordingly, 
novel leadership conceptions need to step beyond hierarchical models; this enables 
these novel leadership conceptions to explain how to nurture innovation climates, to 
explain how policy makers and managers can work together, and to explain how far 
leadership is distributed within and across organisations.  
The present leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation in the public sector 
are undifferentiated. These conceptions are mainly tied to leadership of networked 
governance. Network governance as a leadership approach has the objective of 
stabilizing arenas of interaction through facilitation. This conception is indeed 
highly relevant and consistent; network governance as a foundation for 
conceptualising a balance between stabilisation and de-stabilisation in a context of 
collaborative innovation provides researchers with the advantage of drawing on a 
vast amount of research, related to a number of different, well-defined schools 
related to network governance (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Sørensen & Torfing, 
2007; Torfing, 2013).   
However, the network governance based conceptions are most suitable for analysing 
collaborative innovation leadership in empirical settings where powerful decision 
makers within their own organisations take on leadership. In order to open up for the 
theoretical production of new leadership conceptions that do not fit this empirical 
setting, I discuss the differences that do exist among the leadership conceptions. I do 
so by emphasising a juxtaposition of Sandford Borins’ (Borins, 2002) empirical 
descriptions of ‘bottom-up innovation leadership’ with the network governance 
based leadership conceptions.  
The reason for the choice of this juxtaposition is first of all the above mentioned 
research recommendations; among other issues, Sandford Borins’ empirical 
descriptions stimulates a theory building that allows conceptions not drawing on 
network governance, that display  advantages and disadvantages of bottom-up 
innovations, and that relates innovation to a process perspective. Second, Sandford 
Borins’ notion of bottom-up innovation leadership has intriguing aspects that 
stimulate a theory building. These intriguing aspects are that bottom-up driven 
innovations require and create leadership, and in so doing bottom-up leadership 
creates an informal or alternative leadership structure. What characterises such 
leadership is that it has close ties to, or a located on, the front lines or in middle 
management. Further, the aim of these innovations is to either support already 
defined goals, or to generate new initiatives that politicians are willing to embrace as 
their own. Third, Borins’ descriptions explains the observations that I made of the 
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development process in the City of Copenhagen better than the current, network 
governance based conceptions of leadership.  In the studied process the innovation is 
initiated at the bottom of a central organisation in a profession-based office with no 
prior experience of initiating cross-organisational, political and strategic 
development processes.  
The juxtaposition of Borins’ leadership descriptions and current leadership 
conceptions implicates the identification of four discussion points. These discussion 
points are of a general character that can guide the theory building of new leadership 
forms.  
The first discussion point that such juxtaposition reveals is whether leadership 
should be predefined or whether leadership should be perceived of as a process 
achievement. All leadership conceptions of collaborative innovation with the 
exception of Borins’ assume that a formally appointed leadership is present to begin 
with when initiating an innovation, and that such leadership perceives of itself as 
leadership and is perceived as such by collaborators. However, these assumptions 
should be questioned. In fact, collaboration, innovation and wicked problems are all 
context factors that I suggest calls for the exact opposite image of leadership. What 
in my interpretation defines all of these context factors is uncertainty: Uncertainty of 
roles, of identities, of strategic aims, of whether the innovation generates value, of 
organisational boundaries, of the character of relations between organisations. 
Uncertainty as a condition enables another perspective than what currently 
dominates collaborative innovation in which uncertainty at the outset is framed and 
delimited. Uncertainty has the ability of enabling a questioning of everything that is 
taken for granted in organisations. The uncertainties that I identify as crucial in 
relation to collaborative innovation is wicked-problem uncertainty (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004) and innovation uncertainty (Van de Ven, 1999).  These uncertainties 
have potentially the force to momentarily question the taken-for-granted 
organisational environment of collaborators and leadership, forcing everyone to 
iteratively answer some radical questions: “who are we, and what are we in fact 
doing”? As a result, if we assume that leadership is not defined to begin with, this 
discussion point opens up for a process concept of leadership, since such a process 
can take into consideration issues of uncertainty, an uncertainty that encompasses 
both innovation project and the identity of leadership.  
The second discussion point concerns the position of power. This discussion point 
reveals that leadership and power are closely interwoven, and that the leadership 
position of current collaborative innovation leadership conceptions implicitly 
provides leadership with a steady mandate throughout all innovation phases, hence 
also provides such leadership access to a specific range of  leadership tools to 
deploy. However, bottom-up leadership has not access to such a steady, top down 
mandate. On the contrary, bottom-up leadership initiates a collaborative innovation 
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journey with only an unsteady, brittle, stop-and-go mandate. Consequently, the 
game of power is always open for bottom-up leadership and therefore much more 
all-encompassing, since a mandate has to be acquired, sustained and defended 
throughout all innovation phases. Accordingly, bottom-up leadership has not access 
to steady-mandate leadership tools. As a result, the tools for influence for bottom-up 
leadership have to be theorised in another way, albeit still being able to strike a 
balance between stability and de-stability in order to utilise uncertainty.   
The third discussion point is: What generates novelty? In network governance based 
conceptions of collaborative innovation leadership, leadership and novelty is 
seemingly separated. It is assumed that collaborators through their interaction 
generate novelty. However, this scenario is only possible because leadership power 
is deployed in a way that establishes a defining framework for the collaboration. 
This condition thereby ensures that a steady mandate of collaborative interaction is 
present. Accordingly, leadership and novelty is actually not separated, but the 
leadership-novelty relation is made and enacted before the innovation cycle is 
initiated; this enactment is what defines the scope and the sectorial and institutional 
framing of the collaborative novelty-generating exercise.  
By contrast,  for bottom-up leadership, I have shown that leadership and novelty is 
intimately interwoven in a different way: bottom-up leadership generates a new idea, 
but since the power position is weak, the framing ability for bottom-up leadership is 
not possible; hence, the boundaries of such an innovation project is much more 
blurry, since the type of innovation and its level of implementation is emerging in 
the innovation process. This is both a valuable source of further novelty creation and 
development, but also a source of collaborative instability and doubt about bottom-
up leadership’s dependability.    
The fourth discussion concerns what types of problems that leadership conceptions 
are adapted to? I find that although the literature mentions wicked problems, ill-
defined problems and tame problems, the leadership frameworks do not distinguish 
between these problem types. Network governance conceptions generate the image 
that leadership owns and controls crucial parts of inter-organisational infrastructure. 
In other words, current leadership conceptions seem to suggest that leadership has 
the power to define meaningful frameworks for solving wicked problems. This 
degree of governmental control over problem-definition and -solution clashes with 
research in wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) and is a highly dubious 
assumption.  
The consequence of not tailoring leadership conceptions to specific problem types 
has the consequence that the leadership challenge towards wicked problems are 
conceptualised as less contentious than these problems are. Leadership conceptions 
of collaborative innovation risk operating with a vertical image of power structure 
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and problem definition that is not useful when analysing wicked problems. Current 
leadership conceptions are most suitable for deployment in that political or 
administrative phase in which powerful stakeholders have already detected that there 
is a wicked problem, and under what sector-based hierarchy the solution to such a 
problem should be placed. 
On the basis of this discussion, I find that the following crucial elements should 
guide theory building in order to contribute to leadership differentiations related to 
collaborative innovation: To conceptualise leadership as a process phenomenon, 
related to leadership making and related identity issues; to develop a new conception 
of influence and power for bottom-up leadership, tailored  to conditions of inferior 
hierarchical power position, taking into account the condition of an unsteady 
mandate; to pay attention to initial conditions of leadership positions - leadership 
and the relationship to what it is that generates novelty is intimately related to 
position of power and the ability to exercise such power; to conceptualise a 
leadership approach that can explicitly take into account a wicked problem type.  
Interpreting Sandford Borins’ concept of bottom-up leadership critically inspires a 
theoretical re-interpretation of how bottom-up leadership can be analysed within an 
explicit collaborative innovation research agenda in which the aim is to address a 
wicked problem. Is such an exercise even possible for bottom-up leadership? 
Inspired by the development process in the City of Copenhagen the answer to this 
question is definitely affirmative, since bottom-up leadership in that case managed 
do muster collaborative support for dealing with the wicked problem of 
disadvantaged city districts, despite lack of training in collaborative innovation 
leadership, and despite an inferior power position and an unsteady mandate.   
Inspired by this development process, I find that the following six analytical 
concepts can be consistently combined in order to enable researchers to analyse how 
bottom-up leadership is exercised in a collaborative configuration that seeks to deal 
with a wicked problem through innovation:  
- Process- and end-point uncertainty (Van de Ven, 1999) and wicked 
problem uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) 
- The social construction of leadership, conceptualized as leadership 
emergence through the concept of ‘recognition’ (Griffin, 2002)  
- Public Entrepreneurship (Klein, 2010) 
- Sensemaking (Weick, 1995) 
- Giving sense (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) 
- Leadership distribution  
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Uncertainty is fundamental in the theory building of this thesis. Theorising bottom-
up leadership by means of uncertainty enables import of core elements of wicked-
problem research and innovation research. Wicked problems by definition require 
collaboration, so my theory building ensures that a collaborative aspect is 
maintained in theory development. Uncertainty further satisfies conceptual design 
demands described above. In order to differentiate leadership conceptions for 
collaborative innovation, causal relations between leadership, power position and 
novelty should be reworked. Uncertainty is consistent with a process perspective on 
leadership as it allows for an informal, yet strategic and intentional, process 
perspective on power of influence. Uncertainty explains how the relation between 
novelty and leadership is reconceptualised: Uncertainty enables a theoretical 
explanation of novelty creation that emerges in a process through acts of 
construction and interpretation in radical change processes, as well as an increased 
power base.  
The social construction of leadership is conceptualized by means of Griffin’s 
concept of leadership emergence (Griffin, 2002). Leadership emerges in conditions 
of uncertainty through social processes of recognition. Leadership emergence is a 
suggestion for a post-structural, relational, theoretical explanation of bottom-up 
leadership: how leadership is being made and exercised at the same time. 
Furthermore, my positioning of leadership recognition as a relational leadership 
theory approach (Uhl-Bien, 2006) enables me to define bottom-up leadership in a 
demarcated, yet relational, way: As the group of persons belonging to the 
professional unit that produces the innovation project in focus. This definition also 
allows for immediate superiors to be included in the bottom-up leadership unit, 
insofar as they contribute to leadership and innovation project development on the 
basis of a profession-based insight. Leadership is something that is spread out, but 
only in the profession-based unit that develops the innovative solution. In this thesis, 
I interpret and define leadership recognition within a micro- and action based 
approach to discourse analysis (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004). Consequently, I 
define leadership recognition as follows: Leadership recognition in the context of 
collaborative innovation is acquired when the introduction of your discourse of 
change reaches such a momentum that your emergent leadership and discourse 
cannot be ignored, but are reckoned with, perhaps appreciated, in the strategic power 
games within and between organisations. 
  
Profession based, public entrepreneurship is my conceptualisation of Borins’ (2002) 
notion of ‘bottom-up’. This concept is crucial: It signifies both the point of departure 
of the innovation and it defines the character of the innovation: Entrepreneurship is a 
type of action that bottom-up leadership will have to display in order to emerge as a 
leader. The emerging bottom-up leadership has the advantage of consisting of 
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professionals and perhaps an immediate superior with specialised competences 
within a given service, program or policy field. These members of such a specialised 
unit know where there is a performance gap (Klein, 2010) and have ideas about 
which creative organisational connections to make in order to deal with a wicked 
problem. In order to allow for a detailed analysis between novelty generation and 
leadership emergence I separate leadership and entrepreneurship. Hence, I define 
entrepreneurship as a function fulfilled by 1) bottom-up leadership who 2) acts 
proactively in environments of uncertainty 3) by combining new or already existing 
resources, 4) in order for them to be deployed for a perceived better performance on 
public objectives.    
Sensemaking is a basic social condition in radical change processes (Weick, 1995). 
Sensemaking enables the involved parties to address the uncertainties associated 
with a collaborative innovation project addressing a wicked problem. Sensemaking 
as concept draws on a theoretical approach not conceptualised in network 
governance approaches. Consequently, adopting a sensemaking perspective to 
bottom-up leadership provides the theoretical framework with a perspective on 
collaborative innovation processes, in which both leadership and collaborators are 
caught up in emerging, unpredictable processes. Sensemaking opens up for analyses 
of processes in which the relations between leadership, collaborators and innovation 
project are less clear-cut and defined than what network governance-inspired 
leadership approaches suggest. Collaborative innovation processes are highly 
strategic, but they are strategic processes conditioned by uncertainty and ambiguity.  
Accordingly, actors and their interests are in such an analysis perceived of as being 
fluent and malleable.     
Giving sense (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) captures the strategic and intentional 
elements bottom-up leadership. Giving sense addresses an unclear aspect of Borins’ 
notion of ‘informal’ leadership structures. When uncertainty engulfs all involved 
collaborators it is possible for collaborators to influence each other’s sensemaking. 
Giving sense illustrates how it is possible for bottom-up leadership to actually 
exercise influence by directing the sensemaking processes of collaborators in order 
to acquire high-level support. Making and giving sense is a sort of influence which 
is able to spread across organizations despite an inferior bureaucratic power 
position.  
Leadership distribution as a concept is generated out of a need of emphasising a 
defined output in the otherwise iterative processes of leadership making. The sole 
purpose of bottom-up leadership is to make decision makers embrace the innovation 
as their own. Leadership distribution captures this vertical support. Leadership 
distribution can have several outputs: it can be consolidated within one organisation, 
or it can be distributed, because also collaborators embrace the innovation project as 
their own. Each of these outputs enables analysis of why a specifically exercised 
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bottom-up leadership results in distinct innovation sustainability and innovation 
diffusion.  
Many of the above mentioned organisational phenomena occur simultaneously and 
in an iterative fashion. Accordingly, I disentangle these phenomena causally in order 
to allow analyses in which each phenomenon can be causally put in relation to 
bottom-up leadership and the innovation of a wicked problem through collaborative 
innovation. I do this by means of an analytical model called ‘BUCIL’ (an 
abbreviation of ‘Bottom-Up Collaborative Innovation Leadership’). Modelling 
iterative causalities facilitates future analyses of bottom-up leadership in which 
narrow analyses can be made by focusing only on a single causality in the analytical 
model.   
Accordingly, in order to enhance the analytical focus of the BUCIL model, each of 
the proposed analytical concepts as well as the model in itself are discussed 
critically, qualifying further aspects of theory building and the interaction of the 
concepts in relation to the BUCIL model. What is especially important in these 
discussions is clarifying causally how leadership is related to public 
entrepreneurship and making and giving sense, and how the presence of wicked 
problem uncertainty and innovation journey uncertainty provides an opportunity for 
leadership to emerge and exercise its influence simultaneously.   
This discussion underpinning the concepts in the analytical model and the 
interactions of the model allows me to define Bottom-up collaborative innovation 
leadership (‘BUCIL’) as follows:  
I define bottom-up leadership of collaborative innovation as 1) an intentional 
process aimed at the generation and implementation of new ideas in a specific 
context 2) initiated at the bottom of a public sector organisation requiring that the 3) 
lead unit responsible is able to gain influence through leadership recognition, which 
is conditioned by 4) utilisation of uncertainty through skills of public 
entrepreneurship, sensemaking and giving sense.  
The BUCIL model is adapted to a collaborative innovation context, as it recognises 
the uncertainty that essentially characterizes innovative solutions to wicked 
problems by means of collaborative resources. The key concepts of the analytical 
model are selected because they are theoretically based on an assumption of change 
in uncertain environments. Having the innovation uncertainty and the wicked-
problem uncertainty as a guide for theory building it is ensured the analytical model 
can be used to analyse collaborative innovation processes in a way that 
acknowledges how conditions of uncertainty enable and restraint bottom-up 
leadership.  
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To sum up my theoretical contribution: I contribute to the differentiation of 
leadership conceptions for collaborative innovation. I first of all theorise a new type 
of leadership. I find that specific uncertainty-related aspects of collaborative 
innovation leadership have not been addressed in the literature so far: The social 
construction of leadership related to the way that the conceptual balance between 
stabilisation and the utilisation of uncertainty is conceptualised. For bottom-up 
leadership, stabilisation is ensured by making and giving sense to collaborators, 
thereby utilising uncertainty. Stabilisation is also ensured by the fact that bottom-up 
leadership is flexible leadership that through iterative social constructions adapts to 
a collaborative, political, public sector context, in which uncertainty generates 
conflicts and demands for answers.  
 
Leadership construction for disadvantaged city districts in The City of Copenhagen: 
Overcoming the local-central dichotomy by means of cross-administrative 
coordination 
The analytical model produced in this thesis enables me to make an empirical 
contribution to the research field of collaborative innovation. I do so by answering 
the question: How is bottom-up leadership socially constructed through processes of 
collaborative recognition in an innovation process in the public sector that deals 
with wicked problems? 
The bottom-up leadership of Neighbourhood Development in the first embedded 
case has been going through a development from a position as ‘value-based 
implementer’ in 2008 to a position of a ‘developing coordinator’ in 2010. I 
summarise this positional development by means of four abstract leadership 
dilemmas:  
 
1. How to strike a balance between horizontal and vertical organisational 
structures? 
2. How to integrate development and day-to-day operations in such a way that 
development work still remains? 
3. How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and 
direction while at the same time satisfying demands of co-creation and 
influence?  
4. How to satisfy collaborative demands of a clear leadership position and 
direction while at the same time running an innovation process requiring 
shifts of direction due to uncertainty and adaptation? 
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In the second analysis (2010-2012) of the social construction of leadership, I 
focused on how ND was given responsibility for formulating a cross-administrative 
policy for area-based programs in disadvantaged areas. In this phase, ND moved 
towards a new leadership position in 2012: from a ‘developing coordinator’ to 
‘strategic implementer’.   
In this analysis, I found that the following three leadership dilemmas have been the 
driving force of the positioning of ND’s leadership, from developing coordinator to 
strategic implementer:  
5. How to integrate innovation and coordination? 
6. How can it be avoided that ND’s innovation project and leadership are 
positioned as remote and centralistic? 
7. How to avoid being positioned as an unstable, inconsistent leader, who both 
wants to operate a meta-policy and at the same time develop new 
initiatives? 
 
These findings concerning leadership dilemmas reveal that we see a positional 
development that has a specific character for bottom-up leadership studied, in terms 
of establishing–influencing–mainstreaming. This positional development is made 
visible by having two cases, each located in a different phase of positional 
development. First the leadership has to be established, then influence can be 
increasingly exercised. Subsequently, the space of further development has to be 
delimited and finally shut down; this enables the innovation project to be 
mainstreamed in the strategic-political organisational context.  
These certain dilemmas, revealed by the analysis, are of a character that other 
bottom-up leaderships should keep in mind as they display a range of choices that 
the emergent leadership has, concerning the interplay of innovation project re-
development and options of leadership positioning. 
What bottom-up leadership should pay attention to is that the dilemmas truly are 
dilemmas in the sense that each choice has its disadvantages.  In this respect, the 
study demonstrates the close relation between stabilisation and uncertainty:  
stabilisation of the collaborative configuration may come at the cost of further 
utilisation of uncertainty and vice versa. Risk-taking and tactical choices, informed 
by sensemaking of own leadership identity, are crucial aspects for bottom-up 
leadership in terms of leadership positioning. The study demonstrates that 
Neighbourhood Development has opted for the maximum scope of the project 
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through a certain response to each of the leadership dilemmas. As the analysis of a 
policy formulation process demonstrate, Neighbourhood Development has some 
choices in terms of positioning ‘Policy for Disadvantaged Areas’: should it be  a 
cross-administrative meta-policy, or a more modest policy, that enhances existing 
policies that also seek to enhance cross-sectorial problem solving? As a consequence 
of ND’s alliances and tactical choices, the Policy takes on the administrative 
function of a new coordinative centre. This is risky approach that results in a lack of 
leadership distribution horizontally. Neighbourhood Development at the end of the 
case study becomes aware of a collaborative demand for a closure of further 
developments. Accordingly, opting for maximum scope has the implication of a 
discursive positioning of innovation project and leadership as centralistic, 
administrative and huge. Accordingly, ND as leadership has to adapt to this 
consequence in order not to be perceived of as inconsistent. 
The study demonstrates that bottom-up leadership may perceive it as worth the risk 
of expanding the range of sense giving activities, since it provides bottom-up 
leadership with the possibility of generating great value; but this possibility may run 
the risk of expanding the scope of the project to such a volume, that the ownership 
to the project is being reduced. This is because the innovation project remains 
trapped too long in a development phase, making the collaborative system exhausted 
and impatient before the project enters the value-generating phase of implementation 
and dissemination.   
Another important finding in relation to dilemmas and bottom-up leadership is that 
the study has provided an enhanced understanding of bottom-up leadership’s 
organisational function in a collaborative innovation context. On the basis of the 
analyses in this theses, bottom-up leadership is a flexible form of leadership, that in 
a very agile way navigates and tailors a profession-based innovative idea to a 
collaborative, political-strategic context, by making alliances and mobilising and 
utilising already existing organisational discourses. The on-going social 
constructionist nature of the leadership enables this flexibility. Bottom-up leadership 
adapts its own identity as well as its project in iterative processes between making 
sense, giving sense, experiencing resistance. Bottom-up leadership uses these 
iterative processes of leadership construction to inform new actions of 
entrepreneurship, combining organisational resources in new ways, within the 
evolving interpretation of its own profession.  
Accordingly, another important finding of this study is more detailed knowledge 
about what distinguishes this leadership from other collaborative innovation 
leaderships in terms of flexibility. Flexibility is founded on the fact that an 
aggregated profession-based insight is maintained throughout the entire innovation 
process, providing a reservoir for making sense of the collaborative environment, 
consequently enabling bottom-up leadership to make sense of the collaborative 
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environment in a consistent way. This reservoir for sensemaking is what provides 
bottom-up leadership with a flexibility that is also strategic: the aggregated 
profession-based insight functions as a safe-guard against the risk of being paralyzed 
by uncertainty and ensures consistency in sensemaking processes. This is clearly 
demonstrated in this study, in which the cross-disciplinary element of the area-based 
program-profession is used as a platform for arguing that administrative structures 
should be aligned with the local insights that this profession has of the complex 
character of disadvantaged areas. This insight in a wicked problem is made sense of, 
carving out niches in the political-strategic environment and adapting leadership and 
innovation project to these niches.  
Accordingly, a related finding is that the sense made is contained by bottom-up 
leadership throughout the entire collaborative innovation process. What the 
implication of this flexibility is in a long-term, institutional perspective is an 
empirical question: Is it possible to embed all the sense made by bottom-up 
leadership in the discursive fabric of the collaborative configuration? Is this type of 
embeddedness even tactically desirable for the bottom-up driven innovation project 
in terms of diffusion and leadership distribution?    
What the leadership dilemmas also reflect is that a progressing dialectical 
relationship exists between two crucial aspects of the bottom-up leadership’s profile 
in an organisational perspective: an entrepreneurial function and a leadership 
function. These functions perceived within a discourse analytical perspective 
denotes both an emergent discourse and a related subject position. The relation 
between these elements is up to the emergent leadership to develop, define and 
choose. Accordingly, in a discourse perspective, bottom-up leadership has a high 
degree of control concerning the continual expansion of the leitmotifs of the 
profession based innovation project. However, the more bottom-up leadership 
continues to expand and develop the organisational discourse (by means of 
entrepreneurship), the more collaborators are growing impatient, since this continual 
development blocks for the collaborative adoption and mainstreaming of the 
innovation project. Bottom-up leadership should carefully consider the balance of 
these functions, since collaborators assumably grow weary of new developments 
before bottom-up leadership does. This balance is, of course, dependent on the 
character of leadership distribution; a high degree of leadership distribution could 
allow for further expansion of discourse, if collaborators can make sense of this 
expansion as something that produces ‘collaborative turf’ (Bardach, 1996). 
     
The two analyses compaired contribute with knowledge concerning the iterative 
relationship between entrepreneurship, leadership position, sensemaking and 
discursive influence.  
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As seen in the first embedded case, the leadership sets out on the entrepreneurial, 
profession based platform, and it is this platform that dominates part of the first 
phase. However, this platform moves with new insights and when the innovation 
project faces resistance. Accordingly, when bottom-up leadership insist on the merit 
of the innovation project, but suddenly alters the project as a consequence of a 
necessary adjustment of leadership and trial-and-error feedback related to the 
innovation project, leadership appears fragile and inconsistent. This increases the 
potential for conflict. Accordingly, bottom-up leadership has to accept that it faces a 
radical identity transformation and leadership maturation in the beginning of an 
innovation journey, in which the leadership moves from a profession-based unit to 
being a full-blown, collaborative leadership unit. This transformation involves all 
members of the unit, since these professionals suddenly change status from having 
an intra-organisational identity within a defined, sector-based remit to an inter-
organisational leadership identity, in which they are carriers of an unfinished 
innovation project that requires of them to defend, explain and disseminate the 
project in inter-organisational interactions. This could be experienced as something 
of a shock for the emergent leadership.  
In the second embedded case, the overall positional development towards 
mainstreaming demonstrates in my interpretation that there is a limit to how long a 
collaborative configuration can tolerate being in a development phase.  But the 
dilemma does also point to a limit for how many chains of interactions bottom-up 
leadership can maintain in order to keep winning the organisational battles for 
meaning. In continuation of this point, the leadership dilemmas do also point to a 
limit of how complex chains of making and giving sense that can be communicated: 
as the process unfolds, the history of the process grows, and so there is an 
increasingly complex story to be told to collaborators, concerning ‘who we are, and 
what we are doing’.  
Further, as the second embedded case demonstrates, network relations have to be 
sustained at different levels of interaction, both at the central-administrative level 
and at the local level. According to collaborators, vital stakeholders want to be 
included more in the innovation project; accordingly, network relations have to be 
further expanded. This is why the analysis demonstrates an enhanced leadership 
differentiation within the Neighbourhood Development office. So, in the middle of 
this huge web of interactions, the bottom-up leadership faces the challenges of 
collaborative demands for answers; of leadership expectations; of bureaucratic 
dissatisfaction from intermediate levels of the organisation as well as local 
politicians not included in the innovation; of difficulties of maintaining support for 
the innovation project – in the middle of all these interactions we find the bottom-up 
leadership.  
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This image that the analyses of the social construction of leadership conjure is that 
of a construction constantly tinkered with, built by bottom-up leadership, having a 
constant need for being glued together by means of giving sense and providing 
answers and maintaining alliances to decisionmakers. Accordingly, this image 
demonstrates yet a further important finding concerning the organisational function 
of bottom-up leadership in collaborative innovation: To perform as a container of all 
the sense made during the contentious and confusing innovation process. The 
collaborative push towards mainstreaming and formalisation of the innovation 
project seemingly solves this network-problem functionally by substituting the need 
for making and giving sense with formalised bureaucratic power.  
So, at some point, bottom-up leadership has to make a decision concerning whether 
to continue outlining new development terrain or whether instead enhance its 
leadership in terms of generating value that collaborators can rely on. At some point 
collaborators will demand a value-demonstrating realization of the innovation 
project. This is why Neighbourhood Development moves towards a strategic 
leadership position, ‘strategic’ symbolising a closure of development and an 
enhancement of predictable elements of leadership profile. In this case value for 
collaborators is specific projects within the meta-political framework, projects that 
can be exchanged to political or administrative capital, as well as an administrative, 
managerial stabilisation. Ultimately, the positional development trajectory towards a 
‘strategic implementer’ position signifies the fractures that arise when the innovation 
project leader is initiating the delivery of the innovation project from an informal 
bottom-up leadership position to a formal bureaucratic leadership.   
 
Future research agendas 
I identify three research agendas. Theoretically the relationship between utilisation 
of uncertainty and stabilisation is the main conceptual challenge for leadership 
concepts of collaborative innovation. The concept of uncertainty warrants further 
theoretical developments given a context of collaborative innovation. Future 
research should focus more on the aspect of the social construction of leadership. 
Empirically, it is necessary with more research concerning bottom-up leadership 
deploying the BUCIL model. Other analytical approaches than discourse theory can 
be applied. Future studies should also consider deploying the BUCIL model more 
narrowly, focusing on a single causal relationship of the model, enhancing the 
literature studies concerning the chosen causality. What this study especially calls 
for is the aftermath of bottom-up leadership innovations: what happens when such 
an innovation project is being mainstreamed and when all the contained sense is 
substituted with formal arrangements? Can empowered bottom-up leadership co-
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exist with bureaucratic power structures? Further, the BUCIL model should also be 
deployed in other contexts and/or related to other wicked problems.  
Finally, concerning future research agendas in a broader perspective, BUCIL studies 
can benefit from being located within other research fields besides collaborative 
innovation leadership, such as being compared to other types of leadership for 
wicked problems; or bottom-up leadership can contribute to coordination studies 
concerning how coordination can be achieved across organisations by means of 
certain leadership designs. As this study shows, doubts of the collaborative value are 
related to the entire innovation project that assumes that value will be gained in 
terms of increased coordination among sector-specific programs and policies. 
Accordingly, bottom-up leadership studies in a wicked problem context can 
contribute with empirical results concerning the long-term value of coordination 
efforts: whether to perceive these merely as instances of moments in which 
collaborative decision making is possible (Reff Pedersen et al., 2011), or whether 
inter-organisational coordination is an end-state (Peters, 1998) that can actually be 
achieved and sustained.    
It would also be fruitful to conduct literature studies of different theoretical bottom-
up approaches to managing change across organisations and the institutional 
ramifications. Other approaches have the ’from the small to the grand’ causality, 
such as institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009). Finally, I believe this 
study and the results can contribute further to the theoretical approaches to the on-
going discussion of the social construction of leadership (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010), 
since both collaborative innovation and wicked problems are context factors that 
create a demand for such a leadership.  
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The thesis investigates how new forms of public leadership can contribute to 
solving complex problems in today’s welfare societies through innovation. A 
bottom-up type of leadership for collaborative innovation addressing wicked 
problems is theorised, displaying a social constructive process approach to 
leadership; a theoretical model emphasises that leadership emerges through 
social processes of recognition. Leadership is recognised by utilising the 
uncertainty of a wicked problem and innovation to influence collaborators’ 
sensemaking processes. The empirical setting is the City of Copenhagen 
in which a strategy- and policy-making process is launched by a handful 
of professionals and a middle-manager with an in-depth knowledge of ar-
ea-based planning programs in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The objec-
tive is increased coordination across municipal administrations and social 
housing organizations. A crucial condition for success is iterative leadership 
adaptation. In conclusion, the thesis finds that specialized professionals are 
indeed able to develop politically viable, innovative and collaborative solu-
tions to wicked problems; and that such professionals are able to transform 
themselves into an actual, yet temporary, leadership, fully able to navigate 
the uncertainties and conflicts that characterise large political organisations. 
